Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon language(written or spoken). — creativesoul
I still disagree, but I'm starting understand why...I think. To dodge a bit of confusion, I'm reading [absolute, infallible, ontic, ideal, and objective] knowledge to be the same thing. — Cheshire
I disagree that it is a problem to not know when our knowledge infallible, so I don't see any reason to subscribe to the notion we can't have it — Cheshire
I'm reading "operationally" to mean subjectively or non-ideal; Really, the above sounds contradictory even though I'm pretty certain it isn't intended to be read that way. It's the "..so objectively true" that I'm confused about. — Cheshire
1. A person may know something objectively true and objectively know when they know it is objectively true. — Cheshire
2. You can not 'subjectively/operationally' know when something is objectively true by definition. — Cheshire
P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not... — creativesoul
This notion of "unreflective awareness" allows and/or must admit of a creature being aware of something that it's never thought about. — creativesoul
I disagree. — Cheshire
I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
— Cheshire
The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra
Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here. — Cheshire
Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided. — javra
Enjoi your weekend, my friend. — creativesoul
False analogy. — creativesoul
So the relevant question is...
Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?
I think not. — creativesoul
There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices. — creativesoul
A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief. — creativesoul
Is referral to Reason, the Just, The Good or whatever still referral? — Πετροκότσυφας
Yeah well... without access to the details of the experiment, I cannot know if it's good quality or not. Do you have access to the details? — creativesoul
Do you agree with these two claims? — creativesoul
You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.
p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief. — creativesoul
There's a reason why psychology is called a 'soft' science, and an appeal to authority is rather unconvincing, particularly nowadays given the way science is funded... — creativesoul
Do you not even grant these points? — creativesoul
I would need to see the actual studies and experiments that these conclusions were based upon in order to offer a more informed opinion of the reliability of those conclusions. — creativesoul
In addition, you've now presented a strawman argument on multiple occasions. You've adamantly rejected things that I've not claimed. It is always better to actually present the argument and then clearly express which premisses or conclusions you disagree with and offer some valid objection for that disagreement.
I do not want to get into yet another discussion where one participant is criticizing another's position/argument without first granting the terms. That is the bane of philosophy. — creativesoul
A sure sign that we've gotten something wrong here - when discussing non linguistic thought and belief - is if and when it is too complicated. Simply put, non linguistic thought and belief cannot be that complicated. — creativesoul
I'm talking very specifically - as precisely as possible - about what it takes to become aware of one's own fallibility, which is a much 'cleaner' way to say "become aware of one's capacity to be right/wrong". — creativesoul
Dogs can also count up to four or five, said Coren. And they have a basic understanding of arithmetic and will notice errors in simple computations, such as 1+1=1 or 1+1=3. — APA
I offered an argument for the position I hold. It's been sorely neglected. That argument is based upon something very important. The distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief that the whole of philosophy has neglected to draw and maintain... — creativesoul
Uncertainty is the mechanism. It is fear based. — creativesoul
So, that's three different elemental constituents that have been identified. Namely... 1.being existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between things, 2.being meaningful, and 3.presupposing it's own correspondence. — creativesoul
Thought and belief are indistinguishable at this level. The only difference between the two happens on a metacognitive level. — creativesoul
If offering an accurate account of nonlinguistic belief by means of art, music, poetry, and/or metaphor qualifies as 'capturing nonlinguistic belief', then I may actually agree... — creativesoul
nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor. — Blue Lux
We differ remarkably regarding what an awareness of being wrong/right requires.
[...]
An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.
A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct. — creativesoul
I'm still wrapping my head around your framework... — creativesoul
I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken. — creativesoul
If we set out trust in a minimalist fashion, in order to trust without the ability to doubt, we would lose sight of all of the different situations where one deliberately does not doubt — creativesoul
Non-linguistic creatures have no choice but to 'trust' physiological sensory perception. They also 'trust' the correlations, associations, connections drawn between different 'objects' thereof and/or themselves. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content...
There is no ability to doubt it for pre-linguistic creatures. — creativesoul
I think we agree that all (reasonable/justifiable)doubt is belief-based(trust-based on your framework). It seems you've also implied that doubt is dependent upon a creature's awareness of falsity/mistake? — creativesoul
No. — creativesoul
Can one trust prior to being able to doubt? — creativesoul
Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes. — creativesoul
The wisest is who knows that he knows nothing. — Blue Lux
Once there was a man --
Oh, so wise!
In all drink
He detected the bitter,
And in all touch
He found the sting.
At last he cried thus:
"There is nothing --
No life,
No joy,
No pain --
There is nothing save opinion,
And opinion be damned." — Stephen Crane
I think that's more like a description of the jhana states of 'neither perception nor non perception' and the like, which are part of the Buddhist path, but not the final aim of it. — Wayfarer
Yes, but is the first person point of view really as it is usually characterized, or is that too a reification of an abstract conceptual understanding? — Janus
In this connection and in relation to my discussion with Wayfarer I would say that the notion of "transcendental apperception" is a very sophisticated example of an attenuated analysis founded on the notion of the subject/object divide; and not something experienced prior to it. — Janus
Agree with your analysis. — Wayfarer
So do you think Javra is saying that the unchanging unity of apperception is experientially and/or metaphysically real, as opposed to being merely a formal stipulation? — Janus
Not only physical objects are objects of experience; sensations, pains, emotions, thoughts may also be; in fact they must be objects of experience if we can speak sensibly and truly about them. — Janus
Am I somewhat uneducated then? — Posty McPostface
I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability. — Cheshire
Simply put, objective truth may be possible, but knowing when it occurs might not be. — Cheshire
Rational justification doesn't imply infallibility, so falling short of infallibility does not leave a thing unjustified. — Cheshire
And here lies the issue I have and repeat. All justification can not be said to be sufficient based on the criteria of any given audience. Can it appear as such? certainly, but this is no fault of the concept of justification. An argument can't said to be justified because of who is judging it. — Cheshire
I don't find justification to be the best measuring stick for the quality of knowledge. So, I'm a bit indifferent to how well somethings been justified. I would rather know that it had been criticized and remained unfalsified. — Cheshire
No, I probably could try to; but I was alluding to the third law of thought. "What is, is." The fact you posses an unknown error in your knowledge is simply a matter of being human subject to error. — Cheshire
I'm really just skipping the middle man and suggesting our definition of knowledge falls short of reality. Because either our apprehension of what is true or our justification for what is true will be subject to error so long as we are human. I think we nearly agree. — Cheshire
Don't you have to torture the meaning of "justified" in order to maintain this position?" By saying to the satisfaction of its bearers" it seems to erase justification's implied rational characteristics. — Cheshire
And the result of this trespass is a new variable. The 'Grounding'; which feels nice intuitively, but have we solved a problem here or created one? What does a belief alone mean to us now? The answers given randomly to binary questions, but held without discern-able reason?
No sir, you put justification back where you found it and play with your own toys. — Cheshire
Why should you believe that in all the things you know at least one is a mistake? I would maintain you accept it based on the law of identity. — Cheshire
I think there's reason to be certain at least some of them are wrong and by trying to falsify our beliefs we eliminate our errors and our knowledge improves or specifically becomes a better approximation to ideal knowledge. Without this assumption of unknown error we are left guarding beliefs when we should be testing them. It's a subtle, but significant difference in positions. — Cheshire
I cannot be convinced that a language less creature is capable of believing/trusting that the earth beneath it's feet is solid, unless that belief can be formed by virtue of a language-less creature drawing correlations between different things(including but not limited to itself), and all of those things exist in their entirety prior to being part of the creature's correlation. — creativesoul
Here you've invoked the need for trust/belief prior to associations between things. I replace trust/belief with presupposing the existence thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification(s). That would be the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality inherent to all belief. — creativesoul
This seems to be an issue of finding meaning in one's life. I suspect it is an issue of not knowing what one wants. So, part of the aim of education should be to identify what a person wants and needs, and try to have them achieve that, within reasonable circumstances. — Posty McPostface
I suspect also, that there's a deeper issue here. We are no longer treated as subjects in academic settings. Instead, we're a bundle of potential utility to the economy, which schools have to realize. — Posty McPostface
So, in the end, do we feel guilt or shame in getting something for nothing? Guilt is a powerful motivator. — Posty McPostface
I want to bring up the self-esteem movement that has grasped American high schools and other educational settings. — Posty McPostface
What's the deal with that movement? Everyone should get a reward for just being in school or what? Is this what trying to encourage happiness as a goal has resulted in? It's an utter failure in my mind. — Posty McPostface