a thing becomes another thing when it has all the essential parts. a dead thing becomes alive when it completely fits the definition of a living thing. until that it is dead. — Pollywalls

To me it’s a complex issue (which I’m still taking a hiatus from for the moment). Wanted, though, to clarify the terminology you’ve expressed: a dead thing, by all common definitions, is a thing that once was alive. The main theme of this tread is not how life can follow death but, rather, how life can emerge from non-life/inanimate things.

Taking a more vertical approach: Think of an individual cell, like an ameba for example. One of its lipids, on its own, is not alive (nor dead; it is merely non-life). The same applies with all of its individual molecular components (which, as an interesting aside, can all in due measure be stated to hold particle-wave duality). How then does the unity of the living ameba as identity emerge from the structures of its non-life components? Again, it is to me a complex, and not yet resolved, issue.

I think this illustrates my original point; unconditional love does not exist. Any attempt to define what love is requires conditions which separate it from concepts which are not loving, like greed, fear, and pride. — John Days

When it comes to linguistic expressions of this issue, I tend to prefer you’re overall approach.

[To others here about, I grant it can be a bit harsh sounding. It’s like saying, “No, you’re not selfless. You’re only more selfless than others by comparison; and this, to be even more explicit, in your self-ish strivings/yearnings/intentions to become even more selfless (a striving of the ego which paradoxically entails that one becomes ever-more devoid of ego).”]

Yet, while I agree with you that pure/absolute/untarnished/etc. unconditional love does not exist in space and time, I’ll first ask this: Can one approach the ideal of a perfectly unconditional love (and, conversely, further oneself in mood and action from such an ideal)?

I admit to having a presumption that most would answer “yes”.

The next step, then, is for me metaphysical: Does this ideal of a perfectly unconditional love—which we can be either closer to or further from—in and of itself exist?

Here we may part ways. To me this goal, or endstate, is real; is a teleological cause/reason/motivation which awaits to be discovered (felt, experienced, lived, etc.). To others it may not be.

But, then, my next question would be: If we are to any extent governed by this ideal of unconditional love—be it by desiring closer proximity to this state of being or by aversion to it—then how can this ideal not be real (to further clarify, as real as we ourselves are as conscious agents)?

Yea, I grew up with the belief that “depression is nature’s way of telling you there’s something wrong”. Figure out what that is, resolve it (can be as simple as choice between flight or fight), and one not only overcomes one’s depression but gains some new wisdom out of it. To me, it fit in nicely with Nietzsche’s “what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger”. (in depth discussions of Nietzsche here overlooked)

[Yes, sometimes there are too many unresolved long-held problems that can crash in on a person—be it subconsciously or consciously. At such juncture, trying to figure it all out so as to resolve all these problems at once can be close to impossible. Medication can in these circumstances be of significant help—but, imo, the crutch shouldn’t be mistaken for a final cure. To each their own.]

Tying this into BC latest posts, to be a happy-go-lucky person when surrounded by turmoil (don’t know, stuff like wars that never end, too many orphaned children on the streets, etc.) is not the same as having a healthily thick skin. It's more like the ostrich that finds happiness from the charging lion by placing its head in the sand. Else, a lack of ethos/pathos?

Apropos:

Is it the case that depressive personalities take a greater delight in irreverence, satire, travesties upon the dominant class, sarcastic jokes, and so on?

I hope so. — Bitter Crank

(Y) They damn well better if they're going to get over their depression.

This of course means that God must condone or accept evil in some sense: [...] Somehow he suggests that if one is strong enough to not be affected by it, then they have no reason to condemn evil. Which I think is wrong, and fails to avoid the ills of pantheism. — Agustino

Doubtless there are many facets to the issue addressed in the OP. I’ll here try to tackle the one addressed issue of evil.

As for me, while I prefer not to express God as first (to me, teleological) cause via pronouns, I can certainly relate to the expression of “He” when it is demarcated as specifying the first cause/prime mover (and not an anthropomorphic, omnipotent deity).

That stated, one way of accounting for evil being present alongside the first cause (which, within this outline, would also be absolute good), to me at least, can be traced back to ancient western religious outlooks. One such ancient view (I believe it was from the Greeks, thought it’s been some time since I read up on it) was that God is absolute love (love harmonizes, does away with conflict(s), makes disparate beings share a common sense of selfhood, etc.). All evil within this model then stems from a rejection of absolute love as real (“fear of love”, it can be simplistically phrased). The extents to which one pursues paths toward absolute love or away from absolute love will then have something to do with one’s context-limited/bounded freewill intentions.

The Zoroastrians held that their notion of the devil would need to be re-assimilated into inward desire for their notion of God in order for the universe to find harmony/peace (again, at the very least connoting the concept of absolute love).

To, at the very least, ancient monotheistic Judaism, Satan was understood as the “non-believer” in G-d (to slightly converge the expressions of different paths, the non-believer in the reality of absolute love … which, if it needs to be said, cannot be something physical but metaphysical).

I think that, to most people’s minds, evil is that which becomes overly self-interested at the expense of interest in the wellbeing of others. Most villains in books and movies hold this persona of pleasures obtained through egotism, necessarily conjoined with a lack of pleasure obtained via selfless strivings; the more so, the more evil the villain (one can well argue that the reality of absolute love is that of absolute selfless being). Complexities can emerge in terms of proximate and ultimate ends; e.g., a German who betrayed the common cause of those who willed the Holocaust would be viewed as overly self-interested as the expense of the wellbeing of the larger Germanic populace; other examples of complexity abound (and they’re always easiest to address when addressing “the other”).

All the same, these myriad complexities aside, within at least this one perspective that holds a long history in western cultures, it call be simplified into fear that love (ultimately, necessarily, absolute love) is a lie/illusion/wrong … at times expressed via the phrase “love leads to pain”.

Still, having mentioned this perspective, there is also a long history of wise men (and women, I would think) upholding that a mere desire and belief in (absolute) love is not enough; one must also hold wisdom in knowing how to best safeguard one’s proximity to it (paradoxically always then entailing the like proximity of others one cares for to this same metaphysical end). Sometimes that involves conflict—sometimes even harsh conflict—in the short term to optimally preserve one’s long term goal(s).

So, within this worldview, God doesn’t here condone evil but a) stands in stark contrast/opposition to it and b) would “forgive” anyone that would sincerely once again aspire toward God/absolute love (as opposed to those who merely give lip service). This can also be maintained in a roughly pantheistic worldview ... or, if one prefers, in a panentheistic worldview. Both I would think.

These being my best thoughts on the matter for the moment.

Ps. IMO, and speaking from within the perspective of the just mentioned outlook: Till anyone amongst us can validly be absolute love (a joke, actually) we all will then be in our own ways partly adverse to absolute love, i.e. fearful of it in our own ways. With this truism as a platform of our being, I’d say it’s what one then intends be eventually become that matters most. I heard one wise woman explain that we should, as a rule of thumb, strive to be 60% intent upon such absolute love and 40% adverse to it in our thoughts and actions. What a wonderful world it would be if all humans would actually so be! Huh? (And heck, imo, no need for asceticism to so intend; to mention just one example, loving sex regardless of how rambunctious and kinky will still be loving, will still be a striving toward closer proximity to absolute love ((else, it won’t be and it won’t be loving)).)

Understood. I butted in in part due to me viewing this generic view which you address in you post to be, again, a pervasive misunderstanding (at best) of what is actually entailed by the given philosophical mindset. So, in a way, it seems like we might agree: namely, on our disagreement which the general stance that today goes by the name of "skepticism".

No, he doesn't say that - rather he's saying that there's no such thing as knowledge of the external world as such. — Fafner

To found my statements in fact, both Plato and Hume held that there is an external world. Both were staunch philosophical skeptics, rather than parodies of what philosophical skepticism entails.

For me, that the skeptic claims there is no knowledge of the external world is a strawman. He/she might indeed agree that there is no absolute knowledge of an external world—but then, in another lampoonery of skepticism, he/she already claims that “I know [am aware] I know [as absolute truth] nothing – not even this”. [One can be charitable and not view what might have been intended through this statement to be a logical contradiction.]

I understand you have a different view. But, again, I look to people such as Plato and Hume to be the real thing when it comes to philosophical skepticism.

If we just stop being obsessive about absolute certainty, and adopt some more modest standards for knowledge claims (which is not the same as not having standards at all), then there will remain no longer any good reason to worry about what the skeptic is saying, and thus no reason to not to be confident in most of our claims to know. — Fafner

The underlined portion of the quote is exactly what the (philosophical) skeptic is saying: that there is no absolute certainty, knowledge, or truth that we can apprehend, only optimal approximations of absolute certainty, absolute knowledge, or absolute truth - which is not the same as not having standards at all.

You seem to have answered the skeptic by coming full circle to what the skeptic is saying.

(BTW, skeptics such as Plato and Hume were not lacking in confidence.)

Very odd. — Bitter Crank

Very queer, you mean. Dude, whilst I appreciate you comment, no worries. In the words of someone or other, “there are no solutions, only problems”. Or am I getting that backwards?

Anyways, I’ll take a breather from the forum for the time being. Freewill, don’t you know.

Just as what to me is a humorous side note: Has anybody here seen the evolutionary model/predictions made in the movie “Idiocrasy”? Survival of the fittest, indeed. They even elected a president that had acted in porn movies! Can you believe it???

On a more genuine discussion side, I so far agree with StreetlightX: it’s not about being fittest. Evolutionary models, when addressed on their own right, hold that all life is equally evolved. Quite a different take/paradigm than our cultural mindsets of “more and less evolved that some other”, never mind the mindset of most evolved, or most fit.

Even though I have long thought that life came about in some sort of sloppy environment -- hot smoky vent, warm mud hole, clay mush -- whatever -- there are some practical problems with this idea that I can't get around.

The simplest form of life would need several components which alone might happen by chance, but would have to link up in just the right way, also by chance, more or less all at once. A life form needs a template. Life on earth uses DNA and/or RNA. The life form needs machinery of some kind to build itself and carry out making a copy of the template, and cutting the copy off. In order to have all this machinery, it needs yet another piece of machinery -- it's exterior package.

I can sort of imagine chemistry getting more complicated, but for more complicated life-chemistry to form stuff that could fall together, stay together, and make something more or less alive, seems to be on the outside of possibility. It seems like the ur-life form would have to pop into existence, rather than crawl into existence.

On the other hand, I don't want to invoke an exterior agent -- God, for instance, or some sort of cosmic will.

Solutions? — Bitter Crank

... bury our heads in the sand and consider it a done deal philosophically?

:)

OK, bitter. I get the desire to prohibit discussion on this. I'll for now obligingly bugger off.

The so-called scientific method only exists in textbooks. It has no counterpart anywhere in the world whether in academia or industry. Science had morphed into part goal seeking for monetary benefits and party religion promising people some utopian dreams. It's really instructive to observe how science has become quite a religion in its own right with adherents who embrace it for the same reasons any religion is embraced, a combination of money, hope, and social benefits. — Rich

Well, as I was saying, imposing instead bias upon scientist due to monetary reasons pretty much corrupts that whole scientific ideal of impartiality/objective. This, though, is a people interacting with people issue; not a methodology issue.

Do you know of a better means of figuring out what occurs in our phenomenal/physical world in a way that is minimally clouded by hearsay, personal tall tales, and, sometimes, power seeking deceptions?

Bergson is the go to person for great insight into these ideas. Stephen Robbins in his videos on YouTube does a great job in elucidating on some of Bergson's thoughts. Rupert Sheldrake also takes a partial cut at it. — Rich

Thank you. I'll try to check these out

On the one hand, there’s a lot of science this and science that in our culture. Trouble is that it’s mostly duckspoken by folk who look upon science as an authoritative regime, a kind of Ministry of Truth or, better yet, a type of Kafka’s Castle, which is the only way/path (yup, attempting religio-dogmatic connotations here) toward an attainment of absolute truths in this world. Bullocks. Worse, a gross and horrendous insult to the long history of thinkers that have held the otherwise noble title of “(empirical) scientist” [and hey, male and female, btw]. One of the pinnacle reasons for this is an absurd misunderstanding of epistemology that is then projected, with extreme error, upon the empirical sciences: that they in any way, now or ever, purport to discover absolute truths. Many an average individual will then cry’s out, “but if science won’t supply my absolute truths of what is, what or who will?” This can get deep into culturally habituated mindsets regarding epistemic givens. He who knows absolute truths is the authority all bow down to, right? This may be so for some, but not for those of us who don't subscribe to authoritarianism. In hindsight, Bacon might have done better to say “Understanding is Power” rather than knowledge. For one reason, we all fully well understand that there is no such thing within time and space as “absolute understandings”. But staying on track with the issue of science: The empirical sciences, as much as they rely upon various maths and systems of logic, are all, without exception, inductive. Period. Yet it is this very plasticity to the scientific method which has brought about its many, many, great achievements—its non-authoritarian authority, so to speak.

Generally speaking, any basic course in the philosophy of science will illustrate as much regarding the basic notions of the empirical sciences. Any so called scientific article which ends by declaring a given conclusion to be “proven” is sheer quackery. A conclusion can only be supported—this, at best (given our modern systems of quantitative appraisals of evidence), by a probability value of 0.000[?]. Hence, even in the best of times, there can yet be a 0.01% chance of the results of any given experiment being wrong.

And, btw, from previous readings of your posts, I fully agree with you that the empirical sciences need to be independent of monetary interests in order to be integral. It’s about minimizing bias, not kissing the behinds of those who give you money with hope of increasing their company’s stock-value, and this so that you may continue making a livelihood so as to put food on the table for the kids (which, if explicitly is needed, tends to greatly increase bias—both in what one researches and in the conclusions that are then produced and published … which, in turn, if this trend progresses, will make what was once science into a hollow shell at best, a propaganda machine at worst ). Still, the scientific method is not the culprit here.

This miracle of chemicals developing awareness is in every sense of the phrase a Tall Tale. — Rich

I in a substantive sense agree with this. It’s easy to then declare myself a panpsychist of sorts, but the truth is that my current gut feelings (which can always be wrong) find a sharp division between inanimate identities and animate ones; logically, I’ve no idea how panspsychism would work. This is what I’m diggin’ in the dirt for. What attribute would an inanimate identity hold that, though not itself being the awareness of life, could be logically presented not as a divide but as a continuum.

Apo’s approach, though physicalist, resolves this continuum. Now, traditionally neither he or me have significant issues with sharing our outlooks online. So I was interested in the prospect of sharing a cordial exchange of ideas. Who knows, maybe it’ll amount to something; maybe it won’t. (And, of course, no limits on who can exchange ideas.)

Meet with apo? OK! His system already claims to resolve this transition ....

I get your point, though. But why not try to philosophize on a philosophy forum? X-)

Though I am by no means as in-depth in knowledge as you are when it comes to physics (QM, thermodynamics, etc. … to be slightly arrogant, I instead view my strongpoints to be biology and behavior, or at least to so once have been), I find our worldviews to in large part agree on the issues you’ve just mentioned.

Still, whereas you reduce metaphysics to a triadic system of relations, I’ve instead reduced metaphysics to a) a multiplicity of awareness-endowed agents (i.e., first person points of view), b) the entailed requisites of their presence (e.g., space and time as I’ve alluded to in some previous posts here) and c) a set of teloi, all being alternative means of attaining a state of being devoid of obstructions to intent … with only one such alternative being ontically real and all others being, in essence, illusions of will/sentience.

I don’t see why these two systems couldn’t integrate in principle. In practice, however, within the metaphysics I propose there are logical consequences that so far seem to be viewed in adverse ways by the metaphysics you propose. One such logical consequence is that the body is perishable while awareness is not—stated in terms of more spiritual folk, we are physically mortal but our core remains immortal (again, no homunculi here addressed). Another logical consequence is the metaphysically cogent allowance for the possibility of a multiplicity of incorporeal realms dwelling between our physical world and the pinnacle awareness of the final end. Also stated in terms of more spiritual folk, it is metaphysically possible that different incorporeal worlds exist, possibly worlds of angels, worlds of gods, worlds of chakras, etc. [although the clincher is that, while such worlds cannot be metaphysically disproven, by definition of not being universally applicable to all corporeal beings neither can they be evidenced to be real—else they would be as profane and physically objective as rocks or the laws of gravity … this gets a bit into epistemology, empirical evidence, and the principle of falsification, as well as the metaphysics of the physically real. Still, it is not intended as a joke—though one could well yet maintain atheism (lack of deities) in this metaphysics—and it ties into the logical necessity that the body (and ego) is mortal while awareness is not … something that is readily evident in the nature of the final end I’ve previously addressed.]

Do you see any possibility of these givens being incorporated into the model you endorse? These givens are some of the intrinsic aspect of the model I uphold. Again, we tend to agree far more when addressing issues of physicality.

Now, what about them questions regarding metaphysical identity?

The Heat Death is the finality of natural habit becoming eternally fixed. — apokrisis

I can paraphrase this from a different point of view: the ultimate end is the actualization of absolute order wherein a) all conflict vanishes and b) all imperfectly integral identities become an objectively perfect identity/unity.

Physical entropy--to distinguish it from IT notions--is merely the process of taking paths of least resistance toward the grand finale of this absolute order--thereby being determinstically driven teleologically toward the final end of absolute order. Negentropy, were it to approach this grand final (which is itself metaphysically determinate as end) via its top-down causal abilities, would via its own freewill become more determined/determinate in its actions toward the requirements of actualizing this ultimate end - thereby itself becoming ever-more entropic (following paths of least resistance toward absolute coherence/unity/accord/etc. given contextual constraints).

Yet there is still the same difference in the basic metaphysical underpinnings of what this final end ontically is.

Well the difference here is now that you are arguing for the bounding constraints to be caused transcendentally from without, whereas I say they arise emergently and immanently from within. — apokrisis

I don't get what makes you presume this of me. To me, purpose/telos is intrinsic/immanent to awareness. That the ultimate end is determinate has arguably nothing to do with the objectively real telos (sentience will sometimes pursue other teloi) occurring transcendentally from without as something separate from self. Think of universals ... are they in any way transcendentally from without (such that they at the very least are not also simultaneously immanent to psyches)?

But you still haven't addressed my previous questions regarding the metaphysical nature of identity.

I don't think you should be so quick to assume a spatial separation between points, because there is another way we can go, and that is a temporal separation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but here I’d also be presuming block time rather than some variant of presentism (to generalize: wherein past is collective memory of what was and future is anticipatory forethought of what will most likely be given the logically non-contradictory facts/info of the present … which themselves include the information regarding the past).

Given the premise that only conscious agents are metaphysically real—or, rather, that the whole of the phenomenal universe is derived in one way or another from conscious agents—I don’t find a means to substantiate block time. Again, I do find a requirement that before and after occur within the first-person point of view regarding apprehensions and creations relative to other and—in a more complex fashion—relative to any cohort of individual agents that can causally affect each other. But this would lead to a variant of presentism.

Let me know is this does not directly address you’re offered alternatives regarding temporal separations of identity.

Our two worldviews often converge in multiple ways when it comes to explanations of the physical world. I’m in truth uplifted by this. Yet our differences lie in the metaphysical basic underpinnings. You for instance focus on vagueness as an ultimate beginning; I instead will affirm that the ultimate beginning is unknowable by us *. You view the ultimate end as a materialist form of nothingness (to not confuse it with Eastern notions of emptiness, for example); I instead will affirm that the ultimate end—though its occurrence is contingent on the choices of all co-existing agents—is one of awareness unshackled from the limitations/constraints of space and time (even that which pertain to mind and its thoughts), and, hence, from the boundaries of selfhood (and otherness) … a juncture wherein subjectivity at last becomes, or transcends into, awareness-endowed metaphysical objectivity; else stated, where no difference remains between subject and object (not to be confused with the identity/otherness notion of objects) [* with what the ultimate beginning of space and time was maybe becoming at last apprehended by awareness at this transformative juncture of spatiotemporal finality]. Yet otherwise expressed, the contingently awaiting ultimate end is a juncture where the fist-person point of view at last apprehends—experientially and via logos/ratio-devoid understanding—what it in truth objectively is … it, in my outlook, is the only possible instance of absolute knowledge.

I’ve little doubt of others’ mistrust and distaste for this perspective I’ve been developing. Still, let it be noted that this final end—otherwise conceivable as the totality of unbounded awareness—is not itself a deity; deities are selves separated from otherness. Nevertheless, from within the framework of my metaphysics, this “omega” can only be stated to exist, if nothing else then as an existent potential with teleological impact upon all sentience (be it via freewill-resultant aversion to it or the converse). Whether this “omega” can then be termed a theistic notion of God/G-d/Divinity or, else, an atheistic construct (due to its lacking of a deity that, as a self separated from non-self, interacts with us), I wholeheartedly presume will be in the eyes of the beholder and his/her perspectives of reality.

Where all that matters is parsimony in coherently explaining the physical world, we often can cordially debate—and, again, often enough find agreement. But our metaphysical systems are built up differently.

For now I’d like to address aspects of this difference. By saying “yup” in you previous post to me, I take it you agree that evolution can be partially simplified into a universal common denominator of “preservation of identity”. How do you propose that identity is established if not via awareness which, as awareness, identifies itself as same/identical to itself and different/non-identical to other? Now, if there’s agreement that this identity is established via awareness, then how is the primacy of awareness (an identity known experientially) abandoned for the sake of primacy of matter (an identity known theoretically)? I anticipate that this will reduce to what is the true metaphysical nature of identity.

But if, in the platonic tradition, we recognize non-spatial existence as the true basis of reality itself, we open up an entire realm of non-spatial existence to our inquiring minds. It lies within, or underneath all of physical existence, which, being non-physical, cannot be perceived by the senses, but only apprehended directly by the mind. From this perspective we can apprehend the existence of information at non-spatial, dimensionless points, and the unity of those points through the means of that information. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yo, you still around?

Wanted to see how this idea might pan out with you (and others). To be explicit, I’m using geometric points as representations of aware agents. Most of this will not be analytically reasoned but, rather, terse ideas thrown out there for potential feedback, etc.

I’ll first philosophically entertain an existence (or presence) consisting of a singular geometric point—and nothing else. The geometric point, being volume-less, is in this scenario also space-less yet, nevertheless, a perfectly integral unity. Because this singularity is devoid of otherness, it is also devoid of boundaries via which it can gain a quantifiable identity and, therefore, can well be demarcated as a non-quantity whole. This mathematical scenario is rather hard to conceive other than in very, very abstract terms; but, I’ll intuit, it can be likened to Pythagoras’s circle (the circle devoid of a point at its center or of any line(s), via which quantity is represented within his system), to the Neo-Platonist’s “the One” (albeit, as with the singular geometric point, this “One” could in fact be demarcated as a perfectly integral and wholesome non-quantity being), to Kabbalistic notions of Ein Sof, to Eastern notions of the Brahman, and I dare say even to notions of Nirvana or, similarly, Moksha.

As I remember it, as was addressed in a by now ancient discussion on the old forum, we already agree that it is only once two or more geometric points hold presence that space itself holds presence. What I’m reaching at is that while a singular geometric point can be conceived to hold space-less presence, the presence of two or more points entails the co-dependent origination of space.

Were we to grant both awareness and creative agency to these geometric points, not only would the presence of two or more points necessitate to co-existence of space but also of time: the creations of one point will occur either before, after, or simultaneous to the awareness/apprehension and/or creation of any other geometric point.

Again, in the scenario of there being only one geometric point present, there is neither space nor time (because there here is no occurrence of any before or after). Space and time become, allegorically, the shell of the aware agents (for emphasis, when there are two or more of these).

Abstractly tying this into evolution, I speculate that evolution can be boiled down to “preservation of identity”. I say that this encapsulates all the more complex, empiricism based notions of evolution (begrudgingly, even the “selfish gene” one which I’ve never been able to stand). Now, what is the ontically real identity of geometric points? The spatiotemporal context within which they (again, plural) duel or, alternatively, the perfectly whole/integral being of the limitless here noted by the singular, non-quantifiable geometric point scenario? There are complexities galore in that we conscious agents, as identities, are always a conflux of both aforementioned idealized identities - I so argue. Yet, as with the notion of “we are points of light emanating from the same source”, a notion arguably as old as Akhenaten’s Ra, it is at least arguable that our metaphysically true identity (independent of our beliefs, etc., of who we are) is that of the perfectly whole/integral unity that is both limitless and non-quantifiable.

Though mumbo jumbo to some, it can further be noted that base natures of people are (overly) selfish and elevated natures of people are (relatively speaking) selfless. This singular geometric point example is, in so many other words, a perfectly selfless being: the pinnacle of elevated nature as viewed from within space and time.

So, appraising darn well that all this will be largely nonsense to many (most notably, physicalists), what I’m allegorically alluding to—hopefully in a clear enough way—is that evolution, when metaphysically appraised, might be a struggle between different beings to preserve self-identity given a conflux of teloi of what one seeks to become—one of which will be ontically real (right) and the others being illusions produced by the imagination of minds (and, hence, wrong … such as, I’d argue, the illusion that one can become a spatiotemporal controller of all spacetime/physicality, to whose authority all other conscious agents become subjects of … again, selfishness taken to its extreme, at least to my mind). This metaphysical evolution of being/identity then—to fast forward a bit—plays out physically within spacetime between different lifeforms (of varying awareness ability) and, I’d still maintain, potentially among non-living identities as well.

Ok, I feel I’ve been all over the place in my attempts for concision of basic ideas. Logically, all this would need quite a more robust and coherent means of argument to hold water—I know very well. But hey, I'm aiming for it to make some intuitive sense.

So, yes, within such a model conscious agents are the only things that are metaphysically real, but the physicality that in part emerges due to the space and time that a multiplicity of conscious agents necessarily entails would be quite real in a physical, everyday sense.

Not now such how well this would integrate with Hoffman's position ...

Thanks for clarifying. If I understand you correctly then, yes, the first person point of view is indeed a thing. It is the embodiment of a purpose, an intentionality. — apokrisis

Thanks in turn for your direct answer.

Yea, as to the first person point of view being a thing … “neither is it a (some)thing nor is it not a (some)thing” is my honest, best answer for the moment, equivocal though it may be.

I acknowledge it to be a laconic answer: both in the sense of “Spartan” and in the sense of “dense”. Still, if we’re to make things as simple as possible but no simpler (as someone once said), most any laconic statement can be a bit too simple in certain circles.

An example once given to me that I find helpful is that of a beach’s being. A beach is composed of sand particles (residing along a large collection of water drops, etc.). Mr/Ms Reductionist would insist that to understand what a beach is we must more closely study the individual sand particles it is composed of, such as by means of a microscope. Mr/Ms Irreductionist will insist that to understand what a beach is we must study the holistic totality of sand particles in its own right. This can touch upon what some may term gestalt being - something that, as an identity, is other than the sum of its parts. (I speculate that there will be some who’ll argue that, because no gestalts exist, no such thing as beaches exist either.)

I’ve opted for substantive disagreement on grounds of disagreement concerning what causal processes in truth exist. For example, all bottom up causation might be upheld by the reductionist as compared with the irreductionist upholding that at least some gestalts, or holons, can hold their own causal abilities (e.g., a beach, as a gestalt thing, can have an effect on the type of waves that manifest).

On a somewhat related note, in line with SophistiCat’s comments, I’d be grateful for further clarification on what reductionism entails. So far it seems to me that we all inevitably reduce the nature of being to something primitive: QM particles, or holons (be these objects, ecosystems, aware beings, etc.), or some set of abstract relations (be these dyadic, triadic, etc.), or processes of becoming, and so forth. Hence, so far, to me there seems to be something in addition to “reducing things to basic givens” that would need to be made explicit so as to demarcate the reductionist from the irreductionist. While I currently uphold this to be linked to the types of causation upheld to be ontic—an underlying belief through which explanations emerge—alternatives to this perspective would be appreciated.

OK, I agree, it’s a loaded term whose referent is often ambiguous. And worse, it often addresses different referents (albeit loosely associated) to different individuals.

Nevertheless, I’ve clearly specified what I meant by it in my last post to you: the first person point of view. And, if it must be repeated by me, I do not entify the first person point of view (to use your slang); consciousness is not a homunculus; nevertheless, I uphold that it is, exists, holds presence, etc. while the first person point of view holds awareness. BTW, I’m pretty certain of this one.

My question to you is then not yet answered: in your worldview, does the first person point of view (more concretely, you, me, and many, many others) hold top-down causal abilities of its own?

Tangentially, as to the agency/agent linguistic issue: a bundle of coherently functioning processes is conceived of as a unitary, holistic identity; an identity that may be in the process of becoming, but an identity nonetheless. I say “look: a rock is over there” and not “look; a bundle of coherently functioning processes that, as bundle, takes on the attributes X, Y, and Z—all of which, however, are perfectly devoid of identity—is over there”. Hence, were we to be brief in our statements, that which holds agency is addressed by the identity of “an agent”. This, then, results in the terminology of “conscious agents”.

If you disagree with these comments, on what non-contradictory grounds do you do so?

Like you, I'm sympathetic to his case, but I'm dubiuos about appealing to evolutionary theory to justify it; seems self-defeating to me. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree. If I didn’t specify my position well enough previously, his methodology contradicts the conclusions he draws from it. More concretely, he’s using physical models of evolution to explain conscious agents’ abilities while, in the same breadth, claiming that the physical is an illusion. This leads to a chicken and egg dichotomy in which he wants to support the illusion of physicality via arguments reliant upon physicality not being an illusion. At least as I so far interpret his worldview. So, yes, to me his stance appears to be logically contradictory. Wanted to double-check, though.

In another thread i argued at length why I would instead prefer the terms attentional level and habit level processing. And one of the reasons was that that allows top-down causality to be a part of both. The difference between the two levels then becomes one of spatiotemporal scale. — apokrisis

I glanced that thread over, portions of it at any rate. As its theme relates to this thread’s: Attention is not merely conscious; e.g., the generalized conscience is also attentive to what’s going on (otherwise it couldn’t inform of alternatives to what one desires), though it is not the first person point of view we term consciousness. Habit, on the other hand, can pertain to both the unconscious and to consciousness. A murky, and altogether different topic though.

What I’m here addressing is the agency—or non-agency—of consciousness, i.e. of the first person point of view.

To keep things simple: in your worldview, does consciousness hold its own top-down causal ability?

Consciousness ends up being conscious of how it must be the product of unconscious processes. — apokrisis

A bit late in the thread with this post in relation to this and other related comments you've made.

You’ve affirmed that consciousness is there due to unconscious process of mind. On its own terms, I agree 100%. However, if this is intended to dissuade one from granting consciousness its own agency, it then does away with all possibilities of top-down causation as it would apply to consciousness. It seems to me you either a) ascribe to the unconscious mind awareness-endowed agency (i.e., top-down causal processes) or b) deny agency (i.e., top-down causal processes) to the unconscious mind.

If (a), what coherent rationale would there then be to deny agency to consciousness on its own right? If (b), how would this not be a variant of epiphenomenalism?

[Haven't read you posts in a while. Needless to say, feel free to correct any unintended misrepresentation of your stance.]

@Wayfarer

One, to me glaring, metaphysical lack in Hoffman’s worldview is that he addresses evolution as a leading cause for how we are (something that I happen to agree with on multiple levels) yet does not give any attention to how evolutionary processes work on a strictly metaphysical level.

Yes, this in itself is a can of worms; e.g., which parts of our evolutionary theories are approximated maps and not the actual terrain? (lots of things—both philosophical and of the empirical sciences—could be addressed here; sorry, can’t help myself: one easy to express example: given today’s models of fitness, a bacterium which both a) has never reproduced and b) has been around since the dawn of bacteria would be denoted as holding zero fitness, this despite it having out-survived most life forms on this planet; to me, this hypothetical (it is possible in principle, and might be actual of some individual bacterium out there that, in essence, is a species onto itself) has implications regarding our models of fitness that always bothered me … but back to the main point).

Evolution—i.e., change due to natural selection—could be universally applicable, and not strictly limited to life. (You'll note how the concept of purpose is inextricable from evolutionary theory--this despite it being explained away in multiple ways by those who deny purpose to existence.) But in order for this scenario to make sense one first needs to reduce the complexities associated with biological evolution down to their bare minimums in terms of processes (thereby excluding the means via which these processes occur in physical life both genotypically and phenotypically). Nevertheless, all this would still address the physical. What Hoffman’s worldview endorses—to me, similar enough in attitude to biocentrism—is that only awareness-endowed agencies are objectively real on a metaphysical plane. I say fine, I agree, but then what form of evolutionary theory is espoused that would further simplify change via natural selection so that it may logically hold when strictly considering conscious agents (hence, that would apply to an ecosystem of aware agents/agencies even in the absence of all physicality; or, to be more precise, in the absence of all phenomenal—though not noumenal—reality)?

If this point is not resolved, then—as it currently stands for me—he is endorsing logical contradictions on a metaphysical level in justifying who we are via theories of evolution. However, I grant that I’ve only read the interview and seen the video linked to in the OP. Maybe I’m so far missing out on something? Like I said previously, I’m sympathetic to his cause.

Don't be too sure. Remember, this professor is from California. — Wayfarer

Well, thinking that I'm getting your vibes: Dude, like, Californians can be totally rad at times. :P Nerdy as some of us can sometimes get.

Hang ten. (Y) ;)

I am pretty drawn to his model, but I'm having trouble understanding it in the abstract - when he gets down to the detail of how agents interact, and how agents can actually merge - looses me there. — Wayfarer

From the article linked to in the OP in the Atlantic:

Gefter: The world is just other conscious agents?

Hoffman: I call it conscious realism: Objective reality is just conscious agents, just points of view. Interestingly, I can take two conscious agents and have them interact, and the mathematical structure of that interaction also satisfies the definition of a conscious agent. This mathematics is telling me something. I can take two minds, and they can generate a new, unified single mind. Here’s a concrete example. We have two hemispheres in our brain. But when you do a split-brain operation, a complete transection of the corpus callosum, you get clear evidence of two separate consciousnesses. Before that slicing happened, it seemed there was a single unified consciousness. So it’s not implausible that there is a single conscious agent. And yet it’s also the case that there are two conscious agents there, and you can see that when they’re split. I didn’t expect that, the mathematics forced me to recognize this. It suggests that I can take separate observers, put them together and create new observers, and keep doing this ad infinitum. It’s conscious agents all the way down. — Amanda Gefter

Hey. Just passing through.

I’m not yet familiar with his detailed (I presume mathematical) arguments for the convergence of agents—but to offer some thoughts. To address the scenario of disparate agents converging into one agent doesn’t—yet—seem to me to be an issue of science or technology. Rather its either one of metaphysics or one of philosophy of spirituality. The quoted example Hoffman gives regarding brain hemispheres I find to be apt. However, it itself is implicitly reliant upon models of mind-brain wherein the sub- & unconscious mind is itself endowed with agencies. For the time being, it can be said that we as a society still have basic disagreements as to whether or not consciousness is itself a metaphysically valid agency or, else, an illusion (either in part or in whole; such as can be readily inferred from epiphenomenalism)—so the issue of whether or not a total mind consist of multiple agencies partly converging into a first-person conscious agency can be very controversial.

For the record, I uphold such a model of mind where the unconscious is itself constituted of at times unified, and at times conflicting, agencies. As only one example, to anyone who’s ever felt pangs of conscience, you then at those junctures experienced agencies of your unconscious mind other than the agency which you as a first person conscious self then momentarily were; if for no other reason, the intentions of your conscience and those which you then held were not the same. More concretely exemplified, were I to want to take a shortcut but then to feel pangs of conscience informing me its far better not to, the first-person conscious agency which I am yet has the choice between doing what I want or doing what I now feel these pangs of conscience inform me might be the better course of action. Momentarily, this information of my subconscious which we term conscience is not the first-person conscious I which feels, deliberates, and acts. It is instead an agency of my sub/unconscious mind interacting with me, the first-person consciousness, within my mind. More could be elaborated on, but this was offered to illustrate that a mind consists of multiple agencies which can diverge (e.g., you & your conscience) or, else—as is typical and healthy (the latter, however, being very conditional on the actions being taken)—fully unified into a singular agency that, at such junctures, is undifferentiable from the first person conscious agent's being.

So, yea, this model of mind is itself contentious; we’re habituated to think of the conscious agent as though it were a thing, and object, somehow permanently separated from what is its; namely, the agency-endowed aspects of its mind (e.g., conscience) and its body (e.g. walking while desiring to go to location X), etc. [Personally, its where I find the statement, “there neither is a self nor not a self” to enter the picture … but anyways.]

As to multiple first-person agencies (or selves) converging into one objective, perfectly unified reality of agency, one can find history littered with tales of this: from the Gnostics and their approach of Sophia, to the Neo-Platonists and their notion of “the One”, to concepts of transcendent convergence with an Abrahamic God/G-d in the hereafter, etc. And, as you know, examples can be found in Eastern traditions as well. In most such systems, there are stipulated to be in-between realms of greater awareness—dwelling in between our own present corporeal awareness and that of the pinnacle, unified awareness, however it is expressed. But this converging of minds stuff is neither new nor limited to mono-something-theisms; e.g. the Oracle at Delphi supposedly converged with the virgin priestesses there in order for these priestesses to prophesize; Shaman of varying traditions on this planet supposedly converged as conscious agents with everything from spirits and gods to (as was a common case in South American tribes) jaguars. Eah, but this a science and technology forum—so none of this here applies.

Still, notice how the metaphysical underpinnings of physical objects governing the foundations of reality—something which we’ve now come to communally project upon selfhood as well (the dreaded homunculus argument comes to mind)—first needs to be reappraised before this convergence of conscious agents/agencies can make any sense.

As to Hoffman’s overall views, I’m generally very sympathetic to them from what I’ve so far read. Though, I should admit, I currently find them metaphysically lacking. Also, the terms used need to be changed or else new terms created for notions such as—to at least paraphrase— “reality is an illusion”. In the sense he talks about, it is (or at least I too so affirm); but in the sense of “reality bites”, (perceptual, etc.) reality never is illusory. Thanks for linking to him.

Oh, and a shout out to all the UCI-ers out there: see, Ant Eaters can be competitive! [yup, UCI has an ant eater of all things as its mascot]

[...] This means that our emotions do not have some sort of mind control effect on us and make us perceive, through our thinking, our lives having value to us. It is purely the emotions themselves that allow us to see the value in our lives. [...]

[...] So, continuing on here. Most people would tell me that feelings are nothing more than just feelings and that it is our thoughts (value judgments) that make our lives valuable to us. I am actually reversing this. I am saying that thoughts are nothing more than just thoughts and that it is instead our emotions that make our lives valuable to us. — TranscendedRealms

Howdy.

Wanted to express two positions related to the title of this thread.

First, emotions come in different forms. We linguistically often express this difference by affirming either a) “I feel […; e.g., giddy]” or b) “I am […; e.g., giddy]”. Giddiness either way is an emotion. But, in instance (a) it is apprehended by the “I” in question as present within its own mind as one apprehends—via analogy—the tactile touch of a surface that is nevertheless other than that which apprehends (or perceives, in the broad sense of the word). Whereas in instance (b) the emotion is no longer something apprehended by the “I” in question but is instead one momentarily inseparable property of the respective “I”. [I’m using the term “I” to try to avoid the vagueness of the term consciousness.]

Point being one form of emotions consists of emotions felt/perceived by that which is aware of these emotions and that another form of emotions consists of emotions that are an enactively present component of that which is aware—via which apprehensions of other (including form “a” emotions) are made. Of course there’s overlap between forms (a) and (b) of emotions, but the disparity still exists.
With the former form (a), just because one feels emotion X does not then necessarily entail that one is in any way X; for instance, I could feel pangs of envy but immediately shun these creeping up emotions, myself as awareness/”I” at this juncture not being envious but, rather, antithetical to experiencing envy (though I will at such juncture indeed sense envy as one brewing—and, in this scenario, hopeful soon obliterated—emotion within my total being of mind). It would not be till I emotively deem envy an appropriate response to the here unaddressed stimuli that I would become envious, thereby now being a momentarily envious person in my intentions and outlooks.

I agree that it’s a very complex issue (as well as are issues of self when addressing the ever-changing "I" in conjunction with its total mind and body from which the "I" can well be stated to emerge). Nevertheless, my basic observation here is that there is a difference between “perceiving” one’s own emotions and enactively being momentarily undifferentiable from, or fully unified with, the emotion(s) in question.

Secondly, I for one strongly uphold that emotions consist of (mostly unconscious) reasoning. Enactive emotions—take your pick: love, anger, attraction, repulsion, etc.—entail that so doing x, y, and z, (be these general or specific) will result in some conclusion that you desire to obtain (typically for some reason). Here we have inference that is actively lived: premises accepted as true, one or more general goals/conclusions pursued, and the means by which one moves from these premises to the given conclusion—not in abstract theory but in concrete practice. Perceived emotions—or form (a) of emotions aforementioned—hold the same reasoning to them, but they emerge from fully un/subconscious portions of one’s mind in manners that you are not yet fully converged with, holding premises and conclusions you are not yet fully aware of consciously.

Conscious reasoning is driven by desire; desire is of itself an emotion (not an inference). So thought, when defined as conscious reasoning alone, is itself a tool through which we seek to actualize our enactive emotions (emotions we’re momentarily undifferentiable from … the “I am curious” type of emotion; and not the “I feel some tangential curiosity but am far more interested in doing something else (due to a conflicting emotion which I currently am one with)” type of emotion).

For the record, David Hume was the first to my knowledge to express this position of all abstract thought being governed by (often enough competing) emotive drives.

Don’t know if this will help out in better clarifying your outlook as offered in the OP. But, in summation of this post, imo there is no sharp threshold between emotion and thought. What we may think of as pure emotion is unconscious thought—either goading us as total beings or, else, with which we become fully converged with in our actions and outlooks—and what we may think of as pure thought is always itself a vehicle driven by some emotive state’s purpose.

Still, at the end of the day, for the record, I agree with you that emotions (specifically type “b” emotions) are primary and conscious reasoning secondary—such as in obtaining value judgments. This, though, is not to say that conscious reasoning is not often crucial in helping us discern what is from what isn’t … as well as what ought to be from what ought not to be. Nor am I suggesting that emotions and thoughts are not mutually entwined.

You make a good point that empiricism is classified as an epistemology, whereas materialism is classified as a metaphysics, and so they are not synonymous. — Samuel Lacrampe

I like this summation; it’s pithy. Far better than my ramblings. Sometimes, though, it takes time to edit concepts into more pithy statements (see below). :-}

Back to the original question, I wonder if all things that fit under the umbrella of natural science must be material. — Samuel Lacrampe

What makes this question so hard for me to appraise is the underlying supposition of what is and what is not material. This, though, gets into philosophy of mind … of which materialism is only one formal stance.

[...] The statement "studies show that those who live in this particular way tend to be more happy" is a valid scientific statement, and does not necessarily lead to materialism. — Samuel Lacrampe

As to science and its evidencing of materialism, I’ll offer my own perspective, right or wrong as it may be.

First as a general background, science can either be interpreted as A) “knowledge gained through study or practice”, which I take to then have derivative meanings such as “a particular discipline or branch of learning” or, else, B) “the collective discipline of study or learning acquired through the scientific method”. [These three quoted definitions are taken verbatim from Wiktionary; although other specific meanings for science can also be found there, I take these two to be the most pertinent].

As to denotation A and its derivatives: to me this sense of science may or may not hold personal value … Compare “the science of farting silently in public” (yes, this usage fully conforms to denotation A) to “the science of mathematics” … which also only pertains to denotation A: Mathematics (as with logics) is neither studied nor learned through the scientific method—i.e., (in my own attempt at pithy summation) i) falsifiable hypothesis on that which can be observationally scrutinized by all, ii) reproducible experiment (itself experiential) with no significant confounding variables which holds the potential to conclusively falsify the hypothesis, and iii) inferred conclusions of the experiment.

Then there’s the much touted and too often little understood “empirical sciences” category which pertains to denotation B. It is not mathematics, nor technology, nor logics… though it of course integrates all three in the process of empirically/experinetially/synthetically discovering new, observationally, and universally, verifiable knowledge. [e.g., gravity is a theory, but it is empirically scientific because no verifiable observation has ever been made of gravity not being the case—though just one such verifiable observation (thereby evidencing that the observation is not a willful lie, a hallucination, etc.) would be enough to conclusively falsify the theory]. In sense B of science, scientific knowledge in all cases is, again, empirical—and, hence, a posteriori—knowledge. [But notice that now stating “empirical” becomes disassociated with the branch of philosophy termed empiricism—which, again, claims that all (or, else, “nearly all”, according to Wikipedia) knowledge is a posteriori, i.e. gained after experience of that which it regards.]

While I’m certain that others will disagree with at least some aspects of this just stated appraisal regarding science, I’m again offering it as my own perspective—here, nothing more—and have only provided it to better contextualize the following opinion:

IMO: With one singular, possible exception, there is absolutely nothing of scientific knowledge (in sense B) that “necessarily leads to materialism”.

As one extreme example of this—though I disagree with Berkley’s metaphysics in multiple ways—Berkley’s metaphysics when taken in its complete, mature form (thereby including the omni-perceiving Berkleian God) is fully compatible with all scientific knowledge (of the sense-B type) of today—again, with the one exception I’ve previously alluded to. (And kicking a rock about is not going to refute this claim.) … In saying this, however, one ought to be careful to distinguish inferences drawn from scientific knowledge (e.g., quantum physics’ multiple worlds) from the scientific knowledge itself (e.g. particles have been observed to predictably behave in certain ways).

So, that one exception I’ve so far alluded to is simply this: the mainstream paradigm in most fields of empirical science contains the inference that awareness has developed from out of a perfectly non-aware universe (such as in, life having developed from nonlife) … thereby implying the metaphysical primacy of matter, i.e. the metaphysics of materialism. [However, certain metaphysical suppositions, such as panpsychism as one often mentioned example, can remain noncontradictory to all scientific knowledge without relying upon this just mentioned inference … thereby having the potential of both holding on to scientific knowledge without in any way “leading to materialism”.]

It’s a very tangled philosophical subject … this issue regarding the relation between scientific knowledge and the metaphysical subject specified by the philosophy of mind (again, of which materialism/physicalism is only one variant of).

So you say that empiricism encompasses all experiential things, which includes but is not limited to material things. Could you provide an example of an experiential thing which is not a material thing? — Samuel Lacrampe

To be clear, my statements addressed what empiricism once was upheld to be. Plainly stated, empiricism is/was the stance that knowledge develops from experience and is thereby a posteriori. Of itself, it has nothing to do with materiality.

I’m not now sure if your question intends historic examples taken from former empiricists. If so, as an overview, Hume was not a materialist. Neither was George Berkeley, another well-known empiricist. Locke was a Christian, which I take to entail that he was not a materialist either.

Rather than provide specific examples from former empiricists (I haven’t read the three just mentioned in a while, so I’d be a bit rusty) I’ll give this observation: The general question of which experiential thing is not itself a material thing places the cart before the horse if one is addressing this question from a metaphysical point of view: to the physicalist all things are material/physical things. REM dreams, sensations, expectations, intentions, imagined unicorns, the non-reasoned apprehension of (or awareness of) abstractions in adults which cannot be represented by particulars without at best diminishing the given abstraction (e.g., animal … encapsulating everything from sponges to blue whales, etc.)—to list only a few things experiential—are then all part and parcel of matter in relation to matter to the physicalist. Hence, to the physicalist, there is nothing of experience which is not material/physical—this by the very definition of physicalism.

If, however, the question intended commonsense notions of material objects, I’ll specify the experience of happiness. It is an experiential thing which is not of itself a representation of any particular material thing or set of such. (I’m limiting it to this example in case disagreements ensue.)

[edit: corrected a laughable typo about horses and carts ... if anyone noticed]

But in 150 years' time if, say, New York and London have been flooded and Bangladesh destroyed in the meantime, there will be some people who will say, 'It remains to be proved that anthropogenic climate change did this.' They will host chat shows and have followers. Just you wait and see. — mcdoodle

I get the part about disagreements. Thanks for the humorous reminder. What I don’t get is the part about whether or not there occur states of affairs irrespective to what sentience may believe or feel. We can ask this of the proposition, “I exist/am,” when we address it to our own individual selves as we can ask this of the proposition, “Elvis Presley has died”.

What’s worse to me is the proposition that, “because some believe that he has and some believe that he hasn’t, Elvis is both dead and alive at the same present time and in the same way”.

Your remarks about predictions for the future, i didn't understand. There can't be facts about future anthropogenic global warming. I think most scientists think it's likely to be true, and that on the precautionary principle the best bet is to assume they're right. — mcdoodle

The predicted fact of what will occur if we don’t counteract in the case of global warming can be construed to be a more complex version of what will happen to the proverbial ostrich with its head placed in the ground if it doesn’t start running away from the attacking lion.

Addressing the issue of facticity, through one can come up with a number of possibilities of why the lion is charging toward the ostrich (maybe the lion simply intends to greet the ostrich with a friendly lick, etc.), when the lion and the ostrich are in touching distance only one possibility will unfold. This one actualized possibility will at that juncture become a fact. When we visually imagine the proverbial ostrich placing its head in the ground as a lion charges towards it from afar, we predict what the one future actuality will be. In other words, we predict what the future pertinent fact will be. That the lion will kill the ostrich is then a predicted fact (again, emphasis on predicted).

Addressing the issue of a relativity in which facts are changeable by beliefs and feelings, if the ostrich places its head in the sand, ceases to visually perceive the lion attacking, and then believes and feels that it is free from all future danger in regard to this lion due to what it believes to be the lion’s disappearance, does the charging lion actually/factually/objectively/truly/ontically disappear? [A strictly rhetorical question since we all know via a conflux of experience and reasoning that the lion does not factually disappear relative to the ostrich’s being at such a juncture.]

The same can then be applied to the issue of global warming (a more pressing, realistic, and complex scenario): do the facts of today which point to (and limit) what will occur in the future if we don’t counteract the danger (i.e., today’s facts by which we predict what the future facts will be given set of conditions Q) then ontically disappear were one to not believe that the stated facts of today are indeed factual?

Unlike the ostrich scenario, which concerns a single ostrich, the global warming scenario regards a populace that does not currently hold a unified stance (in this case, a global consensus) regarding the danger of global warming. So, to try to keep things simple via a different question, if person A believes in human caused global warming and person B believes that global warming is a hoax, will the future of this planet be different for the grandchildren of person A and person B … this at the same time? If (objective) reality (as compared to the intersubjective realities of cultures, etc.) is relative to beliefs and feelings, how does this resulting absurdity not obtain?

I hope this clarifies what I initially intended to express.

Then I don't really understand the idea. Facts do not need any sort of justification. They're simply the way that things are. That doesn't mean they're not relative (part of the way that things are is relative--for example, properties are relative to reference "points" (spatio-temporal points)). — Terrapin Station

Yet this eludes the very issue that I’m raising.

“Facts are simply the way that things are” means what in your own perspective? Is ‘the way that things are’ non-relative to beliefs and feelings (hence absolute as previously defined by me: “something not relative that nevertheless is regardless of beliefs and feelings”) or is it relative to beliefs and feelings (and thereby malleable by beliefs and feelings)?

The only facts that hinge on beliefs, feelings, etc. are facts of beliefs, feelings, etc. For example, the fact that Joe is sad that the Miami Heat weren't in the playoffs this year. — Terrapin Station

I myself don’t follow this. If, for example, it is a fact that Joe is sad (at time A, for greater clarity), then Joe being sad at time A is a state of affairs that ‘simply is the way it is’ regardless of what anyone might believe or feel about it … including what Joe might self-delude himself into believing (and remembering) at a subsequent time B.

... In which case, facts about beliefs, feelings, etc., are not malleable by beliefs, feelings, etc. (Assuming I'm interpreting this last quote correctly.)

Hey, my last post of the day. But I am curious to better understand your own position.

Funny, I’m not a correspondence theorist of truth only on grounds that for me truth is (pithily expressed) “fidelity to that which is objective reality" (hence making sense of semantics such as "the arrows aim was true" and "staying true to oneself"). Takes a lot for me to justify this position, and this isn’t the place for me to try; still, the point of this being: though I’m not a correspondence theorist of truth, to me the notions presented by correspondence theory become one necessary form that truth takes … this via fidelity to objective reality.

This off the beaten path view, however, requires that there be a state of affairs (physical, metaphysical, or both) that is absolute, i.e. not relative--namely, that of objective reality.

To avoid this whole notion of what truth is and what it stands in relation to (never mind the issue of objective reality), I intentionally first used the words “right (i.e., correct)” in my first post in this thread. Likewise with my last given question: I asked for means of justification for the addressed state of affairs—and not whether or not the state of affairs addressed was true.

So, no, I disagree with your interpretation of my latest question (in part due to our likely different, and slightly contradicting, understandings of truth—with your understanding likely not affirming anything non-relative to which truths stand in relation).

Instead, my latest question can better be interpreted as asking how one justifies facticity without reliance upon a notion of something absolute (with "absolute" here interpreted as "something not relative that nevertheless is regardless of beliefs and feelings").

[… But all this should be taken in the context of my first post on this thread to which you first replied. More succinctly expressing its contents: if facticity too is dependent upon beliefs and feelings, then do particular facts cease to be when people (and/or ostriches) don’t believe in them?]

Thank you for your own views, TS.

If you are upholding that facts are not relative to feelings and beliefs, but to themselves, how do you establish this to be the state of affairs—i.e., the fact of the matter—without also affirming that this appraisal is itself relative to your own beliefs and feelings?

[emphasis provided because that is the missing link I don't yet understand]

[...]Aren't natural sciences dealing only with things that are empirical; and all that is empirical is material?[...] — Samuel Lacrampe

Empiricism—arguably, much like Cynicism and Skepticism—no longer means in today’s popular culture what it initially meant. Empiricism—what the natural sciences are founded on—is rooted in experience. One nowadays has to invoke different terms—such as “experiential” or “experientialism”—to evoke the same semantics that gave rise to the notion of natural sciences. Empiricism as initially intended, then, addresses experiential knowns (as in, knowledge by acquaintance)—including those regarding matter—but is in no way limited to matter as a topic of interest.

You will find this in empiricists such as Lock and Hume, among others—although I haven’t yet read the works of Francis Bacon (an earlier empiricist who is credited as the father of the scientific method).

I’m with this post trying to better understand what the relativists actually uphold in regard to facticity.

… First, a current event: USA has recently pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement, internationally leaving it in the sole company of Syria and Nicaragua (but Nicaragua is not part of the agreement due the agreement’s not going far enough to protect against global warming; so, imo, it’s a false positive).

Q1 (regarding concrete facts of the recent past): Is the facticity of just stated current event being right (i.e., correct) dependent on how people feel about it so being and their beliefs—such that the stated current event ceases in being a fact were individuals (and cohorts composed of these individuals) to not believe that this current event actually occurred?

Q2 (regarding predicted facts concerning the future): In relation to global warming, is the appraised factuality of its occurrence right (i.e., correct) in manners fully dependent upon what people believe and feel—such that, for one example, global warming would reach lethal levels for humanity (and a good number of other species) if unchecked only were all people of the world to believe and feel that it will? [Therefore: don’t believe in human caused global warming and global warming will cease to be a factual aspect of the world you inhabit.]

Q3 (regarding abstract generalities concerning factuality obtained via a hypothetical): If an ostrich were to place its head in a hole in the ground upon seeing a lion attacking, would the danger to the ostrich then vanish and thereby rescue the ostrich from being harmed?

Q4: If any of the aforementioned questions are answered with a “no”, how does the relativist justify the answer of “no” without relying upon some absolute? … such as that of objective reality, i.e. a reality that occurs regardless of the beliefs and feeling of individuals (and cohorts comprised of these)?

Yo, just wanted to say (Y)

Tell you what, I'll reply to your posts after you reply to mine. As a reminder:

you have yet to address whether or not dfjsl-ajf'ls are existent or not - and if existent, if they exist in the same way you do. — javra

The whole spacetime is present, [...] — litewave

Not according the to model of spacetime which breaks down and thereby leads to the inference of a gravitational singularity.

If by the "sum" you don't mean "collection" or "whole" but all existent things, then the "sum" is not a single thing but many things. And each of those things exists in the context of all the other things.

And if by the "sum" you mean the collection or whole of all existent things then this "sum" is different from each of its parts - because it is not identical to any of its parts, and so the sum is a thing that exists in relation to (or in the "context" of) its parts, which are other things. — litewave

I agree that the whole stands in relation to its parts. But I'm addressing context in the what I take to be the typically utilized way: such as that within which a given resides.

Anyway, there is no such greatest collection, just as there is no greatest number. — litewave

Are you saying there is no universe?