Science is a systematic search for knowledge that follows a specific, defined set of rules and algorithms. — T Clark

Agreed, but to me this sentence is omitting making explicit what the vital essence of all empirical sciences is : empirical data. In theoretical maths one can concoct infinite mathematical universes if the will and intelligence is there for so doing (invent new axioms and, using these as rules, make all the novel algorithm you want). Especially as regards the empirical sciences, this is all however meaningless unless it happens to be accordant to our body of experience derived, empirical data.

Picking on this omission because it’s a hefty pet peeve of mine: that many in the general community place maths before experience in their understanding of the empirical sciences.

Thank you for the feedback on Platonic Forms. I’ve read much of Plato but it’s been some time and, to be honest, my memory of his writings are by now more hazy than not. What you’ve said about Plato and Pythagoras makes sense. And I don’t have anything to debate in regard to the historicity of the concepts.

So we have to posit a different type of actuality, one which determines which potentialities will be actualized at each moment as time passes. This actuality must be in some sense prior to the actuality which is time passing, in order to have any power over time passing (on its other side, potentialities being actualized). So this is the actuality which is somehow outside of time, as prior to time passing, and cannot be said to be co-existent with it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m very much in tune with this. As previously noted, I would append to it the additional factor of this same “actuality which is somehow outside of time” being itself a metaphysical end-state of being. All the same, the relation between actuality and potentiality you’ve described in relation to the present works well with me.

The principle of plenitude says that if given an infinite amount of time, any possibility will be actualized (a monkey at the typewriter will type Shakespeare for example). — Metaphysician Undercover

I should have known. Cheers for the explanations.

So you are presuming that motion, change or action needs a cause and can't instead be spontaneous?

I'm instead making the opposite presumption. Fluctuations are the result of a lack of constraint. The problem that existence has is in developing regulating habits.

The initial conditions are an everythingness of spontaneity that is utterly unruly. There is nothing standing in the way of motion, change and action. Then out of that constraints develop. Chaos is transformed into definite actions having definite directions. — apokrisis

To be accurate, in the first quoted sentences “a cause” should be changed to “causation”—thereby including various types as well as allowing for a plurality of instantiations. And then, yes, this is one of my premises.

BTW, doesn't "spontaneous" translate into something like an uncaused event? You could also uphold ex nihilo events but these would need to reify the nothingness into an uncaused given, or so I'll argue. Nevertheless, these are yet notions of causality--for they address causal mechanisms (of origination).

As it happens, I also very much uphold the notion that “[random] fluctuations are the result of a lack of constraints”. Yet this chaos (these random fluctuations) to me is always relative and can never be absolute (absolute chaos to me is logically contradictory); this, then, likewise specifies that the lack of constraints upon the given chaotic system is itself always relative, and can never be an absolute lack of constraint.

As to the issue of causation-devoid motion, change, or action: how would one go about justifying this position? As a reminder, we both agree upon there being multiple, existent forms of causation, and not merely the efficient variety.

That would seem to fit with my position then. Form stands "at the end of development" as ""emergent necessity". In the end, it restricts free choice as there is only one "right" choice. — apokrisis

I’m in no way surprised by this. For my part, the main disagreements between us so far concern there being vagueness (potential) devoid of a ready existing a prior global telos. Without the ready existing telos, the apeiron could only remain apeiron, as MU has so far argued.

If the apeiron were not perfect potential but, as you sometimes state, “fluctuations of potentiality” (which to me indicates some notion of time and of separateness, however chaotic) and there would already be a ready existent, a priori, global telos, then I could understand how the metaphysics you endorse could logically get off the ground.

All other disagreements as regards the metaphysical seem to me secondary to this one.

A good place to develop a firm understanding of the relationship between potency and act, is by reading Aristotle's On the Soul. All the powers of living creatures are described as potencies. But these potencies must be attributed to something actual in order to substantiate their existence. The potencies, or powers, exist as the body of the living being, the various different bodies of various living beings, are the various potencies of living beings. So the body as a collection of potencies, must be attributed to something actual, and this is the soul itself. Aristotle provides, as the primary definition of soul, the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This necessitates that the body has no actuality prior to having life, there is no actual body, only the potential for such. And the soul brings, or gives, actual existence to the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Though I’ll skip the details, I can very much relate to this understanding.

This is contrary to the principles of emergence which hold that the soul, or life, emerges from the existence of the body, as if it is a potency of the body. But when this premise is taken, then we must look to a prior material existence to substantiate the actual existence of the living body. Since this prior material existence is not living, it can only substantiate the potential for life, not the actual existence of life. So the infinite regress of potential without anything to substantiate the actual, gives way to the infinite vagueness of pure potential, or apeiron. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, agreed. It’s what I was looking for with the OP: some process that, while not life / anima, is yet not altogether nonlife / devoid-of-anima. I acknowledge, maybe a bit too Quixotic even for my eccentric tastes. Hind sight is always 20/20, or so they say.

Lots of material here. Not sure if all my replies will be worth debating if there are disagreements, and I’m confident enough that there will be. Most is an exchange of perspective. I'm mainly interested in the notions of actuality and potentiality as applies to a global telos.

Therefore, that the independently existing ideas exist, cannot be known in any sense beyond an ungrounded assumption, and we must maintain this in our representation of reality, that independently existing ideas is a possibility. The next step of the problem is that an eternally existing possibility is not a real possibility due to the principle of plenitude. So eternal, immutable, independent "Ideas" is refuted in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

If ideas are taken to necessarily be human representations of their referents, then I would understand this position of “[human] representations of reality”. However, this to me seems at odds with at least some Platonic Forms. To me, representations are phenomenal in constituency (either perceivable via the physiological senses or perceivable via imagination in like manners: sights, sounds, smells, proprioceptions, etc.). This while some Platonic Forms, such as that of the aesthetic, for example, are of themselves articles of awareness only in so far as being purely sense-ual and, hence, noumenal: thereby more aligned to faculties such as those of understanding (of sense/meaning)—albeit, this despite the aesthetic as Form being most often apprehended through concordant awareness of the phenomenal. Here, my position is that our awareness of at least some Forms—though they may find representation via words or other symbols—cannot constitute representations of what actually is. For example, an awareness of the aesthetic is itself non-representational … and any representation of what is experienced (though it may help to convey the essence of meaning from one person to another) will in no way of itself embody the given experience (if one for whatever reason cannot experience what another experiences as aesthetic, no amount of phenomenal representation will convey the noumenal reality that is experienced by the other).

All the same, can you further explain the argument from the principle of plentitude: why it precludes any eternally existent possibility from being a real possibility? This to me is tied into what I express toward the end of this post regarding a global telos.

But this produces a categorical separation between human ideas, which according to Aristotle's argument are of the nature of potential, and the independent Forms which are of the nature of actual. In theology the independent (actual) Forms are the divine Ideas, property of God. There is a necessary separation between these Forms, which are independent from, and prior to material existence, and human ideas, which are dependent on the human soul's union with the body. — Metaphysician Undercover

While I can feel at home in certain discussions of theology, these independent Forms to me will hold even when addressed atheistically (i.e. when contemplated in the absence of Deity or deities, angels , and the like). The independent Forms in my view are occurring limitations which bind that which can be. To again use the aesthetic as example, this particular independent Form (here presuming it to so be) will limit, constrain, and form that which in essence is sense-ual attraction and aversion—this from the most base variants of this Form which can be found in the lower lifeforms to more refined and elevated variants of this same Form which can be found among mankind. As Form, the aesthetic emanates through the phenomenal in relation to observers and, in its most refined state, is purely noumenal: the former phenomenal variants being the allegorical shadows on the wall in Plato’s cave; the latter noumenal variants being the Form’s non-representational pure nature—which is sometimes accessible to humans. Given that all beings hold attractions and aversions, all beings are then limited, constrained, and formed by an intrinsic sense of the aesthetic; because no sensation-based attraction or repulsion could manifest devoid of this limitation on what can be, the limitation of the aesthetic is a priori to any potential attraction or aversion of individual beings. (This is quite the mouthful and not at all well substantiated, I’m well aware.)

I bring this perspective up, however, both to offer the possibility that independent Forms need not be theistic in their nature and, for me more importantly, to say that (at least some) independent Forms, as universals, are that which actively in-forms all beings’ identity—thereby making the actuality of the Forms minimally concurrent with the actuality of the beings whose identity is thus brought about via these universal Forms. Else argued, to me, the independent Forms are never fully severed from the beings thus formed—even if these beings hold no conscious awareness of these Forms; e.g. a cat may hypothetically sense sense-ual attraction toward some stimuli (say, some patch of colors) and aversions to others—this being the cat’s aesthetics—even though the cat has no comprehension of what aesthetics are. Yet, the greater the awareness of the beings in-formed by aesthetics, the more the beings can approach sense-ual understanding / awareness of this Forms’ noumenal, true (or pure) non-representational nature. E.g., all life will hold affinities and aversions to phenomenal stimuli but only humans can hold awareness of non-carnal beauty (here taking beauty to be a more refined aesthetic) … and, at times, even reapply this sense of beauty back to carnal bodies: e.g. a straight guy’s appreciation of the beauty to a male nude figure, like Michelangelo’s David, without any sense of sexual desire or any aversion due to this same issue of sexuality (top scores if a straight guy can at times likewise hold appreciation of non-carnal aesthetics when considering the female nude, I’d think).

In overview, imo universal Forms cannot be severed from anything which they any way in-form … this even when that which is thereby in-formed holds no conscious awareness of the universal Forms’ most likely noumenal nature.

Needless to add, these are perspectives on this issue.

The important part regarding the global telos as both actuality and potentiality:

Plato demonstrated, that in nature, the form of all material things precedes the material existence of the thing, and Aristotle followed this principle with a claim of "that the thing will be" only follows from "what the thing will be". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm so far in full agreement with this.

To me the global telos is also something which can eventually become fully actualized on a global scale by all sentience. In this way, the factual global telos also serves as a global end-state of being. I know this perspective can easily be ridiculed as unusual. Still, when comparing this outlook with theistic worldviews, it can readily approximate notions such as “closer proximity to God / G-d”, “to Brahman”, “to Nirvana”, “to Moksha”, and so on. Even when one addresses this global telos in a purely atheistic manner, it is for me the universal noumenal Form (as both global telos and global end-state of being) on which all other universal Forms are contingent—via which, again, all presently actual individual beings become bound, or limited, and, thereby, given their present actual form.

Then, as to the relation of actual and potential: This global telos is both actual as real telos and as an eventual, predetermined, global end-state of being (apo’s Heat Death; my hypothesis of an “unbounded awareness”)—as well as not yet manifest as an actualized, global end-state of being. So while it is thus actual as global telos (and as a metaphysically determinate end-state of being), because it is not yet manifest, it is also only a potential future manifestation whose realization is contingent upon numerous givens—including (in at least the metaphysics I uphold) the free-willed intent of all conscious agents so desiring it to become manifest. (Hence, it’s a given to me that we’re in no danger of it becoming manifest anytime soon, nor in any number of millennia from now.)

In this manner it is both an actuality that is a priori (akin to the Kantian sense; not necessarily in a temporal sense) to all other forms … while also being as end-state a potentiality forever awaiting to be realized.

Though the metaphysics are notably different, I see this relation between actuality and potentiality as holding fast both for a physicalist notion of the Heat Death as global end-state of being as well as for the non-physicalist metaphysics I’ve just touched upon … wherein the end-state is that of what for brevity I’ve so far termed “unbounded awareness” within this thread (including in the OP).

TMK, the conclusion that a global telos is both an a priori actuality and a temporal potentiality remains wherever a global telos is postulated. It is this stated conclusion that gets me interested in the logics of actuality and potentiality.

Then, as a generalized metaphysical hypothetical: Why can it not be logically viable that an eternally present, a priori actuality is coexistent with the temporal potentiality which it as a priori actuality brings forth? Otherwise expressed, given that the global manifestation of the end-state (as global telos) is itself contingent upon multiple unpredictable factors (such as the freewill of all coexisting agents), then this temporal potentiality of a manifested end-state will itself be contingently eternal: the moment in which the globally manifested end-state occurs forever remains indeterminate until all the proper events occur which will result in the end-state’s manifestation.

I maintain this possibility. In which case, one simultaneously has an eternal a priori actuality and a contingently eternal temporal potentiality as a consequence of a global telos. (But this seems to contradict what you say Aristotle argued to be.)

I’m in a bit of a hurry right now. So a quick reply to a quick reading of your post (may reply in greater detail later on after a rereading):

I agree with the position that actuality can logically only be a priori to potentiality. So, from my point of view regarding a global telos, the telos must be a priori to all potentiality as an existent actuality—this even though its obtainment by aware agencies (these also being present actualities) can only be appraised in terms of potentiality. I’m hoping that this at least makes some sense—and it is this overlap of actuality and potentially that currently has me further contemplating the matter. Still—though I can’t yet make out if it’s due to the same reasons or not—I’m in full agreement that actuality cannot be birthed of pure potentiality, and that the latter notion is nonsensical.

As I said it is a double edged sword which defeats both materialism and idealism. He demonstrates how ideas have no actual existence prior to being "discovered" by human minds. The act of discovery is an actualization. So anyone who claims that ideas exist prior to being discovered by the mind must consent to the fact that such existence is purely potential. Then he demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not sure how to here best interpret the term “ideas”—and I have not read Aristotle’s arguments first hand. I so far find it reasonable that at least some platonic ideas (ideals / forms) can be safely presumed to exist prior to any person’s awareness of them. Though not my main interests, basic geometric forms might serve as an easy example—a triangle, for instance. More importantly to me, though, are forms such as that of the Good—which I maintain necessarily exist as actuality even were no human to be consciously aware of this platonic “idea”.

Better expressed: My own present contention is that the Good as form, for example, is both actual and, in an equivocal sense, simultaneously potential. The Good thereby, imo, exists in and of itself as metaphysical actuality while, from the vantage of all actual people, existing only as a potential state of affairs yet to be obtained by any of us. Furthermore, it would hold this status even if no sentience were to be consciously aware of it so being.

For me, this is in no way intended as a defense of idealism. I’m however interested in better understanding the logics of actuality and potentiality from the vantage of a hypothetical global telos.

A guy calls up the city’s unique, Socratic zoo keeper and asks, “What would you term an animal that is half elephant and half rhino?” The zookeeper, staying true to his philosophical roots, replies: “El-if-I-know!”

Obviously monks already do this but they require on the charity of others to sustain them and also devote their time to prayer or charitable work and have other vows beyond poverty. What if you worked a normal career but knew a good portion of your salary went to others and not yourself? Again my wife would probably veto this idea, so it's just a thought experiment. — MysticMonist

I’m on board with your general thought experiment; its good intending. As to your wife’s veto, I believe it may have something to do with a commonsensical approach to life and our relations to others. We have to be living in order to help out others we hold agape for. Like what they tell us about oxygen masks when we’re aboard airplanes, we have to take care of ourselves before we can successfully take care of others. Imo, finding the right balance between maintaining one’s self and giving to others is the trick, though, especially since contexts change all the time. And we can’t all be monks: even if it where what everyone wanted to be, there’s be no one left to sustain us with the occasional charity. For what it’s worth, if you don't mind me saying: sounds like you’ve got a wife with sound judgment, one that's also good intending.

About self-renunciation: I had an insight today from Plato's Republic where he says the virtue/justice is the path to happiness. [...] First, the joy from helping others would be deeper and longer lasting than sensual pleasure. Second, if I could live off a very austere lifestyle then I would become immune to the desire or worry of wealth. — MysticMonist

This could be much ado about nothing—and it’s not directly oriented toward your post. Still—as a tangential to the thread—I wanted to express that although sensual pleasure all too often gets a very bad rap, imo it shouldn’t. I say this without yet knowing what position you yourself take on this topic.

I’m thinking of everything on a spectrum from John Lennon’s song, “Love” (e.g., love is touch) to sexual practices, including those of Tantric sex. In many—though not all—religions, a divinity aligned sex (which in ancient Hindu practices could get very raunchy by today’s standards, for example) serves as a vehicle for attaining closer proximity to God. This “divinity alignment” could well be interpreted as the presence and pursuit of sensuality (as compared with things like sex devoid of any sensed intimacy). I’m aware that in today’s culture such attitude—to not even say spiritual truth / reality—is most often deemed contradictory to what in fact is … this regardless if one is spiritual or atheistic. Nevertheless, to me there’s something worthwhile about sensuality as one more facet of closer proximity to divinity … be this sensuality of a sexual nature or not: like in the sensual (sense-ual; as contrasted to percept-ual) pleasures of deep understandings that have at times been termed ecstasies. I’d even uphold that experienced love—from eros to agape—can itself only be an experience of the sensual.

To be clear, while I don’t disagree with the notion that one can live well even when devoid of most carnal forms of sensuality (such as what can result from out of physical touch), I do maintain that an ideal, fully balanced life (which no one can be in perpetual possession of) would include a wide range of sensual experiences as means of closer proximity to God.

I’ve brought this up because there’s a historical precedent in modern western culture that sensuality if of the Devil’s—from Savonarola to more modern notions of it being the Devil tempting one away from salvation. (no dancing in the streets, kind of thing) Then there’s a self-renunciation in Eastern spiritualties that seem to me to have almost taken over other paths after the West’s colonization of (parts of) the East. Yet, from Shinto to ancient Hindu to other ancient Eastern paths—as well as many ancient western paths—the being-at-home with sensuality as a means of closer proximity to divinity was once relatively widespread … again, be it expressed sexually or not, the focus was on new understandings of the divine gained through sense-experience (rather than percept-experience or reasoning).

Thought it worthwhile to bring this perspective on sensuality into view.

Hello, btw. So you know, I don’t personally subscribe to any notion of God as deity, though I do hold a belief in divinity, with what I here term God essentially being divinity’s pinnacle. The Neo-Platonist “the One” works for me, for example, as well as other notions of what is to me the same referent.

All jokes are welcome. — T Clark

(Y) The Monty Python bunch are imo among the best comedians out there. I almost laugh only at the memory of A Fish Called Wanda: “The central message of Buddhism is not ‘Every man for himself!’” said the Brit to the Yankee—this, I presume, in reference to the notion of freedom. Brazil, Life of Brian … good stuff.

If what wise men say is true about greater knowledge leading to greater awareness of one’s own ignorance, then it must also be true that all the very wise people in humanity’s history have also known themselves to be idiots. So, if all the world’s sages are self-acknowledged idiots, then why should any of us regular folk take anything they’ve said seriously? I mean, come on, you’d have to be an idiot to think that acknowledged idiots are sagacious.

I call this “the sagaciousness fallacy”.

(an attempted emulation of British dry humor)

There, that's more like it. — T Clark

When it comes to humor, I’m in the dark.

How many real men does it to change a lightbulb?

None. Real men aren't afraid of the dark. — Bitter Crank

… need I say more? 8-)

Btw, nice one BC.

This is a bit suspect to me for several reasons. 1) You are assuming future people will reduce suffering in the same way as the parents. Offspring may be nothing like their parents. 2) Using future people in order to decrease some overall suffering seems to not be in the spirit of the moral stance to not use people for a means to an ends. You create a life with suffering in order to reduce some total suffering. — schopenhauer1

OK, I’ll defend my previously made argument and see how far it can go.

As to (1), true, things are not deterministically set—either biologically or behaviorally. Yet just as the kids’ phenotypes are on average a mixture of the parents’ phenotypes, so too can be argued for the kids’ behaviors, including their sense of ethics, when both parents have been around. What I’m upholding is that the kid’s behavior will not itself be random but will be in great part learned from the parent(s)’ behavior. So if the parents desire less suffering in the world, given that they are good parents by common sense standards, so too will their children. Exceptions could of course occur. But this argument is about average outcomes.

As to (2), I very much acknowledge that this position is hard knocks. All the same, if one cares about suffering in the world among humans and lives one’s life thus, then the absence of this person to humanity only increases the suffering in humanity relative to this person’s being otherwise present—this for reasons aforementioned. E.g. where this person would smile at a homeless kid, a non-caring person would not show any kindness toward the same homeless kid; and without the caring person the same homeless kid would receive less compassion and would therefore experience greater suffering. Do you deem this overall reasoning valid or erroneous?

I’ll try to address “the people as means toward ends” issue after this one issue is first addressed—since the former issue is contingent upon the latter issue being valid as here expressed.

On the philosophical principle of using reasoning in conjunction with one’s ready acquired body of empirical knowledge to establish what is and is not real:

An Eastern European, outback shepherd who’d only seen local animals his entire life—with no connection to the world outside his village, such as via books or TV—finally made it out into the country’s big city. There he visited the city zoo. At the zoo he came face to face with a very tall-necked giraffe. While staring at it in disbelief, he contemplated deep and hard. At last, the intrepid shepherd confidently concluded with a wave of the hand: “No animal such as this can even exist!”

(A Romanian joke that may not translate as well as it could. I like it though.)

A more English based one also about observations and reasoning:

Two Californian dumb blonds stare up at the moon. One asks, “What do you think is closer: the moon or New York?” The other replies: “You stupid? The moon, of course! Look, you can’t see New York from where we’re at.”

This is (admittedly) about antinatalism (not procreating future people). — schopenhauer1

Here’re some premises and the resulting conclusions. Where would this go wrong?

P1: Antinatalists hold their stance due to a desire for there to not be suffering in the world.

P2: Some people in the world desire for there not to be so much suffering in the world while others couldn’t give a hoot about other’s suffering.

P3: If all people who desire reduced suffering in the world (including antinatalists) were to no longer exist, then the world would become fully populated by people that increase suffering in the world—this either due to lack of care or due to willful intent.

C1: In order to best bring about the effect which antinatalists seek, people who seek this same effect have to populate the world—and, thereby, at times reproduce—in order to optimally counteract the effects of people who bring about increased suffering in the world.

C2: Though it is in the interest of minimized global suffering that all newly birthed children are wanted (thereby entailing that if potential parents don’t want to be parents then it is good for them not to be parents—regardless of reasons), given the premises listed: the greater the quantity of reproduction by people who seek minimizing suffering in the world, the more the world’s overall suffering becomes minimized via the counteracting of those who produce increased world suffering.

Edit: I know I'm missing some details in terms of logics; still, how does this stand as an overall argument?

No bully wants to be bullied. Therefore even the unjust person perceives the unjust treatment to be bad. [...] So I claim that no one, not even the immoral ones, can perceive object 2 to be morally better than object 1. — Samuel Lacrampe

To be honest, this is my intuitive center of gravity as well, so to speak … and I easily project it upon all others. In no way proud of this, when I as a young kid burned ants with a magnifying glass, I knew darn well what caused them suffering and what didn’t (I had no doubts that they weren’t automata or the like; it takes an adult to dream up that one) … and I fully knew that I would not have liked to be treated the way I then treated these few ants. And so, if I’d been asked, I would have known that what I was doing was wrong -- even if it was a means for me to relieve the stress of having been bullied.

But people can sometimes act out in even stranger ways, even as adults. Think of someone, for example, who is sadistic one day and then masochistic the next—maybe as a psychological means of feeling that justice is done in terms of the previous sadisms they acted out (e.g., though, maybe, only marginally related: I’ve read that men of great power, like male judges, are the typical customers in the paid-for services of dominatrixes).

So while I fully agree that this sentiment of “no bully wants to be bullied” is a good rule of thumb, I so far still think that more involved principles would need to be invoked were one interested in accounting for all human behavior (even more so for all sentient behavior).

For example, some can be said to innately believe that a maximized control-over-other is the only means of successfully minimizing bad for oneself and for others. Fascism, Stalinism, even kingships all tend toward this conception of “objective good”: one of centralized power of sentience over all other sentience through which all other becomes ordered, thus stable, thus maximally happy. Again, it is not an uncommon perspective of what is objectively good (be it further justified as God-ordained or nature-ordained). Yet this outlook stands in direct opposition to the notion of “do onto others as you’d have done onto you” (which can be justified in like manners).

So the question again resolves into how does one justify what in fact is objectively good? For instance, why would a maximized control-over-over be immoral (unjust) in the first place? (certainly this state of being is what bullies aspire for; btw, I'll play the devil's advocate with this for a while if need be)

This seems to be a good goal in general, but there are exceptions to it. Would it be okay for me to withhold truth from you, on the grounds that learning it would make you suffer? — Samuel Lacrampe

I acknowledge that there are exceptions to what I’ve previously mentioned. As to relation between truths and suffering, there can be found various explanations for why truths sometimes lead to suffering: e.g. truths sting bubbles of ego (when the ego is not already aligned with that which is true)—this stinging of ego being the hubris-driven tragedy needed for any catharsis. In attempts to explain this relation, one can even rely on the statement of “truth shall set us free” and somehow work backwards in terms of finding the proper moderations and degrees of expressing truths … this with the reasoning that too much suffering too quickly will in the long term drive someone away from the desire to experience the cathartic pleasures of new truths. (or something like this)

Still, as you illustrate, the understanding of suffering as has been so far here expressed is not, in fact, universal to all at all times. To me, however, this only means we’d need to get deeper into what then is in fact a universal drive to all sentience … whose fulfillment would be innately deemed good by each and every sentience.

BTW, I’ve little hope that we can get to the bottom of things as to what objective goodness signifies; I nevertheless hold the attempts in high regard.

Alright, think of it like the gender-neutral harmony between masculine and feminine attributes in Taoism; the Yin Yang solidifies an inseperable bond within that cultivates the dissolution of vicious or cruel behaviour through moral virtue and ethics. This is an individual, subjective challenge and whether physically you are a man or a woman, to find this balance you need to welcome and identify with both. — TimeLine

Yes, yes, all well and good (and very, very nicely stated, too). But how does one answer the rebuttal that, “this is all part of a movement to castrate men’s masculinity by depriving men of our inalienable (God and/or biology-given) rights to subjugate women as we men see fit (else, we’re not true men)”?

No, really; I personally don’t know how to address such a rebuttal effectively. So I’m asking. I see a little too much of this type or reasoning from my own corner of the world, including on the internet (hopefully it’s much better in other parts of the world).

Well the song depicts a man trying to persuade himself that he does not have tender feelings; a man trying to be manly according to a common image of manliness. It expresses the pain of doing that to oneself, and the impossibility of it. — unenlightened

Interesting. To me, for example, the image of a father (an image of masculinity) does bring about inherent notions of tenderness, such as toward his kids, this alongside firmness when needed. This to try to say that the experiencing of love is to me as much masculine as it is feminine, though the two will sometimes express and react to it in different ways. Though, yes, being an owner of tender feelings might be viewed as weakness of being, non-masculine, in some notions of masculinity.

On the one hand, we could argue sociologically about what images of manhood are promoted in a particular culture that men are pressured to conform themselves to. And on the other hand, we could argue biologically about what are the facts of manhood. — unenlightened

Agreed. I also like and agree with your notion of “image”, btw. I’ll venture that the image of masculinity is furthermore in part made by a) what males, boys included, desire to become (the image of this being potentially termed “a man’s man”) and b) what women desire to someday be around romantically (the image of this being potentially termed “a woman’s man”). The exact opposite could be argued for femininity; though I’ve yet to hear of “a woman’s woman” and of “a man’s woman”--at least not with the semantics here intended.

I find agreement with the rest of your post. In truth, my main interests with this thread can be boiled down to this personal belief: A sense of compassion (alongside others, such as courage and strength) ought to be at the very core of all images we hold of masculinity, else we risk our cultural image of masculinity to become an esteemed image of psychopathy. Other than that, to each their own. (But no, one man’s opinion does not a culture make.)

Upon experiencing deception, one learns that the reality as experienced before the learning of deception, may not fit what is now perceived to be an absolute reality. — Tehilla

I’m so far unclear as to what this (and the overall thesis) intends to specify. And a lot of topics have been addressed; so the OP may need some further unpacking. I will, however, offer this related observation:

Deception cannot exist in the absence of truth. To willfully deceive is to build up—in part or in whole—a fictitious reality, a fictional truth, which then becomes interpreted (trusted / believed) to be non-fictitious in those that are thereby deceived. (While I’d argue this holds true for self-deceptions as well, the issue of self-deceptions can become very complicated by various theories of mind.) So the deceiver, in order to be successful in his/her deceptions, first needs to be aware of the personally apprehended reality / truth in question prior to creating deceptions of it. This form of reasoning then leads to the conclusion that reality has to always be primary, and the deceptions we may or may not live under must always be secondary to that which is real.

So, while we may not currently be able to demonstrate that what we know (via experience, of which empirical data is only one variant of, or via experience & reasoning) is an absolute reality, this aforementioned reasoning does conclude in there being a metaphysical need for there being an absolute reality.

I would also argue that experience is not limited to perceptions that occur via physiological senses (i.e., is not limited to the empirical): one can, for example, experience jubilance or sorrow; likewise can one experience understandings in respect to that which is empirical, this without making one’s lived-through understandings themselves in any way empirical (i.e., apprehendable through physiological senses).

To my mind, then, all accounts of whether or not absolute reality can in any way become knowable to any sentience would be propositions devoid of worth if we couldn’t first establish that such a thing as absolute reality in fact does somehow exist—be this absolute reality physical (which I’d argue against due to the premise of physical reality being in perpetual flux, and hence not technically absolute—as I currently understand the term to denote “perfectly integral / fixed”) or, else, metaphysical.

Again, while you conclude in the OP that, “This paradox points to the impossibility of knowledge of absolute truth,”—a conclusions whose premises I so far find faulty (e.g., that experience can only consist of empirical data)—you haven’t yet made it clear if you nevertheless uphold that an absolute reality exists … even if its particulars are currently indemonstrable by us.

Sorry, what question was that? — unenlightened

this one:

Wouldn’t self-proclaimed real dicks say that this song is for real pussies? — javra

To be clear, the question (and post) was thrown out there in general; not to you in particular. Again, to me, it touches upon what the concept of masculinity is to some (e.g., non-pussy-ness: including lack of attributes such as those of understanding and respectful compromises), and on what it is, or ought to be, to others (e.g., appreciation of things inclusive of the song you've posted).

Edit: just in case this needs clarifying: I’ve always taken for granted that the song “I’m not in love” is about a guy who’s in self-denial about being in love … and that it’s sentimental. Where I’m from, plenty of macho men would presume this song is for wusses. I at least wouldn’t be playing this song loudly while driving through the ghetto thinking that others would view me as masculine for listening to it (unless I felt like proving somethin’ … theoretically).

A song for all the real men... — unenlightened

Personally, as an aside, I ain’t no real nothing … and am real with myself in so being (yea, deal with the multiple negatives … hopefully, I counted them properly). Were I to have been birthed in Scotland, I’d be no true Scotsman either. Etc. That said, this song brings up the question: Wouldn’t self-proclaimed real dicks say that this song is for real pussies?

Now, I gather that dicks, pussies, and assholes are not cultural constructs (yes, they are biological givens) … but the symbolic connotations culturally ascribed to all three sure as culture are. People like Cleopatra have no place in our current cultural constructs: Was she feminine? Yes according to what we’re told (Cesar certainly thought so). Was she a pussy? Um, it would be doublethink to assert either “yes” or “no”. I get that this is swimming upstream against the flow of modern culture, so—instead of building up a long justification for this, which won’t make any difference anyways—I’ll skip strait to the intended conclusion: to pigeonhole real men (and thus masculinity) to being a dick and real women (and thus femininity) to being a pussy is to be a real asshole.

I can hear the real men grumbling: the real men hold the positive traits and it can only be a pussy—a sex betraying pussy at that—that will affirm that pussies aren’t defined by negative traits. (This form of culturally ingrained reasoning is why I personally believe feminists as a group have gotten such a bad rap for their desire of equal worth between men and women.)

All I got to say to this is that pussycats can sometimes be found in damn big sizes. Ya know, tigers and such. Other times they’re stated to wear boots. In any case, I wouldn’t mind living in a world where pussies (and femininity) are deemed of equal value to dicks (and masculinity), and in which neither draw blatant attention to also being assholes (a gender-neutral trait).

(I figure my initial question still stands in regard to the issue of masculinity.)

To add some fuel to this fire:

This song in part touches upon male homosexuality, so it likely isn’t for the really true macho men out there (unless, maybe, they’ve spent too much time in prisons). Other than that, it kind of speaks to the underlying issue of masculinity for us male heterosexuals as well.

The version I know of:


Cut and pasted from Google search:

------

Lyrics

Take your mind back- I don't know when-
Sometime when it always seemed to be just us and them.
Girls that wore pink, boys that wore blue,
Boys that always grew up better men than me and you.
What's a man now, what's a man mean?
Is he rough- or is he rugged, cultural and clean?
Now it's all changed- it's got to change more.
We think it's getting better, but nobody's really sure.

And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are

See the nice boys dancing in pairs,
Golden earring, golden tan, blow-wave in the hair-
Sure they're all straight, straight as a line.
All the guys are macho, see their leather shine.
You don't want to sound dumb, don't want to offend,
So don't call me a faggot, not unless you are a friend.
Then if you're tall, handsome and strong,
You can wear the uniform and I could play along.

And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are

Time to get scared, time to change plan,
Don't know how to treat a lady, don't know how to be a man.
Time to admit, what you call defeat,
'Cause there's women running past you now-
And you just drag your feet.
Man makes a gun, man goes to war,
Man can kill, and man can drink, and man can take a whore.
Kill all the blacks, kill all the reds,
If there's war between the sexes then there'll be no people left.

And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are
And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are
And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are

Songwriters: Joe Jackson
Real Men lyrics © Kobalt Music Publishing Ltd., Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC

------

(Bread, man, bread ...)

Is there a certain way that we ought to express masculinity? — Posty McPostface

Bravo! What, over 30 posts now and no mention yet of size differences as a true measure of a man’s worth!!! Still, shows how far removed this crowd is from them average people out there in the world. (btw, men and women ... yup, this is all funny to me)

Never liked the sound of “lord” and “lady” … until I checked out the two terms etymology on Wiktionary: “bread guardian” and “bread kneader” … two roles that are equally important, mutually important, and complement the other. As to bread, not only does bread sound very similar to “all” in some Languages (e.g. pane & pan) but there’s this Christian custom of bread representing the body of Christ(/world?). Sometimes makes me think it might have been an easily established code in ancient days, maybe similar to “vine (of life)” and “wine” as regards the spiritual side of reality … at least according to some interpretations.

Anyways, the lord / lady dichotomy is about as good a description of masculinity and femininity as any I’ve heard of so far. And then you can get into how each role contains some of the other in it. Now, I very much doubt that there’s only one way to guard bread, figuratively that is; but, still, some guys could be deemed to better express this role than others. Probably not by hording bread at baker's shops, though OK, it ain’t a perfect description of masculinity, but at least it’s better than pulling out that ruler to confirm size measurements, I say. (I hang out with the commoners often enough, don’t you all know).

Then I don't get why they'd say "This food tastes good", as opposed to "My mental state is this food tasting good." Both are true, and objective. — Harry Hindu

I side with SL on this: Truth cannot contradict truth.

As to why one expression over the other, to me it in part has to do with our tendency to project what is objectively real states of mind within ourselves upon external reality, including upon what the other subjects’ objectively real states of mind consist of—this being a natural occurrence that can range from being very healthy to being very nerve-racking (to say the least).

In parallel, it’s the same as saying “I’m visually perceiving this flower to be white” rather than saying “this flower is white”. The first statement can be argued to be more epistemically honest; the second statement is however more gregarious and, thereby, socially practical … since it implicitly acknowledges that it is already known that there is commonality between all people concerned in respect to what their own objectively real states of mind are when visually perceiving the given flower. Yet, however we express what objectively is, in this case truths will not contradict with truths.

Now, to build upon SL's statements, some of us may have more experience than others with honestly saying to the family chef that “This one dish doesn’t taste good; I’ll instead eat of that other dish you’ve cooked” and being told in reply, “But, it does taste good, dear; try some more of it and you’ll see”. Here truths—regarding the objectively real states of mind concerned in relation to the dish addressed—will contradict. And so these truths cannot now be deemed in any way objective respective to what they reference but, instead, can only be concluded to be relative to each subject’s personal inclinations—i.e., to be subjective truths.

Taking a step back, our commonly shared, external, objective reality will never be deemed to hold any contradictions. It will always be innately deemed to be non-contradictory in all of its aspects both big and small. This factor, I very much believe, plays into the very commonsensical notion of there being only one universe (akin to: one-ubiquitously-consistent-logos-bundle of which we are all entwined with) as regards the physical world. For example, it’s why we know that our current Theory of Relativity and QM are not the last word as regards physical reality: as of yet, there are aspects of these two models that are not fluidly congruent relative to each other (in respect to observations). But truths always cohere to truths. So we know that there is yet some subjectivity at play in at least one of these models that is incongruent to reality; else stated, that at least one of these two models contains some non-objective properties.

Let's rely on the relative-objective test to determine if moral goodness is an objective property of human behaviour. Object 1: A man acts towards others as he would want them to act towards him. Object 2: The man acts in such a way that he would hate others to act towards him. Which object would subjects observe to have the highest degree of moral goodness? I foresee that a large majority would say object 1, and the remaining few, if any, would be indecisive. But I also expect that virtually nobody would choose object 2. If this is the case, then moral goodness is objective.

Thoughts? — Samuel Lacrampe

While I’d like it to be this easy, I deeply believe Donald Trump--for example--would hate being around people who act toward him the way he acts toward others (the “you’re fired” attitude among others). Given that he’s the elected president of the USA, I don’t find his personality to be too exceptional in today’s culture. I’d say a lot of people are this way and find a sense of satisfaction in so being: bullies, for instance; but I suppose it can also be characters that we don’t intuitively think of as bad. Does a shy wallflower treat others the way he/she would hate to be treated—this, say, at social gatherings? This could be so for at least some. And if it pleases people to be so, on what grounds could we justify that it’s bad for them to be so?

Myself, I’d for example here lean more on Buddhist-like philosophy of suffering and the desire to minimize it--or at least something similar to this perspective. Were this to be evidenced a universal drive, we could then say something along the lines of “that which would successfully minimize suffering, and increase happiness, for one and all would be an objective good (a good that is universal to all sentience irrespective of contexts)”. Then this can be applied to scenarios 1 and 2 which you’ve provided. If we could logically maintain that the golden rule is better at minimizing the suffering of one and all than is the standard of “doing onto others as one would hate to be done onto oneself”, then we could safely conclude that scenario 1 is closer to an objective good than is scenario 2 … and that those who follow scenario 2 go about what they truly want in (logically) wrong, or inappropriate, ways. (Here, this would hold even when many would choose scenario 2.) Though more involved, I again think this type of approach would serve as a best means of justifying what would be objectively good, and why it would so be.

I observe the colour yellow and say "Yellow is the best colour". In this case, the object is 'yellow', the subject is me, and the property is 'best colour'. The property is obviously subjective because it is not linked to the colour yellow in itself. Now, you come in, and observe me saying that statement "Yellow is the best colour", and so you conclude "Sam's best colour is yellow". In this case, the object is me, the subject is you, and the property is 'best colour being yellow'. The property is now objective, because any new subjects, you or someone else, will hear me saying "Yellow is the best colour".

To sum up, it is imperative to clearly identify who or what is the subject, object, and property for any given context. Once this is done, the paradox is resolved. — Samuel Lacrampe

I’m in general agreement.

Here’s where it gets even trickier for me: Is the first-person point of view an object/entity, a process/becoming, both, or neither? These (we) first-person points of view are the very subjects whose presence is the source from which all subjectivity we are aware of emerges. Nevertheless, our presence as first-person points of view is, in and of itself, objectively real. Furthermore, for example: Grammatically, “me” is an object addressed and “I” is the subject that is addressing—yet both terms can hold the same exact referent.

To my mind, one way to resolve this is to interpret all objects as bundles of processes. Conversely, to not think of first person points of view as being bundles of processes leads to the conclusion of homunculi (of conscious agents as objects in the roundabout sense we typically think of rocks as objects: as somehow being perfectly stable and integral in their constituency). But, then again, to me this works its way into the difficulties of identity theory; there typically is a pervasive stability—however imperfect it may be—to a conscious agency throughout a lifetime (otherwise we typically address extreme mental disorders).

BTW, a day ago you asked about the possibility of such things as moral goodness being objective. As far as I understand things, goodness can only hold the possibility of being objective from the vantage of being a lowest common denominator that is universal to all first-person points of view. But, for emphasis, here we’d be addressing abstract universals that are integral to all, and not particulars that are relative to any context. Still, all first-person points of view hold in common so being first-person points of view … regardless of how otherwise different they may be relative to each other. If they likewise all share some attribute X whose fulfilment would be innately desired by all (though each in its own way), than the fulfilment of this attribute X would then equate to an objective good … such that its presence would be in manners indifferent to beliefs and choices. This form of reasoning, however, does require that conscious agents—i.e., first-person points of view—be acknowledge to be objectively real … but this again gets into identity theory in terms of what they (we) might metaphysically be: in essence, addressing the tricky issue I first mentioned in this post.

So that would be an example of the object not changing state but the observer. If it's still there when you come back and it's just the same-- no, but if you come back and bring someone else with you, and the two of you walk around, look at it from different angles, maybe do so at different times of day and so on, then we start to think "objective". — Srap Tasmaner

Thought about it and I’ll give this murky territory a try. I might be coming out of left field with this one. So, some thoughts that I’ll gladly see corrected wherever needed:

First off, objectivity cannot logically be that which is completely severed from subjectivity. Were this so, then empirical objectivity could never obtain. So “independent of” should be interpreted as “indifferent to” … obviously, this without any connotation of sentience being invoked by the phrase.

Back to the subjective-objective dichotomy: As per the OP’s outline, to my mind this naturally leads to a stratification of layers regarding that which is externally objective—i.e., regarding that which externally is in manners indifferent to what any subject might will or believe.

As regards perception, first layer will always be that of an experienced direct realism between beings that share common, genotypically inherited modes of perception: all of us non-blind/color-blind people will visually perceive the same colors; what we see is what we get color wise.

Also as regards perception, a deeper layer of objectivity can be found between species of sentience: humans and bees both pay special attention to the sun’s sunlight and location in the sky (as do many other species of life—e.g., all that hold any form of circadian rhythm); both species interact with this causality-endowed-web-of-information (i.e., Heraclitean logos) produced by the sun (and which also in part is the sun) and, so, have physiological means of sensing this information. This information remains the same for both species, yet, from the vantage of both species’ perceptions of it, the information will hold a type of lowest common denominator in respect to its objective appearance relative to the two species. Hence, it will hold a common appearance to which both species, each in its own way, builds up upon vie its own species-specific means of interpreting this information. This layer of objectivity regarding what externally is in regard to perception results in a type of indirect realism.

Likewise with objects being objective: all of us humans innately know via direct experience that objects occur in the external world; we agree upon the objects’ attributes and, so, can hold objective appraisals of which objects are and which are not. Nevertheless, conjoining experience and reasoning does result in a conclusion as old as Heraclitus that it’s all processes in relation to one another. On this deeper layer of contemplation, there objectively are no objects but only processes.

This multi-layering of objective reality can be extended in many directions. Yet, in this mode of thinking, reality itself is not what dwells at the very pith of these multiple layers but, rather, the entirety of all these layers as is (fully including the subjects that are entwined with and make sense of this logos).

This, then, also has some interesting implications for truth—here interpreted via correspondence to. When one is only aware in an intuitive manner of direct perception of the rock other there, one would express—relative to one’s momentary awareness—a full truth in that the rock over there is an objective object (say, not an imagined object). However, when one has process theory in mind and views the same rock, one would then express—again relative to one’s momentary awareness—only a partial truth in saying the same thing … for while one is honest in what one innately sees, one here overlooks the additional reality one is aware of regarding the rock being only a bundle of process and, in this sense, not an object.

Like I was saying, it’s a murky territory.

One summary of this perspective is that—while always remaining indifferent to subjects at all layers and at any particular time—interpretations of what is objectively real in terms of external givens will nevertheless remain relative to the commonly shared awareness of cohort(s) of subjective beings. For simplicity of argument, and because only humans think about such things, we can safely say “relative to the commonly shared awareness of sapient beings”. (Edit: this conforming to the same conclusion of the quote from ST.)

Nevertheless—to further complicate things—in accordance with Harry Hindu’s posts, this would also lead to conclusions such as: the presence of subjects is objectively real. Going by the definition of “indifferent to subjective appraisals”, so too can intra-personal states of being be objectively real (e.g., my current emotion is objectively real, regardless of how I may interpret it after the fact). Also, leading to a kind of pseudo-paradox: the subject is itself objectively real; i.e., the presence of the subject is objective, and thereby fully entwined with objective reality in total.

Thoughts?

Unless I am mistaken, then it seems to me that both the "daytime-nighttime" and "road sign" examples are determined to be objective through a process similar to the objective-relative test, thereby arguing in favour of the test. — Samuel Lacrampe

To my mind, they are. I’ve myself come to similar enough conclusions as yourself. Maybe some of the disagreements in this thread have been due to conflating—quite understandably—the notion of what is experientially objective with the notion of objectivity as a metaphysical standard. Don’t know.

In skimming what I previously wrote to you, saw that my use of terms was all over the place—not as sharp as it could have been; things like using the word “real” instead of “reality” and the like, never mind my use of the term “isle”. Wanted to say: my bad. Without this being an excuse, my odd dislexicalities tend to show more when I don’t take sufficient time in writing. As to a reply: cool.

Good one. — fishfry

I'm on the verge of blushing here. Not good for my reputation. But hey, even a broken clock is right twice a day. Cheers.

Edit:

I wonder if that's characteristic of compelling examples of objectiveness. — fishfry

Btw, I haven’t gotten into exploring your proposal because it would get into process philosophy—and that murky area of whether or not entities are in fact objective. Your proposal sounds good to me philosophically. That said, kids will think, for example, that the tree over there is objectively real … and I’d here agree with the kids. And, in truth, I innately think this myself even when there are no kids around. So, again, what you bring up would get murky for me.

I'd say that objectivity can address equally as many issues (induction, evidence, measurement, confirmation etc). Objectivity is a metaphysical issue. What is actually objective isn't. Likewise, reality is a metaphysical issue, what's actually real isn't. — Πετροκότσυφας

OK, then in addressing the referents to terms, and in speaking on my own behalf, I currently continue to uphold that while what is reality (and not: what is real) should be left up to philosophy, what is objective (and not: what is objectivity) should be left up the empirical sciences. Hence, as an ideal worth pursuing, the empirical sciences shouldn’t be biased by notions of what is reality in their endeavors to discover more of what is objective.

Do we disagree on this?

I'm not clear what you mean here. If by "what reality is" you refer to what the concept itself means, then I'm not sure how one (i.e. what is reality) is a philosophical question while the other (i.e. what is objective) isn't. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well, all questions can be reduced to philosophical questions. Unless you are unclear on what modern-day notions of empiricism are, then the empirical objectivity of the empirical sciences shouldn't be all that hard to fathom (even though empiricism too holds its foundation in philosophy).

This, however, is in a different ballpark than that of what reality actually is. This question, for example, can address the physicalism v. neutral monism v. substance dualism (etc.) issue. Yet, this metaphysical issue regarding reality is a difference that makes no difference in respect to empirical objectivity.

While you seem to suggest that the use of the term "real" lead scientists to deny what is "objective", Robinson, as I read him, does not say that. — Πετροκότσυφας

I wasn't addressing terminology; I was instead addressing reliance of practices--namely that of scientific investigations and development--being founded on conceptualizations. All the same, I'm in no way here to uphold or else argue about what Robinson truly said or intended. You may well be right in this respect.

Please name a single specific thing that is objective so that we have something to talk about. — fishfry

I’d like to give this a try:

That daytime follows nighttime follows daytime follows nighttime (etc.) is objective because subjective me and subjective you (and all other subjective beings, from sunflowers, to bees to … well, etc.) all are constrained by the same information … thereby making this information in due measure independent of what either I or you (or anyone else) may will or believe regarding the matter. Anything physical—from that which I and only I visually see at the current moment, like my own laptop, to the causal webs into which these things are entwined (such as laws of nature)—will be objective for the same reason: they will hold presence independent of what individual minds may will or believe. Hallucinations? These—which, one would think, can only be discovered when contradicting what all other agencies hold to be objective—will be non-objective on grounds of contradicting the causal web of all other givens that all other agencies are bound by and are thereby in one way or another aware of (the logos of the world, it used to be termed) … and, thereby, will be the products of an individual mind.

Other questions could pursue. But I’d like to know in turn, on what system of justification would you deny that nighttime being followed by daytime is not an objective, empirical observation? (Presuming that objective data is not confused with absolute certainties? For which, I grant, no justifications can be provided, tmk. Also presuming that objective data does not equate with an eternally fixed, perfectly stable absolute data that is severed from subjectivity (such that, for example, no awareness of it could occur), for this to me currently seems to be a logical contradiction as regards data.)

As I’ve previously mentioned, I myself don’t have any problem in addressing the term “reality”. My own interpretation of what he’s getting at relies far less on the dichotomy between spiritual interpretations of the word “reality” and physicalist interpretations of the word “reality” and for more on a type of tribalism that occurs within academia; a tribalism that I picked up on in reading his Ch. 11 but which I don’t recall him specifying via particular cases.

I’ll try to provide examples from fields of empirical-science based academia which I’m most interested in. One side of the isle you have the academic tribe of evolution via natural selection; on the other side of the isle you have the tribe of cognitive science. You will also find a plethora of sub-tribes within each division (e.g., evolution requires determinism v. evolution requires indeterminism; or, cog.sci . ought to incorporate Freud’s notion of repression v. cog.sci . ought to call BS on Freud for being utterly unempirical in his speculation regarding how the mind works). These tribes and sub-tribes hold their own intuitive notions of “reality”, with these notions sometimes overlapping, sometimes being rather incongruent, i.e. logically contradictory to each other. Terminology between isles, though often the same sign, will also often enough hold different “reality-based” semantics. “Instinct” is one such term, rather easy to pinpoint due to its ambiguity. So too is “adaptability”, what is addressed by the termed “paradigm”, “mind”, “feelings” among many others terms I’ve not needed to contemplate for some time from the vantage of academia.

The details are for me right now a blurred memory. Nevertheless, here’s a telling example: if life changes via evolution through natural selection and if cognition occurs, then human cognition must have itself evolved through natural selection that stems all the way back to prokaryotes. Yet, this conclusion is incongruent to the “reality” maintained by (the majority of the tribe-members on) either side of the isle. Evo.Psych. is to me a noble attempt at bridging these two isles, but, as with the earlier version of this attempted bridge known as sociobiology, instead of bridging the two sides it instead has a tendency of becoming its own academic tribe that holds yet another intuitive understanding of what “reality” actually is.

Within this context of academic tribalism, as (however poorly) depicted, between different branches of the empirical sciences, Robinson’s proposal of setting aside notions of “reality” in favor of notions of “the objective” makes sense to me, personally. Forget about preconceived notions of what reality really is and, instead, focus on what data is objective and what explanations best account for such data. I mentioned this recently in another thread; amoeba have been empirically demonstrated to learn. Does this fit in with most people’s conceptualizations of reality? No. It is an objective datum? Yes. So why is it not a datum incorporated into all branches of the empirical sciences that address biology and cognition? This other than it not fitting into ready-present notions of what reality is … thereby requiring some degree of paradigm-shift as regards what reality is? In not incorporating new data, though, both academic sides deny what is objective datum in favor of preexisting biases regarding what is “reality”.

The core issue, per my understanding, then being:

What reality is is itself a metaphysical question (albeit one we take for granted and quite often disagree on as regards the particulars). What objective data is is however thoroughly within the realms of the empirical, and stands regardless of notions regarding reality. Hence, the empirical sciences should focus on what is objective (and how to best account for it) and leave the issue of what is real to that other branch of academia known as philosophy.

The extra stuff isn't quite the same as mind, as best I can tell. I tend to use mind as an umbrella-term, covering the likes of experiences, qualia, thinking, love/feelings, headaches, self-awareness, consciousness, all that. [...] Does that differentiation work? If yes, then what of that extra stuff? — jorndoe

We here agree on what mind consists of (leaving behind possible metaphysical appraisals and expressions of the physical, e.g. Pierce’s notion of effete mind).

To my best current understandings there are two means of appraising the issue of life after death: 1) via reincarnations of self-identity and 2) via causal models that specify something along the lines of “while mind, and the self-identity that goes along with it, will always be causally tied into brain within the realms of this physical world, it can subsist to varying extents without being tied into brain within realms that are not of this physical world”.

My favorite is scenario (1). I cannot metaphysically disprove scenario (2). Furthermore, among others, there is an additional metaphysical possibility of both scenarios (1) and (2) co-occurring: e.g. via analogy, like possible dream states between awakened states, so too could there be the possibility of (something like) Elysian Fields or realms of Tortures in-between reincarnations of self-identity within the physical world (e.g., Tibetan Buddhists will often go this route as regards the afterlife).

So the extra-stuff would not be the same as mind if mind is interpreted to always and in all ways be tied into the functioning of the brain—or, else, to in no way be. This, though, is a catch-22 dilemma of physicalism as regards this issue. When addressing mind as first person experience of self-identity and all that it requires, there is no extra stuff involved … neither in scenario (1) nor in scenario (2).

Going back to your diagram, mind can itself be interpreted as a body of information that holds some degree of stability over time, only that this body of information is incorporeal—this holds true even when mind is causally entwined with brain within the physical realm we coexist in. One can interpret the spiritualists’ notion of a subtle body as being nothing more than this: the body of information which is mind, including the self-identity of the conscious agency that is tied into, and emerges from, this body of mind (again, mind as you’ve specified it in the given quote above).

Explaining the “hows” of life after death via scenario (1) is relatively easy when compared to scenario (2). This is in part due to scenario (2) requiring causal mechanisms at play within realms of non-physical reality. Think of string-theory’s multiple parallel dimensions as a rough analogy; only that, here, these other realms are not explainable via the physical, as is string-theory’s.

While I wouldn’t mind further delving into this topic—it’s an interesting topic to me as well—I again am not one to have all the answers. I’ll likely rely more on logical possibilities given a non-physicalist metaphysics. And, to reemphasize, I myself don’t sponsor a Cartesian dualism of mind and body as two basic substances.

It can simply mean that the cause is unknown. — praxis

I actually like this option as regard ultimate metaphysical beginnings: the metaphysical beginning is currently unknowable.

Still, when claiming that nothingness is a metaphysical substratum to what is, one has a clear definition of what is meant by “nothingness”.

Either way, this doesn’t address the issue of order-as-potentiality itself needing to predate (a never absolute) actuality of chaos in order for greater actualities of order to obtain from this chaos. I so far like Agustino’s arguments on this point, though I’ve here likely stated them poorly.

Apropos, as to designers and a first-cause-telos:

Odd thing is, designing requires intentions, and intentions require goals. A designer then, by logical necessity, cannot be identical to the goal(s) it is designing toward. Nor can it have created/designed these goals, for this too would require intentions with pre-set/determinate goal(s) aimed towards.

I grant this doesn’t disprove the possibility of a grand designer. Nevertheless, if the logic here is sound, it does disprove that the first cause can in any way be equivalent to a designer (OK, given that a grand designer were to be, it as psyche/deity would be intending toward this first cause more than any of us are (arguably) … but again, the first cause would be greater than this grand designer).

What is the first cause if not something come from nothing. — praxis

It can well be the one and only uncaused given, for instance. You’ll note that regardless of metaphysics adopted, there will always need to be such an uncased given. For instance, logically, and not playing with words: if something emerges from nothingness, then this can only translate into nothingness caused something to be. Then, in this scenario, nothingness (defined by the absence of anything) is itself an uncaused non-entity/process-given from which something emerges.

And, as others have mentioned, the first cause need not be a deity … no more than nothingness need be a deity.

The world is at peace. It is the mind that is restless. — unenlightened

Wait a minute, aren’t our bodies aspects of the physical world?

Gottcha (or so I currently believe …)

Nope, had no real point in bringing this up.