Tell you what. Think it over as much as you'd like. I might reply to you some other time.

Apparently I was adding text while you were responding; but be that as it may, you still haven't offered any actual argument — Janus

for what have I not provided "any actual argument"?

But that was not what I asked you to provide an argument for; which you will soon see if you go back and read carefully. — Janus

OK, firstly, you added text to a sole phrase of "why not" which you don't acknowledge editing in the given post or in you're last. Interpretations of this are present in my mind, but I won't mention them.

so to now quote the entirety of the newly edited version:

Why not? Why cannot the intuition that awareness is ontologically different than physicality be a subjective epiphenomenal illusion? You haven't presented an argument for that yet. — Janus

Secondly, the "intuition" you are now addressing is something of which the first person point of view is aware ... so this moving of the goal post doesn't move anything in terms of this now argument.

I have no idea what you are talking about here. — Janus

Well, that was the point: allowing for contradictions leads to a ubiquitous rational unintelligibly ... and that is why there being both an ontology of eliminativism and a non-eliminativst ontology at the same time and in the same way would be an invalid possibility.

Why not? — Janus

Because then 1 + 1 will not be equal to 2 at the same time and in the same way that it is equal to 2, and we then ought not prefer one over the other since their both are equally true and are both equally not true ... and so forth/backward.

I would opt for non-eliminativisn, but I am not going to pretend that my opting for it is free of prejudice; free of subjective feeling and intuition. I also acknowledge that it is possible that my prejudices, subjective feelings and illusions are all epiphenomenal illusions; although of course I don't believe they are. — Janus

If you'd like to end it here, that's OK with me. If you'd like to work this out some more, then please specify which prejudice your are addressing within the argument. We certainly aren't here choosing which of our premises are true and which are false based on preformed beliefs about what the true conclusion is, I'm currently believing, for this would be irrational of us to do.

[edited. my bad, a mix of dyslexia and rushing things leading to too many typos]

From the eliminativist point of view the first person point of view is not ontic, but epiphenomenal. This is a form of monism; but it is not neutral monism. From the point of view of subjective idealism the physical or material is epiphenomenal and the subject is ontic. Neutral monism wants to say that the physical and the mental are not substantially different. The alternative is substance dualism. All these positions rely on grounding assumptions; so none of them are definitively demonstrable in the sense of being free of prejudice. — Janus

In my honest (non-belligerent) impression, you are here accusing me of things that I am not culpable of as pertains to the argument I’ve offered. Where is the argument, of itself, flawed?

As to the prejudices you’ve invoked, these are the conclusions you conceive of as a result of various different premises. But I’m not here debating the repercussions of this stated argument in terms of a concluding ontology--so I will not address these various possible repercussions.

If nothing else, lets both at least pretend, with a friendly wink, that we currently are truth seekers attempting to be as unbiased about our own beliefs and concerns as possible.

An ontology described by eliminativism and the ontic presence of an awareness aware of such ontology are mutually exclusive ontic givens; they can’t both be ontic at the same time and in the same way (unless someone would like to propose an ontology in which mutually exclusive ontic givens are also mutually inclusive at the same time and in the same way, this being a so called possibility I'd argue to be invalid). We can discern different alternatives for eliminativism and, hence, possible errors in it (this without going into the specifics). We cannot discern valid alternatives to our ontic presence as first person points of view while we are aware.

Since only one of the two—eliminativism or non-eliminativism—can be true, which do you rationally find to be true (all biases as pertains to repercussions and concerns about them aside)?

Once we can rationally arrive at an answer to this question, then we can take thing further, if desired, in terms of what it might and might not signify. (However, I'm not personally interested in turning this threads topic into one of ontological worldviews.)

So it would seem that from the perspective of those presuppositions eliminativism is demonstrably wrong, but it does not seem to be demonstrably wrong in any definitive, unprejudiced way. — Janus

Agree that we all have our biases, but you're loosing me with this. Other than the prejudice that something ontic is (a topic for a different debate ... but you'll notice it is equally upheld by eliminativism), where is the prejudice in there ontically being a first person point of view (a first person awareness which is debating the issue of whether or not it exists)?

And again, due to there being a contradiction of reasoning, one cannot hold both eliminativism and there being an awareness aware of eliminativism at the same time and in the same way; therefore, at least one the two is necessarily false.

I’ll say OK to this. But you’ll notice that, here, I was only offering you what I take to be a sound argument for why eliminativism is demonstrably wrong.

My so far favorite Gettier case is this one (I’ve only read about Gettier cases online):

The pyromaniac (Skyrms 1967). A pyromaniac reaches eagerly for his box of Sure-Fire matches. He has excellent evidence of the past reliability of such matches, as well as of the present conditions — the clear air and dry matches — being as they should be, if his aim of lighting one of the matches is to be satisfied. He thus has good justification for believing, of the particular match he proceeds to pluck from the box, that it will light. This is what occurs, too: the match does light. However, what the pyromaniac did not realize is that there were impurities in this specific match, and that it would not have lit if not for the sudden (and rare) jolt of Q-radiation it receives exactly when he is striking it. His belief is therefore true and well justified. But is it knowledge? — Stephen Hetherington

I find it far more realistic than most others. For the record, I too sponsor a no false lemmas resolution to the Gettier problem. If a premise or observation is false, that it cannot be rationally used to obtain a true conclusion, thereby making all Gettier cases epistemically unjustifiable derivative beliefs that, thereby, are held due to luck and are hence not instances of knowledge.

But in saying that, this quoted example illustrates the tentative nature of what we presume, or uphold, to be knowledge. Such that were you or I to be in the same position, we’d of course maintain that we knew that the match would light (in absence of the information regarding the specific match we pick and of the perfectly timed jolt of Q-radiation [have no idea what this is but I’m rolling with it]).

As the IEP article points out, one problem with the no false evidence resolution is that it can result in methodological doubt of what is true knowledge (the one form of skepticism which has been commonly understood for some time by the term, “skepticism”). Yet to the other form of skepticism that is subjectively certain/sure of there not being anything which is demonstrably infallible (the non-Cartesian form of skepticism which holds no doubts about this being so—e.g., Pyrrho, Academic, Cicero, Hume, etc.—not here addressing the subsequent differences between these--a form of which Descartes was not), the technically tentative nature of knowns is just an intrinsic aspect of what knowing is all about. Yes, like many in history, this second form can wind its way towards a negating fallibilism where all knowledge becomes denied, but here I’m addressed a Pragmatist-like stance of a positing fallibilism (illustrated, for example, by Cicero and Hume … and, in at least some measure, the Pragmatist Pierce who came up with the term “fallibilism” [ I haven’t read his works to figure out if the guy was a closet skeptic]).

So in looking back at the example, most everything we do and know could hold intervening causal elements that are not those which we use to epistemically justify our knowledge. But until we discover that our premises are false, we then hold all the reasoning in the world to conclude that we know.

That said, in Gettier’s Case I, for example, one here discovers that one was wrong in that which is used to justify the conclusion … so, again, I agree that the conclusion here is then not knowledge.

I would love to find a convincing argument against (eliminative) physicalism, that relied upon no tendentious presuppositions, to support my intuition that it is wrong. — Janus

As much as I’m not on board with Cartesianism, this is where Descartes’ first person style argument becomes useful. Here’s a good natured challenge: you (anybody actually, as long as it’s a personal first person argument) can try to come up with a rational/justifiable alternative to you, the first person point of view which addresses itself as “I”, not holding presence while in any way aware of anything.

Don’t worry about the “thinking” part of the argument as Descartes laid it out; with the thinking part you can find justifiable (although likely noncredible) alternatives … thereby resulting in eliminativism as a possibility of what is. Strictly focus on, “I, an awareness, or a first person point of view (I've got to convey what I’m addressing linguistically, and the latter to me seems more precise), do not hold presence (I am not, or do not exist) as an awareness, whatever this might be (could be an entity, a process, both, or neither), while I am in any way aware (be it of perceptions, sensations, or understandings) because …”

You can use BIVs, evil demons, whatever you’d like, as long as the explanation is consistent and gives a valid alternative to being aware while aware.

If you cannot come up with a valid alternative to this proposition, “I, a first person point of view, am while aware (including of the thoughts I'm having which purport to present an alternative to my so being),” then it will surpass the certainty level of any other proposition to which there are rational alternatives, including that of eliminativism. In a colloquial sense, because the first will be by far firmer (recalling etymologies of truth and trust both winding back to tree, tree of life/knowledge kind’a thing I believe (held in pagan cultures long before Abrahamic religions were popularized); the axis mundi which is perfectly firm … also firmament, but I digress :grin: ).

This isn’t to say that the first proposition will be then demonstrated to be infallible. But it will be among the least fallible propositions that can be devised—again, because no justifiable alternative for it can be conceived in practice, hence no possible error for it can be conceived in practice regardless of how hard one tries. And since it falsifies eliminativsm, which does hold rational alternatives, it then proves eliminativsm to be wrong in terms of what is in fact ontic … this as much as 2 + 2 = 4 can arguably be firm/certain due to not holding any justifiable alternatives in practice (meaning, in practice where all hell doesn’t break loose due to rational contradictions [edit: to be clear, contradictions of reasoning] being accepted as instances of non-erroneous reasoning).

But thinking of illusions in terms of "first person points of view" is already to assume that first person points of view are not themselves illusions. — Janus

You by definition are here being purely rationalistic, and ignoring that devoid of awareness we cannot rationalize. OK, so despite clear cut etymology and classical usages of the term, empiricism nowadays implies only experiences obtained via the physiological senses--such that ideas are not empirically known (unlike in the time of Lock and Hume). So I'll term it experientialism--such that we can only know of our ideas via awareness of them.

Without now drawing out the issue, would you in such offered context of concepts presume pure rationalism devoid of an experientialism upon which it is at least in part grounded?

I mean you are evoking the subject and it's consciousness, which on the eliminativist perspective are both illusory, so that obviously won't do. [...] My intuitive sense is that eliminativism is wrong, but I can't see how it, or for that matter, any other metaphysical view, can be definitively proven to be wrong. — Janus

I'll butt in for a moment (sorry Wayfarer).

I think they can be conceived of as illusory because subjects and consciousness are slippery fish to hold onto in terms of definitions.

Yet in all definitions I’m aware of, neither can meaningfully be when fully devoid of a first person point of view (one might sleep without dreams, but there’ll yet be a first person point of view aware of this subsequent to the sleep; otherwise we wouldn’t know that one can). So the emanativist is arguing against there being such a thing as a first person point of view being in any way ontic … likely so as to uphold an axiomatic system of metaphysics which their own first person point of view maintains is indispensable for making sense out of things. But inherent to this is a logical contradiction, just that it’s not spelled out. For a first person point of view cannot be illusory to the same first person point of view. And a first person point of view is not in any sense of the term a physical object. If logical contradictions serve to prove that that which is addressed is false, and if there is no justifiable alternative we can discern to a first person point of view holding presence while one is in any way aware, then the eliminativists are proven wrong by this lopsided contradiction.

Of course there would then be a lot of explanations still needed to make sense of things. Nevertheless, the eliminativist stance I so far believe is proven wrong by this inconsistency or reasoning.

A sense of proportion!! — charleton

This comes with things such as 6.5 of the global GDP being spent on subsidizing fossil fuels. ... and the rather fight-on-your-own attitude toward renewable energies, in terms of both implementation and research (e.g., turns out Tesla isn't going to make a renewable energy grid in Puerto Rico after all, thought hey offered)

But by all means, I'm all for re-foresting the planet.

The atmospheric concentration of CO2 has increased 0.01-2% in 100 years. The hysterical claims of the green lobby are unable to mobilise physical science to use this fact to explain the Global warming that exists. — charleton

Been working on a logical argument, but it may be too convoluted to be taken seriously:

P1: Greenhouse gases keep sunlight-produced warmth from dissipating into outer space. (T/F)
P2: CO2 is a greenhouse gas. (T/F)
P3: Humans require fire in order to comfortably live (such as in the cooking of meat). (T/F)
P4: Fire releases CO2 into the atmosphere. (T/F)
P5: Human populace has grown almost exponentially in the last few hundred years. (T/F)
C: (all other things such as forest depletion and fossil fuel issues aside (these ought not be addressed for the make fat cats rich)) Therefore, humans have contributed to there being more greenhouse gasses in our atmosphere, aka to global warming. (T/F)

I take all these to be true. But if I’m missing something here, what would that be?

Oh, science is never about absolute proof, most of all because it’s empirical and thereby inescapably inductive. Therefore, in order not to doubt human caused global warming when those with great monetary influence tell us to, what is missing is a demonstrated infallible certainty that all these premises are so. Back to the drawing board of philosophical enquiry as regards infallibity [… unless people don’t need extensive evidencing for that which is obvious: our planet is in big trouble as far as life goes, as in the mass global extinction we’re right now living through].

Ok, I’m all sarcasmed out for the day :meh:

... may anyone feel free to strengthen this argument if you think it might in any way help



thanks. When it comes to taking care of people's basic needs before expecting most to care about other things, I again concur.

Yea, I find plenty of self-interest in love—though I don’t know if it can always be properly termed rational self-interest. This from all everyday notions of love to that of universal compassion; it’s not as if Nirvana is not in the Buddhist’s interest to obtain, for example. On a related topic: even haters love—themselves, that is (I don’t think it’s possible to hate in an absence of self-love)—though this at the expense of all else, thereby perverting the term’s commonly understood connotations of it being interpersonal with phrases such as “love for (optimal quantities of) money”. In short, to be alive is to love a set of givens out of self-interest, but what this set of given’s consists of can drastically differ due to differences in that which is intended. And I’ve spoken with enough very educated that take themselves to be rational—such as on issues of economy—that I take to be irrational, such as because infinite growth is irrational when you have finite recourses, me thinks.

Hunger trumps love. Almost always. — frank

Yes, agreed. Still don’t think Trump suffers from hunger, though. Well, and there are the relatively rare occasions of those in want of basic subsistence which nevertheless exhibit far more communal love than most Wall Street Bankers. Won’t reedit the just said, but come to think of it, isn’t it true that that those who are relatively poor give to the homeless and the like proportionally more than those who are rich? (As in, ten dollars for a poor guy is equivalent to some million dollars for the very rich.) I’ve seen rich Christians come near to kicking the homeless in in the street; whereas those who are poor(er)—and, yes, those who are authentic Christians (as in, follow JC’s mores as best they can earnestly)—will give to those in need … and will be called commies by those who don’t.

This fact is all you need to know about Global Warming. — charleton

You mean that whole thing about carbon dioxide being a greenhouse gas? Whose to say? Why, I once heard that there's one scientist somewhere that someone heard about that disagrees. It's all so uncertain. (My compliments to those who don't take me seriously here.)

Love is the basis of all morality. Love for oceans and forests flourishes among those who have been emancipated from hunger. There is no evil ideology here. Just Nature itself. — frank

A rhetorical question: Has Mr. Trump not been emancipated from hunger? (a humorous question, I hope … now see that unenlightened got to this roundabout issue before me)

I’m not big on the term “evil” either, but I find that love is far more difficult an obtainment than we’d like to believe. Heck, I’ll even say that we all hold some degree of fear of love, including folks such as Mother Teresa (e.g., if a person has never felt their hart pound when kissing another out of some degree of fear/anxiety that they all the same seek to overcome, than I think one’s been missing out one what first kisses can be). Just that some seek to overcome these fears while others make the most out of love being (to them) a big joke.

Incidentally, in seeing this as a potential rebuttal from someone out there: love of nature does not then mean one wants that all life be physically immortal either. Yet at least some Native Americans, for example, honored the spirits of the animals they killed by burning their whiskers (indicative of care/sympathy even if one takes it to only be symbolic), and such Earth-based religions don’t give thanks to a Creator deity for daily meals but the spirits of those beings/lifeforms who were sacrificed so that life as whole may be sustained. Not advocating for religious/nonreligious preferences, just trying to illustrate that that the issue of love is a complex thing, especially when it is extended more universally … but I fully agree that love is an important emotion/state of mind to strive for and maintain all the same.

- as javra suggests? — apokrisis

Why the question mark? :smile:
Yea, that's how I've been thinking about it so far.

One of my all-time favorites is indefatigable: untiring, unrelenting, and the like.

Something about how the word roles off the tongue … can never take it’s saying seriously (due to the sound; not the meaning).

Hey, thank you for the feedback. Yea, that belief is a form of trust has been my working hypothesis for a while now, and I can’t so far find anything wrong with it.

To stir up the waters a bit on this issue of trust: Yes, to trust-that is to hold some form of expectation, I agree. Interesting to me is that expectations also seem intimately related to forethought, at least in more intelligent animals. While trust and forethought don’t to me appear to be synonymous (rather, forethought appears to me to occur with a foundation of multiple beliefs (improperly stated, "trusts")), putting my behavioral evolution hat on, I could maintain an argument that something from which our trust and expectation descends can also be found in some pre-linguistic form in at least some unicellular organisms; for example, in trusting/expecting that that is prey and not predator, or vice versa.

This ties into a more philosophically biological approach to trust/belief that I’m also working with as a hypothesis: some trust is genetically inherited in our behavioral phenotype (perceptual trust would be one example), some is acquired via experience (i.e., learned), and some is enactive (as in actively choosing to trust/believe this rather than that … which can subsequently become learned and, eventually, habitual).

Still curious, though, to see if there something I’m mistaking in the “a maintained trust that” – “belief that” equivalency. For example, this understanding of belief doesn’t seem to sit well with Ancient Greek notions of belief … but not knowing my Ancient Greek, I haven’t yet discerned what might be missing, this when it comes to terms such as “dogma” (a stubbornly held belief/trust?).

But in terms of this thread, yes, I too uphold that beliefs can be non-linguistic.

Since my last post had no takers, I’ll expand a little on what I previously posted so it doesn’t seem so trite.

If there is no semantic difference between a maintained trust that and a belief that then, as per common experience, trust precedes linguistic expression. Much as Bonno hates the topic of perception, trust, for example, is inherent to all perception—trust that what we seem to smell, taste, hear, touch, and (the ever so popular) see is as we perceive it to be. If you see a red cup, you believe that there is a red cup you see. No language is required for this; indeed, to require that instances of language precedes all such instances of belief would be to push the limits of credibility, imo.

Our pets maintain trust that we are not out to kill them as would their natural predators or adversaries—a more complex, conceptual trust than that inherent to perception. (This being an example I find glaring, though numerous other examples can also be argued.) In measure to their degree of intellect, animals can become surprised or bewildered—these being reactions to when that which is trusted to be is not as one trusted it to be.

Acknowledgedly, defining belief in terms of maintained trust (again, both in terms of “that” and not in terms of “in”) then pushes the philosophical question further back into what trust is. Though in my view not the easiest of topics to tackle, I take it that no one would argue that trust, as linguistic concept, has no ontically present referent within cognition. Nevertheless, so defining does evidence that beliefs (and if beliefs are thoughts, then thoughts as well) are not necessarily contingent upon language … as others here have also mentioned.

And again, if you disagree with belief-that being nothing more, and nothing less, than a maintained trust-that, be direct about your reasons for disagreement.

I'm increasingly convinced that beliefs are a folk-psychological back-construct; that they are an invention that serves, however poorly, our attempts to explain what we do; but which does not correspond to anything real. — Banno

Can you—or anyone else for that matter—find any difference between the semantics of “a maintained trust that [such and such is the case]” and “a belief that [such and such is the case]”?

If yes, I so far haven’t, and would like to hear about it.

If no, then do you still feel the same about “a maintained trust that” (given that it means the same thing as “belief that”)?

For that belief to exist one would have to exist to believe it. Similarly [...]
in Descartes' argument, it's not the cause of the thought that is relevant. Even if the thought was thought by the evil demon, the one that holds the belief about thinking it, the one that is conscious of the thought and experiences it, must exist in order to do so. — BlueBanana

As a meta-example of what I’m saying: I uphold that fallibilism is true. It fallibilism is indeed a true belief (a belief which conforms to the ontic given which it references, namely our psychological/mental capacities), then it will be justifiable, at least in principle (it will not contradict any other epistemically established, believed truths and will cohere into such truths which are related). So here the onus is on me to justify that my belief is in fact ontically true (and not merely a believed truth that is in fact false, i.e. not true).

Some will uphold the Buddhist stance of no-self to signify that we do not exist--more particularly, that there is no ontic given which the pronoun "I" references. (Something which is not in keeping with what the Buddha stated; he said, “neither is there a self nor is there not a self” … or something along these lines, which need not be a contradiction if not at the same time or in the same way. More recently saw a documentary, “Compassion in Emptiness,” in which it is stanchly affirmed that self-worth is crucial for compassion—thereby acknowledging there being a self while yet maintaining a no-self thesis … different issue though.) As a different example, others will argue for one form or another of hard-determinism and, in so doing, will denounce all agency … as in “I did this (I caused this to happen)” or “Descartes thought things (Descartes caused his own particular thoughts to hold presence)" … which can also result in an argument against the presence of selves (minimally as pertains to the agency involved with thoughts, beliefs, interpretations (which are essential to the meaning/significance that either accompanies or is embedded with perceptions), etc.—and what is a self when deprived of all agency? … but I won’t play the devil’s advocate in arguing for this).

Feel like my hands are tied. I, for example, don’t want to rely upon a hard-determinist argument because I disagree with it. But I’ll conclude with this: until one can demonstrate with infallible certainty that all such alternatives are false, or impossible, there will remain some degree of possible error in our appraisals that we exist … even that anything exists (for it is we who make such appraisals).

Here’s a justifiable possibility (as compared to possibilities that are for example contradictory, thus unjustifiable, thus invalid--such as the possibility of a square composed of three sides) with which to more formally back this up: we humans are not the pinnacle of what intellect can existentially be, such that if our species survives some 100 millennia from now, it will then obtain some instances of knowledge which we currently cannot fathom. No one can prove a) that our species will go extinct and b) that 100 millennia from now some sapient descendent of our species will not discover some strongly justified alternative to our needing to be/exist (or to anything needing to be/exist). The very potential for such justifiable alternative being someday discovered in itself makes our current convictions that we exist less than perfectly secure from all possible error—therefore, our belief that we exist is yet technically fallible.

This is all taken to an extreme--though I so far find it to be a sound argument. But again, the onus is now on me to justify fallibilism as currently being ontically true (though maybe not at some future period of our awareness as sapient beings given all universal time that is yet to come … For, if fallibilism is currently true, the impossibility of this scenario could not be demonstrated with infallible certainty).

As you may notice, falliblism does away with the crutch of absolute/infallible subjective certainty. But this is not to say that it denies there being such a thing as the ontic, as well as conformity to that which is ontic.

But what if the teapot is not only small, but also invisible and does not interact with the Universe in any way - it can't be perceived and does not influence anything? How could its existence be proven even in theory? — BlueBanana

To keep this short for now: Why presume that such a teapot is an ontic given to begin with? If it’s not an ontic given, then all beliefs affirming its truth would be false … and thereby unjustifiable.

Not always: one can always know their own existence. Mathematics and logic can also be argued on. I also think the context matters, as some information can be said to be infallible with specific premises, like that we can generally speaking trust our perceptions. Considering "I think, therefore I am" to be the only certainly justified belief and the only infallible knowledge won't get one far and I think no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from that. — BlueBanana

But of course one can always fallibly know about one’s own existence, that 1 and 1 equates to 2, etc. In your statement though I read the implicit affirmation that knowledge is infallible in order for it to be real/true knowledge. Reminds me of my take on why so many philosophical skeptics in history maintained that there can be no knowledge: because to others knowledge is always taken to entail infallibility.

To be clear, by “infallible” I don’t intend “infallible for all intended purposes” of “infallible given the conditions X, Y, and Z” but, instead, that which is “perfectly secure from all possible error”. I duly uphold that the argument for the law of noncontradiction is abnormally strong to an extreme—or at least that it can be—but I as of yet don’t know of an infallible justification for it. Because there is no justification that is perfectly secure form all possible error that either you or me (or anyone else that we’ve ever heard of) can evidence for the law of noncontradiction, the law of noncontradiction then will not be perfectly secure form all possible error as far as we can evidence. It is thereby fallible—i.e. holds some capacity of being wrong, regardless of how miniscule and utterly insignificant this capacity might be. Which is not to say that it is therefore false.

Then, 1 and 1 being equivalent to 2 could potentially entail that 1 and 1 does not equate to 2 at the same time and in the same way. This is acknowledgedly aberrant. But since there is no infallible justification for the law of noncontradiction, contradictions could then be instances of non-erroneous reasoning in ways in which our limited (non-omniscient) minds can’t currently fathom. This is my short-cut argument for 1 + 1 = 2 being fallible—and not infallible—knowledge (for it could be that 1 + 1 is also not equal to 2 … iff contradictions were not errors of reasoning … which we can’t infallibly evidence one way or another). This, though, doesn’t make it untrue that 1 + 1 = 2 and only 2. Our notion of 1 + 1 = 2 could well be an ontic truth, and thereby infallibly correct, but I’m not holding my breath for anybody to demonstrate its literal infallibility.

As to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, Descartes took the “I think” proposition for granted, without demonstrating its infallibility. In fact, the thought he refers to could conceivably be caused by some given other than himself—the “I” he is addressing—such as by the evil demons we’ve all since Descartes time have become so accustomed to … or else the thoughts could be utterly uncaused in all senses (a block-universe model could account for this). Were any of these alternatives to describe that which is true, the proposition “I think” would then be false. As with 1 + 1 = 2 however, this isn’t to say that “I think” is therefore false. But it is not an infallible premise, or proposition, or conclusion form which other infallible conclusions—namely, that of “I am”—can be drawn.

In short, knowledge pertaining to non-omniscient first person points of view will always be fallible, regardless of what it may be about. I can argue this one further if needed. Simply present an instantiation of what is supposed to be infallible knowledge. :razz:

Though, because justification can be strong and weak, so too can knowledge be strong and weak. We hold strong knowledge that we are earthlings (right up there with BIVs, say rather than all 7(?) billion of us being extraterrestrial offspring) … as well as that 1 + 1 = 2 and that we are/exist. We hold comparatively weak knowledge of what the weather will be like in a few days from now (but we generally still know something about it).

That all knowledge is theoretically capable of being wrong, again, does not then mean that all our knowledge therefore is wrong (it could in fact depict that which is ontically true). Only that it is fallible, sometimes to an exceedingly insignificant degree—this outside of philosophical contemplations such as those regarding the nature of knowledge.

What about the situations where people might disagree on whether the evidence justifies a belief? — BlueBanana

In these cases, these very same people would disagree on whether or not knowledge is had. My quoted statement states that where knowledge is had it will always be (fallibly) epistemically justified to be true. Where there is disagreement about the validity of justification, however, there will then also be disagreement on there being knowledge.

If the Russell's teapot existed there'd be no justification for individuals of it. — BlueBanana

A good point. Poorly worded on my part. Here I meant that truths are always justifiable in principle. For example, if a teapot floats in space between the Earth and Mars, it will be capable of being evidenced to so be given a sufficiently large body of acquired information and analysis of this information. So too with there being a needle in a haystack. But, yes, we were talking in context of knowledge being justifiable true belief in practice. What I was getting at, in retrospect, is a little more complex, and it deals in large part with what I take to be ontological themes. To not seem like a charlatan: Ontic givens will, I uphold, not be mutually exclusive (will not be contradictory) and will cohere with each other when sufficiently related … akin to saying that the cosmos is a whole (it in fact gets more complex due to ontic randomness/indeterminacy being, imo, part of the picture, but to keep this on the brief side …). Truths, then, by virtue of conforming to ontic givens in one way or another, shall then hold similar properties: they shall not contradict and will cohere when sufficiently related. I won’t try to justify this here; its more than a mouthful even if I haven’t missed the mark. But then, if so, to justify a truth is to show how it is noncontradictory to other established truths (with those of direct experience being paramount, though fallible; here invoking foundationalism) and, with this, how it coheres into sufficiently related truths (here invoking coherentism). So truths are then always justifiable, at least in principle. But, in retrospect, my bad for bringing this up. It’s a topic for a different thread, maybe. And, again, good call on what I previously said. Yes, some beliefs which are ontically true cannot be justified in practice.

First I'd like to say that the hollow Earth theory is a poor choice of example [...] — BlueBanana

I personally like the hollowed Earth example. The Earth is either hollow or it is not; they can’t both be true (and even if contradictions were to be non-erroneous reasoning, we wouldn’t be able to make any sense out of them anyway). Even when knowledge is specified as “believed to be true beliefs epistemically justified in being ontically true” it would still pivot around ontic truth … thereby being upheld to be justified true belief (till evidenced to in fact be untrue, were such time to ever present itself … it might never do). It could be that my expressions/understandings are off base—in which case I’m very grateful for the criticism—but, to me, propositional knowledge then entails that that which is known is always assumed to be ontically true. Then, because those who know the earth to be hollow hold contradictory positions to those who know the earth to be solid, at least one of these two maintained instances of knowledge will be false. Justifications for the Earth being solid far outweigh justifications for the Earth being hollow (e.g., tectonic plate movements caused by convection currents of magma explain earthquakes … earthquakes being something which the hollow Earth model cannot as coherently justify).

Now that I think of it, this turns out to be a fairly good example of the complexities involved with knowledge. But I’ll leave it as it is unless there’s greater interest in this example.

More on topic, I find the view peculiar in that it allows false knowledge but does not really allow its practical usage. Basically it gives individuals the possibility of belief that their knowledge has a chance of being incorrect, but the hollow Earth model is, although stupid, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us, theoretical possibility, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us. This is why I'd prefer to define irrational beliefs, when believed by other to be justified, to be knowledge, that one then has a belief about that the knowledge is false. — BlueBanana

I’m so far not getting this. While I haven’t myself explicitly made use of the phrasing “false knowledge”, I can understand it in this way: false knowledge is not knowledge because it is false. This in parallel to a false truth (e.g., a lie) not being truth because it is false.

That seems logical but I also can't quite agree. I feel like there's a jump between the colloquial sense of uncertainty and absolute certainty. — BlueBanana

My take is that if we don’t find a means to amalgamate common sense uses of certainty (as in, “I’m sort’a certain that […]” or “my certainty of […] is strong”) with philosophical certainty, then we deprive ourselves of a term (and corresponding concept) used for “not being uncertain about” within realms of philosophy of mind. What I meant was that to believe X is to not be uncertain about X (therefore, to not be uncertain that our beliefs concerning X are true)—and not that it means “believing belief X to be (philosophically/absolutely) certain”.

... And now, without further ado, I'm off to bed. Man, I'll try to keep my posts shorter next time around. No promises though.

Ah, just saw your usage of epistemic justification contra my usage of factual justification. I like it.

Whoa, I didn't consider this at all to be honest - that one could have infallible knowledge with justification that isn't infallible. [...] — BlueBanana

Right, but I don’t endorse the term of “infallible knowledge” in this case for the reasons I previously tried to provide. If knowledge is not a lucky guess, then one cannot have infallible knowledge—not unless one infallibly demonstrates it to so be "infallible belief that is infallibly true and is infallibly justified as being true".

On the other hand, one can luckily guess a conclusion which is ontically true and, in so being, which is factually correct and, thereby, perfectly devoid of error--hence, which is infallible. If one can’t justify this conclusion, though, it would not be knowledge. Where it gets trickier is: If one can justify that some conclusion is ontically true—but not infallibly justify the conclusion to so be—one would then have only fallible knowledge of an ontic truth, but not infallible knowledge.

Why would this conclusion not properly fit the stance of a fallibilistic epistemology? (From previous exchanges, we both agree with epistemology being fallible.)

As I stated somewhere earlier in this thread, I try to make definitions that describe colloquial uses, and that knowledge is in colloquial sense never certain is the very reason I'm using my idea of false knowledge. This leads to basically that when one believes to know something (that is, they believe to have a justified true belief) instead of knowing that they only believe that information, they must know that thing. — BlueBanana

I fully agree with this.

Because of this, it must be that as the person in your example believes their belief to be true and infallible, they do know that which their intuition tells them. — BlueBanana

But an somewhat unclear about this. Whenever we believe things--and are not then uncertain about them--we then hold a subjective certainty that our beliefs are true. But mere subjective certainty does not then imply that one holds knowledge of what one is confident about. I can be certain that the universe is most properly depicted by a cyclical model, but this in itself is not knowledge of the universe so being--not unless I can justify this certainty to be ontically true (which I can't).

What I'm not sure about is whether intuition, which I think is a valid justification, can justify intuition. — BlueBanana

Interesting issue. To me an intuition is an apprehension of awareness. This is in parallel to physiological perceptions being apprehensions of awareness. Foundationalism would hold that these immediate apprehensions of awareness are self-evident truths (though I'm not certain about how it typically addresses intuitions). The rebuttal is that they could be illusion, hallucination, or delusion. So, to me, that's where Haack's foundherentism shines. But I'll leave this open for some other post, if this topic of justification gets further addressed.

Seems like there’s something in the way here, though I’m not sure what it is. As you’ve mentioned, (fallible) justification is about (imperfectly) evidencing something to be the case, not about (absolute) proof. Then the implicit question is, “justified to be true to whom?” To the individual, to a cohort of those concerned in the matter, or, else, in an absolute sense as viewed from some supposed omniscient perspective? To the individual and the cohort, justification will always be fallible; from the latter ideal perspective, it will be infallible, i.e. serve as absolute proof.

To readdress a former example, that there is a sheep in the field is justified to Tom as a true belief—and is therefore fallible knowledge to Tom. But it is not factually justified as a true belief to the shepherd (and to us) who knows that what Tom was looking at was in fact a shepherd dog in the field. (Tangentially, the shepherd (or else us the onlookers) might find Tom’s presumption morally justified—else stated, understandable, and thereby not deserving of reprimand even if wrong—but the shepherd will nonetheless not find Tom’s belief to be factually justified, this due to being based on Tom’s false belief of having seen a sheep). To complete the example, the shepherd’s knowledge on this matter, though outstanding, is nevertheless fallible as well—this because it is not literally omniscient.

Hence, given Tom’s limited information, Tom has valid but fallible knowledge of there being a sheep in the field. If Tom doesn’t approach the animal or talk to any shepherd, that’s all he will ever know about what he saw in the field. And when Tom tells his friend about it, his friend will have no reason to doubt that Tom has knowledge of there having been a sheep in this one field.

The shepherd (as also applies to us the onlookers) also holds limited information—and is thereby not infallible due to not being omniscient. But he holds more information on this topic than does Tom. So both the shepherd and us the onlookers hold valid but fallible knowledge of Tom not knowing that there is a sheep in the field, this due to our knowing that Tom was wrong in what he thought he saw.

To Tom, his belief is justified (to the best of his awareness). For clarity, Tom here factually holds justifications for his belief being true—for he has no info that would evidence any of his other beliefs which he uses as justification to be false.

To the shepherd, Tom’s belief is not factually justified (to be technically correct, also to the best of his awareness), due to the belief being based either on false premises or illusory experiences.

(A problem however emerges when one wants to affirm that a believed to be justified belief is not justified from an omniscient perspective—for no sentient being is endowed with this perspective in practice.)

Longwinded but this serves as a background to this conclusion: Wherever knowledge is upheld, relative to the individual(s) who so uphold, knowledge will always be factually justified to be true.

The property of truth doesn’t follow from the property of being justifiable; rather the reverse applies. If a belief is true, it will then necessarily also be to some extent justifiable. Untrue beliefs will not be factually justifiable (at least given sufficient enquiry into the matter and a sufficiently large body of information being obtained). So if one can’t justify a belief, it evidences the belief to either be uncertain or to be certainly false.

To that extent, both unjustified true beliefs and justified false beliefs would not be propositional knowledge whenever they are known to so be, this to whomever knows them to so be (this latter instantiation of “to know” is referencing knowledge via acquaintance/experience, maybe to greater extent than propositional knowledge … it would all be contingent on the particular examples).

So—while one can try to argue that knowledge is beliefs believed to be justified and true irrespective of whether or not they are in fact justified and true (this from an omniscient perspective?)—I’m maintaining that in practice knowledge will always be justified and true to the best awareness of the knowers … and will be so maintained to be until evidenced otherwise.

If an individual stubbornly maintains an irrational belief to be true and justified as true (e.g., the belief that Earth is hollow … believe it or not, I’ve heard this one before), while it will be considered knowledge to the individual, it will not be knowledge to us. That it is a “belief that is believed to be justified” is insufficient to make it knowledge to us. What would make this belief knowledge to us is a justification for this belief that would evidence this belief to be true (this in light of the many things we already (fallibly) know, such that gravity requires mass, thereby entailing that a hollowed planet would be devoid of the gravity we experientially know our planet to have).

We would hypothetically concede to this being knowledge only because we’d then come to believe that it is true on account of the justifications provided. Yes, it would then be a believed to be true and justified belief—but it’s status as knowledge would be fully contingent on these beliefs of being true and justified. Hence, I’m maintaining, whether or not a belief is (fallibly) true and (fallibly) justified is pivotal to what knowledge is.

knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, regardless of whether it's true or not and regardless of whether it's justified or not. — BlueBanana

This sort of leads its way into the issue of what justification is. There’s foundationalism, coherentism, or Susan Haack’s proposal of a hybrid, which I favor (I’ve yet to find reason to take other theories of justification seriously). All the same, if truth has no bearing on justification, then I so far find that the term “justification” would be devoid of meaning.

I’ll elaborate a little: Imo, justification is the process of evidencing that addressed to be just. To be just can hold two meanings: just in terms of facticity and just in terms of morality. When it comes to propositional knowledge, to justify a belief is to evidence how the belief’s contents are factually just (not morally just). This, in turn, entails that justification is about evidencing a belief to be true (with truth loosely meaning “conformity to that which is factually just”—which to me encompasses correspondence theory of truth).

So if knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, it would then need to be belied to be true. So then when we discover that our believed to be justified beliefs are not true, then they cease to be knowledge for us.

Also, doesn’t a belief need to be to some extent justified by oneself in order for one to believe it to be justified by oneself?



All too true. The issue as you pointed out is one of demonstrability. To add an example, one can hold an intuitive certainty about something—a gut feeling—and this belief can in fact be infallibly true, or infallibly correct (when ontically appraised from some supposedly omniscient perspective). But—as you’ve mentioned—if one has no means of evidencing this gut-felt certitude to be infallible, one would have no means of knowing whether or not it in fact is infallible.

But this then to me signifies that we can’t have infallible knowledge, since knowledge in part requires that it be justified. To be in possession of infallible knowledge seems to me to require that one is also in possession of a demonstrably infallible justification for that which one believes (again, with justification to me being an evidencing that that addressed is factually just).

To be more explicit, I take infallibilism to be about demonstrably infallible believed truths (Descartes comes to mind as an infallibilist, for that’s what he was searching for prior to commencing his methodological doubt; he had faith that he could demonstrate infallible believed truths). Fallibilism—as I see it at least—is like holding a null hypothesis that all of one’s knowledge is infallible despite not having infallible justification for this which, as a null hypothesis, will always then hold the potential of being falsified … thereby making all knowledge fallible from the get go.

So one could unknowingly hold infallible beliefs at any time. But without being able to infallibly justify any particular instantiation of this, one then could never be in possession of infallible knowledge (for one wouldn’t be able to appraise whether or not one’s beliefs are infallible). More to the point, because justification is an intrinsic aspect of propositional knowledge, devoid of infallible justification one cannot then have infallible knowledge. No?

Its late for me and I’m a bit tired; hoping I didn’t misinterpret your latest posts.

A justified true belief is true knowledge. It seems logical that justified belief is then knowledge. Knowledge can be false. Therefore a justified belief can be false. If something can be some way, I don't see why one couldn't believe the thing to be so. So, a justified belief can be false, and therefore one can believe a justified belief to be false.

Seems far fetched but that might work :chin: — BlueBanana

In thinking that I agree, and in furthering this train of thought:

There’s a difference between fallibilist systems of epistemology and infallibilist systems of epistemology—although the two often seem implicitly converged in addressing knowledge. I’m one to strongly argue against infallibilism (that we can obtain knowledge guaranteed to be perfectly secure form all possible error), so I’m addressing the position I uphold, that of fallibilistic epistemology. Some homemade perspectives:

Justified and true belief is, in a sense, the ideal standard by which we declare what is and is not knowledge. It is ideal because implicit to it is the affirmation of an infallible, or ontic, truth. In practice, however, all we ever have to work with is believed to be truths. So, in practice, what we uphold to be knowledge can be specified as “believed to be true beliefs which we can justify in being ontically true” or, more briefly expressed, “justified believed truths” … which we then assume to be justified true beliefs by default of being justified in being true. (I take this to be similar enough to what you mean by “justified belief is [...] knowledge”.)

JTB—due to being ontically true—cannot hold the potential of being wrong: it is infallible. The issue here becomes whether or not one knows the given truth, in which case one can justify it, or if one is merely lucky in holding a belief that is ontically true. But, again, in practice we only have JBT—which we then assume to be JTB when in deed justified (e.g., noncontradictory to our other JBTs, etc.). We can’t guarantee that what we assume to be a true belief is in fact true; this because we are fallible in our appraisals of what is true. And, I believe, it is because of this that we must then also be capable of justifying our beliefs as true. If we can’t evidence that our beliefs are in fact true then we don’t have grounds for confidence that our beliefs are true (either due to a then resulting uncertainty or due to flagrant contradictions between the beliefs we hold within awareness at any particular time).

This summing up my current views, what you’ve termed “false knowledge” is, to me, then JBT which we take to be JTB by default which, nevertheless, is however not in fact true (though it remains fallibly justified as being true).

As an example: if Tom believes he’s seen a sheep at a distance and can justify this belief (e.g., it looks like a sheep, etc.), then, to Tom’s awareness, he holds (fallible) knowledge of there being a sheep at a distance—though, in fact (in truth), what Tom has seen is a white coated shepherd dog bred to look like sheep. When Tom approaches the sheep he discovers that what he previously took to be knowledge was wrong—for new JBTs now evidence (justify) that the animal is in fact a dog.

Even if not everything here rings true, I yet maintain that there should be first made an explicit distinction between fallible knowledge (which always holds the potential to be incorrect and thereby false in what it upholds as true belief) and infallible knowledge, which by definition is incapable of being false (specifically in that which it affirms to be true).

Maybe some of this will help … again, only meant to confirm what I interpret you as saying.

Nietzsche was a pessimist, y'all. A Dionysian pessimist, but a pessimist nonetheless. — darthbarracuda

Seems like it’s a glass half full half empty issue, from what I recall of him. But he did have parables that to me are not indicators of pessimism. That one about the beast of burden as camel that then has its back broken due to carrying too much of a load, then transforming into a predator, a lion, that needs to destroy the monster of thou shalt (and thou shalt not)—the size of this monster being proportional to the weight it once carried—and, after so liberating itself from this body of authoritarian constraints, then is reawoken, or rebirthed, as a baby who sees the world for the very first time. To me, it is a parable of hope; of challenges to be sure, but one that is nevertheless far more optimistic than pessimistic in its underpinning.

However, eventually, some norms are established, like not killing another human being, etc.

Rather, it is the process of being ethical, or observing morals, that brings about the change in character or the mind which leads to happiness. — Posty McPostface

Again, I’m in overall agreement with the sentiment the OP proposes, but I don’t yet see this sentiment being in any way applicable in today’s world--in terms of concrete results. The DSM could easily incorporate among its metal-disorder indicators something about unethical behavior—regardless of type or degree. One might be surprised at how trite some of the there listed mental disorders are. Yet there are complications:

You mention murder as an example. In war, there can be both killing of humans as well as murder, the later often entwined with extreme cruelty. Skipping the examples, in today’s world would there be any interest to then have those who engage in the latter diagnosed as insane?

Ask most any young enough child if cruelty—toward other humans, toward animals, or in any other form—is good and they will answer, “no”. Us adults, having a history in which we’ve all more or less had instances of being cruel toward some other at some point in our lives (even if indirectly, such as in our eating of veal knowing the cruelly required for its production), will then justify such instances of not being saints or angels as often excusable, if not utterly normal and necessary. Or worse, we go about pretending that we actually are saints or angels, somehow separated from the swine, because this is less painful than being honest about our own faults. Regardless, we all nevertheless know that cruelty is wrong. Yet to make the case for this to be an un-health of mind would then affect all of us adults in manners that most of us would not like. And so, we adults are generally ambivalent in terming cruelty a wrong. It all depends, we most often say.

Don’t want to draw this out in other directions in relation to ethics. I simply believe that generally, insanity will be minimally contingent on the given behaviors standing out from the norm. There’s this modified quote I picked up on that I like, “When the lunatics take over the asylum their beliefs become the dogma of the sane.”

I very much agree with the original argument that being aligned to a moral compass can only make a mind healthier. Yet if one become too moral one deviates from the norm—at a certain juncture can even become harmful to the norm (such as by exposing too many deceptions, etc.). And this generally does not lead to good results for a social individual. I could fathom that some wise individual might be able to hold onto both an integral moral compass and a general accord to the practices of the norm, but I don’t yet understand how the tension would not yet remain … it would not be the serene happiness that I take is most often associated with eudemonia.

Not that any of this is a formal argument, but I think it better expresses my quibble with the pragmatic application of holding unethical behaviors and inclinations to be aspects of an unhealthy mind. (as for murder, please see my aforementioned comments).

I’ll be taking a break for now. Still—without here presenting what I already agree with and what I find issue with—I’m thinking it might be beneficial to first try to present a definition of this very abstract term, “aesthetics”. Yes, I know it’s something that has been addressed for over two millennia without yet being definitively defined. But having a general idea of what aesthetics is supposed to be to those who’d partake of this discussion would nevertheless be helpful.

As to me, I’ve already said a little of it in my previous posts. If needed, I’ll better express what I interpret as the referent to this word in a later post.

Hmm, guess no takers then. I thought it was an edifying thought that what is ethical can be thought to be conducive to a sound and healthy mind? — Posty McPostface

I gather from a few mocking birds that people have a hard time even figuring out what the golden rule is supposed to be about. How on earth is anyone expected to know what is wrong and what right if we adults don’t first have a cognitively present, perfectly justified, absolute truth about what ethics are? I say adults because most all kids have such knowledge; but kids don’t count because they don’t think about their thoughts as we adults do … at least they don't count according to a bunch of learned adults that can’t settle on what the golden rule is.

Skipping some potentially important step in argumentation, in short, I find a lot of truth in the OP’s basic assertion. So, more seriously, I second that there ought to be some established clinical diagnosis for cruelty, for instance. Problem is it’s so rampant among mankind that you’d have a hard time finding someone devoid of this mental disorder to write it up as a mental disorder in the first place—and even if you did, then the majority of others would ensure that this denotation of mental insanity never makes it to the light of day.

My occasionally present dark and obtuse sense of humor, I guess. But the point to this post I think still holds.

This is in opposition to just measuring somethings aesthetic value purely on subjective taste, without regard for the taste of others, or whether some have better or worse taste. — Noble Dust

There are some terms that don’t chime true to me within the context so far addressed: “measure” and “better and worse taste [...objectively(?)]”.

The first, measure, to me doesn’t fit because aesthetics are not something measurable. One can make a numeric scale, such as from 1 to 10, but even so there is no mathematically precise way of gaging aesthetic quality or intensity ... save by comparison of qualia to the extent this is at all possible.

The second, better and worse taste, is to me about as ambiguous as it gets. Refinement by the self-declared elite will be deemed better taste than what is the common and, hence, vulgar tastes of the masses. An individual with commonsense-like tastes will deem the overly abstract tastes of the self-professed elite to be pompous buffoonery that, maybe, has lost touch with reality. Now, me personally, I’ll find better tastes as well as worse tastes in both the more refined and in the more vulgar—this to not confuse a generalized observation with a personal inclination. But, being that it’s an issue of value, the question will always remain: better or worse to whom and for what personal reasons?

That aside, where you find a strawman in my stance I find a perspective which does not work in yours (imo … but I’ll refrain from adding this “imo” to every statement I’ll make, though they will so be—which to me signifies that I’m still learning things and could well be wrong in what I currently uphold).

This objective aesthetic would either be objective in the sense of a rock, as a physical and measurable object, being objective or, else, objective in the sense of being 100% impartial, as in (partial) objectivity in what one judges to factually be.

I for now greatly presume we both agree that it would be more along the lines of the second form of objectivity. Correct me if needed. Nevertheless, I strongly disagree with the first application of the term within this context of aesthetics.

Then objective aesthetics would be something which holds for all particular cases of experienced, subjective aesthetics … these always being individualistic and, where commonality is found, common to some given cohort.

The objective aesthetic, though, would itself not consist of any particular phenomena which would apply to individual cases of experienced aesthetic. Otherwise, it would not be a universal property common to literally all instances of this experience of the aesthetic.

Suffice it to say that, from the vantage I’ve tried to present, while one can hold an understanding for others’ aesthetics, the value of the experienced aesthetic will nevertheless always be accordant with the statement that “aesthetics is in the eyes of the beholder”. It’s not this or that object that is the objective aesthetic. Its more like this: it’s what all individuals experience—a calling toward (akin to a telos) which attracts in a specific way relative to where the individual presently is mentally—that serves as the myriad different facets of the same, objective aesthetic.

While I’d be glad if this at least makes some sense even if not fully agreed with, no problems if it doesn’t. I don’t now currently know how to express myself better.

At any rate, I don’t find myself to be presenting a strawman so far.

I don't equate personal "truths" with aesthetic preferences, because I don't use the term "personal truth"; I'm not sure what it means. Personal experience, for instance, is not synonymous with personal "truth". — Noble Dust

A personal truth simply means a personal non-falsity, or non-self-deception. That a person dreamt of trees would be the person’s personal truth, were this dream-experience to have been real. That the trees actually signify what the person dreamed them to signify, for example, might or might not be a self-deception.

Aesthetics—unlike things such as hallucinations—are always truths that strictly apply to the being in question. One cannot, for example, hallucinate an experienced aesthetic.

Hence the different between personal experiences and personal truths as a significant subset of the former.

Do you have a better way for making this distinction?

I do know of another alternative: c) an objective standard of aesthetic value that exists, but which no one subjective being is in possession of.

Or, better:

c) An objective aesthetic reality which no subjective individual has fully experienced, but which is the basis of each subjective individual's aesthetic experiences, even experiences that result in conflicting aesthetic opinions. — Noble Dust

This is an issue of metaphysical inquiry into whether there is something along the lines of a Platonic Form for the aesthetic. I believe there is. All the same, in what way does either alternative you’ve expressed serve as a means of appraising that which is aesthetic?

For my part, I'm in agreement.

Dude, if what one is interested in is a discussion that mutually attempts to better understand the subjective truths of others, where I come from tonality matters … strange as this might seem. A shoot first ask questions later approach doesn’t suit me well. Yes, to each their own methods; just saying, though …

As allegory, I’ll address paintings since it might be less personal. The aesthetic value to works of Rembrandt and Warhol can either be judged—I’ll use the harsher word for “appraised” since it is a judgment after all—based on a) personal truths of aesthetic preferences or b) an objective standard of aesthetic value which one as a subjective being is in possession of. If you know of an alternative to (a) and (b) let me know.

I have in no way claimed that Warhol is devoid of value, to me. To me, his artwork is often repetitive in structure, his painting and illustrative technique is quite simple and at times juvenile, and the concepts and social critiques he makes—though I too like them—do not stand up the concepts and social critiques of Rembrandt. Now that the novelty of each has passed, you’re typical schooled artist will far more easily duplicate Warhol’s methods (though not his genius in the context of his own time) than those of Rembrandt, whose degree of subtlety is immense. I appreciate the layers of meaning that can often be found in Rembrandt far more than in the one-size-fits-all in your face approach of Warhol. This, then, is a reflection—for better or worse—of my own tastes, i.e. is one person’s summed up explanation of his own personal truths as regards one’s own aesthetic preferences.

Another might likewise cordially explain why they find Warhol more appealing than Rembrandt. Maybe on account of being more minimalist, more serene in expressions, while all the while being more frank. I, then, upon then better understanding this alternative aesthetic, might then further develop my own, maybe to the point that I then will indeed favor Warhol over Rembrandt on a personal level of who I’d most likely first buy an art book of, or who’s works I’d first place in my house most prominently where I to have the money.

Still, all this would yet be (a) interacting with (a), and at no point in time would it be due to (b).

To claim a bird’s eye view of aesthetic truth is, from where I currently stand, to be a participant in the emperor’s new clothes phenomena. “Why yes, they are beautiful … well, maybe not to me personally now but to all those others out there who exalt in this view from nowhere regarding aesthetic truths and who I naturally then agree with; its they who are the experts, after all; you can tell by how much money they’re making.” Something along these lines.

To me aesthetics is power relative to the psyche(s) which hold the experience of it. If it does not grab you without letting go—while dragging you toward realms of reality both intimately familiar and yet estranged from you--it holds no power to you and is not to you an aesthetic. Of course it may not to you while it may indeed do so to others. Aesthetics are in the eyes (or ears, etc.) of the beholder. And, in so being, they will always pertain to (a); not to (b)—again, this as I currently interpret things.

Same, then, with music. And my own subjective truths so far remain the same as they were when first here expressed—idiosyncratic as they might, or might not, be. Yet I now see I need to emphasize this: again, I hold this perspective not in terms of all music, but in terms of the overall music making its way into common culture. Such a thing still exists, I at least hope. And I of course do not deny occasional exceptions standing out as great music. In terms of new bands within common culture, X Ambassodors come to mind with their hit single Renegades. But again, it’s an issue of individual tastes.

I was suggesting that you were assuming an objective standard by saying "It's about what is expressed". — Noble Dust

To me art is minimally differentiated from non-art precisely due to the intention of expression and its then manifested results. If I find a brick placed on a brick wall and it was maybe forgotten there by someone, it then is not art. If, on the other hand, the same brick on the same wall in the same position resulted from some psyche’s intention to express anything whatsoever either to others or this their own person, then it is art. Maybe not the best to most, but it then is an instance of art all the same.

So yes, I do claim this aspect of something expressed to be a universal in relation to what art minimally is. Hence, were someone to claim that a certain landscape is art, this—as I currently interpret it—can only make sense were the person in question to interpret the landscape to have been in some way created by some being with intention to express some either emotive or cognitive meaning. Can you find something wrong with this?

If not, then I argue that what is expressed then matters relative to who it is expressed to.

Another way to appreciate this last point is to appreciate that we don't have an ongoing model. each one of us has our own on going model which is different to others - and sometimes radically so - and all of them are conjectural on your understanding. But this, surely, makes every model, no matter how seemingly absurd, equal in authority to every other. — PossibleAaran

You raise good points. Yet there remains this: the Viking, the young Earth Christian, and the physicalist atheist, when they are in close enough proximity to interact, will all hold implicit accord on everything which is common to all three. They may each enter into immediate conflict upon such an encounter due to disagreements—even that of an all-out war—yet even in so doing they each will hold implicit accord in what causes what in relation to their immediate, concrete, commonly shared reality (hence, in the reality of causation); in who said or did something prior to the other saying or doing something (hence, in the reality of temporal sequences and, thereby, of time); in the truth that they are standing upon a solid substratum which affects each equally (hence, in the reality of a physical realm applicable to all); etc.

Each of the three individual’s explanations for causation, time, physicality, etc. will indeed be different—and each will project upon the others a belief that the others lack an adequate understanding of what is metaphysically true—yet this commonly shared reality between each will itself hold its own metaphysical validity in so being.

To me at least, the more mature caricatures of the Viking, the YE Christian, and the physicalist atheist would only have grounds for conflict when contradictions occur in regard to what is commonly shared.

They share one world but hold different explanations for it. This, in itself, is not grounds for conflict for it is a difference that makes no significant difference. But when these explanations for the shared world a) are not demonstrated to be and b) infringe upon the others understanding of what the shared world is, then the explanations of each takes away from the extended-self of the others. By “extended-self” I’m keeping in mind that context is itself one aspect by which the self is defined; e.g. who I am is in part defined by whether I’m a BIV puppeteer by others or not; by whether the world I inhabit is fully deterministic or else can facilitate the reality of freewill; by whether the laws of nature are stable—and some can from this extrapolate eternally fixed—or, to address the other extreme, can change on a dime at any time for no reason whatsoever; etc. A different subject but I'm hoping this issue of an extended-self can be at least partially understood.

To simplify, I’ll only address the YE Christian and the physicalist atheist. They both hold common knowledge of a multitude of givens regarding the here and now—including that of both being humans inhabiting planet Earth. Yet the first claims that Earth started about 6,000 years ago on causal grounds of God and the latter claims that Earth started about 4.5 billion years ago on causal grounds of physical laws. The latter’s claims are accordant to the empirical sciences at expense of any divinity being real and the former’s claims are accordant to one of many interpretations of divinity being real at expense of the empirical sciences. Add some politics into this as regards what the nation to which they both hold citizenship should do and conflicts as regards explanations can then unfold on grounds of contradictions in terms of what is.

Despite such potential conflicts, there yet remains the common reality. I’m upholding that while this reality common to all (“uni-verse” will carry the same connotations) may be reinterpreted metaphysically—such as via inquiry into metaphysics regarding substantiations for what is—it nevertheless can neither be ignored nor denied as a core metaphysical component of reality.

Not that all this serves as any resolution to the problems addressed. But to me at least it reframes the problems in a way that is more acceptable. So, with such outlook, it’s not an issue of everyone for themselves in terms of metaphysics but an issue of which explanation for the whole best accounts for what is common to all in noncontradictory manners … ideally, in as impartial a fashion as is possible, imo.

You're essentially stating your bias (as we all do), but then saying that we're all just biased. — Noble Dust

And somehow, this isn't true?

either own up and make a claim about one era being superior to the other (and then defend the claim), or stop complaining and just accept the evolution of music. — Noble Dust

Sorry, but you lost me here. T-Bone Walker is neither superior nor inferior to Sting. Neither were the eras. To me that is.

As to the second portion of this quote, I to me have not complained, but only frankly stated one more person's subjective truth.

But by assuming that standard and not expressing it and defending it, your assertions hold no weight. — Noble Dust

I'll then let the those who know the objective truth of the aesthetic matter determine what is superior.

Not my style of argument.

As I mentioned previously, it’s a matter of taste. To entertain the comparison you’ve chosen— comparing an apple with an orange in terms of content—the allegorical, metaphorical, and metaphysical allusions made in the lyrics of Running Up that Hill to me far surpass the lyrical appeal of Dare You to Move. Why and how and who cares are not things that can be decided via logical analysis.

Same with the painting world. Some will deride those who claim that painting quality has gone down the drain in terms of what is the modern standard. Yet to someone like myself, a Rembrandt far outweighs the quality—both of structure and of content—of a Warhol.

It’s not about the new which does away with the old. It’s about what is expressed, the quality with which it is expressed, and the tastes of the audience which is exposed to the former.

Now, I acknowledge my bias in what I uphold. But, then, for others to not acknowledge their own is more than a bit dishonest—else, they’re stipulating that their own aesthetic tastes are to be deemed the metric standard by which all else is measured.

So, I’ll be true to myself and uphold that which I initially stated … not as an objective reality but, again, as one more person’s preference.

Again, this is just a skewed view. — Noble Dust

And I will continue to uphold my own bias till I discover good reason not to.

Nitpicking on two songs in an out of context fashion does not evidence an unbiased conclusion that the quality of music overall has remained unchanged.