There, that's more like it. — T Clark

When it comes to humor, I’m in the dark.

How many real men does it to change a lightbulb?

None. Real men aren't afraid of the dark. — Bitter Crank

… need I say more? 8-)

Btw, nice one BC.

This is a bit suspect to me for several reasons. 1) You are assuming future people will reduce suffering in the same way as the parents. Offspring may be nothing like their parents. 2) Using future people in order to decrease some overall suffering seems to not be in the spirit of the moral stance to not use people for a means to an ends. You create a life with suffering in order to reduce some total suffering. — schopenhauer1

OK, I’ll defend my previously made argument and see how far it can go.

As to (1), true, things are not deterministically set—either biologically or behaviorally. Yet just as the kids’ phenotypes are on average a mixture of the parents’ phenotypes, so too can be argued for the kids’ behaviors, including their sense of ethics, when both parents have been around. What I’m upholding is that the kid’s behavior will not itself be random but will be in great part learned from the parent(s)’ behavior. So if the parents desire less suffering in the world, given that they are good parents by common sense standards, so too will their children. Exceptions could of course occur. But this argument is about average outcomes.

As to (2), I very much acknowledge that this position is hard knocks. All the same, if one cares about suffering in the world among humans and lives one’s life thus, then the absence of this person to humanity only increases the suffering in humanity relative to this person’s being otherwise present—this for reasons aforementioned. E.g. where this person would smile at a homeless kid, a non-caring person would not show any kindness toward the same homeless kid; and without the caring person the same homeless kid would receive less compassion and would therefore experience greater suffering. Do you deem this overall reasoning valid or erroneous?

I’ll try to address “the people as means toward ends” issue after this one issue is first addressed—since the former issue is contingent upon the latter issue being valid as here expressed.

On the philosophical principle of using reasoning in conjunction with one’s ready acquired body of empirical knowledge to establish what is and is not real:

An Eastern European, outback shepherd who’d only seen local animals his entire life—with no connection to the world outside his village, such as via books or TV—finally made it out into the country’s big city. There he visited the city zoo. At the zoo he came face to face with a very tall-necked giraffe. While staring at it in disbelief, he contemplated deep and hard. At last, the intrepid shepherd confidently concluded with a wave of the hand: “No animal such as this can even exist!”

(A Romanian joke that may not translate as well as it could. I like it though.)

A more English based one also about observations and reasoning:

Two Californian dumb blonds stare up at the moon. One asks, “What do you think is closer: the moon or New York?” The other replies: “You stupid? The moon, of course! Look, you can’t see New York from where we’re at.”

This is (admittedly) about antinatalism (not procreating future people). — schopenhauer1

Here’re some premises and the resulting conclusions. Where would this go wrong?

P1: Antinatalists hold their stance due to a desire for there to not be suffering in the world.

P2: Some people in the world desire for there not to be so much suffering in the world while others couldn’t give a hoot about other’s suffering.

P3: If all people who desire reduced suffering in the world (including antinatalists) were to no longer exist, then the world would become fully populated by people that increase suffering in the world—this either due to lack of care or due to willful intent.

C1: In order to best bring about the effect which antinatalists seek, people who seek this same effect have to populate the world—and, thereby, at times reproduce—in order to optimally counteract the effects of people who bring about increased suffering in the world.

C2: Though it is in the interest of minimized global suffering that all newly birthed children are wanted (thereby entailing that if potential parents don’t want to be parents then it is good for them not to be parents—regardless of reasons), given the premises listed: the greater the quantity of reproduction by people who seek minimizing suffering in the world, the more the world’s overall suffering becomes minimized via the counteracting of those who produce increased world suffering.

Edit: I know I'm missing some details in terms of logics; still, how does this stand as an overall argument?

No bully wants to be bullied. Therefore even the unjust person perceives the unjust treatment to be bad. [...] So I claim that no one, not even the immoral ones, can perceive object 2 to be morally better than object 1. — Samuel Lacrampe

To be honest, this is my intuitive center of gravity as well, so to speak … and I easily project it upon all others. In no way proud of this, when I as a young kid burned ants with a magnifying glass, I knew darn well what caused them suffering and what didn’t (I had no doubts that they weren’t automata or the like; it takes an adult to dream up that one) … and I fully knew that I would not have liked to be treated the way I then treated these few ants. And so, if I’d been asked, I would have known that what I was doing was wrong -- even if it was a means for me to relieve the stress of having been bullied.

But people can sometimes act out in even stranger ways, even as adults. Think of someone, for example, who is sadistic one day and then masochistic the next—maybe as a psychological means of feeling that justice is done in terms of the previous sadisms they acted out (e.g., though, maybe, only marginally related: I’ve read that men of great power, like male judges, are the typical customers in the paid-for services of dominatrixes).

So while I fully agree that this sentiment of “no bully wants to be bullied” is a good rule of thumb, I so far still think that more involved principles would need to be invoked were one interested in accounting for all human behavior (even more so for all sentient behavior).

For example, some can be said to innately believe that a maximized control-over-other is the only means of successfully minimizing bad for oneself and for others. Fascism, Stalinism, even kingships all tend toward this conception of “objective good”: one of centralized power of sentience over all other sentience through which all other becomes ordered, thus stable, thus maximally happy. Again, it is not an uncommon perspective of what is objectively good (be it further justified as God-ordained or nature-ordained). Yet this outlook stands in direct opposition to the notion of “do onto others as you’d have done onto you” (which can be justified in like manners).

So the question again resolves into how does one justify what in fact is objectively good? For instance, why would a maximized control-over-over be immoral (unjust) in the first place? (certainly this state of being is what bullies aspire for; btw, I'll play the devil's advocate with this for a while if need be)

This seems to be a good goal in general, but there are exceptions to it. Would it be okay for me to withhold truth from you, on the grounds that learning it would make you suffer? — Samuel Lacrampe

I acknowledge that there are exceptions to what I’ve previously mentioned. As to relation between truths and suffering, there can be found various explanations for why truths sometimes lead to suffering: e.g. truths sting bubbles of ego (when the ego is not already aligned with that which is true)—this stinging of ego being the hubris-driven tragedy needed for any catharsis. In attempts to explain this relation, one can even rely on the statement of “truth shall set us free” and somehow work backwards in terms of finding the proper moderations and degrees of expressing truths … this with the reasoning that too much suffering too quickly will in the long term drive someone away from the desire to experience the cathartic pleasures of new truths. (or something like this)

Still, as you illustrate, the understanding of suffering as has been so far here expressed is not, in fact, universal to all at all times. To me, however, this only means we’d need to get deeper into what then is in fact a universal drive to all sentience … whose fulfillment would be innately deemed good by each and every sentience.

BTW, I’ve little hope that we can get to the bottom of things as to what objective goodness signifies; I nevertheless hold the attempts in high regard.

Alright, think of it like the gender-neutral harmony between masculine and feminine attributes in Taoism; the Yin Yang solidifies an inseperable bond within that cultivates the dissolution of vicious or cruel behaviour through moral virtue and ethics. This is an individual, subjective challenge and whether physically you are a man or a woman, to find this balance you need to welcome and identify with both. — TimeLine

Yes, yes, all well and good (and very, very nicely stated, too). But how does one answer the rebuttal that, “this is all part of a movement to castrate men’s masculinity by depriving men of our inalienable (God and/or biology-given) rights to subjugate women as we men see fit (else, we’re not true men)”?

No, really; I personally don’t know how to address such a rebuttal effectively. So I’m asking. I see a little too much of this type or reasoning from my own corner of the world, including on the internet (hopefully it’s much better in other parts of the world).

Well the song depicts a man trying to persuade himself that he does not have tender feelings; a man trying to be manly according to a common image of manliness. It expresses the pain of doing that to oneself, and the impossibility of it. — unenlightened

Interesting. To me, for example, the image of a father (an image of masculinity) does bring about inherent notions of tenderness, such as toward his kids, this alongside firmness when needed. This to try to say that the experiencing of love is to me as much masculine as it is feminine, though the two will sometimes express and react to it in different ways. Though, yes, being an owner of tender feelings might be viewed as weakness of being, non-masculine, in some notions of masculinity.

On the one hand, we could argue sociologically about what images of manhood are promoted in a particular culture that men are pressured to conform themselves to. And on the other hand, we could argue biologically about what are the facts of manhood. — unenlightened

Agreed. I also like and agree with your notion of “image”, btw. I’ll venture that the image of masculinity is furthermore in part made by a) what males, boys included, desire to become (the image of this being potentially termed “a man’s man”) and b) what women desire to someday be around romantically (the image of this being potentially termed “a woman’s man”). The exact opposite could be argued for femininity; though I’ve yet to hear of “a woman’s woman” and of “a man’s woman”--at least not with the semantics here intended.

I find agreement with the rest of your post. In truth, my main interests with this thread can be boiled down to this personal belief: A sense of compassion (alongside others, such as courage and strength) ought to be at the very core of all images we hold of masculinity, else we risk our cultural image of masculinity to become an esteemed image of psychopathy. Other than that, to each their own. (But no, one man’s opinion does not a culture make.)

Upon experiencing deception, one learns that the reality as experienced before the learning of deception, may not fit what is now perceived to be an absolute reality. — Tehilla

I’m so far unclear as to what this (and the overall thesis) intends to specify. And a lot of topics have been addressed; so the OP may need some further unpacking. I will, however, offer this related observation:

Deception cannot exist in the absence of truth. To willfully deceive is to build up—in part or in whole—a fictitious reality, a fictional truth, which then becomes interpreted (trusted / believed) to be non-fictitious in those that are thereby deceived. (While I’d argue this holds true for self-deceptions as well, the issue of self-deceptions can become very complicated by various theories of mind.) So the deceiver, in order to be successful in his/her deceptions, first needs to be aware of the personally apprehended reality / truth in question prior to creating deceptions of it. This form of reasoning then leads to the conclusion that reality has to always be primary, and the deceptions we may or may not live under must always be secondary to that which is real.

So, while we may not currently be able to demonstrate that what we know (via experience, of which empirical data is only one variant of, or via experience & reasoning) is an absolute reality, this aforementioned reasoning does conclude in there being a metaphysical need for there being an absolute reality.

I would also argue that experience is not limited to perceptions that occur via physiological senses (i.e., is not limited to the empirical): one can, for example, experience jubilance or sorrow; likewise can one experience understandings in respect to that which is empirical, this without making one’s lived-through understandings themselves in any way empirical (i.e., apprehendable through physiological senses).

To my mind, then, all accounts of whether or not absolute reality can in any way become knowable to any sentience would be propositions devoid of worth if we couldn’t first establish that such a thing as absolute reality in fact does somehow exist—be this absolute reality physical (which I’d argue against due to the premise of physical reality being in perpetual flux, and hence not technically absolute—as I currently understand the term to denote “perfectly integral / fixed”) or, else, metaphysical.

Again, while you conclude in the OP that, “This paradox points to the impossibility of knowledge of absolute truth,”—a conclusions whose premises I so far find faulty (e.g., that experience can only consist of empirical data)—you haven’t yet made it clear if you nevertheless uphold that an absolute reality exists … even if its particulars are currently indemonstrable by us.

Sorry, what question was that? — unenlightened

this one:

Wouldn’t self-proclaimed real dicks say that this song is for real pussies? — javra

To be clear, the question (and post) was thrown out there in general; not to you in particular. Again, to me, it touches upon what the concept of masculinity is to some (e.g., non-pussy-ness: including lack of attributes such as those of understanding and respectful compromises), and on what it is, or ought to be, to others (e.g., appreciation of things inclusive of the song you've posted).

Edit: just in case this needs clarifying: I’ve always taken for granted that the song “I’m not in love” is about a guy who’s in self-denial about being in love … and that it’s sentimental. Where I’m from, plenty of macho men would presume this song is for wusses. I at least wouldn’t be playing this song loudly while driving through the ghetto thinking that others would view me as masculine for listening to it (unless I felt like proving somethin’ … theoretically).

A song for all the real men... — unenlightened

Personally, as an aside, I ain’t no real nothing … and am real with myself in so being (yea, deal with the multiple negatives … hopefully, I counted them properly). Were I to have been birthed in Scotland, I’d be no true Scotsman either. Etc. That said, this song brings up the question: Wouldn’t self-proclaimed real dicks say that this song is for real pussies?

Now, I gather that dicks, pussies, and assholes are not cultural constructs (yes, they are biological givens) … but the symbolic connotations culturally ascribed to all three sure as culture are. People like Cleopatra have no place in our current cultural constructs: Was she feminine? Yes according to what we’re told (Cesar certainly thought so). Was she a pussy? Um, it would be doublethink to assert either “yes” or “no”. I get that this is swimming upstream against the flow of modern culture, so—instead of building up a long justification for this, which won’t make any difference anyways—I’ll skip strait to the intended conclusion: to pigeonhole real men (and thus masculinity) to being a dick and real women (and thus femininity) to being a pussy is to be a real asshole.

I can hear the real men grumbling: the real men hold the positive traits and it can only be a pussy—a sex betraying pussy at that—that will affirm that pussies aren’t defined by negative traits. (This form of culturally ingrained reasoning is why I personally believe feminists as a group have gotten such a bad rap for their desire of equal worth between men and women.)

All I got to say to this is that pussycats can sometimes be found in damn big sizes. Ya know, tigers and such. Other times they’re stated to wear boots. In any case, I wouldn’t mind living in a world where pussies (and femininity) are deemed of equal value to dicks (and masculinity), and in which neither draw blatant attention to also being assholes (a gender-neutral trait).

(I figure my initial question still stands in regard to the issue of masculinity.)

To add some fuel to this fire:

This song in part touches upon male homosexuality, so it likely isn’t for the really true macho men out there (unless, maybe, they’ve spent too much time in prisons). Other than that, it kind of speaks to the underlying issue of masculinity for us male heterosexuals as well.

The version I know of:


Cut and pasted from Google search:

------

Lyrics

Take your mind back- I don't know when-
Sometime when it always seemed to be just us and them.
Girls that wore pink, boys that wore blue,
Boys that always grew up better men than me and you.
What's a man now, what's a man mean?
Is he rough- or is he rugged, cultural and clean?
Now it's all changed- it's got to change more.
We think it's getting better, but nobody's really sure.

And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are

See the nice boys dancing in pairs,
Golden earring, golden tan, blow-wave in the hair-
Sure they're all straight, straight as a line.
All the guys are macho, see their leather shine.
You don't want to sound dumb, don't want to offend,
So don't call me a faggot, not unless you are a friend.
Then if you're tall, handsome and strong,
You can wear the uniform and I could play along.

And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are

Time to get scared, time to change plan,
Don't know how to treat a lady, don't know how to be a man.
Time to admit, what you call defeat,
'Cause there's women running past you now-
And you just drag your feet.
Man makes a gun, man goes to war,
Man can kill, and man can drink, and man can take a whore.
Kill all the blacks, kill all the reds,
If there's war between the sexes then there'll be no people left.

And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are
And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are
And so it goes, go round again,
But now and then we wonder who the real men are

Songwriters: Joe Jackson
Real Men lyrics © Kobalt Music Publishing Ltd., Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC

------

(Bread, man, bread ...)

Is there a certain way that we ought to express masculinity? — Posty McPostface

Bravo! What, over 30 posts now and no mention yet of size differences as a true measure of a man’s worth!!! Still, shows how far removed this crowd is from them average people out there in the world. (btw, men and women ... yup, this is all funny to me)

Never liked the sound of “lord” and “lady” … until I checked out the two terms etymology on Wiktionary: “bread guardian” and “bread kneader” … two roles that are equally important, mutually important, and complement the other. As to bread, not only does bread sound very similar to “all” in some Languages (e.g. pane & pan) but there’s this Christian custom of bread representing the body of Christ(/world?). Sometimes makes me think it might have been an easily established code in ancient days, maybe similar to “vine (of life)” and “wine” as regards the spiritual side of reality … at least according to some interpretations.

Anyways, the lord / lady dichotomy is about as good a description of masculinity and femininity as any I’ve heard of so far. And then you can get into how each role contains some of the other in it. Now, I very much doubt that there’s only one way to guard bread, figuratively that is; but, still, some guys could be deemed to better express this role than others. Probably not by hording bread at baker's shops, though OK, it ain’t a perfect description of masculinity, but at least it’s better than pulling out that ruler to confirm size measurements, I say. (I hang out with the commoners often enough, don’t you all know).

Then I don't get why they'd say "This food tastes good", as opposed to "My mental state is this food tasting good." Both are true, and objective. — Harry Hindu

I side with SL on this: Truth cannot contradict truth.

As to why one expression over the other, to me it in part has to do with our tendency to project what is objectively real states of mind within ourselves upon external reality, including upon what the other subjects’ objectively real states of mind consist of—this being a natural occurrence that can range from being very healthy to being very nerve-racking (to say the least).

In parallel, it’s the same as saying “I’m visually perceiving this flower to be white” rather than saying “this flower is white”. The first statement can be argued to be more epistemically honest; the second statement is however more gregarious and, thereby, socially practical … since it implicitly acknowledges that it is already known that there is commonality between all people concerned in respect to what their own objectively real states of mind are when visually perceiving the given flower. Yet, however we express what objectively is, in this case truths will not contradict with truths.

Now, to build upon SL's statements, some of us may have more experience than others with honestly saying to the family chef that “This one dish doesn’t taste good; I’ll instead eat of that other dish you’ve cooked” and being told in reply, “But, it does taste good, dear; try some more of it and you’ll see”. Here truths—regarding the objectively real states of mind concerned in relation to the dish addressed—will contradict. And so these truths cannot now be deemed in any way objective respective to what they reference but, instead, can only be concluded to be relative to each subject’s personal inclinations—i.e., to be subjective truths.

Taking a step back, our commonly shared, external, objective reality will never be deemed to hold any contradictions. It will always be innately deemed to be non-contradictory in all of its aspects both big and small. This factor, I very much believe, plays into the very commonsensical notion of there being only one universe (akin to: one-ubiquitously-consistent-logos-bundle of which we are all entwined with) as regards the physical world. For example, it’s why we know that our current Theory of Relativity and QM are not the last word as regards physical reality: as of yet, there are aspects of these two models that are not fluidly congruent relative to each other (in respect to observations). But truths always cohere to truths. So we know that there is yet some subjectivity at play in at least one of these models that is incongruent to reality; else stated, that at least one of these two models contains some non-objective properties.

Let's rely on the relative-objective test to determine if moral goodness is an objective property of human behaviour. Object 1: A man acts towards others as he would want them to act towards him. Object 2: The man acts in such a way that he would hate others to act towards him. Which object would subjects observe to have the highest degree of moral goodness? I foresee that a large majority would say object 1, and the remaining few, if any, would be indecisive. But I also expect that virtually nobody would choose object 2. If this is the case, then moral goodness is objective.

Thoughts? — Samuel Lacrampe

While I’d like it to be this easy, I deeply believe Donald Trump--for example--would hate being around people who act toward him the way he acts toward others (the “you’re fired” attitude among others). Given that he’s the elected president of the USA, I don’t find his personality to be too exceptional in today’s culture. I’d say a lot of people are this way and find a sense of satisfaction in so being: bullies, for instance; but I suppose it can also be characters that we don’t intuitively think of as bad. Does a shy wallflower treat others the way he/she would hate to be treated—this, say, at social gatherings? This could be so for at least some. And if it pleases people to be so, on what grounds could we justify that it’s bad for them to be so?

Myself, I’d for example here lean more on Buddhist-like philosophy of suffering and the desire to minimize it--or at least something similar to this perspective. Were this to be evidenced a universal drive, we could then say something along the lines of “that which would successfully minimize suffering, and increase happiness, for one and all would be an objective good (a good that is universal to all sentience irrespective of contexts)”. Then this can be applied to scenarios 1 and 2 which you’ve provided. If we could logically maintain that the golden rule is better at minimizing the suffering of one and all than is the standard of “doing onto others as one would hate to be done onto oneself”, then we could safely conclude that scenario 1 is closer to an objective good than is scenario 2 … and that those who follow scenario 2 go about what they truly want in (logically) wrong, or inappropriate, ways. (Here, this would hold even when many would choose scenario 2.) Though more involved, I again think this type of approach would serve as a best means of justifying what would be objectively good, and why it would so be.

I observe the colour yellow and say "Yellow is the best colour". In this case, the object is 'yellow', the subject is me, and the property is 'best colour'. The property is obviously subjective because it is not linked to the colour yellow in itself. Now, you come in, and observe me saying that statement "Yellow is the best colour", and so you conclude "Sam's best colour is yellow". In this case, the object is me, the subject is you, and the property is 'best colour being yellow'. The property is now objective, because any new subjects, you or someone else, will hear me saying "Yellow is the best colour".

To sum up, it is imperative to clearly identify who or what is the subject, object, and property for any given context. Once this is done, the paradox is resolved. — Samuel Lacrampe

I’m in general agreement.

Here’s where it gets even trickier for me: Is the first-person point of view an object/entity, a process/becoming, both, or neither? These (we) first-person points of view are the very subjects whose presence is the source from which all subjectivity we are aware of emerges. Nevertheless, our presence as first-person points of view is, in and of itself, objectively real. Furthermore, for example: Grammatically, “me” is an object addressed and “I” is the subject that is addressing—yet both terms can hold the same exact referent.

To my mind, one way to resolve this is to interpret all objects as bundles of processes. Conversely, to not think of first person points of view as being bundles of processes leads to the conclusion of homunculi (of conscious agents as objects in the roundabout sense we typically think of rocks as objects: as somehow being perfectly stable and integral in their constituency). But, then again, to me this works its way into the difficulties of identity theory; there typically is a pervasive stability—however imperfect it may be—to a conscious agency throughout a lifetime (otherwise we typically address extreme mental disorders).

BTW, a day ago you asked about the possibility of such things as moral goodness being objective. As far as I understand things, goodness can only hold the possibility of being objective from the vantage of being a lowest common denominator that is universal to all first-person points of view. But, for emphasis, here we’d be addressing abstract universals that are integral to all, and not particulars that are relative to any context. Still, all first-person points of view hold in common so being first-person points of view … regardless of how otherwise different they may be relative to each other. If they likewise all share some attribute X whose fulfilment would be innately desired by all (though each in its own way), than the fulfilment of this attribute X would then equate to an objective good … such that its presence would be in manners indifferent to beliefs and choices. This form of reasoning, however, does require that conscious agents—i.e., first-person points of view—be acknowledge to be objectively real … but this again gets into identity theory in terms of what they (we) might metaphysically be: in essence, addressing the tricky issue I first mentioned in this post.

So that would be an example of the object not changing state but the observer. If it's still there when you come back and it's just the same-- no, but if you come back and bring someone else with you, and the two of you walk around, look at it from different angles, maybe do so at different times of day and so on, then we start to think "objective". — Srap Tasmaner

Thought about it and I’ll give this murky territory a try. I might be coming out of left field with this one. So, some thoughts that I’ll gladly see corrected wherever needed:

First off, objectivity cannot logically be that which is completely severed from subjectivity. Were this so, then empirical objectivity could never obtain. So “independent of” should be interpreted as “indifferent to” … obviously, this without any connotation of sentience being invoked by the phrase.

Back to the subjective-objective dichotomy: As per the OP’s outline, to my mind this naturally leads to a stratification of layers regarding that which is externally objective—i.e., regarding that which externally is in manners indifferent to what any subject might will or believe.

As regards perception, first layer will always be that of an experienced direct realism between beings that share common, genotypically inherited modes of perception: all of us non-blind/color-blind people will visually perceive the same colors; what we see is what we get color wise.

Also as regards perception, a deeper layer of objectivity can be found between species of sentience: humans and bees both pay special attention to the sun’s sunlight and location in the sky (as do many other species of life—e.g., all that hold any form of circadian rhythm); both species interact with this causality-endowed-web-of-information (i.e., Heraclitean logos) produced by the sun (and which also in part is the sun) and, so, have physiological means of sensing this information. This information remains the same for both species, yet, from the vantage of both species’ perceptions of it, the information will hold a type of lowest common denominator in respect to its objective appearance relative to the two species. Hence, it will hold a common appearance to which both species, each in its own way, builds up upon vie its own species-specific means of interpreting this information. This layer of objectivity regarding what externally is in regard to perception results in a type of indirect realism.

Likewise with objects being objective: all of us humans innately know via direct experience that objects occur in the external world; we agree upon the objects’ attributes and, so, can hold objective appraisals of which objects are and which are not. Nevertheless, conjoining experience and reasoning does result in a conclusion as old as Heraclitus that it’s all processes in relation to one another. On this deeper layer of contemplation, there objectively are no objects but only processes.

This multi-layering of objective reality can be extended in many directions. Yet, in this mode of thinking, reality itself is not what dwells at the very pith of these multiple layers but, rather, the entirety of all these layers as is (fully including the subjects that are entwined with and make sense of this logos).

This, then, also has some interesting implications for truth—here interpreted via correspondence to. When one is only aware in an intuitive manner of direct perception of the rock other there, one would express—relative to one’s momentary awareness—a full truth in that the rock over there is an objective object (say, not an imagined object). However, when one has process theory in mind and views the same rock, one would then express—again relative to one’s momentary awareness—only a partial truth in saying the same thing … for while one is honest in what one innately sees, one here overlooks the additional reality one is aware of regarding the rock being only a bundle of process and, in this sense, not an object.

Like I was saying, it’s a murky territory.

One summary of this perspective is that—while always remaining indifferent to subjects at all layers and at any particular time—interpretations of what is objectively real in terms of external givens will nevertheless remain relative to the commonly shared awareness of cohort(s) of subjective beings. For simplicity of argument, and because only humans think about such things, we can safely say “relative to the commonly shared awareness of sapient beings”. (Edit: this conforming to the same conclusion of the quote from ST.)

Nevertheless—to further complicate things—in accordance with Harry Hindu’s posts, this would also lead to conclusions such as: the presence of subjects is objectively real. Going by the definition of “indifferent to subjective appraisals”, so too can intra-personal states of being be objectively real (e.g., my current emotion is objectively real, regardless of how I may interpret it after the fact). Also, leading to a kind of pseudo-paradox: the subject is itself objectively real; i.e., the presence of the subject is objective, and thereby fully entwined with objective reality in total.

Thoughts?

Unless I am mistaken, then it seems to me that both the "daytime-nighttime" and "road sign" examples are determined to be objective through a process similar to the objective-relative test, thereby arguing in favour of the test. — Samuel Lacrampe

To my mind, they are. I’ve myself come to similar enough conclusions as yourself. Maybe some of the disagreements in this thread have been due to conflating—quite understandably—the notion of what is experientially objective with the notion of objectivity as a metaphysical standard. Don’t know.

In skimming what I previously wrote to you, saw that my use of terms was all over the place—not as sharp as it could have been; things like using the word “real” instead of “reality” and the like, never mind my use of the term “isle”. Wanted to say: my bad. Without this being an excuse, my odd dislexicalities tend to show more when I don’t take sufficient time in writing. As to a reply: cool.

Good one. — fishfry

I'm on the verge of blushing here. Not good for my reputation. But hey, even a broken clock is right twice a day. Cheers.

Edit:

I wonder if that's characteristic of compelling examples of objectiveness. — fishfry

Btw, I haven’t gotten into exploring your proposal because it would get into process philosophy—and that murky area of whether or not entities are in fact objective. Your proposal sounds good to me philosophically. That said, kids will think, for example, that the tree over there is objectively real … and I’d here agree with the kids. And, in truth, I innately think this myself even when there are no kids around. So, again, what you bring up would get murky for me.

I'd say that objectivity can address equally as many issues (induction, evidence, measurement, confirmation etc). Objectivity is a metaphysical issue. What is actually objective isn't. Likewise, reality is a metaphysical issue, what's actually real isn't. — Πετροκότσυφας

OK, then in addressing the referents to terms, and in speaking on my own behalf, I currently continue to uphold that while what is reality (and not: what is real) should be left up to philosophy, what is objective (and not: what is objectivity) should be left up the empirical sciences. Hence, as an ideal worth pursuing, the empirical sciences shouldn’t be biased by notions of what is reality in their endeavors to discover more of what is objective.

Do we disagree on this?

I'm not clear what you mean here. If by "what reality is" you refer to what the concept itself means, then I'm not sure how one (i.e. what is reality) is a philosophical question while the other (i.e. what is objective) isn't. — Πετροκότσυφας

Well, all questions can be reduced to philosophical questions. Unless you are unclear on what modern-day notions of empiricism are, then the empirical objectivity of the empirical sciences shouldn't be all that hard to fathom (even though empiricism too holds its foundation in philosophy).

This, however, is in a different ballpark than that of what reality actually is. This question, for example, can address the physicalism v. neutral monism v. substance dualism (etc.) issue. Yet, this metaphysical issue regarding reality is a difference that makes no difference in respect to empirical objectivity.

While you seem to suggest that the use of the term "real" lead scientists to deny what is "objective", Robinson, as I read him, does not say that. — Πετροκότσυφας

I wasn't addressing terminology; I was instead addressing reliance of practices--namely that of scientific investigations and development--being founded on conceptualizations. All the same, I'm in no way here to uphold or else argue about what Robinson truly said or intended. You may well be right in this respect.

Please name a single specific thing that is objective so that we have something to talk about. — fishfry

I’d like to give this a try:

That daytime follows nighttime follows daytime follows nighttime (etc.) is objective because subjective me and subjective you (and all other subjective beings, from sunflowers, to bees to … well, etc.) all are constrained by the same information … thereby making this information in due measure independent of what either I or you (or anyone else) may will or believe regarding the matter. Anything physical—from that which I and only I visually see at the current moment, like my own laptop, to the causal webs into which these things are entwined (such as laws of nature)—will be objective for the same reason: they will hold presence independent of what individual minds may will or believe. Hallucinations? These—which, one would think, can only be discovered when contradicting what all other agencies hold to be objective—will be non-objective on grounds of contradicting the causal web of all other givens that all other agencies are bound by and are thereby in one way or another aware of (the logos of the world, it used to be termed) … and, thereby, will be the products of an individual mind.

Other questions could pursue. But I’d like to know in turn, on what system of justification would you deny that nighttime being followed by daytime is not an objective, empirical observation? (Presuming that objective data is not confused with absolute certainties? For which, I grant, no justifications can be provided, tmk. Also presuming that objective data does not equate with an eternally fixed, perfectly stable absolute data that is severed from subjectivity (such that, for example, no awareness of it could occur), for this to me currently seems to be a logical contradiction as regards data.)

As I’ve previously mentioned, I myself don’t have any problem in addressing the term “reality”. My own interpretation of what he’s getting at relies far less on the dichotomy between spiritual interpretations of the word “reality” and physicalist interpretations of the word “reality” and for more on a type of tribalism that occurs within academia; a tribalism that I picked up on in reading his Ch. 11 but which I don’t recall him specifying via particular cases.

I’ll try to provide examples from fields of empirical-science based academia which I’m most interested in. One side of the isle you have the academic tribe of evolution via natural selection; on the other side of the isle you have the tribe of cognitive science. You will also find a plethora of sub-tribes within each division (e.g., evolution requires determinism v. evolution requires indeterminism; or, cog.sci . ought to incorporate Freud’s notion of repression v. cog.sci . ought to call BS on Freud for being utterly unempirical in his speculation regarding how the mind works). These tribes and sub-tribes hold their own intuitive notions of “reality”, with these notions sometimes overlapping, sometimes being rather incongruent, i.e. logically contradictory to each other. Terminology between isles, though often the same sign, will also often enough hold different “reality-based” semantics. “Instinct” is one such term, rather easy to pinpoint due to its ambiguity. So too is “adaptability”, what is addressed by the termed “paradigm”, “mind”, “feelings” among many others terms I’ve not needed to contemplate for some time from the vantage of academia.

The details are for me right now a blurred memory. Nevertheless, here’s a telling example: if life changes via evolution through natural selection and if cognition occurs, then human cognition must have itself evolved through natural selection that stems all the way back to prokaryotes. Yet, this conclusion is incongruent to the “reality” maintained by (the majority of the tribe-members on) either side of the isle. Evo.Psych. is to me a noble attempt at bridging these two isles, but, as with the earlier version of this attempted bridge known as sociobiology, instead of bridging the two sides it instead has a tendency of becoming its own academic tribe that holds yet another intuitive understanding of what “reality” actually is.

Within this context of academic tribalism, as (however poorly) depicted, between different branches of the empirical sciences, Robinson’s proposal of setting aside notions of “reality” in favor of notions of “the objective” makes sense to me, personally. Forget about preconceived notions of what reality really is and, instead, focus on what data is objective and what explanations best account for such data. I mentioned this recently in another thread; amoeba have been empirically demonstrated to learn. Does this fit in with most people’s conceptualizations of reality? No. It is an objective datum? Yes. So why is it not a datum incorporated into all branches of the empirical sciences that address biology and cognition? This other than it not fitting into ready-present notions of what reality is … thereby requiring some degree of paradigm-shift as regards what reality is? In not incorporating new data, though, both academic sides deny what is objective datum in favor of preexisting biases regarding what is “reality”.

The core issue, per my understanding, then being:

What reality is is itself a metaphysical question (albeit one we take for granted and quite often disagree on as regards the particulars). What objective data is is however thoroughly within the realms of the empirical, and stands regardless of notions regarding reality. Hence, the empirical sciences should focus on what is objective (and how to best account for it) and leave the issue of what is real to that other branch of academia known as philosophy.

The extra stuff isn't quite the same as mind, as best I can tell. I tend to use mind as an umbrella-term, covering the likes of experiences, qualia, thinking, love/feelings, headaches, self-awareness, consciousness, all that. [...] Does that differentiation work? If yes, then what of that extra stuff? — jorndoe

We here agree on what mind consists of (leaving behind possible metaphysical appraisals and expressions of the physical, e.g. Pierce’s notion of effete mind).

To my best current understandings there are two means of appraising the issue of life after death: 1) via reincarnations of self-identity and 2) via causal models that specify something along the lines of “while mind, and the self-identity that goes along with it, will always be causally tied into brain within the realms of this physical world, it can subsist to varying extents without being tied into brain within realms that are not of this physical world”.

My favorite is scenario (1). I cannot metaphysically disprove scenario (2). Furthermore, among others, there is an additional metaphysical possibility of both scenarios (1) and (2) co-occurring: e.g. via analogy, like possible dream states between awakened states, so too could there be the possibility of (something like) Elysian Fields or realms of Tortures in-between reincarnations of self-identity within the physical world (e.g., Tibetan Buddhists will often go this route as regards the afterlife).

So the extra-stuff would not be the same as mind if mind is interpreted to always and in all ways be tied into the functioning of the brain—or, else, to in no way be. This, though, is a catch-22 dilemma of physicalism as regards this issue. When addressing mind as first person experience of self-identity and all that it requires, there is no extra stuff involved … neither in scenario (1) nor in scenario (2).

Going back to your diagram, mind can itself be interpreted as a body of information that holds some degree of stability over time, only that this body of information is incorporeal—this holds true even when mind is causally entwined with brain within the physical realm we coexist in. One can interpret the spiritualists’ notion of a subtle body as being nothing more than this: the body of information which is mind, including the self-identity of the conscious agency that is tied into, and emerges from, this body of mind (again, mind as you’ve specified it in the given quote above).

Explaining the “hows” of life after death via scenario (1) is relatively easy when compared to scenario (2). This is in part due to scenario (2) requiring causal mechanisms at play within realms of non-physical reality. Think of string-theory’s multiple parallel dimensions as a rough analogy; only that, here, these other realms are not explainable via the physical, as is string-theory’s.

While I wouldn’t mind further delving into this topic—it’s an interesting topic to me as well—I again am not one to have all the answers. I’ll likely rely more on logical possibilities given a non-physicalist metaphysics. And, to reemphasize, I myself don’t sponsor a Cartesian dualism of mind and body as two basic substances.

It can simply mean that the cause is unknown. — praxis

I actually like this option as regard ultimate metaphysical beginnings: the metaphysical beginning is currently unknowable.

Still, when claiming that nothingness is a metaphysical substratum to what is, one has a clear definition of what is meant by “nothingness”.

Either way, this doesn’t address the issue of order-as-potentiality itself needing to predate (a never absolute) actuality of chaos in order for greater actualities of order to obtain from this chaos. I so far like Agustino’s arguments on this point, though I’ve here likely stated them poorly.

Apropos, as to designers and a first-cause-telos:

Odd thing is, designing requires intentions, and intentions require goals. A designer then, by logical necessity, cannot be identical to the goal(s) it is designing toward. Nor can it have created/designed these goals, for this too would require intentions with pre-set/determinate goal(s) aimed towards.

I grant this doesn’t disprove the possibility of a grand designer. Nevertheless, if the logic here is sound, it does disprove that the first cause can in any way be equivalent to a designer (OK, given that a grand designer were to be, it as psyche/deity would be intending toward this first cause more than any of us are (arguably) … but again, the first cause would be greater than this grand designer).

What is the first cause if not something come from nothing. — praxis

It can well be the one and only uncaused given, for instance. You’ll note that regardless of metaphysics adopted, there will always need to be such an uncased given. For instance, logically, and not playing with words: if something emerges from nothingness, then this can only translate into nothingness caused something to be. Then, in this scenario, nothingness (defined by the absence of anything) is itself an uncaused non-entity/process-given from which something emerges.

And, as others have mentioned, the first cause need not be a deity … no more than nothingness need be a deity.

The world is at peace. It is the mind that is restless. — unenlightened

Wait a minute, aren’t our bodies aspects of the physical world?

Gottcha (or so I currently believe …)

Nope, had no real point in bringing this up.

What if world peace is only achievable without free will? — Bryce

I first want to comment on the notion of world peace:

World peace seems to be here mentioned, however hypothetically, as though it were some absolute finale to be obtained between conscious agents. It can’t be.

Here’s one possible definition of world peace: a world where no human rapes other humans. Can this even be envisioned by us? It would require quite a lot to be accomplished: a different politics and economy for instance, and this at global levels—obviously one founded on the principle of universal checks and balances. It would also require that no human, male or female, would find any self interest in either raping or in condoning the activity to be in any way justifiable (e.g., well, that’s the way the world/reality is/works).

Is it possible that this ideal can be obtained … in the following week, the following century, how about 10,000 years from now?

To say, “no” is to not struggle for it. Yes, today, many will indeed answer “no, this ideal is not possible to ever obtain”. But let’s say that we’re not omniscient on this issue and that not only is this state of the world possible but that it will be obtained, say, 50,000 years from now.

Will it be “world peace” then? Relative to today’s world, hell yes! Relative to ideals yet to be found of increased understanding between people, hell no. Nevertheless, once obtained as here defined, human relations could always descend back into today’s standards of civility—just as today’s standards of civility can, given an atom bomb here and there, descend back into even more barbaric times of human interaction in the generations to come.

World peace can never be an absolute. But we can be closer or further from what we can currently envision to be a world peace by comparison to today’s standards of living. And, to deny that things can be better is to not invest any effort in attempting to make things better.

In relation to world peace and freewill:

It can only be achieved through the freewill of all (or at least most) so intending it to be. Which, mandatorily, negates coercion as means toward such an ends: just as one cannot coerce another into sincerely liking/sympathizing with you by placing a gun to their head, so too can a human populace not be coerced into treating all people as respected members of a global community. Both fascism and Stalinist (as compared with kibbutz-like) communism come to mind in this respect.

What do you think of this and this (Chapter 11: On Misunderstanding Science) reading of Newton by Guy Robinson? — Πετροκότσυφας

I did a quick reading of both, mostly focusing on Ch. 11. I’ve so far not found any significant disagreements with what he’s written.

On the finer side of things, I nevertheless do view the enterprise of the empirical sciences to be progressing toward a better understanding of objective reality, although in no way linearly. But—maybe paradoxically to some—my perspectives regarding this progression are here closely aligned with those addressed by Kuhn and by Robinson. So, for instance, Kuhn’s observations, to me, themselves serve as a progression of the empirical sciences toward greater understandings of objective reality … which, in part, includes the presence of all of us conscious observers trying to figure out what the reality common to all of us actually is.

Using Robinson’s own terms and semantics, though, I do find usefulness in differentiating “reality” from “the objective”, this in so far as “reality” can all too often connote a perfectly stable phenomenal world that always was and always will be. For instance, taking into account only our current cosmological models—diverse as these are—science clearly informs us that phenomenal reality itself changes over time … this when appraised on a cosmic scale of time. A little like a window pane which we all agree to be a solid given the timeframe of our shared current lifetime / generation: given enough time (hundreds of years), the glass would nevertheless be observed to behave like a liquid working in slow motion, becoming thicker at the bottom and thinner at the top. At any rate, not a perfectly stable external reality … even though it mostly is from the reference points of individual human lifetimes.

All the same, again, I’ve so far found no significant disagreements with what he’s written as regards the sciences. Especially in regard to such things as the implications of Newton's statement "(if I may so say)".

How about yourself, do you find yourself in general agreement or disagreement with Robinson’s observations?

How should we reestablish of relations between science and technology to make wider room for philosophy? — Pacem

We’re all here biased toward favoring philosophical thought. Most people today think that philosophy lacks any practical value. Kind’a like a lyric I once heard: “If it don’t make money it don’t make sense”.

That said, to address the OP, it’s noteworthy that - while accordant to empirical evidence - neither Newton’s (or Einstein’s) nor Lamarck’s (or Darwin’s) publications regarding the natural world concerned direct, first-hand scientific investigations conducted through the scientific method. Both of the OP’s stated works, instead, addressed philosophical perspectives that intended to best account for the given empirical evidence regarding the natural world. In the sciences, at least, one does this by combining parsimony of explanations with maximal explanatory power for the empirical data in question.

What’s missing today is the understanding that the empirical sciences (including the scientific method as procedure, which can be minimally traced back to the philosophy of Bacon) are themselves the outcome of philosophical thought.

It could be argued that there’s a structure to the themes of the OP: philosophy in general --> philosophy applied to the natural world --> the empirical sciences as a body of procedures and paradigms emerging from philosophies applied to the natural world --> technology as the application of some of the conclusions resulting from the empirical sciences.

So, while we’re here biased in favor of philosophy, there’s nevertheless a philosophical foundation to both the empirical sciences and to the resulting technology that most people, imo, are not very familiar with.

edit: haven't read much of Newton's work; so I may be wrong about lack of first-hand experiments addressed in it; still, his theories of gravity and of space are philosophical theories - and not outcomes of particular experiments that abide by the scientific method

It dawned on me that there is a distinction between observing the world and performing logic on the world, but the two are always intertwined. I cannot just look at an object without imposing my sense of reason on it. That's what knowledge is. — Hanover

To push the limits a bit, the thought occurred to me that to perceive requires this analytic side (here assumed by me genotypically inherited): either that perceived is innately judged to be a thing, aka entity—e.g. wall, food, predator—or, conversely an activity, aka process—e.g., the wall’s activity is that of inflexibility to one’s being/actions, the prey’s activity is that or running away relative to one’s being/actions, the predator’s activity is in part that of seeking out one’s being/actions. Something along these lines. Taking this perspective would potentially result in the conclusion that to perceive is to analytically judge, at minimum, what is entity and what is processes (i.e., behaviors, activities) of becoming.

Or course, far more complex and stimuli-specific genotypically inherited analytic-judgments can be offered. And, the more adaptively intelligent the lifeform the more of its behaviors will be gained by synthetic means, i.e. by learning (e.g., requiring parenting in due measure) … but these synthetic means too will require some basic analytic (top-down) judgments as to categories of what is perceived. Again, such as what is thing and what is activity.

So, in pushing the limits, thing is, one can readily argue that amoeba engage in such analytic discriminations between walls, foods, and predators as things—as well as between the respective activities of each. Curt evidence for this is that they would perish if they didn't so discriminate. Amoeba have also be experimentally shown to learn *, so, to some extent, they use their inheritable top-down judgments to made bottom-up judgments, the latter being not specific to the species but to individual selves.

Then, back to more philosophical issues, how should we denote such genetically-inherited analytic-judgments of an ameba in terms of (primitive) forms of knowledge? This since there is a behavioral gradation—of both complexity and abstraction—in these analytic judgments from at least ameba all the way to humans.

It’s certainly not JTB, nor knowledge by acquaintance … and terming it tacit knowledge, though I think it proper, doesn’t address what is denoted by us through the term “knowledge”.

I’m thinking of this as a different route to get to the root of what we intend to signify by knowledge—from which, then, can be interpreted to emerge all the more specialized forms of knowledge we humans are familiar with, including that of JTB and of acquaintance. (Currently don’t want to myself start a new thread on this topic, saying this in case this post is too far off topic.)

* as a quickly found on line reference, the first two sentences from an abstract to an article found at: http://diventra.physics.ucsd.edu/Learning.pdf [overall article is about mathematical modeling of simple intelligent behavior]

Recently, behavioural intelligence of the plasmodia of the true slime mold has been demonstrated1. It was shown that a large amoeba-like cell Physarum polycephalum subject to a pattern of periodic environmental changes learns and changes its behaviour in anticipation of the next stimulus to come.

To talk about unbounded awareness is incoherent. There is only awareness-of. Or the lack of that particularity, and so a lack of a definiteness of concepts and impressions at some moment. — apokrisis

We justify our metaphysics differently. To keep things as simple as I can (skipping the justifications for the following conclusions):

As I’ve previously tried to mention, the “what it is like” of this endstate can only be incomprehensible to any self-endowed being. It, in fact, is the only endstate to awareness that is, as endstate, intuitively incomprehensible—all others being intuitively comprehensible to us. Compare it, for example, to the nonbeing endstate to awareness; who doesn’t hold an intuitive comprehension of what this would be? The other two, by the way, are a stability-of-self endstate and a control-over-other endstate. The hypothesis being that, regardless the specifics, we always intend toward one of these four endstates or, more commonly, a conflux of two or more of these endstates … and interact with others that do likewise.

To be clear, the endstate of “unbounded awareness” isn’t justified by its comprehensibility to us (for emphasis) self-endowed beings. It is, I believe, thoroughly justified—but not proven—in the sense that “all roads lead to Rome”; in likewise manner is it conceivable / imaginable as endstate: for example, what would the metaphysical grand conclusion be to an ever closer proximity to harmony/love/unity/order of awareness? What else but a perfectly selfless awareness/being? Yes, there is intrinsic choice between which of the four imaginable endstates of awareness is in fact the ontically real endstate; this because none can be itself definitively proven to be ontically certain; all that can be asserted with unfalsified certainty is that one of the five endstate alternatives (here the four endstate scenarios + the scenario of there being no endstate to awareness whatsoever) will in fact be ontically real—hence, will in fact be the metaphysically objective endstate scenario of being (thus being real regardless of subjective appraisals or intentions as to whether or not it is).

You may notice that this places the metaphysical above the physical … since the physical, in this model, results from a plurality of Akashas (to use the terminology I’ve previously used) in perpetually changing relations to these various endstates for Akasha (all endstates being illusory save for one). And yes, the physical (which we all know darn well to be rather complex) then in turn limits, or bounds, what Akashas can do via physical causations, including that of brain-mind relations, genotypes, etc. … which (when cutting corners) can be stated to result in individual selves that hold awareness-of.

Again, though we can both thoroughly relate to Pierces conclusions of objective idealism, this metaphysics I uphold is nevertheless not one of physicalism.

At the end of the day, it is only one more philosophical view to add to the rest of them. But it nevertheless is the philosophical view that I uphold.

I'd go further and suggest that all objects of perception contain indistiguishable elements of the synthetic and analytic. — Hanover

With my curiosity straying away from the metaphysical for a second:

This reminds me of experiments I once learned about where geese (?) chicks were presented with two overhead forms (cardboard cutouts or something like this): one where the bird shape had a short neck and long tail feathers (typical or raptors) and another with long neck and short tail feathers (typical of non-raptors). The chicks ran looking for shelter when the first form was glided overhead but did nothing significant when the second form was glided overhead. I concede this is only hearsay without a proper link given (won’t now try to find it)—but supposing something like this to be at times the case:

Would you be conformable with saying that this synthetic (bottom-up obtained) and analytic (in cog.sci . terms: top-down attained, i.e. (genotypically) predetermined toward learned) conflux of meaning can be inherited in all things that can perceive?

For my part, I’m accustomed to using other terms to express such behavioral inheritance of meaning. But I’m curious to know how one would address this same form of inheritance of meaning(s) in lesser animals via formal epistemological philosophy—this such as via the synthetic / analytic distinction.

If I'm rambling, I'll understand. But I am curious all the same.

Not missing, but explicitly rejecting. — apokrisis

Boggles the mind why you then bring up notions such as that of the Ein Sof to support your metaphysics. Could easily confuse others as regards what your positions are, don't you know.

Although I'm certainly also sympathetic to the idea that all differences disappear as we work our way back to vagueness.

So we are both arguing from opposite sides of the fence. In the end I am speaking in a physicalist register, you (I assume) an idealist register. But I agree also that "in the end", experience is what is epistemically primary (for us). — apokrisis

Right, but your sympathies as regards the metaphysics are clearly misplaced—regardless of our potential agreements on the physical and on the here and now. And these conversations have clearly not been about the physical relations between brain and mind.

This telos of “unbounded, selfless awareness” I’ve made mention of is in no way about “going back to vagueness” … just as a human’s awareness is not more vague respective to that of an ant’s but, rather, a greater magnitude of harmonized awareness that is far less bounded by the logos which surrounds and which, as individual lifeform, is far more capable of producing and restructuring the surrounding logos toward the ends which it seeks. The metaphysical telos of unbounded awareness is one of infinite, perfectly harmonized awareness—one of absolute love, some may say—unrestrained by logos. It is only this aspect which makes it an ultimate unknown to any of us body-endowed beings of awareness (as well as to—if one chooses to entertain such things—angels, deities, etc.) At any rate, not one of vagueness.

I’ll only address this part:

If there is awareness, then there must be equally also its "other" - however that is then correctly conceived. — apokrisis

Here, you confuse awareness with awareness-of. In most, if not all, aspects of life—heck, even in all aspects of out of body experiences, where one to entertain the possibility of such occurrence—our awareness always consists of some awareness-of. It is awareness-of that in-forms us as selves, gives us as conscious agents form. We as selves are different due to the differences in awareness-of which, in part, includes: our perceived contexts of physical environment (our own bodies are, in part, perceived as self via physiological senses such as that of proprioception), our memories experienced at any given time, our moods, our thoughts, our percepts of that which is internal to our own minds (like in the imagined taste of freshly cut lemon), and so on. And yes, from here on out, of course, there’s self and other/world as a requisite dichotomy. Nevertheless, what you seem to be missing from the terminology of Ein Sof (and related terms from other cultures) is the very plausible (at the very least, quite fitting to all works in which it is mentioned) metaphysical interpretation of the intended referent being that of awareness sans awareness-of. This awareness sans awareness-of, however, is stated to be obtainable by many in many cultures via things such as meditation; though not maintainable, other than a maintained awareness of this being the foundation of all that can and does stand. Naturally, there can conversely be no awareness-of sans awareness.

But, I figure, we’re getting too spiritualizational-like (my sense of humor) in using terms such as Ein Sof, this being the Kabalistic term for the ground of all being, out of which the Kabalistic tree of life emanates.

Still, wanted to clarify this different metaphysical perspective—relative to that which you hold—which is likewise rather ancient, and very wide spread to different cultures. Of course this metaphysical slant cannot be evidenced via physics, awareness of which already entails there being some awareness-of; only via metaphysical means. And yes, I already know, we disagree on whether awareness could hold presence in the absence of awareness-of.

Probably the wand that gives it a humorous flair. :)

There are any number of oddities though.

When is this extra stuff installed?
What difference does it make?
What the heck is this extra stuff anyway? — jorndoe

Lots of questions, to which I don’t currently have an answer to. But why address this as “extra-stuff”. It is no more extra than is the mind-stuff causally tied into the brain-stuff. Question then is, can the normal stuff of mind yet be when separated from the normal stuff of body to which it is normally causally tied into. To reply with the obvious, in dualism and non-physicalist monism this does become a metaphysical possibility – still, this metaphysical possibility is not the same as a metaphysical requirement/actuality that can be proven to be in any particular way. As to the “hows”, I refer back to my initial sentence (still, what self is as an identity is bound to play some part in this issue, imo).

In what I currently presume to be a parallel stance to your own:

There are non-linguistic ways that lesser animals can – and we humans do – associate qualitative experiences such as the colors green and red with differentiable meaning. Rather than limiting meaning to the semantics embodies within languages, we could, for example, presume language as a refinement of the following: e.g., all mammal’s blood is red; red can then be associated with any number of givens appraised to be ontically associated with blood: the presence of life (signifying fresh food for most, if not all, carnivores); the presence of a wound whereby the other is in some way in need of assistance (arguably common enough among social mammals which will lick each other’s wounds with emotive intent of helping the other out). The qualitative value of green, however, will not hold the same symbolic referents tied into what which is ontic - most likely, most often, meaning something symbolically associated with grass and tree leaves. So, for example, to the carnivore (given that it can visually differentiate between red and green), red will hold a body of meaning apart from the body of symbolic meaning it emotively relates to the color green. In this example, no formal language is required for red to hold specific meaning(s) differentiable from those held via awareness of color green.

Yep. Anaximander confused the heck out of folk as the only recorded scrap of his actual words talked about cosmic justice vs injustice. Heraclitus likewise talked about this unity of opposites - flux and logos. — apokrisis

Personally glad you added Heraclitus into the mix here. If you’ve ever read his fragments, his notion of “Zeus” is to my notion of what I’ve so far termed the telos of “unbounded awareness” as Anaximander’s notion of Apeiron is to your notion of vagueness. This being another, although maybe trite, way of illustrating the differences (rather than agreements) in our current structures of metaphysics.

The main difference here then is you want to add some further twist - another metaphysical dimension to your analysis. And that is based on the opposition of good and bad, or some such deontic distinction.

So my position would be deontically neutral. Neither competition nor co-operation would be inherently either good or bad. — apokrisis

You’ll notice I made no judgement call as to whether conflict or harmony is good, or as to which would be bad. Think in terms of Nietzsche’s meme of “beyond good and evil”. Slay Nietzsche’s dragon as Nietzsche’s lion by slaying each of its scales of “thou shalt” and “thou shalt not”. When you’re done, you’ll understand that this is about meta-ethical values, and not about any authoritative other telling you the “truth” to what is “Good” and what is “evil” – or alternatively, to what is right and what is wrong. We’re currently conflicting—I do hope you’ll laugh at the specious conclusion that, therefore, we are both evil. Gee, what would a debate forum be without all the evil-folk so defined as evil due to conflicts of opinion? Rather, in my system, primary focus is always placed upon end-states to being-as-awareness that is always in a state-of-becoming.

This is the portion missing from your system which brings about that extra layer which we sometimes term “ethics” but which I gather is nowadays better addressed as the philosophy of value-theory. Not an unimportant aspect of metaphysics, considering. And, to my mind, you cannot coherently obtain it if you insist on the only ontically real end-state being that of a Heat Death. This in the metaphysics I endorse is one variant of what I’ve so far termed “the nonbeing endstate of awareness (which is not identical to the identity of self)”, and I do look upon it as an ontically illusory endstate. Of course, you are far more interested in explaining the nuts and bolts of the physical – while I’m far more interested in explaining what the different types of reality that can be are, including that of physical objectivity and of metaphysical objectivity – and your system of metaphysics works best in terms of the physical aspects which you seek to explain.

To my mind, it would be nice to try to converge the two systems, but the current problem is, we justify our two systems in drastically different ways … although we both start with a kind of epistemological vagueness, to use your terms.

To me – and no doubt the arguments will persist on this – you seem to reify epistemological vagueness into a sub-stantial Apeirion and then proceed to make conclusions with use of this Apeiron as a premise. The way I go about things is by building up from foundations of optimal firmness (crispness) and then using these resultant conclusions of optimal firmness as foundations for further enquiry. Your system explains awareness thermodynamically; my system starts off with awareness as ontic, brute, fact. To illustrate, I can find no justifiable (via awareness, reasoning, or both) counterfactual to the proposition “the first-person point of view holds presence when in any way aware”. This lack of currently known counterfactuals does not then make this experience-based proposition an “unmitigated certainty”, for one cannot prove that at no future point in time will there ever be discovered such counterfactuals – and, thereby, demonstrate the proposition to be perfectly devoid of all possible error. But, because no counterfactuals can currently be found for it, it does make it a second-best type of certainty, an “unfalsified certainty” I’ve termed it (an inductive/abductive epistemological process of reasoning that nicely conforms to the scientific method’s principle of falsifiability, apropos). I’ve mentioned this not because I seek argument on the matter but so as to not appear so obtuse in what I’ve previous expressed.

At the end of the day we both for the most part agree with C S Pierce’s ontology. For my part, I wouldn’t mind debating these differences between us once I’m finished with reediting the entirety of my notes, this so that we may better exchange notes. But, due to the constraints of life, it’s bound to be some years before I finish doing so.

So, if it’s OK with you, maybe we can defer our basic metaphysical disagreements to some other future time. Plenty of other things to debate/talk about as far as I’m concerned. If not, I’m all ears.

With a smiling attitude, you're replies, to me and to others, personally remind me of that popular Metalica tune: something about, "you label me, I label you" something or rather.

Wanted to pop in to say this, unforgiven as it might be.

I'll get back to the "logic" of it all tomorrow. Hell, maybe.

And my argument - the one I say many ancient wisdoms share, even if in groping, informal fashion - is that the vague~crisp defines that epistemic limit best.

However if you can argue against that, go for it. — apokrisis

Your answer of "vague~crisp" does not answer the question that you replied to … unless it is to explicitly say that the metaphysical beginning is unknowable. This being the very position I hold which you first chose to argue against. (This in manners that were less than cordial seeming. I won’t splurge on the details but, hell, we’ve all got our moods. And no, no apologies on my part.)

As to your notion of dichotomies with relations in-between being everything in terms of existence:

You have a rather important dichotomy to existence: that of conflict v. harmony. Some of us emotive people can interpret the same as hate v. love. Some of other folks can interpret it as states of chaos v. states of order. It doesn’t much matter how the processes are interpreted here; nor at what levels of existence they're addressed; the two processes of becoming remain the same.

I say that, while conflict (between gives) is impossible devoid of harmony (minimally, within the givens that conflict) the opposite does not hold metaphysically. Harmony can occur in the absence of all conflict. This is not a “crispness” that requires both dyads to be. In the latter form, the given of harmony / love / order can exist just fine in the complete absence its opposite – to not even address any relation in -between. This, again, metaphysically. (Granted not given some presumption of a known initial firstenss but given existence as is in current forms.)

For now, I’ve little doubt that you will disagree. But this would lead us into, maybe, more fertile grounds of debate.

I for now have to take some time off for myself. I’ll check back on this tomorrow.