I’ve heard of this sort of thing before, as in:



I’ve also been told it means one hasn’t become fully dead inside.

Strife can be a pain in the … heart. But then there wouldn’t be any pleasure in living life without it every now and then … at least in the before and after parts.

You just made me revisit the dictionary for definitions of “desire”. The first one that comes up on Wiktionary is, “to want; to wish for earnestly”.

What can I say? If it needs saying, I’m not a Buddhist. Still, we so far disagree.

Seems to me that you and Kym are using the word "desire" in two different ways. First, desire as "a strong feeling of wanting to have something or wishing for something to happen." This is the type of desire the Buddhists are talking about, the kind I thought Kym was referring to in the original post; the kind that leads to consumerism, alienation, and environmental degradation. But you're also using to mean intentions, motivations, and goals. Completely different things. In a sense, opposites. — T Clark

I honestly don’t yet understand why desire as you’ve defined it in quotes is not commensurate with intentions. Much less why they should be opposites. An example:

I’m holding on what I take to be logical grounds that even the most enlightened of Buddhists will hold “a strong feeling of wanting to have [obtained Nirvana] or wishing for [Nirvana] to happen. Now, I get that a lot of so called “enlightened” gurus will state that they have obtained Nirvana; logically, though, this at best can only be an equivocation of meanings—for they still suffer from the same bodily functions we all suffer from: hungers, full bladders, and, yes, old age and worldly death. Nirvana is a literal cessation of these karmic (i.e., action and consequence) ups and downs. So, unless these “enlightened ones” are bullshiters or worse—hell, it's been known to happen—they yet desire to actualize Nirvana and, with this desire as the cause to their behaviors and choices, thereby intend to actualize/obtain Nirvana as a long-term goal. Then, in so desiring/longing for Nirvana (which need not be first-person limited, e.g. I've heard some Buddhist declare they will strive to enlighten all sentience, lesser animals included), they then choose their other desires accordingly—e.g. not clinging to worldly possessions, etc. ... or so the story goes.

But I agree that there’s a lot that’s been probably lost in translation in statements about “desire”. Reminds me of how we sometimes translate an underlying concept into “harmony between anger and calm” as one entailment of the yin-yang symbol; yet “anger” to us doesn’t translate well, often signifying bad intentions toward others in English. Doesn’t do justice to here paraphrased sayings such as “when calm is on the outside and turbulence/animation/”anger” on the inside one is alive; when all turbulence/etc. is on the outside and the inside is perfectly calm, this is death”—i.e., for example, don’t become rage-full for this is a closer proximity to a death of being: turbulence being spewed from within to the outside; instead, be like the spinning top: calm on the outside, balanced, and hard to take down due to the turbulence/etc. within (… I gained this little nugget from some Aikido teachings). Here, again, I’m only addressing issues of translation.

Ideally, I don't eat because I desire food. I eat because I'm hungry. My body has signaled to me it needs food. On the other hand, I often eat out of desire, not hunger. The desire has nothing to do with responding to my body's nutritional needs. It fulfills some other need tied up with longing and fantasy. — T Clark

Here again I so far disagree. Hunger is a more rudimentary desire/longing/intention of our mind, whose intention it is to satisfy the physical requirement of our bodies (here using common speech and not getting into dual aspects of monistic substance, or like subjects). The proprioceptive pangs of an empty stomach are perceptions obtained via physiological senses—and so belong to what is perceived by mind. One way of verbalizing it is by saying it is a desire of our more primitive mind: from the mid and hind brain (although I’m typically not big on modeling mind in terms of primitive and non-primitive). The conscious us can then become one with this diffuse desire we sense as hunger—e.g. “I am hungry and intend/want/desire to eat something”—or else choose to shun this desire on account or prioritizing other desires—the person who fasts will do so for whatever aim/goal they have in mind.

When you say you sometimes “eat out of desire, not hunger” I so far interpret you to mean that the conscious you then eats out of a desire to satisfy something like a sweet tooth, rather than the desire to quench one’s hunger. Yet either way, there is a conscious you who engages in the satisfaction of desires, i.e., in the obtainment of the end which some aspect of mind intends.

To me, in a roundabout sort of way, this speaks to Hume’s “reason is the slave of desires”: we reason so as to satisfy our desires; we do not desire so as to satisfy our reasoning. If this is too much from out in the left field, then please never mind that I just brought this last part up.

I kind’a like 's categorization of desire, myself.

Haven't had one made for myself, at least so far. We might be dealing with the same issue.

A truism: we all want for that which we want to be obtained as we want it obtained (no magic genies in bottles playing tricks with our wishes, kind of thing) — javra

I'm not sure if you mean this as a description of what does happen or what should happen. Reading on, I suspect the latter. — Kym

Oh; no, I was aiming for the former: that truism to me depicts the way thing are, hence is descriptive and not prescriptive.

As one relatively inconsequential example: If I want to pick up an object and I find that I can do so as I wanted without any obstructions to my achieving this, no problems for me; I may even be joyous in so doing. However, if there’s something that obstructs my desire to have the object in my hand—like someone else that pushes my hand away from the object while I’m reaching for it—then there are problems for me: frustration, or irritation … some form of unpleasant affect. I argue that this is so not because the truism I offered should be the case but because the truism I offered is the case at all times.

This truism I offered might then be a bit more debatable at face value than I first thought.

Now, I’m of course not denying the reality of often competing desires one chooses between and of the differences between short- and long-term intentions and their priorities. But I do argue that any choice made between competing desires will be itself made with a goal—hence, a desire—in mind … a goal which we want to obtain (to which I still think the offered truism applies).

IMO much suffering has been facilitated by the ease in which we separate events into 'means' and 'ends'. This is a false dichotomy it seems to me, that fails to insulate the ends from any dubious means undertaken: The quality of the means used seems to always infuse into that of the achieved ends. Those damned roosting chickens! — Kym

I agree with the underlined sentence in the quote. But I don’t see ends and means being a false dichotomy, at least not so far. The ends are out there in the future. The means are what we do now (else plan to do in the present) so as to get to that place or even in the future.

Saying that the ends justify the means can be very misleading, with this I'd again agree. But saying that the ends limit (and/or goad) what the means can and cannot be in order for the ends to be obtained, however, to me seems rationally valid.

I then got a bit lost in your discussion on the role of causality. Can you simplify it for me Javra? — Kym

To better do so, where is there disagreement with this:

[...] to desire/intend is to seek an end and then chose one’s actions accordingly in manners governed by the obtainment of this pursued end. — javra

It's pretty obvious that no sentient being gets to live much past teatime without the faculty of desire. So desire certainly can't be flat out bad then. But it can go bad pretty easily, especially in the absence of any checks and balances.
[...]
For us philosophical hold-outs two questions skulk in the corners like reluctant elephants:
1. How can philosophy get its hands dirty again with the lived reality of individual desire?
2. How can philosophy influence the trajectory of a culture seemingly caught in death spiral down a vortex of desire? — Kym

I agree that desire is not innately bad—no more, for example, than the very presence of living selves; rather, its ethical value would be contingent on that which is desired. I also very much like the way you bring up “checks and balances”. To be clear, for me this addresses a checks and balances of power among different and interacting selves; with “power” demarcated as “the ability to accomplish”, which can be further defined for sentient beings as “holding the capacity and desire to manifest at some future time (even if this future is measure in nanoseconds) that end which is desired, else wanted, else intended in the present”. Hence the brilliance of any government that can self-maintain an honest checks and balances of all powers concerned.

A truism: we all want for that which we want to be obtained as we want it obtained (no magic genies in bottles playing tricks with our wishes, kind of thing)

I think philosophy then needs to first acknowledge this truism as real, maybe even figure out some way of logically evidencing it to so be, and next figure out ways of addressing it in terms of logically derivable oughts (what should be)—such that this basic desire-impetus is optimally satisfied for, at least, the vast majority of individuals given their/our perpetual interactions with other desire-endowed beings.

But then this gets in a bunch of things that modern academic culture is not comfortable with. As a primary example, to desire/intend is to seek an end and then chose one’s actions accordingly in manners governed by the obtainment of this pursued end. More simply, it is for one’s actions to be teleologically caused by the very end which one desires to obtain. Doesn’t matter if it concerns one’s getting from a present location A to an intended location B or, more abstractly, if it concerns how to best obtain a state of personal happiness given one’s interactions with multiple others who each pursue their own personal happiness … in often very different ways. I’m here thinking of a mass murder’s happiness in obtained supremacy over others (along with a few other types of such people); this as compared to an altruistic or empathetic person’s happiness in contextual harmony found within her/his family, community, and society; this as compared to an ego-loving person’s happiness in an unending stability of personal being (like the want for the immortality of one’s own selfhood or, maybe less dramatically, in wanting their context as they know it to never change one way or another thereby never needing to change as an ego; and so forth. All these different beings interacting with each other in pursuit of their own type of idealized personal happiness.

At any rate, issues of politics aside, there’s a teleological causation at work with desire, i.e. with intention to manifest/obtain—the intention containing the goal which causes actions and goads decisions toward the goal pursued. This, of itself, doesn’t bode well with modern philosophical paradigms of reality—for this form of causation is neither amicable to causal determinism (its not fully efficient causation) nor to causal indeterminism (there must first be a determinate impetus of desire as cause in addition to some determinate end (be it mentally or metaphysically determinate) in order for teleological causation to occur—as one example, the previously offered truism is neither chosen by us to be nor can it be in any way done away with for as long as we in any way intend anything … i.e., it is a metaphysically determinate aspect of our constituency in our choosing activities in manners governed by some intended end. And to further complicate matters, some of our desires/intentions are sub/unconscious … but in order for them to be efficacious desires they too would work in the same way as conscious desires.

That’s my take at least. We need to think outside of the box in terms of things such as causation if we’re to have any hope of (1) and (2) which you address.

:grin: :up:

I often presume that from an Eastern philosophy perspective, the ultimate reality is taken to be that of non-dualistic being/awareness. Hence the occasional Eastern metaphor of dualistic experience—that of self and other—being “illusion” or “dream” or some such—like you said, the veil of maya. As per Buddhism, that whole “neither is there a self nor not a self” predicament.

Having said that—to be more pragmatic about things—the world of dualistic experience will likely continue for inestimable eons yet to come, is replete with facts unearthed by the empirical sciences concerning our commonly shared world, and is for us selves about as real as real can get. Besides, if one for example buys into the Anima/Spiritus Mundi motif, our world still has a lot to teach us about ourselves.

More to the thread’s topic, when it comes to what consciousness is and how it should be conceptualized, the issue reminds me of some of the lyrics to an old-time song called “Epic” by the band “Faith No More” (the song can be found on youtube):

You want it all but you can't have it
It's in your face but you can't grab it
What is it?
It's it
What is it?
It's it
What is it?
It's it
What is it?
It's it
[…]

Yup. If they're logged in.

... Wait, just checked: the @mane style didn't leave a message indicator for me. But the reply-arrow will.

Fair enough. I'll leave the issue at that, for my part.

(By the way, how can I make that lttle arrow+name link you guys all do?) — Kym

when logged in, go to the bottom of the post next to the time posted, an arrow will appear labeled "reply"; clicking on it puts the arrow+name in the post you're writing

Question. If physicalists are so on board with consciousness being illusory, why do physicalists so often gag at the notion that our phenomenal reality is an illusion (as per Eastern philosophies--and not per commonsense notions of illusions concerning what is otherwise commonly shared/objective phenomena)? Never quite got that.

Now, my argument in favour of Chalmer's position, is that experience is irreducibly first-person. In other words, it is not an object or a phenomenon, in the sense that things that we experience are objects or phenomena. So the question is not 'why do we have consciousness?' but 'what is consciousness?', which is really a question about the first-person nature of experience. — Wayfarer

I'm only nitpicking: The way I read this it might, or might not, convey an implicit assumption of the permanency of the self … even in so far as consciousness/experience not being possible devoid of something other which is experienced. I’m presuming this will be much ado about nothing new to you, all the same:

Where one to take the experiences of all those who are reputed to have had intense spiritual experiences—this via meditations or otherwise—their awareness/consciousness in such instances increase far beyond what our average commonplace states of consciousness are. Hence, were such experiences to be believed as non-bogus, then the magnitude of our consciousness can become greatly amplified in terms of both quantity and quality of awareness.

Hallucinogen-based experiences, such as those of Aldous Huxley in his “Doors of Perception”, greatly complicate matters in terms of preferred ontological explanations, but they are reported to occur all the same. When not going haywire, these again purportedly endow selves with increased awareness that is often enough coupled with a highly increased sense of selfless being (i.e., increased impartiality of awareness relative to all that is other in normal states of being, with its hypothetical zenith being that of an experienced, complete non-duality of being/awareness ... attested to by some within history).

Cases such as these speak toward the possibility of consciousness becoming far more and qualitatively far different than what we take it to be in everyday life.

Having addressed the generally more pleasant, in not wholly imaginary (as many atheists will believe), aspect of the conscious self holding the potential to transmute into something much greater than ordinary human conscious being, there then are the more explanatorily accessible instances where human consciousness can become diminished, fragmented, or else cease holding presence.

To dwell a great deal on DSM examples of mental disorders would get depressing, but, in passing, there is everything from extreme cases of schizophrenia, to multiple personalities, to catatonia, to sleep walking with awareness of the external world, to states of indefinite unconsciousness. In these cases, at least typically, the awoken human consciousness becomes less and other than what it ordinarily is as a unified point of view, such that it is no longer as functional, if at all so.

Less unnerving are the ordinary transitions from wakefulness to sleep, in which our ordinary awoken consciousness becomes gradually reduced in magnitude; would be termed hallucinatory if its sometimes occurring, half-awoken experiences would likewise occur while fully awoken; and eventually cease to hold presence—until, in some instances, it then holds presence as a first person point of view during REM dreams—after which it again awakens and thereby holds an awoken presence.

In all aforementioned cases, what it is like to so be/experience still holds. But all these examples—both of increased magnitude, including instances of non-dualistic awareness rich in meaning, and of decreased magnitude of human consciousness, including that of a lack of presence—do point to there not being such a thing as a permanent conscious state of being—ultimately, not even to a necessary first person point of view in order for awareness to be.

In other words, there is no requirement for awareness to be a self as typically understood and held onto by most everybody: one which is differentiated from everything that is other and is thereby dualistic in its experienced being; one which defines itself (e.g., I am stupid/smart, talented/a klutz, poor/wealthy, etc.) and then clings onto its own self-produced definitions of what it is as an otherwise intangible awareness/self.

I get that there’s a linguistic quagmire when it comes to what consciousness signified and how the term is used; to me, though, it nevertheless seems blatant that there is a clear cut distinction between consciousness per se and being conscious of, this as a staple part of our commonsense understandings.

I tend to think you’d agree with more rather than less of what I’ve mentioned … ?

I think this is descriptive of the stance of natural sciences, is it not? — Wayfarer

Your comments seem about right to me.

That stated, to my mind, the concept of objectivity which I’ve tried to articulate does not of itself make an ontological commitment regarding whether or not minds as we know them—or even any conception of Mind with a capital “M”—are required for the physical to be. In other words, I currently believe it can equally apply to systems of idealism as much as it can apply to systems of physicalism. Notwithstanding, yes, what I previously described does very much take into account the objectivity of the empirical sciences, this due to these sciences being phenomena founded (i.e., empirical).

Yet the same principle of objectivity as impartiality can also be applied to non-Kantian notions of noumena, as in basic geometric forms and rudimentary mathematical relations between quantities which are only capable of being apprehended by the intellect—and can so be in purely abstract forms. Or to the principles of thought.

And, from the stance of my own beliefs: It would be a stretch—and I’m not interested in here arguing for the case—but one can also apply this objectivity-impartially equivalence to the notion of an objective good—in the Platonic and Neo-Platonic sense. To give an overall gist of this approach: what do all sentience desire/intent/want? This can wind its way toward what Buddhists address as a liberation from suffering—or, imo more formally, from obstructions to one’s will being fulfilled as one intends it fulfilled. Then there’s the issue of what such state of fully (or at least optimally) liberated being might ontically be and, once appraised, how it might be best pursued. As one example—a bit spiritual for the atheistic folks, I would assume—this could be a state of perfect non-duality; e.g., Buddhist notions of Nirvana or Neo-Platonic notions of “the One”. None of this is here conclusive, obviously; but, again, the impartiality/objectivity equivalence makes such sort of thinking feasible to me. For example, all subjects (or partial, ego-centric beings) are subjects of both physical objectivity/impartiality to which they conform—this being the world we experience phenomenally (e.g., truth being a conforming of beliefs and statements to that which objectivity is)—as well as being subjects to metaphysical objectivity/impartiality—this being quite a bit harder to succinctly specify in any meaningful way, but to me a) it is by definition not itself a subject, b) it incorporates the striven for end of liberation from suffering previously mentioned, and c) it is an Aristotelian-like telos/final cause via which the physical world is in large part determined in a manner fully compatible with the freewill of agents. Anyway, it’s what I’m working on … and it’s quite the headache. What can I say, a well supported value theory is important to me.

I mentioned this to try to illustrate that this notion of objectivity I’ve been working with in no way specifies what might otherwise be termed scientism—I won’t address scientific realism other than to say that any scientific realism that cannot properly incorporate value theory misses the mark, imo--but yes, imo, it is very much in tune with what the empirical sciences seek and often discover in their endeavors.

It seemed to me to especially fit into the nature of objective phenomena that was being discussed in the thread.

Apropos, having looked at the link you’ve provided, what do you make of Kant’s theorizing of the Nebular hypothesis? To me it so far indicates that he did not take the view that minds as we know them need to be in order for the physical to be. I’m speculating without any evidence that maybe he held some form of pan-something (panpsychism, pansemiosis, something) as a precursor to what we now can more readily talk about, this as an aspect of his transcendental idealism. Wouldn’t mind hearing about differing opinions on Kant’s upholding of the solar system’s formation in such manner … if it doesn’t deviate too much from the thread’s theme.

No problem here, for me. Umm, maybe one. If the phenomenal is mind-dependent, then what does "experienced phenomena" mean? — tim wood

We do not need to hold concrete particulars of sight in order to contemplate sight in abstract terms. Same applies for the concrete particulars of hearing, taste, touch, smell, proprioception, etc., i.e. to all phenomena. For example, we could contemplate visual phenomena in abstract ways as manifesting from multiple vantages—e.g. an ant’s, a cat’s, and a human’s—toward any particular object without needing to invoke particular examples of the sight all three of these beings concretely see.

Hence, by “experienced phenomena” I was intending to distinguish phenomena as it is directly experienced from the same phenomena as it can be abstractly thought about with or without concrete examples.

I understand that there could yet be confusions all the same with the Kantian notions of phenomena—as in, within Kantianism, abstractions are experienced phenomena too (although not in the original ancient sense of phenomena, in which abstractions devoid of concrete examples would be experienced noumena). Still, the experience of that which is seen is not the same as the experience of an abstract contemplation regarding the contents of sight in general which is devoid of visualized concrete particulars.

So, in immediate experience, the green leaf seen is a direct presentation of the green leaf out there. In abstract contemplation, however, my seeing of a green leaf is a re-presentation of the object out there which to me and all other like sentience results in a green appearance. The former is what occurs in what I termed “experienced phenomena”. The latter is what occurs when we abstractly contemplate the nature of phenomena.

From a few days past:

( )

An old thought just came to me, one can apply issues of phenomena on an impartiality spectrum—such that most partial is fully limited to what is for the individual and only for the individual and what is most impartial equally is for all sentient beings regardless of type, degree, and quality of awareness.

At the most partial level, it is the phenomena I perceive. Less partially, it is the phenomena which we perceive—and the inclusivity of this “we” will indicate the degree of impartiality relative the the most partial perspective of the “I” when solely addressed. For example, this "we" could be one and one’s buddy, one’s group(s), one’s total species, all mammals, etc. Lastly, that which is equally applicable to all sentience is most impartial relative to any particular sentience.

Replace “impartiality” with “objectivity”—as can be quite validly done—and you can then address objective phenomena … as long as this objectivity is not addressed in terms of an absolute but, instead, in terms of being relative to the inclusiveness of all sentient beings addressed.

From this, we then can validly address objects as objectively manifesting and as holding objective phenomenal properties relative to the human species. Whichever properties are present to other species of life will then be more impartial/objective … until we arrive at things such as natural laws that address without any contradiction why things are as they are--such as why the moon’s presence needs to be even were all sentience to be sleeping due to the many causal factors which the moon manifests upon everything else, from ocean tides to, if I'm not mistaken, at least some circadian rhythms which occur even when we’re sleeping.

This, of course, in some ways might be contradictory to what many/most? nowadays understand by “objective reality” … but I find that it yet holds validity as an interpretation of objectivity, hence the objective world, and, consequently, of physical objects.

Via this interpretation of "objectivity as impartiality", one then can cogently address things such as the objective certainty of objective phenomena; e.g. it is objectively certain (and not my illusion) that the tree with green leaves is taller than the gray tree next to it which is devoid of leaves.

Also, from a Kantian point of view, such an understanding of the the objective world, when addressed from a fully impartial pov, would strictly consist of noumenal givens which our mind re-presents to us via mind-dependent/created phenomena.

If there are intrinsic errors found in this reasoning, please let me know.

You’re quoted statement seems to me to only be an incomplete statement. Imo, more completely stated, “Phenomena are mind-caused re-presentations of the mind-independent noumena regarded”. This where mind is readily understood in the commonsense fashion and where phenomena and noumena are understood in Kantian manners—who after all popularized the concept of phenomena within our modern lexicon, tmk [though, like Wayfarer, I’m preferential to the ancient, original understanding of these two terms; e.g., a word on the tip of one’s tongue is a given (a particular known meaning) apprehended by the mind (nous, hence noumenal) devoid of any phenomena (i.e., appearances, either visual or auditory), making the meaning of this word at the tip of one's tounge a purely noumenal apprehension in the ancient sense of these terms… this, however, being a foreign interpretation to our modern Kantian understandings of phenomena and noumena ... and I'll here stick to the Kantian meaning of these terms]. At any rate, as per Kantianism, members of the same species will share common mind-caused phenomena to re-present the same noumena, which will be independent of the individual or collective minds pertaining to members of the given species. The more different two species are, the more different their mind-caused phenomena in relation to the same independent noumenon will be; yet all species—trees, ants, humans, etc.—will perceive the same noumena in terms of its solidity and location, for example (where it to be a solid, e.g., a boulder [trees do perceive/sense boulders and react to them in their root growth).

To me at least, the phenomenal is mind-dependent, as MU states ... but not the Kantian noumena it re-presents to the perceiver.

Also, experienced phenomena (contra abstract understanding of phenomena at large) will always be experienced as a direct presentation of what is, as gurugoeorge states … but this does not of itself make phenomena when abstractly addressed non-representational of what is regarded.

BTW, don’t have much to argue in the being/process debate. Still, whether it holds any inkling of ontological value or is strictly a poetic metaphor unrelated to the ontic which it addresses, I’ve always found it interesting that the being/process dichotomy within metaphysics can be easily compared to the particle/wave duality in QM—such that whether it is being or else process/working will be to a large extent dependent on contexts of observation. Though of in one way a rock is a bundle of ever-changing processes; thought of in another way a rock is a (relatively) changeless thing; but you can’t think of a rock in both ways at the same time and in the same way. You can maybe differentiate aspects of it in this way, such as its atoms and their activity—neither of which would then be the rock as gestalt entity/process—but then these atoms too are either things or processes, and so on ad infinitum. Same then applies to whether a machine is a set of workings or, else, a thing, imo. But again, since I don't now know how to evidence that this observation has any ontological value, I wouldn't know how to debate it.

If it’s of any benefit to the effable/ineffable divide, this to me is in parallel to the rational/arational divide … where “arational” is that which occurs beyond, or outside, the realm of conscious reasoning (and not “irrational”, meaning erroneous reasoning).

Our immediate comprehension of a directly perceived object is always, of itself in the very moment of experience, an arational occurrence—for it happens in manners that do not consist of consciously occurring explanations, provided causes, or provided motives for the immediate occurrence of awareness. In other words, our immediate awareness of the object is an instance of that which occurs beyond or outside the realm of consciously occurring reasoning.

This however, does not entail that our immediate awareness of objects, which of itself occurs arationally, cannot be rationally accounted for. It occurs be-cause of this and that explanation, cause, or motive. The provision of which will make our experiences rational (and the belief in the potential to so provide reasons for will then imply the belief that everything is rational without exception … although glitches such as that of “why being rather than nonbeing” might occur).

Same then with what’s ineffable—hence, beyond expression in words. It always holds the potential to be expressed via words, however imperfectly or improperly, but first the ineffable given must be to some extent commonly shared. We can’t, for example, properly convey what experience is to anyone who has never held first-hand awareness of experience (as in, to a philosophical zombie … can’t think of other examples). What experience is will then of itself be beyond expression via words—you’re either endowed with nonlinguistic knowledge of it via acquaintance or you’re not (aka, or you’re a p-zombie).

But this doesn’t mean that we can’t imperfectly address this commonly shared given via words—which will either conform to or deviate from this commonly shared, otherwise ineffable given (i.e., words that can either express truths or falsities in relation to what phenomenal experience is). Then, as previously mentioned by others, not all experiences are commonly held. We can talk about certain complex emotions or certain obscure concepts at length; this doesn’t then mean that a) we can obtain an adequate understanding of what is addressed strictly via words in all such cases (especially where we cannot related due to lack of shared emotions or concepts) or b) that the word(s) used will be perfectly equivalent to that which it specifies (thereby making that specified beyond expression via words, at least in some ways, which is in itself significant). E.g., the heck did Gnostics have gnosis about, anyway? Elephino. Or, could Van Gogh [Goya had his own issues] express via words what he felt and thought when he deprived himself of that one ear? Nope, not to me at least; I don’t care how long his essay on this might have been.

Well, it's an interesting question. I'd say the ball is an external object knowable as your phenomenal state. I don't deny external reality and consider a dream state of a ball distinct from an awake state, not in terms simply of clarity, but in terms of the former being of an objective thing externally. — Hanover

A distinction could be made between phenomenal experiences obtained via the physiological senses and those phenomenal experiences obtained via the imagination. “(Phenomenal) experiences obtained via the physiological senses”, or something shorter to the same effect, would rule out dream states, I'm thinking.

Partook of this discussion, so I won’t bail out of it as time allows.

So what exactly that primordial experience consists in; what the necessary conditions must be for its possibility and for its actuality can become metaphysical questions. Is it fundamentally akin to what we think of as physical: some sort of blind energetic or virtual process that gives rise to this world and the beings that experience it) or is it fundamentally akin to what we think of as mental: a spiritual and/ or intentional process. Or is it somehow both at once and/or neither? — Janus

Good questions. Along with the typical answers that so often lead to as of yet irresolvable conflicts between differing groups, there are also the affixed beliefs (which can be true of false) regarding the nature of causation. I so far do not know, for example, of many physicalists that accept even as remotely possible any causal mechanism which would be required for non-illusory agency. Would be grateful for any references to any established physicalist who does accept metaphysical freewill—although I know there’s been at least one physicalist here about on the forum who upholds top-down models of causation along side panseimiotics. To better illustrate these affixed convictions, unlike what was tmk first proposed by David Hume, modern day compatibilism is really a causally deterministic physicalism dressed up in fancy language games which yet preserve the ontology of causal determinism. Name it soft determinism, it's still causal determinism without exception. Hume, btw, rejected both causal determinism and causal indeterminism on logical grounds, while acknowledging that both are in some way required for life to be as it is—however, he did not go so far as to provide a causal alternative as regards mechanisms. Still, this form of causal compatibilism proposed by Hume has been for the most part utterly forgotten in today’s philosophical discourse, unfortunately, to my mind. This to me is then in parallel to the issue of what the stuff of reality really consists of. Open mindedness is not always a bad thing.

[...] I am merely pointing out that, once you lose the lingering Cartesian dualist presuppositions, it is not inherently a self-contradictory view, as many of its critics seem to want to claim it to be — Janus

Yes, it is not an inherently self-contradictory view, since it only upholds those believed truths applicable to eliminativism and denies other experientially given facts which would contradict eliminitivism—such as that there needs to be some given to which illusions appear in order for there to be illusions in the first place, as Wayfarer has repeatedly mentioned in better ways than I just have. We’re culturally accustomed to the stance, and our so being accustomed psychologically grants it an authority of being true not held by novel ways of interpreting reality, even when the later are not self-contradictory. This, or itself, however fits in with the illusory truth effect.

That said, so too is the flat Earth theory not inherently self-contradictory—since it too only accepts those logical arguments and experienced data which do not deny the stated worldview which is maintained—and I’d venture that it too starts with different premises than what the rest of us start off with in discerning the shape of the planet. It is only self-contradictory to those who more impartially take into account data which flat-Earth theorists reject as being true.

So the eliminitivist view being coherent given its axiomatic premises does not place it on equal footing to other non-eliminitivist theories that more impartially take into consideration facts ignored by eliminativists—such as the requirement for awareness to be in order for awareness of anything (including of a theory of eliminativism) to be. It is after all not incoherent to be a non-eliminativist physicalist, for example (this having nothing to do with my potential dis/agreement with such ontological models in part or in whole). Some such are common enough frequenters of the TPF, such as in addressing physicalism from a vagueness and symmetry breaking approach (this at least to the degree that I properly understand Apo from former debates).

The question I'm interested in is the one ProcastinationTommorow clarified: do such mental phenomena provide counterexamples to theories of mind that require all mental phenomena to have objects? Is it that the investigation of the causes of the state will reveal that it actually has an object after all, despite its superficial "lack" of a target? — jkg20

Mind consists of both conscious and non-conscious processes. The interplay between the two is greatly debated in many different fields. Since it’s of pertinence, one of David Hume’s innovations in philosophy was his bundle theory of self/mind wherein the mind is considered to be a commonwealth of agencies. His model of mind, however, was impoverished by a lack of (at least explicit) acknowledgement concerning the unitary though ever-changing nature and presence of a first person point of view.

The conscious self can be stated to emerge from the unconscious self (e.g., that which holds presence while one sleeps); I’m myself preferential to the conscious self being a gestalt-like form emerging from various agencies of the unconscious mind which serve as its constituents. This is of course debatable, but serves as at least one illustration of what could be the case. Logically analyzed, however, to the degree that the conscious self holds agency, so too do those aspects of mind which are not part of consciousness yet with which consciousness is intimately entwined. One relatively easy, though in some ways extreme, example of this is that of the conscience. You take a shortcut and some sensation we term conscience conveys to you—typically in manners lacking phenomenal characteristics of the physiological senses, i.e. lacking in auditory, visual, tactile, etc. attributes ( … unlike children’s cartoons where there’s a good and bad angel on each shoulder whispering things into one’s ears)—again, conveys to you that it would be prudent and wise to not take this shortcut which you as a conscious self are momentarily intent on taking. Here, your conscience is an agency of your mind that—despite apprehending the same context in which the conscious you finds yourself in—is other than you as a conscious agency, for it holds different intentions (and along with these, perspectives) regarding what should be done in relation to what is. We lack proper terms for these both mundane and oftentimes beneficial experiences, as is the case with the presence of a conscience: this conscience of which you become momentarily aware of is not you as conscious agent which decides whether or not to act as one’s conscience informs is best; yet neither is this conscience a subconscious or unconscious process of mind at the time it is experienced, for it makes up part of one’s consciously apprehended mind of which one is consciously attuned to. Less extreme examples are emotions which drive, motivate, and tempt—these too are often “felt” rather than being a unitary enactive aspect of one’s being as a conscious self, and these too, I'll maintain, hold context aware aims of which you as a conscious self is not always consciously aware of. At any rate …

Long story short, what can consciously appear to be an activity of mind lacking intentionality, such as that of an unfocused anxiety, can nevertheless hold intentionality from the vantage of those unconscious processes of mind of which one as a conscious self is not consciously aware of. These activities of mind can, for example, be learned reactions to stimuli that play out at unconscious levels of mind—thereby yet holding objects of awareness (i.e., the stimuli, which can be as much of the external world as they can be of the internal realms of one's total mind—see again the example of one’s conscience holding one’s conscious self as stimuli for its activities/processes) and, hence, can all be process of mind that hold intentionality.

Again, this is very reminiscent of David Hume’s bundle theory of mind/self—flawed as his model of mind was on account of lacking the unitary presence of the first person point of view, if for no other reason.

As Ying points out, there are numerous different psychologies of mind which often address such troublesome unconscious processes differently. Yet, as regards philosophy of mind, examples such as the one you’ve provided do not contradict any model of mind in which it is accepted that there is such a thing as unconscious processes whose agencies are not identical to that of the conscious self (cf., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconscious_cognition).

(In wanting a sabbatical from debates, this will be my last post for a while, I think.)

In thinking about the evolution of language—which has many examples, such our tendency to trust “The Bank of Billy” more than “Billy’s Bank” and other such often aesthetic factors that play out in which words fall out and which become popularized—wanted to address the word ejaculation: expressing brief and abrupt statements. Just checked with Wiktionary and this definition is not even outdated, and also includes thus expressed prayers. The term can be found in older novels, as in “the person ejaculated many things upon the others” … was copiously used in books such as Withering Heights in such manner. So here we are, ejaculating concepts to each other all the time on TPF … both men and women. No wonder we can on occasion gain new conceptions of things. :cool:

What is a charade? :joke: — Purple Pond

A more recent US president now renowned about something to do with head underneath tables can be famously paraphrased as asking, “What is is?” This can be a very philosophical question, for what is is is still a matter of debate, and can get to the core of many a philosophical issue … but it wasn’t within the context in which he posed the question. His so asking in the context he asked was a good example of a charade. :yum:

Thank you :razz: :blush: All the same, interesting research you've pointed out in previous posts, such as that of direct brain stimulation.

First, let there be a distinction made between suicidal intentions and altruism—simplifying this by overlooking our inevitable various degrees of ignorance as concerns forethought. The person who jumps on a grenade because he’s sick of life is not the person who cares for his fellows and innately senses her/his duty to safeguard. And of course, there are vastly less extreme examples of unwittingly reciprocal altruism; give a child a present it cherishes and the child will later on in life hold warmer feeling toward you and those like you than otherwise. That said, giving a child a present with this reason consciously intended is, to my mind, a bit sociopathic; nevertheless, the pleasure one receives from so doing (to not address less common instances such as giving a few bucks to a homeless person on the streets) is one of assisting others with a sense of self-esteem or empathetic pleasure as reward—a satisfaction that serves a utilitarian purpose of reciprocity, even if in only the most abstract of ways.

The just mentioned can obviously be argued against—and once one accepts that altruism is real in a good number of people, explaining it is riddled with complications.

Still, to address the proposition that there is no true altruism on account of selfishness: To the persons who feel anything from a) lack of remorse otherwise present in not fulfilling an innately sensed duty to b) a sense of eudemonia in benefiting others, their actions will of course be out of self-interest and, loosely worded, thereby selfish. But their self-pivoting interests (whose intentions would they be otherwise) are those that strive for and become emotively rewarded by closer proximity to an ideal state of selflessness—at least in respect to those one cares for. There are of course those who take advantage of this, those who do not share the same goal of selflessness as their own self-interest. Sadly, a joyful coward will live to reproduce whereas a firefighter that dies in the burning building will not. Nevertheless, altruism—however further debated to be—can only be a behavior engaged in due to the intrinsic values held whereby others are deemed to hold their own intrinsic value, rather than merely holding instrumental value to oneself, here a type of value that is thereby disposable when no longer of use.

So the upheld fact that we are all selfish, with which I technically agree, does not then do away with altruism being at times a real aspect of humans.

Some species of animal, btw, are far more altruistic on average than humanity when addressed as a total species. Meerkats serve as one good example. They too behave thus out of their own self-interests.

My own perspective is that if we learn from the time we’re young that the only way to obtain satisfaction is by taking without giving and by domination (rewarded temper tantrums and the like), then we will likely behave in such ways as adults. But if we learn from our most important education—that of our social surroundings during our preadolescent years—the joys of sharing, of fairness, or compassion, and the like—even if we only acquire a taste of this joy—then we’re far more likely to be altruistic-leaning as adults, maybe most especially in times of need as regards those we care for.

Either way, we’re being selfish in seeking to obtain that which we cherish and value.

You yourself exhibit concern for the issue of humanity. Selfish as this concern might be, it is yet a concern that intends toward the wellbeing of others and, hence, is altruism leaning.

To decry that the altruism involved is not perfect misses the point of true instances of altruism. No one, for example, has ever experienced a perfectly true love in whatever form one wants to contemplate the term, yet there are instances of non-deceptive love all the time.

We can either foster these self-centered interests toward selflessness in ourselves and in others or, else, not foster them and instead seek purely egotistic interests. Can’t think of any other way in which there might be an altruistic future for humanity than by engaging as best we can in the first alternative in a fair and just way.

As far as our species goes, the future is contingent on our present actions.

However, phenomenologists, Husserl, Zahavi, Henry, Sartre and others have argued convincingly in various ways that pre-reflective (non-thematic) self-awareness must be inherent to conscious experience. In that sense we do experience our experience, our consciousness and our self-awareness. — Janus

You raise a good point. But I find that it doesn’t need to be evidenced by very complex arguments. We know of our own happiness or assuredness—to not mention other examples—strictly via self-referential experience of that which is experiencing—such that, in cases such as these, the object of our awareness is ourselves as the subject of awareness, as the first person point of view (e.g., “I am happy/confident/uncertain/curious/etc.”). In such core experiences upon which all other experiences are dependent upon, the “I” is simultaneously both subject of awareness and object of awareness without there being any experienced differentiation between the two.

This is different from experience wherein a) we are perceiving a percept via our physiological senses, this being the strict realm of modern empiricism (be the percept internal such as a full bladder or else external), or b) perceiving percepts of our own imagination (e.g., an imagined apple), or c) sensing a sensation such as that of a temptation in the form of an emotion we choose to either embrace of shun, or d) understand a meaning to something like an sign or an abstraction (the latter three not occurring via physiological senses but through experiential apprehensions of the intellect/mind by the first person point of view). In all four of these cases, though, there’ll be an object of awareness that is qualitatively other than the subject of awareness which is apprehending.

But again, in cases such as that of being happy/sad, the subject and object of awareness are one and the same given—which, via its perpetually changing being as such, then apprehends percepts, sensations, and understanding as other than itself which perceives, senses, or understands.

Interestingly for me, in this core type of experience, the object/subject dichotomy breaks down, such that it is both and neither. Making it into an object doesn’t fit the bill, for it is not. This non-duality of being might make little if any sense outside of direct experience; yet experience attests to it.

To get back in the main subject of this thread: To deny this experientially evidenced ontic given is to make use of this same ontic given so as to theorize in very abstract ways that it is an illusion, that it doesn’t exist. If this were true, everything else would be illusion by default; not here indulging contradictions of reasoning—for everything else we can be aware of is contingent upon this ontic given being non-illusory … and only secondly upon that which we are aware of—laws of logic included—being non-illusory.

But that’s not to say that there is no physical or that our minds’ processes are not directly correlated with our brains’ activities. Experience, if nothing else, evidences that there is such a thing as physicality and that the correlation holds, irrespective of what causal mechanism might be at work. Worst comes to worst from a materialist’s pov, the physical is what Pierce termed effete mind; doesn’t change the fact that it’s still physical in a common sense perspective of things.

Some people say that the thing we both believe is a proposition. For various reasons that scenario is suboptimal. What's the alternative? — frank

The meaning, rather than the proposition. What we both believe can be expressed or represented with a proposition, but is not the proposition itself. — Sapientia

But then propositions don't get to have meanings; they are meanings. — Srap Tasmaner

To further confuse the issues:

Someone says, “I’m feeling happily excited,” and this sentence has a proposition to it such that its underlying meaning can be true or false. My dog wags its tail at assuming I’m about to take him for a walk when I pick up his leash and thereby communicates to me that he is feeling happily excited; the dog’s tail wag is not propositional because of what reason?

Its meaning can be true or false. The more intelligent the animal the more capable it is of deception. While it’s rational to assume it is nearly always a communication of what the dog is truly feeling, with a sufficient amount of intelligence what is communicated could also be false. A human’s smile will illustrate this. And some dogs have been known to at least try to intentionally deceive—thereby holding a meta-awareness of what their behaviors convey … and with this, beliefs of what their behaviors impart in the understanding of the other.

(See for example: https://www.newscientist.com/article/2124087-dogs-use-deception-to-get-what-they-want-from-humans-a-sausage/)

More likely it is not propositional because the tail wag is not an underlying meaning to word-based concepts, I presume. But this would imply that propositions, while being the underlying meaning to word-based languages, are all the same contingent upon words. And prioritizing signs over their meaning to me doesn’t yet make sense; a sign that bares no meaning will be little more than white noise.

I’m among those who try to avoid the term “propositions” for reasons such as this, but then maybe a proper noncontradictory denotation for the term could be arrived at.

So as a self acknowledged Taoist of the form you’ve just prescribed, all reasoning is an illusion to you (see the link Ying posted: it's made up of words). I think I get it now.

Not to repeat myself too often, but: As you say …

the Logos, "in the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the Word was God..." — Bitter Crank

I don't recall Heraclitus ever mentioning that. Oh well. As you say ...

Thank you. A very nice reading.

The Tao does not exist. — T Clark

and:

Return is the movement of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao. All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — T Clark

To me the Taoist quote implies that the Tao is that which returns us the the last mentioned "non-being", such that the Tao which is mentioned, or named, exists as this process. The nameless Tao is then the "non-being" to which the Tao we address brings things closer to. So the Tao does exist in this view (though not in the "stands-out" semantics of "exists"; and again, "non-being" to me here seems mistranslated, such that it is not in fact nothingness, though being no thing).

But I can agree to disagree.

Return is the movement of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao. All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — T Clark

I’m presuming something was lost in translations with this last sentence. Take the relatively well known Buddhist concept of Nirvana. It is not made up of things—be these physical, mental, or any other category. Yet, in English parlance, it is not non-being but the very opposite: it is the essence of being, what the no-self doctrine is in large part about, tmk. I so far maintain that the same applies to what this last sentence of Taoism is addressing: birth of what holds presence/being despite not being anything phenomenal and in any way separated, for lack of better terms (what we normally associate with "being"). Don’t know if this is worthy of a debate, but I wanted to mention this perspective.

In agreement, though ... given such (re)interpretation.

Doing a Nietzsche thing by saying something intended for no one and everyone: even if politely replied to, a series of ambiguous declarations assumed to be sound without justification or clarification does not an argument make. Or else we speak different language games, and I’m not interested in playing. Enjoy.

Do not confuse yourself.

When one communicates, it is done intentionally. It requires shared meaning. Shared meaning is language.

All communication requires shared meaning.
All shared meaning is language.
All communication requires language. — creativesoul

When animals express themselves—such as a rattlesnake’s rattle—they do so without intention? If someone answers yes, a large bias is showing—if only in terms of the evolution of the CNS/brain and its associated behaviors. I’ll leave the philosophy of mind component out of this. But I’d be interested to hear of the argument for animals behaving unintentionally, if there is one that doesn’t by its own standards then equally apply to other humans.

The bear to which the rattlesnake rattles does not share the meaning of what the rattle signifies with the snake? Takes a philosopher to argue that there is no shared meaning between the two, typically via the argument of “if I cannot explain it in my own terms then it must not exist even though all empirical indications present it as so”. The bear would be dead otherwise—leading to only those animals being alive that can share the meaning with the snake. That stated, the bear can understand the snake's intentions just as well as the snake in this one regard, and the snake can understand the bear’s intention (to attack or to leave it alone) just as well as the bear. This is a shared meaning between species.

So we answer “no” to both these questions: animals behave intentionally and animals can share meaning across species via their behaviors. Given this:

Therefore, the rattlesnake’s rattle is linguistic???

Personally, I’m OK with all information (of which sentient beings are in any way informed) being conceived of as language in a very broad and poetic sense, as in the Ancient Greek concept of Heraclitian Logos, but even I acknowledge that so upholding is not in keeping with common standards.

Have a look at communication (exchanging information between entities; this definition coming right after that of things such as the communication of smallpox) and language (words and ways of combining them) ... granting that there is significant overlap in subsequent definitions, notably in definitions 4-8 of "language".

More importantly, what does this have to do with belief? — creativesoul

Well, I was replying to a “WTF???” comment made by you know who in relation to what I intended by the term “state-able”.

That being said, this issue of language and communication might well have significant implications on what propositions are. A dog’s and a cat’s moving of the tail hold different meanings (at minimum to dogs, to cats, and to humans); are their tail movements conveying different propositions held by each animal type when so moving their tails? Were the behaviors linguistic, the answer would seem to be a necessary "yes". Were the behaviors only communicational, it would remain an open-ended issue contingent on how one first defines propositions.

Might be helpful to use a word like "development" for changes an individual undergoes during its lifespan, and reserve "evolution" for populations. — Srap Tasmaner

In biology, an individual’s conformity to environment is specified as acclimatization whereas a populace’s conformity to environment (to that which is ontic) over generations is specified by adaptation.

Fitness—which to my mind could, as previously alluded to, be more metaphysically addressed as conformity to the ontic over time (how well something fits into that which is ontic; more concretely, one’s environment)—could then be hypothetically addressed in terms of acclimatization of individuals or cohorts within a specific generation or, else, in terms of adaptation that occurs via numerous generations within a populace (species). I suggest this while strongly emphasizing that “fitness” in current practice within fields of biology is tmk strictly shorthand for “evolutionary fitness”--hence not (always?) encompassing acclimatization (haven't read up on this in a while). Still, to me widening the scope of fitness to include fitness of acclimatizations is in keeping with a lot of our common usages of the term (e.g., that there person is quite fit (in mind as well as body), kind of thing). But, then, there is no such thing as being “more evolved” in biological fields either; all co-existent species are technically always equally evolved--equally selected upon given their ancestral time span. [edit: this not to say that all species are equally fit] Though we all understand what we mean when we say that we are more evolved than bacteria, for example.

Anyway, if any of this is of use ...

Hurricanes, sand dunes, and rivers, for example, are 'replicated' all the time given the right atmospheric/geological/hydrologic conditions [...] — StreetlightX

When thinking about this my preferred subject has been fire (I forget where I first read of the parallel): it can be “birthed” of heat or sparks, for example; can have an “old age” and “die”; it needs to consume energy from outside itself in order to persist/be (i.e., for self-preservation); and, here most relevantly, it can reproduce itself via buddings that travel to new locations. The question here pondered by me being, “what then makes fire a non-living entity (doing away with the limitations of organic compounds as a necessity for life)?” Thought I’d mention this since it might be relevant to future discussions. (So it’s mentioned, my best current answer is that it is entropic rather than negentropic and, hence, autopoietic—I find that the latter two mutually entail each other.)

So at the very least what distinguishes life from other, natural, self-organizing systems is a mechanism of heritability and an ability to self-maintain - the two key components of autopoietic theory. Of these two components, I'm fairly convinced that the universality of DNA as a replication mechanism is, despite it's universality, a contingency due to shared ancestry, rather than an intrinsic component of life itself. — StreetlightX

I am very much in agreement that we shouldn’t prejudice ourselves to life necessarily consisting of the organic chemicals we know it to consist of on Earth—at least when engaged in abstract reasoning concerning the denotations of life and of evolution.

So going back to the question of agency, the question is: where can we locate it? There are - on the outline above - three possible places (at minimum). (1) At the level of sheer reproduction (hurricanes, etc); (2) At the level of the mechanism of heritability (DNA expression, epigenetic processes of methylation, etc), and; (3) At the level of self-maintainence processes. — StreetlightX

I’m of the mindset that (3) is both necessary and sufficient for agency. And again, other planets in other (edit:) universes galaxies might hold self-maintaining agencies/agents that make use of something that is neither nucleic acid based nor protein based. I’m not asserting this as a fact but merely as a possibility I currently find no reason to conclude invalid.

Complications arise when it becomes clear that one can't cleanly and analytically separate (2) and (3): in order to heal a cut, they body draws upon DNA in order to grow new skin to do so. So the question is: it is analytically necessary that processes of self-repair draw upon mechanisms of heritability? What is the modality of the connection between (2) and (3)? — StreetlightX

But when it comes to the question you’ve posed, boldfaced by me, I’ll argue that it is necessary, given the following modification to the question: “that process of heritability draw upon processes of self-repair” (thereby making self-repair and self-maintenance primary and heritability an outgrowth of this primary aspect).

My reason for this is as follows: For evolution consisting of replication to occur (the orthodox current understanding of evolution), there necessarily needs to be inheritable variations among the givens considered. Otherwise, regardless of quantity of qualitatively identical givens which replicate, with a sufficient change in context (here loosely used to specify both external and internal conditions relative to each given) all givens will perish and none will survive (such as to further reproduce). And I take it as a given that changes in context always occur. The process of self-maintenance then, will also need to be to some extent capable of creating relatively random changes in that which is self-maintaining—i.e., capable of creating mutations (some of these will be beneficial, some deleterious, and some inconsequential, at least at the time of mutation). It is the self-maintenance processes that mutate, these encompassing the maintained process of replication. That stated in summarized form, for the non-deleterious mutations to be inheritable—thereby producing naturally occurring variations within the populace—they will need to be bound to the same process utilized in self-repair/self-maintenance (homeostasis, for example, is most commonly not self-repair though it is self-maintenance). Hence, as conclusion the just argued, the processes of self-maintenance and heritability will then need to be interrelated somehow.

In short, my own conclusion is that agency is required for reproduction as an aspect of evolution--something to which fire, I currently find, is for example not subject to (fire does not change its constituency over time).

To be clear about this, I do not desire to stifle interests in evolutionary processes extending beyond the realms of the biological; I’d rather encourage these interests. But I will again uphold that such abiotic evolution will need to reinterpret evolution in manners in which it is not partially contingent upon givens replicating themselves—such that biological evolution becomes a particular variant of a more general, if not universal, process. To this effect, for example: Evolution of language (a very interesting topic), to the extent it holds replicating givens (such as concepts and their expressions) a) is yet driven by (biotic) agency and b) yet holds naturally occurring variations in the givens addressed (again, concepts, their expressions, and the like).

Missed the sarcasm. Needed a :wink: — Hanover

(palm to the face emoticon) Got it. Wasn't being sarcastic, though. I really did like the post's contents; "thumbs up". :smile:

... I'm off the the night.

I was being humorous, in my way at least. I agreed with the contents of your post and communicated/expressed my agreement with you're post's contents without using words/language.

Since when is language limited to only verbal? — creativesoul

So a person's smile, a dog's growl, and a snakes rattle are all linguistic? Some might disagree, such as those who uphold that language is properly speaking the conveyance of words, be these auditory, tactile, written, or via sign-language ... So next question: what is language?

Not following. The belief isn't the behavior. — Hanover

What's that got to do with all behavior being communicative to any other being that has a even a remote similarity of behaviors?

So it doesn't go unexpressed, :up:

All communication IS language.

WTF??? — creativesoul

Try expressing this to all the research that goes into non-verbal communication, ya know, facial expressions and the like. Whistling down the wind.