Can one trust prior to being able to doubt? — creativesoul

My answer is an unequivocal "yes". To doubt one must first hold a trust for that which is accurate, for one example. Since we were talking about non-linguistic creatures, were a dog or a chimp capable of doubting something, it would first need to trust that there is a distinction between what we term right/true/correct and wrong/false/incorrect (they each point to something held in common). Addressed otherwise, doubt always is contingent upon a preexisting certainty, i.e. on something which we trust to be.

Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes. — creativesoul

Ah. I can see how that could be inferred. But no. What I want to address is not something which is because it takes the form of a thought which we can manipulate via the act of thinking. I instead was here addressing what to me are inherent aspects of awareness. For example: To be aware of anything, I argue, presupposes a trust that that which one is aware of is as one interprets it to be. [It would be a long list, but, for example: an imagined ghost is trusted to so be imagined; a so called real apparition of a ghost is trusted to be real by those who "see" the ghost. Thoughts and justifications as to what was and was not real that occur after the fact here placed aside; though these too are likewise trusted to be as one apprehends them to be ... and so forth.]

Hence, I was not addressing this as an acquired trust. For example, we instinctively trust that that which we see is as we see it to be; as do animals; we humans can, however, come to no longer trust our eyes in certain situations due learned trust: such as when where sticks get seemingly bent when submerged in water. But this is built up over our innate trust in what we see being as we see it to be. BTW, I gather that some presume human infants acquire all such trust. I disagree with this. As an example: an infant trusts the stimuli of a nipple to be as it anticipates it to be and acts accordingly, without having learned how to do so or consciously holding conceptual understandings of what it's doing and interacting with. Nevertheless, in so doing, it innately trusts its impressions (not very visual, but consisting of many tactile perceptions) to "correspond to reality". Not reality as a conceived of ontology; rather, reality as that which is real.

I'm curious. Do you uphold a "blank slate" notion of mind?

The wisest is who knows that he knows nothing. — Blue Lux

Oh yea, well:

Once there was a man --
Oh, so wise!
In all drink
He detected the bitter,
And in all touch
He found the sting.
At last he cried thus:
"There is nothing --
No life,
No joy,
No pain --
There is nothing save opinion,
And opinion be damned." — Stephen Crane

:razz:

Who wants to be wise, anyway. :smile:

I think that's more like a description of the jhana states of 'neither perception nor non perception' and the like, which are part of the Buddhist path, but not the final aim of it. — Wayfarer

Good to know.

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Edit: Maybe I was too laconic with my answer. As to Nirvana being the end of samsara, I’ve read of this, naturally. I’ve also read of many who claim to have obtained, or actualized, Nirvana … this while still in samsara, still getting hungry/thirsty ever now and then, still hurting occasionally from pains, still getting old and dying. Which to me seem rather hypocritical, if not dishonest—as compared to professing, say, “he’s gained an awareness of what Nirvana is; or of Nirvana as an aim”. But I don’t want to turn the thread into a discussion on what Buddhist notions of Nirvana entail ... a topic on which you're much better versed.

Yes, but is the first person point of view really as it is usually characterized, or is that too a reification of an abstract conceptual understanding? — Janus

I’d go with the latter. In this situation, there something of the Buddhist thought that I rely on (to the extent my interpretations even come close to what was meant): The first person point of view holds real being and therefore is, yet the reified thoughts it very often ascribes to its own being—making itself an entity which, like physical objects, persists in unchanged ways over time—is erroneous. For example, I imagine the Buddhist notion of Nirvana to be the non-temporal instance wherein the first person point of view is no longer “constrained” so to speak by objects of awareness … and, somehow, gains a fully awareness of Being as foundationally being non-dualistic (or something like this). So, “neither is there a unified self nor is there not a unified self” sort of thing.

In this connection and in relation to my discussion with Wayfarer I would say that the notion of "transcendental apperception" is a very sophisticated example of an attenuated analysis founded on the notion of the subject/object divide; and not something experienced prior to it. — Janus

Then I’ve misunderstood some crucial aspect of transcendental apperception. I was previously thinking it was, in part, a way of addressing that process in which experiences of being and being are undifferentiated. Again, that awareness which is not of an object/subject divide but to which objects of awareness pertain. I’ll read on to see what unfolds. Curious to find out.

I would want to say that the unified self—“the first person point of view” as I name it—is not so much before the object/subject divide as it is at the very center of it. Taking the form of subject whenever objects of awareness are apprehended—which is pretty much whenever we’re aware of things other than those that are constituents of us as the unified self/ves (I can't stand the thought of solipsism, and that some entertain it). Words get in the way, but, for example, the moment we think of ourselves being happy/certain we then make this thought an object of our awareness—and at its core is the subject which is happy/certain in manners that do not differentiate the experience from the being which experiences. But this now seems to be somewhat tangential to the issue.

Agree with your analysis. — Wayfarer

Cheers :grin:

So do you think Javra is saying that the unchanging unity of apperception is experientially and/or metaphysically real, as opposed to being merely a formal stipulation? — Janus

Oh, to me the first person point of view is as real as anything else.

Not only physical objects are objects of experience; sensations, pains, emotions, thoughts may also be; in fact they must be objects of experience if we can speak sensibly and truly about them. — Janus

True, but there are certain experiences which do not consist of a first person point of view perceiving, sensing, or understanding something other—other relative to itself as the first person point of view which apprehends percepts, sensations, or understandings/meanings (e.g. abstractions). In these limited set of experiences the object of awareness / subject of awareness divide break down so as to no longer be. These experiences can include those of being happy and of being certain—among others, naturally including unhappiness and uncertainty.

Here it is the “I” which both is happy or certain as a subject of awareness and also, simultaneously, experiences its own happiness or certainty as the objects of its awareness. But, this latter sentence is only a poorly phrased linguistic expression. Experientially (which I intentionally differentiate from our modern understanding of “empirically”), in being happy or certain the object/subject of awareness no longer exists as a dichotomy. And it is this unified awareness of self - always changing in form in some way while likewise always remaining unchanged in being unified - that can be happy or certain which, then, cannot be an object of awareness. Again, experienced happiness or certainty is neither the object nor subject of awareness, while simultaneously being both in an undifferentiated manner while taking the form of :"that which experiences objects of awareness".

Re-expressed, happiness and certainty are examples of experiences which are not objects of awareness but, instead, constitute that which is the subject of awareness which apprehends objects of awareness.

So to say that the unified self which can experience itself to be happy/certain, etc. is itself an object of awareness/experience is a category error—for it is that to which objects of experience (including those of thoughts and imagined objects) pertain which, of itself, can be happy or certain (for example) in its so being.

Wikipedia defines thought as encompassing a “goal oriented flow of ideas and associations that leads to a reality-oriented conclusion.” Granting this definition (imperfect though it might be), whether thought requires language and, if not, when it does and when it doesn’t is, to me, again, ultimately grounded upon metaphysical presuppositions. And I currently do not want to engage in debate over metaphysical presuppositions. If this is too abstract, one issue is that of whether or not thought is teleological. And language to me is at the very least one form of highly developed thought. But, again, I find that answering your questions requires complex, metaphysics-contingent answers—which I’d rather not presently discuss.

Am I somewhat uneducated then? — Posty McPostface

no

:razz: :up:

Then again, no one can be perfectly educated, and the ambition to become better educated is always a good thing for, well, typically, at least those individuals that are educated.

Two things to assist in your reply. (I probably won't be around for a day or two)

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability. — Cheshire

The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: it is ontic that there is nothing ontic; thereby concluding in both A and not-A at the same time and in the same way. If we allow for one logical contradiction, such as this one, to be valid/just then it would lead into a type of ubiquitous unintelligibility—for anything could then potentially only be valid only if logically contradictory. We are therefore stuck with the law of noncontradiction for as long as we want anything to remain intelligible to us. Thereby necessitating that we mandatorily accept that there in fact is something ontic. This too is not infallible, but I propose it is not falsifiable either. (Having read up on it some, I’m not big on dialetheism for this reason—which is upheld due to a lack of justification for the law of noncontradiction.)

So we then can "unfalsifiedly" know that something ontic is. But as to the details, such as in our knowledge of what is ontic being accurate, yes: we remain fallible with sometimes lesser degrees of certainty. Still, again, this does not entail that we are thereby wrong.

Simply put, objective truth may be possible, but knowing when it occurs might not be. — Cheshire

Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided. (It’s a bit of a quantum leap, I imagine, between the assumption that we can hold absolute/ideal/objective/infallible/indubitable/etc. knowledge (for which truth—if not also justification—with the same qualifiers is required) and a justified conviction that such a thing is not, at least presently, possible to obtain for anything whatsoever.*)

Again, we cannot infallibly know anything. Be we can and do fallibly know very much--some of which, such as 1 + 1 = 2, is currently unfalsifiable by any means we can currently think of.

I mentioned these two points, in part, because your stances seem to me to present a kind of slippery slope toward Pyrrhonianism. This is where, roughly expressed, it is deemed warranted to not hold any beliefs due to all epistemological criteria being fallible. But then, if so held, the very act of debating would be a bit hypocritical.

------

* In thinking of a possible criticism for what I've stated: Instead of something along the lines of "I know that I know nothing", replace with, "I/we fallibly know that I/we infallibly know nothing".

Rational justification doesn't imply infallibility, so falling short of infallibility does not leave a thing unjustified. — Cheshire

But of course.

And here lies the issue I have and repeat. All justification can not be said to be sufficient based on the criteria of any given audience. Can it appear as such? certainly, but this is no fault of the concept of justification. An argument can't said to be justified because of who is judging it. — Cheshire

Yes and no. But here, to approach the matter from a different angle, we'd start addressing the issue of universals. Justness, or the property of being just, is only found within individual minds; yet, it is impartially applicable to all minds, regardless of what the particular mind might want to make of it. So the the universal of justness is a universal standard by which all judgements, be they rational or irrational, are measured. And the decision to deem something sufficiently justified rests upon the mind(s) concerned.

Though I already know the concept of universals is a big and contentious issue. But this is my take.

BTW, tangentially, I venture that lesser animals do not appraise the world via what we recognize as logical contradictions. If so, than the universals of the law of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle applies to them as well. Again, making such ubiquitous universals technically be ubiquitous universals. Its a supposition, but I find merit in it all the same.

I don't find justification to be the best measuring stick for the quality of knowledge. So, I'm a bit indifferent to how well somethings been justified. I would rather know that it had been criticized and remained unfalsified. — Cheshire

Remaining unfalsified is itself a form of judgment as pertains to justification: the means used to appraise something as unfalsified will themselves be a form of justification. But this aside:

If one upholds that all justification and appraisals of truth are fallible, then by what (rational) means does one discern what is and is not in fact wrong if not via justifications? (an answer here is sincerely wanted)

No, I probably could try to; but I was alluding to the third law of thought. "What is, is." The fact you posses an unknown error in your knowledge is simply a matter of being human subject to error. — Cheshire

The third law of thought is that of the excluded middle, which naturally follows those of identity and noncontradiction. (for technical purposes, this when the qualifier of "in the same way and at the same time" is applied)

More importantly: How does it follow that some given which is liable to error is therefore erroneous?

I'm really just skipping the middle man and suggesting our definition of knowledge falls short of reality. Because either our apprehension of what is true or our justification for what is true will be subject to error so long as we are human. I think we nearly agree. — Cheshire

Here's a crucial point in which we disagree: that our awareness of what is ontic is liable to error does not then entail that there is nothing ontic. Hence, the distinction between operational knowledge and ideal knowledge. Until infallible appraisal of truth and justification can be made, we will not be able to obtain ideal knowledge (there's a caveat to this, but it applies only to one metaphysical given which is itself a-rational: that which just is; and the obtainment of ideal knowledge of it also requires a literal eradication of distinction between itself and all forms of subjectivity ... this only as a hypothetical of what might be possible in principle; its a trite issue but I've mentioned this hypothetical exception for maintained accuracy all the same. Please don't mind this part if it doesn't make sense or apply to your concerns as pertains this thread's issues of knowledge). Again, until then, we only have operational knowledge of what is, which itself is meaningless without the standard of ideal knowledge ... by which it can become potentially falsified.

Hence, until you evidence why the possibility of being wrong about X entails that one is wrong about X, that which we operationally know can well be fully conformant to reality.

If you find yourself disagreeing, then please evidence how fallibility entails the necessary presence of error.

Don't you have to torture the meaning of "justified" in order to maintain this position?" By saying to the satisfaction of its bearers" it seems to erase justification's implied rational characteristics. — Cheshire

Can rational justification be infallible, i.e. perfectly secure form all possible error? I don’t believe it can. This does lead into a major quandary in philosophy, but, if its untrue, can anyone here supply evidence of an infallible justification (e.g., such that all premises and means of justifying are themselves evidenced to be perfectly secure from all possible error)?

Otherwise, it seems to me that all justification will be deemed sufficient for its intended purposes when it satisfies those for which the justification is provided (be it one’s own self or others to which its expressed).

So the issue of how and when knowledge is deemed to be, such as in relation to the examples previously provided, still remains.

But I acknowledge the issues become increasingly more complex the further they become enquired into; to me, it inevitably leads into metaphysical positions concerning various aspects of reasoning, such as those of the three basic laws of thought.

And the result of this trespass is a new variable. The 'Grounding'; which feels nice intuitively, but have we solved a problem here or created one? What does a belief alone mean to us now? The answers given randomly to binary questions, but held without discern-able reason?

No sir, you put justification back where you found it and play with your own toys. — Cheshire

Don’t know if you’ve been keeping track of the conversations on the thread; I added the “grounded” part due to them. For simplicity of argument, however, I’ve no issue with sticking to the concept of “justification” as traditionally understood.

And stop it with the “sir”, mon senior. We’re all brats here, me thinks. :smile: [or maybe this was just you being a brat just like the rest us :razz: ]

Why should you believe that in all the things you know at least one is a mistake? I would maintain you accept it based on the law of identity. — Cheshire

You’d have to explain this better for me to understand. Are you alluding to the law of noncontradiction?

I think there's reason to be certain at least some of them are wrong and by trying to falsify our beliefs we eliminate our errors and our knowledge improves or specifically becomes a better approximation to ideal knowledge. Without this assumption of unknown error we are left guarding beliefs when we should be testing them. It's a subtle, but significant difference in positions. — Cheshire

As stated, I can find this disposition warranted. Nevertheless, what I was attempting to emphasize is that there’s no need to become paranoid about being wrong about any particular upheld known—not until there’s some evidenced reason to start believing it is, or at least might be, wrong. But yes, remaining at least somewhat open to the possibility is part and parcel of the epistemological stance I maintain: fallibilism (or, a specific form of global skepticism that, unlike Cartesian skepticism, is not doubt-contingent).

I cannot be convinced that a language less creature is capable of believing/trusting that the earth beneath it's feet is solid, unless that belief can be formed by virtue of a language-less creature drawing correlations between different things(including but not limited to itself), and all of those things exist in their entirety prior to being part of the creature's correlation. — creativesoul

My more justified answers to your posts are contingent on a number of metaphysical conclusions. I’ll try to do my best to reply without embarking upon these.

Trust to me is itself a process of awareness heavy embedded in metaphysical issues. Trying to define trust in the broadest manner possible while skipping all these, I get roughly this definition: a disposition—be it a) genetically instinctive, b) learned and stored within memory and one’s unconscious, or else c) consciously maintained and utilized—of so called “psychological” (and not epistemic) certainty toward what was, is, or will be.

So:

Suppose an animal which has not acquired a trust that the earth is solid beneath its feet were to walk upon quicksand. Why would it have done this if not for its innate (genetically instinctive) trust that the earth beneath its feet is solid?

I’ll keep this short since there’s a lot here that could be disagreed with; including a philosophy of mind which addresses a) innate, genetically inherited behaviors/dispositions, b) the unconscious were tacit memories and learned behaviors are stored, and c) conscious awareness (with the latter being perpetually interwoven with the two former). Although this isn’t metaphysics, it’s still a rather contentious subject, and my understandings of trust heavily rely upon the overall understanding of mind just addressed.

I’m mainly wanting to see the extent to which there’s common ground so far as concerns understandings of what trust is.

ps.

Here you've invoked the need for trust/belief prior to associations between things. I replace trust/belief with presupposing the existence thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification(s). That would be the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality inherent to all belief. — creativesoul

To me, this very presupposition you address is one of maintained trust that, namely trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality". And here, I'd uphold this to be an innate (or genetically inherited) trust.

This seems to be an issue of finding meaning in one's life. I suspect it is an issue of not knowing what one wants. So, part of the aim of education should be to identify what a person wants and needs, and try to have them achieve that, within reasonable circumstances. — Posty McPostface

Well, to me that sounds more like the role of a counselor. Good teachers however can wear many hats. Thing is, shoot … I think the best way I can express this is via the parable of the person who teaches the famished other how to fish rather than giving him/her food. Does this make sense?

I think it was Aristotle that I’m now paraphrasing: A good teacher is to be admired more than a parent, for the parent only gives the gift of live, whereas the good teacher gives the gift of living life well.

But, as others have said, this won’t happen by “telling”.

I suspect also, that there's a deeper issue here. We are no longer treated as subjects in academic settings. Instead, we're a bundle of potential utility to the economy, which schools have to realize. — Posty McPostface

Definitely.

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I'll be out for a while.

So, in the end, do we feel guilt or shame in getting something for nothing? Guilt is a powerful motivator. — Posty McPostface

Don’t know. Children, I believe, just feel the vanity to it without knowing how to articulate it. Adults, sometimes, learn to believe that getting everything for nothing is the best way to go. And I somehow doubt these adults feel shame or guilt about it—but I do believe they yet feel empty inside.

I want to bring up the self-esteem movement that has grasped American high schools and other educational settings. — Posty McPostface

It’s been going on for a while where I'm at.

What's the deal with that movement? Everyone should get a reward for just being in school or what? Is this what trying to encourage happiness as a goal has resulted in? It's an utter failure in my mind. — Posty McPostface

Because it’s contradictory to our innate sense of merit, to feeling rewarded for successfully overcoming challenges, for doing good, and for being correct in our beliefs. It’s getting everything for nothing. And children sense that this is a vein, or empty, worth.

I could argue there are good intentions behind it—such as in wanting children to not feel worthless—but, from my experiences, it doesn’t work for the reasons just mentioned. In my experience, the hardest thing to teach is a genuine interest in wanting to learn, to gain more knowledge and, possibly, wisdom. This by learning how to question. The good teachers I had knew how to do so—thereby bringing about self-esteem in us as a consequence of our held effort and desire. Not by teaching that we should hold self-esteem so as to learn. Don’t know if this is what other as calling “awesomeness” but it certainly wasn’t about having fun in the classroom. It was about learning, and when there was a mutually pleasant, reciprocal interest on the part of students and teacher(s), the fun then followed.

But since I take it you’re looking for something more concrete, the number one way to making education better? Decrease class sizes. Make it more personal. This can only make things better regardless of the qualities of the teacher(s). There are other factors, such as in selecting for better teachers via better pay that draws in more candidates, but impersonal interactions are always a lot less effective than personal ones.

Ok. I was going by the US and what I know of Europe. Glad to hear, and quite hopeful, that this situation isn’t ubiquitous.

Yea. I was a high-school teacher in Compton once. Spoke from some personal experience. Kids that are intelligent—with a big emphasis on this—but don’t know how to subtract hundreds, don’t know who Hitler or Stalin was, and so on. You’ll note that “too many” is, however, not a blanket statement. That aside, are you upholding that society today is better informed about the world than it was a few decades past?

Yea :smile: . Thought I'd help out a bit by doing my part to keep the thread on topic.

Just saw some similar comments, but since I’m feeling a bit cranky myself:

Uhum. To hell with happiness. You want to be happy go to Disney town until you’re sick and tired of it, then, after your fed up with being happy, go back to class where the teachers teach you (and not “facilitate”) about the world.

Problem is that too many teachers today have their heads stuck up their donkey, have no good education themselves, and don’t give a hoot about children’s welfare—which doesn’t consist in being happy, but in being well-informed. Why do we not all get lobotomized just right so as always be happy till the moment we perish? Whatever your personal answer happens to be, it demonstrates that there’s a lot more to life than constantly feeling oneself to be on cloud nine.

And as compared to today—a time that correlates nicely with economic theories which illustrate that it’s in the interest of profit to have an uninformed/dumb electorate/populace—the 50s and 60s in America (at the very least) was one golden age of education. Because those folk were vastly more informed than we presently are. It only led to things such as increased equality between people of different stripes being institutionalized—activities which did not make the respective practitioners persistently happy, like when being bit by police dogs.

Ok, just wanted to throw that in.

I think I get what others are saying though, happiness in the sense of eudemonia … in which case, never mind all of this.

My reason for presenting it in the way that I did was, largely, to illustrate the difference between justified / well-grounded beliefs (in the latter example) and those that are not (in the first example). Maybe a better example should be used; all the same: In both the before and after versions, the same two basic realities are at play: a cat is out in the yard and satellites are up in the sky. In the before version, though, there is no rational connection between these facts and the held known. In the latter (granted that it’s a very strange cat which only goes outdoors on fully sunny days), the same two facts are now rationally associated with the affirmed known.

The way I’ve asked the question, “if it’s a believed truth that is justified (or warranted) to the satisfaction of its bearers”, then intends to get at more significant examples of knowledge. Such as knowledge of reality being as materialism, or idealism, or Cartesianism affirms it to be. Which, if any, actually knows how reality in fact is? (it could be something apart from these three choices) If it’s asserted that they all in fact know how reality is, then is reality inherently contradictory? Or is knowledge indifferent to truth? And so on … but in all cases, the respective belief-that will be justified/warranted to the satisfaction of its bearers—just that it will not be deemed justified by those of contradictory positions, due to what these latter will perceive as inherent contradictions in the positions addressed (or some other rational fallacy).

I know the aforementioned probably confuses things a bit. But, again, what else can knowledge be if not a belief whose reasons for being are rationally associated and that is in fact true?

Alternatively, isn’t this why so called mad men are so labeled: their explanations for why they believe what they do are not rationally sound?

However I would like to learn more about evolution and how people think it is possible to evolve in an unnatural world. — bloodninja

I haven’t heard it formally addressed by name so far in this thread, though it’s been more or less directly alluded to: sexual selection is an important aspect of biological evolution in all species in which sexual reproduction occurs. For humans, for example, were all women to solely choose type X males to have sex with, and where all men to likewise solely choose type X women to have sex with, then our species would biologically evolve to eventually consist of only type X people (together with the variations that naturally ensue due to givens such as non-lethal mutations, recessive alleles, and the like). What I’ve expressed is the extremely simplified version, and it does presuppose the reality of biological evolution. That said, for as long as humans will have sex via any mode of choice in who we have sex with, and for as long as reproductions occur via sexual intercourse, the species will continue its "natural"--and typically very gradual--biological evolution. But again, there are a lot of additional factors involved in this; as one among very, very many: that of changing contexts leading to different attributes being most beneficial and, hence, potentially attractive.

Think I'm just re-expressing what Bitter Crank has in mind, just in more formal terms.

I too find myself between these two extremes:The one side denying any and all non linguistic thought and belief based upon an utterly inadequate framework that sorely neglects to draw and maintain a meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief; and the other side neglecting to draw and maintain the equally crucial distinctions necessary for taking proper account of the complexity of belief. — creativesoul

I’m currently interpreting the following to be in line with your outlook, and since it fits into the thread’s subject:

I’ve come to understand belief as the content to that which is trusted to be (including to have been and to will be). I’ve also come to find at least three categories for trust: trust-that (trusting that X in fact is; e.g. trusting that the earth beneath one’s feet is solid); trust-in (roughly, trusting that X can or will do Y; e.g. trusting in Ted’s capacity to do well in a marathon despite the uncertainty to this); and trust-between (roughly, trust existing between two or more agencies as pertains to implicitly maintained contractual obligations; e.g. Alice’s trust that Bill will not deceive her). “To believe” is to me then fully synonymous in all instances with “to trust”.

Curious to know what criticism of this overall proposition could be offered. (I’ve addressed one potential criticism below)

Thus understood, though, to believe is other than to think—for the latter requires connections made between givens whereas the former a) does not and b) is a prerequisite to thought’s occurrence (each associated given must be trusted in some way prior to associations between them being made).

When one ponders one’s beliefs, one is then thinking about what one generally trusts in manners that now abstract the formerly held enactive trust/belief—this into something now apprehended by the contemplator which enactively trusts. Again, such that one must enactively trust that one’s apprehended abstractions, memories, etc. pertaining to that which one trusts are valid. That which is pondered in some existential sense now becomes other relative to that agency which is enactively trusting.

Likewise, to think is also in similar manner different than thinking about thought—for the thought one thinks about is that which is apprehended by the thinker.

BTW, in conjunction with the aforementioned, one then can also classify trust as being innate (e.g., a calf’s innate trust that it must stand and run as quickly as it can); learned (e.g., one’s learned trust that Earth circles the sun and not the other way around); or enactive (e.g., one’s consciously held trust whenever some uncertainty is consciously discerned).

Thus understood, beliefs can be innate, learned, or enactively held. Animals not capable of any significant degree of intelligence will be largely guided by innate trust/beliefs that cannot be altered—save by processes of biological evolution acting out on the life or death of individuals relative to a given species (or, such as is the case with ants, individual colonies/cohorts). The more intelligent the animal the more learned trust/belief it will hold a capacity to gain via enactive trust/belief that later on become tacitly remembered. When it comes to humans, we’re intelligent enough to be capable of sometimes altering both our learned trust/belief and, less often, our innate trust/belief via our enactive trust/beliefs.

So it’s known: The major criticism that I know of concerns the way in which trust is typically thought of in English speaking communities, as strictly pertaining to agency in relation to other agencies (cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_(emotion)). But I believe (trust) that this is too narrow a demarcation of what is ontically occurring—brought about by how English conceptualizes reality via words’ connotations. For example, in Romanian (harkening to Latin) there is no linguistic disparity between trust and belief—both being addressable via the word “cred” (as per credo); and to have trust in another agency can (but is not necessarily) specified by “in-cred-ere” (akin to “to entrust”). Hence, “I believe you” gets translated as “te cred” [whereas “I believe in you” translates into “am incredere in tine”]; this while “I believe that […] gets translated as “cred ca […]”. To me this serves as one reason/example for why a more universal aspect of belief-as-trust is ontically present in mind processes than that which English specifies.

OK, all this is a mouthful. But then, propositional knowledge can roughly be expressed as “well-grounded trust-that that is true”. Criticisms of the aforementioned, wherever applicable, would again be welcomed.

Best advice I can offer follows from a translation technique I like to use when folk are using terms in a way unfamiliar to myself. We can replace the term with it's definition in every instance of use. If the overall writing still makes sense, then it's an acceptable manner of speaking. — creativesoul

Yes, its a promising idea; still, replacing words with definitions can make communication cumbersome. The longer a definition the more cumbersome the expressions become. And I don’t have a short definition. (more on this below)

The bit above regarding justification being a more advanced form of what occurs in pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic creatures is not at all problematic for me. In fact, it would have to be that way, or similarly so, if my own position is right. — creativesoul

Very glad we concur here.

It seems that you're using this notion of 'evidencing' as a manner of talking about sufficient reason to believe... or warrant. It's commonly called "ground" for belief. Seems like nothing is lost if we swap "evidenced" and "justifies" with "grounded" and/or "warrants"... — creativesoul

“Grounded” and “evidenced” are indeed synonyms. But “evidenced” seems to me to provide the process by which the conclusion is obtained—that of data and reasoning about it—whereas “grounded” does not, instead simply serving as conclusion. No?

“Warrants”, I’ve wanted to make use of the word myself previously in this thread. Two issues that come to mind. One is that warranting has many other meanings such that when the word is used, to my ear, it does not specify reasoning as process. The second more directly concerns the thread’s subject: should propositional knowledge then be phrased as “warranted true belief”? Here again, the implication of “belief supported by reasoning to be true” seems to me to be connotatively lacking. I find that the continuum between nonlinguistic intelligent animals and adult humans should be expressible by a single terminology. Otherwise, it at the very least insinuates a division in attributes.

Still thinking about it, though. Part of why I’ve been thought-stuttering here (yes, unbeknownst to others, I have) is that I associate “justify” with “making just” and, in turn, “just” with a metaphysical principle for that which is … well, it’s hard to express in a few words. At any rate, here I deviate from a physicalist’s framework. To laconically express it would only be poetry and to justify it … well, it’s a very long analytical philosophy I’m working on. But on a whim, I’ll try anyway. You have the intra-subjective, this being what goes on in and only in individual minds; dreams for example, among many others. Then there’s the inter-subjective: languages, cultures, etc. Then there’s the dia-subjective: givens that are, curtly expressed, equally applicable to all intra-subjectivities; i.e. physical objectivity, inclusive of its natural laws. And the last category: non-subjective reality. This last category is, for lack of a better short phrase, metaphysical objectivity; hence, equally applicable, or impartial, to all intra-subjectivities. Justness, then, is in my view a property of non-subjective reality. By all means, no justification for any of this was provided so there’s absolutely no call to take any of this seriously; I’m saying this in all earnest. But with this as background, if non-subjective reality is, and if this metaphysical objectivity is in part synonymous to justness, then to justify something is to align it with that which, firstly, is metaphysically objective (via reasoning) and, secondly, as a derivative, to that which is physically objective (via reasoning + data). I understand if this brief account isn’t making much sense; never mind if it does not seem credible. I’ve nevertheless mentioned it, however, so as to illustrate why I’m so attached to the term “justify”, i.e. to make just. It fits well into the metaphysics I’ve in mind—and, here, it does not necessarily imply either linguistic manifestations nor thought which occurs after the fact.

If I’ve just spoken out of hand by mentioning my reasons for preferring the term “justify”, my bad. I’m pretty certain we share different metaphysical dispositions and, on my part, it’s by far not the most important aspect of this thread’s discussions.

I’m going to mull over the issue of terminology some more, though. Thanks again for your input so far.

Unfortunately for the debate, didn't find much of anything to disagree with.

Simply put, should we let evolution do what it does best which is filter out the weak? — intrapersona

I strongly disagree with this notion. But I’ll just address it in this way:

The Mike Tyson’s of the world can pulverize the world’s Einsteins; therefore we should let ear-biting boxers rule and do away with the Einstein’s (the guy had a weird kind of dyslexia or some such, which, naturally, is a disability). For evolution is about the culling of the weak.

Love is a weakness via which to manipulate others to one’s own will, say the unloving and self-proclaimed strong. Let all humans that love be enslaved by those who don’t till only the strong remain. For evolution is about the death of the weak.

Victims of rape were responsible for their own victimization, for they were not strong, say those rapists who are. Let all humans change into rapists or perish, for evolution is about the annihilation of the weak.

… And among this horrendously long list are those where born, or else become, disabled.

Um, nope; none of this sounds right to me. But it always was and always will be fodder for those who are waiting for the worms to come (a Pink Floyd reference). Whenever we are altruistic toward each other, we are strong; when we cull each other out, we become weak—this at the expense of a few who ultimately implode due to lack of social infrastructure. Or so evolution has selected to be the norm for social species. It’s why the “cheaters” among mankind that do things like bite off others' ears in a fair fight, lack love, or rape are not much liked.

Yes, evolution and ethics is a complex issue. Still, it’s not the ethics of a society verses biological evolution. Our ethics—with its cheaters and all—has evolved to so be. The only way to deny this is to deny biological evolution to begin with. And, to be clear, I do say this as someone who upholds something along the lines of an omega point.

I thoroughly enjoy critiquing others' and my own writings, and do appreciate valid objections. I seek them out, in fact, often. Unfortunately, they're few to be found hereabouts. That said, you didn't elaborate upon one, but hinted at it. I agree with the sentiment about some saying that valid inference requires language use. I could probably make that argument against my claim. Kudos. — creativesoul

In the words of the British, buggers. I was hoping to get on with other things, but since this is intellectually stimulating …

What I was hinting at leads back to the way all languages I’m very familiar with (roughly, two: English and the other one being largely Latin based, Romanian) are structured. They very often presuppose linguistic capacity in the cognitive attributes they specify. In a way this makes a great deal of sense: we’re addressing these concepts to ourselves, not to non-linguistic creatures. In another way, to my mind, it handicaps philosophical enquiries into what is by predisposing our abstract thought to limit itself to that realm of linguistically-dependent cognitive givens. Add to this ego-centeredness and the anthropocentrism that naturally ensues in light of the problem of other minds and, to me, there’s something of a near universal cultural bias that obfuscates the way we, humans, contemplate all things pertaining to mind, most especially non-human minds. (And, for fairness, on the other side of the isle there’s the occasional character that believes lesser animals are just as aware of things as humans are, the anthropomorphizing crowd. Me, I’m stuck somewhere in the middle between what I deem to be these two, to me not very well-grounded, extremes.)

For example, we deem that one must first understand what “validity” and “inference” point to as words prior to being capable of engaging in valid inferences—for how can one engage in valid inferences (further complicated by the sometimes very formal structures we associate with them) when one does not know what the language-demarcated concepts are?

Somewhat tangentially, Descartes is well reputed to have believed that lesser animals are basically mind-devoid automatons. He’s anecdotally known, for example, to have kicked a pregnant bitch while believing she held no feelings to speak of. This being only rational to him. Because only humans have feelings, i.e. emotions—not to even bring up the capacity of reasoning and, hence, of making inferences … which are worthless if not somehow evaluated for their validity in contrast to their potential falsehood. (to those who go by anatomy, just as lesser mammals have their own limbic systems, so too do they have their own cerebral cortexes, these being less developed mirror images of our own ... not to even mention analogous evolution of intelligence as can be found in octopuses)

But this topic is to me a headache. One that should be resolved, but not a subject which data alone can resolve. To me, this issue requires reasoning concerning metaphysics—as far removed as it may sometimes be to immediate concerns. And so doing is too off-course from the thread’s intended subject—and debate via soundbites hardly does the topic justice. BTW, if at all of interest, the book Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved by Frans de Waal, et al. serves as a good example of these complexities—and of the difficulty in using data to resolve the matter. IMO, it sort of all boils down to preexisting metaphysical commitments on the part of each particular philosopher or scientist. And our language certainly conveys in implicit manners many of these metaphysical commitments—to not even bring up our culture(s).

That’s my general take in regards to language and cognitive processes—even if it is a bit too general. But if there’s something more specific that you’d like to address in terms of the capacity to reason among more intelligent non-linguistic beings, let me know what it is. Also, to the extent we differ in this just addressed outlook, I wouldn't mind finding out how.

I’ll address some of your other replies a little later on.

Hey, thanks for the thoughtful reply.

Yea, human language is built to connote human language dependent concepts when it comes to many a mind-associated process or attribute. Talk to some and they’ll insist that “valid inference” necessitates the use of language as well. But be this as it may.

I’ve used “believed truth” as shorthand for distinguishing belief-that from belief-in, both of which are beliefs.

As to the criteria for “evidencing” … again, this would get deeper into interpretations of mind than I’d like. I’ll try though: that which evidences is that which suggests the truth of. One might object in that non-linguistic beings lack our linguistic concept of truth. Clearly they lack any account of what truth is; yet, again, for lack of better terms that are ready present, I uphold they do have understandings of that which conforms to reality, i.e. of that which is true.

I’ll provide an example (there are far better ones when it comes to lesser animals, such as those pertaining to great apes, but keeping this sufficiently common): a person’s petting a dog on the back typically evidences the person’s affection toward the dog to the dog. The dog’s memories of being petted will then evidence to the dog that the person who pets him holds affection for him. The data here non-linguistically justifies the given belief-that (haven’t yet come up with a novel term for the concept, though).

If I’m not mistaken, seems like our primary disagreements are over the words that should be properly used. And that no proper words exist for the intended concepts. To me, however, this is not to say that the concepts are lacking or that they’re not well-grounded, to use your semantics.

If they are well-grounded, then these currently ineffable (?) concepts do relate to the thread’s contents; this by illustrating how linguistic justification can be a more advanced, abstracted form of what occurs in pre-/non-linguistic intelligent beings so as to result in “well-grounded beliefs”. But it’s hard to debate most of this if the concepts are not understood via the words used. So, presently, I’m contingently planning on backing out of this discussion.

The act of justification is when a speaker provides the ground for his/her belief statement to another person. — creativesoul

In my previous post I addressed what I intended by the term "to justify" as process and "justification" as an instance of this process. The concept I have in mind and have described does not require language--thought it also applies to linguistic expressions. And, so far, I have no better term for it than that of "justify/justification". I won't rewrite it, but its there.

Linguistically, when asked, "how do you justify X?" what is typically asked is, "what are your reasons for believing X to be true?" One doesn't need to provide these reasons for the valid reasons to be there, i.e. for the belief to be well-grounded, I agree in this. But if reasoning is provided among us linguistic beings and if the reasoning is found valid, then the believed truth is then deemed to be justified--or, as I previously addressed, is "evidenced to be just/correct/right".

Intelligent animals and toddlers don't provide the reasoning for their beliefs to themselves or to others; of course not; they have no language by which to do so. But they can infer, reason, all the same. And via their inference their beliefs can be well grounded or not.

I guess what I'm driving at is that well-grounded-ness is always itself fallible, never infallible/absolute.This is what makes surprises possible in intelligent beings. As well as learning by trial and error.

In due measure with intelligence there are reasons--inferences--held for certain beliefs being maintained. And it is this reasoning that I'm currently terming "justification"--again, the evidencing of being just/correct/right.

Maybe this will better help in making sense of where we differ:

It is validly inferred from pre-existing true belief, actual events, the way things are, and/or some combination thereof. — creativesoul

How then do you believe this non-linguistic valid inference is different from “[non-linguistically] evidencing [that concerned] to be just/correct/right”?

Not sure who you’re addressing this to, but so it doesn’t go un-replied:

Once you get to the roundabout point you address, the ensuing issue is:

>>> How does a belief become well-grounded in the absence of actively manifesting language.

For example, what makes surprise—be it on the part of an intelligent lesser animal, a human infant, or an adult human—warranted and, thus, well-grounded?

Surprise is the act of finding our concepts of what is true to be unwarranted—this typically as they apply to expectations of what was, is, or will be, expectations assumed to be well-grounded. We adults will often linguistically warrant—i.e., linguistically justify—our surprise by explaining that we had good reason to think we knew that which we then discovered we didn’t. All the same, the act of being surprised precedes any and all linguistic justifications for so being. It is entwined with non-linguistic evaluations of what in fact is. Hence, surprise for the animal or toddler, for example, is the expression of a discovery assumed to be well-grounded that that which has been so far assumed to be warranted/well-grounded in fact isn’t.

Or, alternatively, what to a specific (intelligent) lesser animal or toddler warrants—makes well-grounded—that a specific sound is what they are intentionally called by? That the sound is made in representation of their personal being?

It certainly isn’t linguistic justification via linguistically classified abstract concepts. But it is, I uphold, a non-linguistic means of evaluating what in fact is from what isn’t, one that makes use of, at least, a very rudimentary reasoning—a far less developed reasoning that nevertheless remains true to the laws of thought.

Hence, my current position: the non/pre-linguistic believed truth is thereby believed well-grounded via some system of non-linguistic justification*. One which—among more intelligent sapience which adult humans are—becomes expressible via linguistic means and, thereby, certainly vastly more complex (by comparison to infants and to lesser intelligent animals). Yet one which—as we all experience when not linguistically justifying our beliefs and actions—does not stand out consciously as do our linguistic expressions of concepts. … But this, I acknowledge, gets a little deeper into hypotheticals of how the mind works (ones that are in keeping with biological evolution); all this likely not being a proper subject for this thread.

* By “justification” I here roughly intend “to reckon or surmise that that concerned is warranted due to interrelations between obtained data and, hence, due to some form of reasoning, be the reasoning linguistic or not (with “warrant” as verb here roughly meaning: to guarantee as true). Please let me know if this intended concept is better expressed by a term other than that of “justify”, as in “to evidence just/correct/right”. I’ll then use that term instead, if it indeed is more fitting of the concept.

As a heads up, I’m currently in no position to properly argue all of this stuff out. Just presenting it here as my upheld current opinion—which I hope I’ve to some small degree justified. All the same, the matter of explaining the occurrence of surprise in non/pre-linguistic beings still seems to me to be pertinent to the issue of well-grounded beliefs being knowledge.

I understand, but I think this is an error. — Sam26

Then illustrate how none of the three examples I provided for justification via causal reasoning is in fact a form of valid justification. Otherwise, if any of my examples of justification are valid, they prove my position's validity.

Also, there are no prelinguistic JTBs, but there are prelinguistic beliefs. Justification is a linguistic endeavor, and always has been. There is no medium for justification apart from language. It necessarily involves others within a linguistic setting. — Sam26

What you’re saying is mainstream. Right up there with all concepts being dependent upon language, rather than vice versa. But I disagree with this popular believed truth that you too uphold. To get a better understanding of your stance:

1) If the pre-linguistic child cannot discern via reasoning was is true from what is false by means of some form of implicit, non-linguistic justification applicable to its various empirical experiences and imaginations, then how—in your opinion—can such child come to know any particular language to begin with?

2) When we are not linguistically justifying out beliefs to ourselves or to others, do we know anything? If you answer that we do, how so? (Remembering of a linguistic justification seems to me to count as an instance of consciously apprehended linguistic justification for something—so I’m not here addressing recollections.)

Our views are likely to differ even after you provide answers for these questions, but I am sincerely interested in how you view the world in this regard.

In all fairness, the precise definition of reasoning is a fuzzy issue in philosophy, granted. But I’m hoping that some linguistic ambiguity might be the reason for our partial disagreements.

It might be that you’ve misinterpreted me as saying that to justify something one must provide for the cause of the very belief’s manifestation. This, however, would be a very incorrect interpretation of what I said/intended to say. What I was/am thinking is that justification requires reasoning and that reasoning sometimes consists of contemplated or expressed causal relations.

To keep this example simple, if person A asks person B to justify the truth to the eight ball being in a particular corner pocket, one valid justification could be as follows: It’s in the specific corner pocket by the cause of person C hitting it with a cue ball on the right. Less formally: it’s there because person C hit it with the cue ball.

Of course there are countless other ways to justify this, such as by having person B take a look into the corner pocket. But each different form of possible justification would likely be best suited to different particular contextual factors, such as that of why person A want’s to know.

If it’s a linguistic ambiguity that is the principle reason for our current disagreements, then our current disagreements have been caused by a linguistic ambiguity. In this case, the reason equates to that which has caused—and not to a motive, intention, etc. To justify the truth of our current disagreements, one could provide data to some other. But where this is not feasible, an alternative means of justifying this truth is by the causal reasoning just mentioned, by specifying that a linguistic ambiguity was the cause for it.

More complexly, since it’s the first thing that now comes to mind, to justify that change is real and not unreal as per the conclusion of Zeno’s paradoxes, data of itself will not suffice. So, here, one could try to justify this truth via causal reasoning: e.g., awareness, which is ever changing, is the reason, the cause, for Zeno’s being at all familiar with his paradoxes—for his being at all familiar with what logic and reasoning are, for that matter. Hence, due to Zeno’s conclusions being dependent upon awareness’s presence—i.e., due to awareness being a/the cause to the effect of Zeno’s conclusions—Zeno’s conclusion that change is not possible can only be somehow flawed. OK, this does not of itself find any fault with the specific reasoning that he used. But it does provide a valid (regardless of it being to whatever measure imperfect) justification for change being real.

I’m thinking this could unfold into what is meant by causation. Here, I simply intend the property wherein the existential presence of X (the effect) is determined by Y (the cause)—such that the cause produces the effect in due measure to which the presence of the effect is determined by the cause. It’s on the generalized side as definitions go, but it does encapsulate efficient causation fairly well, imo. This delineation can apply to physical entities but is in no way limited to physicality. Example: my thought of a freshly cut lemon causes me—is the reason for—my unexpected extra salivation; for, in this case, the presence of a watery mouth has been determined by the thought of a freshly cut lemon.

Again, I’m not saying that all reasoning consists of causal reasoning, but that some of it does—to me, a fairly good portion. And we justify things by use of reasoning—including, at least at times, that of causal reasoning.

If disagreement persist, I’m honestly unclear as to the reasons (not motives, but causes). So I’ll stop here and see what replies I get.

It is my intention here either to convince you that we make these decisions without justification, or to learn from you that there's something I've missed. Can you help? — Pattern-chaser

I’ve intentionally avoided this thread because it addresses a darn good, and very complex, question. Compliments to the chef.

Theories without evidence … This to me seems to make the issue revolve around empirical data. But, then, this would oust all metaphysical theories, including that of materialism among many others. In how we make sense of the empirical data is then embedded our reasoning concerning what is or, at least, what might be, given the empirical data we have. To some such as myself, non-empirical experiential data also gets tacked on; e.g. the presence of awareness, of emotions, and other aspects of mind is then intra-subjective data we all hold and can readily agree on intersubjectively … making their presence objective in the “impartial” sense of the word (it’s not an obsolete definition of objectivity by any means), or so I maintain.

The BIV scenario, as far as I can comprehend, is one asking how we can justify that we are not BIVs. Maybe this can be justified. My best go at it in a nutshell: The very idea of being a BIV is dependent on there being such a thing as real brains, wirings, and computers. Yet if we were BIVs, then all our empirical data would be bogus by entailment of so being BIVs. Thereby making our beliefs of real brains, wires, and computers bogus. Thus making the possible reality of being a BIV bogus. So the idea could maybe be argued to be self-annulling, if not necessarily self-refuting. Not claiming that in its current form this argument is failsafe, but with some tweaking, who knows …

At any rate, it’s an epistemological problem; one that, to me, addresses justification for the explanations of evidence we do have.

In thinking about the thread’s intended point, though, Zeno’s paradoxes of change/motion came to mind. How to justify that Zeno’s paradoxes are rationally flawed and that change/motion is real? Here again, the validity of what experience informs us and of what a certain set of reasonings conclude directly contradict, so the two conclusions can’t both be correct. Here, I trust the validity of awareness—which is ever-changing—far more than that of the reasoning specified, so I’m certain that the reasoning is flawed though, so far, I haven’t figured out how.

But again, to me the thread’s theme is complex. Me, I’d venture on teleological causation as it applies to choices made between mutually exclusive possibilities. We are driven toward an aim that is found in the not yet materialized future—one that is often enough itself chosen, and often enough changes via our choices—that then determines/causes us in the present to favor investigating some givens and to move on when it comes to others. Were the aims to change, the choices we make would follow suit. To me this is an intrinsic part of the logic—or, the justification—to why and when we move on from contemplating such things as BIVs or Zeno’s paradoxes.

Still, this in itself is a metaphysical position that, like others, attempts to make best sense of the evidence at hand.

All the same, I’d like to read of other logical reasons for dismissing some philosophical conundrums but not others.

That's fair, I wanted to give your replies more consideration, so I just replied to the aspects I had already thought through. I'll return in kind. — Cheshire

Cheers. We haven’t chatted before and it’s sometimes fuzzy what the other’s character is like. But, yea, if you can find a viable alternative account of what knowledge is—this as per the question asked—or else find faults with my reasoning, I’d love to hear bout it. Nice talking with you, btw.

If you ever prove that things are not subject to error [...] — Cheshire

Right. I hear that Descartes once tried it. Turns out he didn’t succeed. But his methodology also produced such philosophical questions as BIV scenarios. Meanwhile me and a few others are worried about the outcomes of increased global warming, a possible future politics of global Orwellianism, and other such philosophically trite things.

Look, to be less sarcasticalish, in the absence of proven infallible truths (and, thereby, infallible knowledge), we’re left with what we realistically have. We’re not discussing what knowledge is to aliens in some alternative parallel universe of our imagination, but what it is in the world in which we live.

I’ll grant that operational knowledge, unlike ideal knowledge, can hold degrees of strength. To intuitively know that the planet is round is not as strong a knowledge as to know so due to well justified empirical evidence—though both are fallible and both could be instances of ideal knowledge. So, if this makes sense to you, then you’re eleventh know could be stronger than the ten knowns it addresses. But you’d have to provide for why this is so.

Still, I’m not big on when I give replies without having my honest questions answered in turn. A personal quirk wherein I typically find other things I’d rather be doing. Again, why do you find some believed truths justified to the satisfaction of its bearers to be nonsense rather than knowledge?

It's a bit of straw-man isn't it? If an individual told me something absurd I wouldn't confuse it with the subject of knowledge. — Cheshire

No, not a straw man: Why do you appraise it as nonsense—this if it is a believed truth that is justified to the satisfaction of its bearers?

We have an ideal concept of circles, but we don't call the one's we draw operational circles. Because we never draw ideal circles, so the operator is redundant. — Cheshire

Yes, because here we clearly know that no drawn circle is an ideal circle—and so there’s no implicit equivocation involved.

Same with knowledge, from where I stand at least. You do recognize, however, that some hold their knowledge to in fact be infallible? Be this within religions, philosophies, or out in the everyday world. Here, there is equivocation between the operational and the ideal that is confused with unequivocal states of affairs which are in fact obtained ideals.

It would obfuscate if in fact the demon was necessary. In actuality, suppose all the things you know. I'm asserting 1 of them is wrong and you don't know which one. — Cheshire

In which case, why should I believe you in lieu of proper justifications for this? Due to an authoritarian commandment?

It was a false choice. In this experiment we know 11 things and 10 of them are subject to error. — Cheshire

Yes. Well, you’re discussing this with a fallibilist—i.e., a philosophical skeptic in the tradition of Cicero and Hume, among others (not Pyrrhonian and not Cartesian): a very broad, but different, matter. As I’ve indicated in my previous posts on this thread, all our held beliefs of what is true are—I argue—susceptible to error, hence to being wrong. Though this in no way entails that they are. Until they’re falsified in so being, there’s no reason to believe that they are wrong.

Hence, following your specifics, we fallibly know 11 things, all of which are subject to error.

At any rate, that we know 11 and not 10, 9, or 0 givens still does not answer the question of what knowledge is.

I'll try to better clarify my position:

The issue of terms is the very semantic facet that I’m yet trying to better specify. One could just as readily say “X knowledge” and “Y knowledge” instead of the “ontic knowledge” and “subjective knowledge”—but this is far less descriptive.

The point is that one is a fully conceptual ideal—that is thereby non-operational as knowledge. It presents a knowledge that is infallibly justifiable and infallibly true—this not being possible to obtain in at least current practice. The other form is the only type of knowledge that can be had in practice. This, I’m thinking, is again best exemplified by the criterion of truth; there is the fully conceptual ideal of absolute truth which can never be wrong; and then there is the only operational form of truth that can be found: that which we believe to conform to the former type of ideal truth.

So—the thought just came to me, with the help of previous posters—scratch “ontic” and “subjective” and replace with “ideal” and “operational”, respectively. (seems to do a better job at describing what’s intended).

Operational knowledge, then, can only be evaluated via use of ideal knowledge. Without it needing to conform to ideal knowledge, any claim to have a justified believed truth will be knowledge. E.g., I know that it will be sunny today because—i.e., due to the cause of; or, on grounds that—my cat is out in the backyard and there are satellites in the sky. Now, in everyday life, were someone to tell you this, you’d think them to be, well, ignorantly mistaken. To not in fact know that it will be sunny today. But why come to this verdict if it’s a believed truth that has just been justified to the satisfaction of the bearer?

The answer I’m giving is that this believed truth does not conform to ideal knowledge—here, because it is deemed to not be validly justified. And, hence, is then judged to not be knowledge.

>>> At this point I should ask: If someone were to tell you it’ll be sunny today for the reasons just mentioned, and whether or not it’ll be sunny today holds some degree of risk/importance for what you do today, would you then yet hold their belief to be knowledge? And, therefore, act in accordance to this known?

Compare the aforementioned with: I know it will be sunny today because my cat has the odd habit of only going outdoors on days that are perfectly sunny, and he is now outdoors, and because the weather forecaster has picked up from satellites the depiction of weather patterns that nearly always entail that a sunny day is in store.

Here, while yet not being ideal knowledge—which is perfectly justified to be an absolutely true belief—the given justified believed truth nevertheless does conform to ideal knowledge (to our ideal of what perfect knowledge should be). And, because of this, can now be deemed to be operational knowledge. Hence, here, we will deem this person to in fact know what he is talking about—and will hold no reason to question this knowledge unless we hold other data or reasoning that appear to us to conflict with it.

So, I’m arguing, we can only appraise what is and is not operational knowledge by appraising whether or not it conforms to ideal knowledge. If it’s falsified in potentially so being, then we deem it to not be knowledge.

At a particular moment in time let's suppose you know 10 things. And then, my philosophy demon informs you that one of the things you know is wrong, but not which of the things you know is wrong. So, you turn and tell me you in fact know 9 things. I argue that, no you know 10 things because you can't tell me which 9 are actually correct or you know zero things because 1 of the ten is wrong and it could be any of the 10. — Cheshire

It’s an interesting thought experiment, but I think it obfuscates the primary issue. Here, we’re trying to apply (meta-)operational knowledge to what is and is not particular instances of operational knowledge given the circumstances. How do we know if we only know nine or none of the ten formerly thought to be know givens? The question of what knowledge is to begin with still remains.

So, in my own words, would you call this a metacognitive state of mind that Buddhism enforces [teaches], through the practice of mindfulness, compassion, and altruism? One then refers back to this state of mind, when dealing with depression? — Posty McPostface

Yes, of course.

There's the caveat, thought, that Buddhism is Buddhism and, thereby, not materialism. :wink:

This is an ongoing discussion we're having in the On Disidentification thread if you care to join us. In that thread, I attempted to disidentify from the condition and live by thinking that "I have depression, and not I am depressed." My trial ended with me feeling angry or frustrated that I still feel the symptoms of depression even if I didn't think I have the condition.

I suspect endogenous problems like depression, are very deeply embedded in one's persona, so it can be difficult to disidentify from or become detached. — Posty McPostface

Just perused the other thread. Since I’ve already replied on this one, I'll add to what Wayfarer said here:

There’s a different in ordinary cognition between, “I am angry/sad/jealous/etc.,” and “I feel angry/sad/jealous/etc.” The former captures that which you as first-person point of view momentarily is, what you as a conscious awareness is constituted of. The later captures what you as a conscious awareness introspectively apprehends as other than the you which is so apprehending.

If I feel envy within myself, I then have a choice as to whether to shun this emotion/mood till it vanishes from my total being or, else, to actually become envious in relation to that concerned. If, however, I am envious, this is a matter of fact that I have no choice over for as long as I so remain. Here, all choices I that I can make will by default be made by envious me.

As others have mentioned, to go from “I am depressed” to “I feel depressed” in a sustained way will take a good degree of cognitive work. And holding onto the belief that “I am depressed because it is how I am genetically; because I am ontologically predetermined to so be” is utterly antithetical to the process. Buddhism often has quite a lot to say about such forms of mediation in which one makes all experiences that which one in some way apprehends as an awareness—thereby experientially establishing the given awareness as ontologically independent of all which it otherwise will be constituted at any particular moment as a “self”. Note that within Buddhism, this is intended to be transformative in what one construes to be ontological, to be real, in regards to personal being. It is after all part and parcel of the ontological position of Buddhism. This process of meditation, however, is neither quick nor easy. It requires effort and perseverance. Still—in parallel to feeling envious v. being envious—until one experiences the “I feel myself to be depressed” reality one will perpetually experience the “I ontologically am depressed” reality: In the first there is a cognitive choice as to what to do about experiencing oneself to be depressed; in the second there is no such choice to speak of, for the depressed individual is who is doing the choosing by default.

Imagine an either obese or muscle-challenged individual wanting to become fit and muscular, but not having any will or desire to engage in any of the exercises that are required to so become, then asking, “so what else can I do to become muscular?”

If this is harsh, so be it: To what extent do you care about your own predicament of depression?

You want to hold onto the believed truth that “I can’t do anything meaningful to change it, for it is part of what I am” and, in this case, your held belief shall be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Believing otherwise—as with physical exercise to become muscular—also requires the needed effort and perseverance. Be this via dis-identification or some other means. Thought about action is not the action itself.

Well, again, I'm no psychiatrist. I also don't hold onto the ontological notion of (full) biological determinism, believing there's always some "nurture" involved in our behavioral phenotypes. This then makes the issue of heredity more complex: for then there is both some measure of biology at play as well as implicit learning, especially during the formative years.

To the extent that the depression is a biologically determinate property, where its physically caused, then physical remedies in the form of proper pharmaceuticals will be the proper remedy.

Still, my non-expert belief is that what we biologically inherit are predispositions to, and not the actual result. Any plant will grow one way when held in a closet and another when held in sunlight. Some are more predisposed to this or that ailment as a result of interactions with stressful experiences; don't know who wouldn't break (or, at least, bend) given sufficient stressors. But we're each predisposed to this differently. For example, we likely do inherit a risk gene of some sort, but this doesn't predetermine who we will be. Same with clinical depression--again, in my non-expert opinion.

What has helped me is this metacognitive attitude: Depression is nature’s way of telling you there’s something wrong.

Figure out what that is, and then you can directly, enactively, address the problem. This may be an oversimplification, but this by simply choosing between flight from the problem (and the best means of so doing) or fighting the problem (and the best means of so doing).

Otherwise, depression seems to me to be an unconsciously held certainty that there’s an insurmountable obstacle in the way. One that results in a consciously experienced blockage in motivation, often accompanied by great sorrow—again, this for reasons that are not consciously discerned.

With this as context, then, the more the given underlying problem—often in the plural—has been ignored, the deeper within the unconscious mind it becomes buried. And the harder it is to bring up into conscious awareness. At which point, a drastic change in behaviors—either consciously willed or else also assisted by prescription medication—can then serve as a break from the underlying issue. If the underlying issue is not of immediate pertinence to one’s life, then it will start decaying (a neuroscience term for when synaptic connections between neurons are not used and begin wilting and, eventually, because of this, eventually no longer physically exists—being instead replaced by other, new, now functioning synaptic connections).

If the depression is, for example, caused by a personal guilt—since this doesn’t apply to most here: say, that a woman began partying with booze when finding out that she became pregnant because she didn’t want to face the facts at the time, and then maybe had a miscarriage in the third trimester—then the depression could be resolved via meaningful self-forgiveness (such as by learning from the mistake and, maybe, helping others not to repeat it). If, on the other hand, the depression is, for example, caused by contextual factors such as our global warming, then making this explicit and consciously deciding to either do something about it (however small) or else deciding to live with the foreseeable consequences will get one to overcome the unconscious impediment.

And somewhere in-between all this you could hold onto Nietzsche’s’ statement that what does not kill you will only make you stronger. (There’s also the Neon Flux version of “what does not kill you maims”—but this one’s likely to not help out in this situation, unless one’s into dark humor and can have a good laugh about it. :joke: )

But I’m no psychiatrist. Still, hopefully some of this might help out.

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apropos, a joke about how things can always be worse: Guy gets a call form the doctor. Doctor says, "You're analysis is in. I've some bad news and some worse news for you. Which do you want to hear first?" The guy says, "Tell me the bad news." Doc says, "The results indicate that you only have 24 hours left to live." The guy is shocked, angered, and asks, "How can things possibly be worse?". The doctor replies, "Well, I forgot to tell you about it yesterday."

:smile:

Fire causes discomfort when touched. That doesn't require language to learn. Is it not the ground for believing that touching fire caused pain? — creativesoul

There are causal beliefs. For example, my belief that snakes are dangerous was caused by the bite of the snake. But I would take issue with the idea that the cause is a ground or justification, as in an epistemological ground. Why would you think that causal effects are a grounding. Moreover, to answer the question why I believe something, it may take into account both causality and reasons/evidence, but there is a big difference in terms of epistemology. If a cause is the same as a justification, then we can justify all kinds of weird things. When I talk about justification or a grounding, I'm talking about reasons/evidence, and I think most philosophers are talking about reasons/evidence. — Sam26

A reason, by definition, is a cause, motive, or explanation. It then naturally renders reasoning as the process of providing causes, motives, or explanations for. To justify a belief as true, I then argue, is to provide valid reasoning (a set of valid, i.e. consistent, causes, motives, and/or explanations) for a belief being true.

The argument can be made that most of our justifications are non-linguistic at any given time. We could linguistically express them, but we generally don’t. It is only when we want to convey these to others or else deliberate upon some issue internally that we make use of language. For example: When playing a sport, one knows to move left instead of right at a certain juncture—for example—without need for linguistic expression of beliefs, truths, or justifications; this while one yet holds a justifiable true belief that so moving is optimally advantageous at the given moment.

A lesser animal pet can thus be argued to know what its name is—for example—for it holds a pre-linguistic believed truth which is to it justifiable via its experiences of causes and motives (with explanations here being deemed to always be linguistic for the sake of simplicity. Although, when defined as “to make something understandable”, explanations then will not necessarily contain human language: e.g., an animal’s body language (which sometimes can be intentionally deceptive in more intelligent lesser animals) explains its states of mind to other like—and often unlike—animals; or, an animal’s memories of motives and causes will serve to explain to the animal the meaning of some given).

An animal can then be upheld to know that fire burns—especially when it is an acquired belief of what is true that is itself in keeping with the animal’s set of learned causal relations and motives for actions (i.e., with the animal’s non-linguistic reasoning regarding what is). Here especially thinking of the more intelligent lesser animals: canids, corvids, dolphins, elephants, great apes, etc.

But here things can get complex very quickly: an ant innately knows its cast and what to do for the colony (just as we innately know how to suckle when birthed, among other forms of our innate knowledge). And in such instances, the issue of JTB becomes murky—although, imo, not necessarily invalid (especially when the property of justification is not conceived as entailing human language: e.g., a human baby is justified in holding a pre-linguistic belief that suckling will satisfy its pangs of thirst/hunger, thereby knowing it must suckle in order to live).

While I’m at it: Knowledge by acquaintance, broadly defined, can be deemed in similar enough fashions to be believed truth justified by first-person experience. Example: I am justified in holding the believed truth that I am psychologically certain by my experienced feeling that I am—which is itself the valid reason (cause, motive, or explanation) for my belief being true. Thus, one can validly affirm, “I know I’m certain (or happy/sad; etc.).

as a sub-quote taken from the one above:

If a [presumed] cause is the same as a justification, then we can justify all kinds of weird things. — Sam26

Yet this is how we get to certain people knowing that the Young Earth model of the universe is true. Or that eliminative materialism is true. What stands in the way is that their specified causes, motives, and explanations for so believing will not be fully coherent and, thereby, will contain contradictions. This, at least, in principle wherever the justified believed truth is in fact false.