I’m mainly wanting to see the extent to which there’s common ground so far as concerns understandings of what trust is. — javra
Here you've invoked the need for trust/belief prior to associations between things. I replace trust/belief with presupposing the existence thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification(s). That would be the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality inherent to all belief.
— creativesoul
To me, this very presupposition you address is one of maintained trust that, namely trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality". And here, I'd uphold this to be an innate (or genetically inherited) trust. — javra
Can one trust prior to being able to doubt? — creativesoul
Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes. — creativesoul
Can one trust prior to being able to doubt?
— creativesoul
My answer is an unequivocal "yes". To doubt one must first hold a trust for that which is accurate, for one example. Since we were talking about non-linguistic creatures, were a dog or a chimp capable of doubting something, it would first need to trust that there is a distinction between what we term right/true/correct and wrong/false/incorrect (they each point to something held in common). Addressed otherwise, doubt always is contingent upon a preexisting certainty, i.e. on something which we trust to be. — javra
Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes.
— creativesoul
Ah. I can see how that could be inferred. But no. What I want to address is not something which is because it takes the form of a thought which we can manipulate via the act of thinking. I instead was here addressing what to me are inherent aspects of awareness. For example: To be aware of anything, I argue, presupposes a trust that that which one is aware of is as one interprets it to be.
Hence, I was not addressing this as an acquired trust. For example, we instinctively trust that that which we see is as we see it to be; as do animals; we humans can, however, come to no longer trust our eyes in certain situations due learned trust: such as when where sticks get seemingly bent when submerged in water. But this is built up over our innate trust in what we see being as we see it to be. BTW, I gather that some presume human infants acquire all such trust. I disagree with this. As an example: an infant trusts the stimuli of a nipple to be as it anticipates it to be and acts accordingly, without having learned how to do so or consciously holding conceptual understandings of what it's doing and interacting with. Nevertheless, in so doing, it innately trusts its impressions (not very visual, but consisting of many tactile perceptions) to "correspond to reality". Not reality as a conceived of ontology; rather, reality as that which is real. — javra
I'm curious. Do you uphold a "blank slate" notion of mind? — javra
I think we agree that all (reasonable/justifiable)doubt is belief-based(trust-based on your framework). It seems you've also implied that doubt is dependent upon a creature's awareness of falsity/mistake? — creativesoul
No. — creativesoul
Non-linguistic creatures have no choice but to 'trust' physiological sensory perception. They also 'trust' the correlations, associations, connections drawn between different 'objects' thereof and/or themselves. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content...
There is no ability to doubt it for pre-linguistic creatures. — creativesoul
I’m thinking of a dog that wants to traverse some narrow bridge, for example, but doubts whether or not it can do it via some sensed fear or anxiety (i.e., holds some trepidation about it). It would need to be aware that there is a possibility of being mistaken in trusting that it could traverse the bridge. Because of this, it would need to hold some notion of falsity/mistake—obviously not linguistic or linguistically conceptua — javra
Even if so, we maybe agree that one does not need to doubt in order to trust? So we may hold beliefs that are justifiable and true without needing to doubt/question ourselves about them, for example. — javra
I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken. — creativesoul
If we set out trust in a minimalist fashion, in order to trust without the ability to doubt, we would lose sight of all of the different situations where one deliberately does not doubt — creativesoul
BTW, if you’d like to mutually agree to disagree and be done with the discussion, I’d be onboard. — javra
I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken.
— creativesoul
I don’t follow. Here, written hastily enough, a more formal argument:
-- Premise 1: If there is uncertainty of any form, there will be uncertainty about something (there is no such thing as a context-devoid, free-floating, uncertainty).
-- Premise 2: If there is uncertainty about something, there will minimally be two competing alternatives regarding that something: that that something is (else should be, or can be done) and that the same something is not (else shouldn’t be, or can’t be done).
-- Premise 3: Uncertainty holds the potential to cease so being.
--Premise 4: The potential of uncertainty being resolved entails the following: Whichever former alternative remains at expense of all others, this now resulting singular possibility/decision will signify that—to the mind of that which was formerly uncertain—all former alternatives other than the possibility which remains where wrong (if addressing something of fact, a belief-that).
-- Premise 5: In order for premise 4 to hold any validity, there must be some sense of wrongness/mistakenness v. rightness/correctness on the part of the mind involved.
-- Conclusion: The presence of uncertainty entails an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as of the capacity to be right/correct as pertains to some specific given.
Please explain what you disagree with and why in the just given generality—so that I may better understand what you have in mind. If you answer than only humans can understand the concepts to any of these words, you’d be completely missing the intended point of the argument—which aims at universals regarding how the mind works (in this case, as pertains to the presence of uncertainty). In which case, without getting into philosophy of mind or that of metaphysics—which I don’t care to do presently—we’d at best end up running in circles, something that I don’t want to do. — javra
How do you go about conceptualizing non-linguistic belief?
Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is? — javra
...we all have innate “minimalist” trust/beliefs and our more complex beliefs are built up on top of them. — javra
Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is?
We differ remarkably regarding what an awareness of being wrong/right requires.
[...]
An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.
A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct. — creativesoul
I'm still wrapping my head around your framework... — creativesoul
nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor. — Blue Lux
I find that you’re thinking of right/wrong in too abstract a manner—as only relatively mature humans can do. Yet very young children sense when they do wrong things (cheat, act aggressively, etc.) just as much as when they do good things (overlooking the more fuzzy grey areas). What’s more, so do dogs. — javra
nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor.
— Blue Lux
Of course. Very good points — javra
Though I’d like to avoid metaphysical issues, I find I can’t address this properly without eventually mentioning something of metaphysics. To be relatively informal about it, there are metaphysics of sharp and absolute division pertaining to different life forms’ abilities and, on the other side, there are metaphysics of gradations. Doesn’t matter if its Richard Dawkins or many, but not all, Abrahamic fundamentalists, here there is a metaphysical divide between man and beast. I take the latter metaphysical position, one of gradation which, when sufficiently extended, results in sometimes expansive leaps of ability. I also don’t approach things from a physicalist account; pertinent here is that to me there is a non-subjective objectivity at play in reality at large: justness—this just as much as the laws of thought—is to me an aspect of this non-subjective reality which is equally impartial to all discrete givens. Why this is important: in the latter position, we do not learn of justness conceptually in order to sense right and wrong, no more than we learn of formal laws of thought in order to operate via laws of thought. It is not something acquired from language but, instead, it is a universal facet of mind which language expresses, however imperfectly. Here there is no absolute metaphysical division between man and beast; both are, in a very trivial way, equal facets and constituents of nature. It is not that a less intelligent being is metaphysically apart from the laws of thought, or from the universal of justness. It is only that less intelligent beings are in due measure that much less capable of forming abstractions about these universals—which, as metaphysical universals, concretely dwell within all of us (with or without our conscious understanding of them) as innate aspects of what, or who, we are as sentient beings.
So, potential debates galore on this issue—and the issue can sprawl in myriad directions. I’ve highlighted some of my beliefs, though, only to better present my disposition. — javra
A dog doesn’t hold a conscious understanding of “alternatives” regarding some given nor of “right and wrong”. Nevertheless, to the extent that intelligent creatures, dogs included, can become uncertain of givens, they will actively experience competing alternatives which they must choose between so as to resolve the uncertainty. — javra
...if there is uncertainty about something, what other mechanism can be at play other than that of competing alternatives for what in fact is?
But to better understand: with the process of thinking in mind: can a thought, of itself, be defined as not necessarily consisting of a consciously understood abstraction (regardless of the degree of abstraction)? For instance, could we settle on correlations between percepts being an act of thinking? This would not require language nor consciously appraised abstractions. Still, the implications of so defining thought would then be fairly expansive (e.g., if an ameba can make correlations between its percepts than it would be engaged in an act of thought while eluding predators (e.g. bigger amebas) or while searching for prey. Amebas can easily be discerned to elude predators and search for prey—which takes a bit of autonomous order within an environmental uncertainty to accomplish—but I mention them because, obviously, they are rather “primitive” lifeforms.). I lean toward a more inclusive understanding/definition of thought and, therefore, thinking—again, favoring the outlook of gradation rather than that of division. But I’d like to know your general position as regards the nature of thought before I reply. — javra
All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul
All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things.
— creativesoul
I don't know that I agree with this. For instance, in Kant's contention that existence is not a predicate. — Blue Lux
Music and poetry, art and metaphor is not conventional language. There are aspects that are expressed in these things that transcend a linguistic expression, thus they become poetry. Poetry is not language. Lots of poetry, grammatically and with regard to standards of language in an essay for instance, is completely nonsensical if viewed this way. One can say that these things express a communicability, but definitely not a language, for a language has an organized structure of sign and meaning, including bits of an organized method. This is nonexistent in poetry, art and music. There is music theory... But you won't find Beethoven in music theory. — Blue Lux
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