Would she even try such a stunt? — Rich

In my own opinion, no she wouldn't. My stance's justifications are inductive ... meaning to say, not of deductive logic. The nature of experience having a lot to do with this.

Now you are really showing your true colors. — Rich

Funny, I had Helen Keller in mind. So that would answer that. Trying to address the metaphysical here, though.

I don't know, my last question to you seems pretty coherent given the topics we're discussing. Can you answer it?

But hey, if we've suddenly departed from common semantics, so be it. Till some next time, then.

Is vagueness an uncaused presence of "lack of crispness"?

There's something your missing out on in you system of justification. The miraculous coincidence between the conclusion of mystics you quote to support your Pierciean perspectives and the "scientific rationalism" you endorse. You believe in miracles now?

Whose talking about phenomenal representations of what is non-phenomenal. Think of the four Aristotalian causes, together with all other possibilities of causation that have accumulated in our history (such as that of co-arising, etc.) and logically justify the causal principle by which the firstness came to be. It could be an uncaused given (another possibility of causation). Whatever you choose, how do you justify it was ontically so.

And yet these mystics you gleefully put down in their place, with nothing more than their states of (non-measurable) awareness, came to the same conclusions you did via "scientific rationalism". How?

OK then, the impetus is on you to illustrate via logical argument that existence had a metaphysical beginning. Is the Apeiron you uphold an uncaused given; is it nothingness from out of which something originates; it is itself caused by nothingness into being; etc. And, logically, why must your conclusion so be? This, by the way, addresses metaphysical (and not physical) beginnings.

This is not so new. Anaximander did it at the dawn of metaphysics with his much misunderstood tale of existence's emergence by symmetry-breaking from the Apeiron.

Indeed, something similar is the basis of most ancient wisdoms. You have the Judaic Ein Sof, the Taoist Dao, the Buddhist dependent co-arising, etc. — apokrisis

First off Ein Sof is a Kabbalistic-specific expression which is far closer to Zen Buddhist notions of emptiness (interpretable as absolute selflessness, and not nothingness) than that of the processes of becoming you've mentioned.

Secondly, you hold a long history of degrading them mystics / spiritualists while you then go ahead and use their own notions to support your views. Can you clarify why?

The first essay I mentioned, by Guardiano, discusses the influence of Ralph Waldo Emerson on Peirce as depicted in a series of essays in a publication called The Monist. Emerson was something of a fountainhead of wisdom in the American literary tradition, and was also deeply interested in Vedic religion, one of the factors that lead him to break from the Church. I think the influence is that Peirce's 'primordial firstness' which precedes everything that exists, is influenced by Emerson's conception of Brahman. But there is huge scope to Peirce's writings on such matters, far more than can be summed up here. — Wayfarer

I can understand this possible relation between Pierce’s “primordial firstness” and the Vedic Brahman. Thanks for the info.

To be frank, via my own philosophical skepticism based understandings (yea, kind of like those of Plato’s Academy, but different), I can hold my own till the cows come home that there is no way of justifying any belief regarding whether or not existence has a metaphysical beginning – never mind what kind of metaphysical beginning it might have had if it indeed had one. Lots of words to say: to my best current reasoning, nobody can know if existence ever had a beginning.

In Vedic tradition, Brahman is the end aspired for, a state of being that has always been, awaiting, without which there would be nothing which can stand. There’s a bit of a cognitive jump to then thinking that this Alpha and Omega of Vedic tradition, so to speak, once existed of itself in manners devoid of anything standing. To me, it, in a way, would parallel the fallacy of thinking that, once, there was only Nirvana … from out of which then emerged (via some variant of efficient causation, no doubt) all our cycles of death and rebirth via dependent originations. No Buddhist in his/her right mind could ever entertain such as thing without laughing … which, I believe, can be viewed as one reason for the Buddhist schism from Hinduism. Of course, this together with disagreement on the homunculus notion of self which Hindu tradition - at times - makes itself, arguably all to easily for Buddhists, prone to.

Musings that could all be disputed (save for the lack of justification in upholding a metaphysical beginning, I strongly contend) - given despite my limited knowledge of the cultural topics at hand. But again, thanks for the shared info. I haven’t read anything by Emerson yet. Nice when you find new readings to look forward to. I’ve placed The Monist on my list.

[Just saw Rich’s post; the one I’ve written is in the same overall vein … still, different enough to make me think it’s still worth posting.]

In effect, the philosopher thinks of time as transcendent. — Agustino

Contingent on interpretations of “transcendent”, I can envision alternatives to this: e.g., that of time being a metaphysical corollary of freewill-endowed awareness in the plural, of multiple first-person points of view that will things … and here, too, time can well be hypothesized to be relative, i.e., not absolute, and immanent.

For instance, akin to all the BIV, etc., mindsets of abstract hypotheticals, hypothesize two freewill-endowed first-person points-of-view that are incorporeal and dwell within incorporeal realms. That they in any way interact entails that there will be, at minimum, an incorporeal body of information common to both; this, in itself, speaks more to non-physical space, or distance, between the two as gaged between a) what is private to both and b) what is common to both. Again, grant that both hold some causal sway over this common non-physical space of information (which, if one would like to be more abstract, can be fully non-phenomenal … this in as much as an intention is of itself non-phenomenal: has no taste, smell, sound, visual appearance, or tactile feel, etc., though one could phenomenally re-present it at will). When one causes this common space to change, it will causally influence the awareness of the other, and vice versa. There is then a cause-and-consequence to all willed actions on the part of either; furthermore, the cause (the willing of the activity) will always be before the resulting consequence. Hence, there will always here be a before-and-after relative not to phenomena but to one’s willed action as awareness. And, so, the ontic reality of this before and after will be, in this scenario, relative to the two points of awareness, as well as dependent on their so being.

OK, a simpleton attempt at providing an example of how the philosopher’s time can be relative and not absolute, also metaphysically entailed while not being transcendent. The intended point to this hypothetical primarily being that, metaphysically, were there to be a plurality of freewill-endowed first-person points of view as a foundation to all that otherwise stands, there will then, I now think via logical entailment, then also be present some form of time.

True, within the offered hypothetical, there would be no way of measuring “how much time” had passed (kind of like when one is in an extremely good state of mind in interacting with another). To slightly paraphrase what you’ve mentioned, the repetition of the same identity common to all would be required for time to become measurable (including from such a metaphysical interpretation as that previously mentioned): that the sun goes up and down in the same way over and over again allows for quantification of how many days have gone by. This in turn, requires a physical space –a common space between all first-person points of view – that remains relatively stable in its constituency. Even in an imaginary digital clock that never cycles there would yet be repetition of “the same identity” in abstract form: 1a, 2 (1a + 1b), 3 (1a + 1b +1c), etc.

But yes, there is also the notion of absolute time among philosophers. Nevertheless, (as with Rich) I don’t believe that the immanence of time is strictly limited to the materialist’s notions of time.

An exquisite post in my view.

The question this leads to is, would C S Peirce have described his philosophy as naturalistic or physicalist in the current sense? — Wayfarer

The other point that should be considered is that Peirce says that 'nature forms habits'. The unavoidable implication is that nature has or is mind. — Wayfarer

In attempts to compliment you post, I think it should be remembered that C S Pierce was never privy to Georges Lemaitre’s hypothesis that everything could be mathematically traced back to a single point (the beginning of the Big Bang cosmological model from which the model obtained its pejorative term of “Big Bang”), nor was he aware of all the epistemological criteria that since then followed, which is used to nowadays substantiate this model as depicting an ontic fact. (We often forget, it is only a model of what might have been.) In essence, using Pierce's model of objective idealism, the effete mind of his time did not yet organize into forms that contained this, then non-existent, information.

Focusing in on the quasi-meta-physical* implication of this Big Bang model, that something emerged from (what for all technical purposes is) nothing, would Pierce then have viewed this awareness-evidence supported, mathematical model of the Big Bang as nullifying his metaphysics of objective idealism? Or, conversely, would he interpret this Big Bang model and all the empirical evidence since then acquired for it as only one, itself yet evolving, aspect of the ever evolving effete mind he explains via his objective idealism?

To my understanding, this difference in answer gets to the root of whether he’d today become a triadic-relations physicalist / naturalist or, as I very much believe he would, remain a non-physicalist, remain an objective idealist.

It would result in the same thing from all practical purposes of everyday life; it would however make a big difference as regards the ontic nature of being.

* Though itself an issue of possible contention, I say “quasi-meta-physical” because one cannot address the ontic reality of the metaphysical by basing one’s epistemology regarding what is in what one intuitively knows to be the realities of the physical (regardless of how concrete or abstract these might be). From the metaphysics of Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, to list only three of the long since gone guys, so doing would certainly be understood to be a self-contradicting enterprise. The ontic reality of the metaphysical is in a top-down relation to the ontic reality of the physical, not the other way around; else there would be no “beyond-physical”. This, then, includes the metaphysical issue of whether or not something can emerge from nothing, again alluding to what the Big Bang model of cosmology implies.

Did you really ever follow what I said then. You keep coming up with questions I've already covered. — apokrisis

You've covered them by placing the cart before the horse: better spelled out, maths before awareness ... then by explaining awareness via maths, you feel justified in using observations to model your system in what logically amounts to ad hoc explanations of why things must be.

An observation; yes, made by one who is nevertheless fallible and proudly knows himself to so be. Not an insult, and certainly not an apology.

Another problem with free will (or not) is that the agent about whom we are talking is also the agent providing the evidence for free will, or not -- a clear conflict of interest. — Bitter Crank

:D I take this to be irony, and find it indeed humorous. As to the complexities, what's new, the mind's complex. This complexity all boils down to that solutions / problems dichotomy.

OK, yes, but in your view bio-semiosis must emerge from pan-semiosis (e.g., not the other way around at some grand scheme of things; this where “bio” signifies “life”, which I acknowledge to loosely interpret as being “the presence of a first person point of view, aka awareness”). Other than things being such that our awareness-based knowledge does indeed illustrate—to the best of our knowledge—that life followed non-life, why must biosemiosis emerge from pansemiosis when rationally analyzed?

This is the part that I initially hoped you held a cogent grasp of when I started this tread.

Start by answering honestly why a modelling relation with the world wouldn't feel like something. On what basis can you simply presume that? — apokrisis

Isn’t your triadic system one of pan-modeling-relation-with-context/the world? If I’m not extremely mistaken in so appraising, then why would a lepton, for example, not hold feelings - given that it is this triadic relation that in your system explains the "what it is like" of human feeling? Why would information, as information, not hold feelings? This must be wrong, though. It leads into nonsensical conclusions.

I can, um … vibe ;) … with just about everything you’ve stated. Yea, there are other allegories that can be used, like one where consciousness is like a horseman and its total sub/unconscious mind is the horse that is being ridden. Imperfect in that, to me, it lack’s acknowledgement of how consciousness is a forever changing product emerging from the unconscious mind. Bear with me a moment.

Still, like the conductor or the horseman/woman, the thing is we as a conscious agent either a) do our thing without any need for choosing anything consciously (much like the typing of a sentence where we don’t consciously choose which particular key to hit; or speaking, were we don’t consciously choose via deliberation which word follows the other) or b) choose by means of some deliberation between alternatives. Now, whether or not this choice is metaphysically free is a metaphysical question that can’t be answered via analysis of the physical—else it would have been long ago. In scenario (b) the alternatives are themselves the products of the mind’s agencies other than that of the conscious I. So the conscious I chooses one alternative at the expense of all other alternatives, and, thereby, in due measure, alters the plastic operations of its own brain’s neural networks … which then proceed on the path chosen by the conscious I (like an orchestra following a conductor’s flow, or a horse following the horseman’s pull on the reigns; the conductor doesn’t decide how each musician plays his/her specific instrument; the horseman doesn’t decide how the horse chooses to gallop on the specifics of the terrain).

OK, this would hold if i) metaphysical freewill is ontically real and ii) if we stop with the (to me greatly) incoherent notions of efficient causations between brain as one thing and mind as another; i.e., my brain doesn’t cause me to do something, nor do I cause my brain/body to do something; rather, this form of causation between conscious agent - total mind - brain and spinal column (i.e., the CNS, where neuron nucleuses are found) - and non-CNS-body is all, for the most part, simultaneously bi-directional (in simplified form, bi-directional between conscious agent and body) … this akin to how temperature and pressure are simultaneously bi-directional causal factors relative to each other.

And, yes, if we’re to indulge this model, there are many more complexities: e.g. tongue-tied speech, or slips of the tongue, or stuttering – to keep these examples all aligned with speech – would all be examples where the conscious I wills a certain X but the unconscious agencies of its mind are not unified on the same exact will being fulfilled by the conscious I as it intends (this for whatever reasons).

Oh, as to sleeping and wakefulness, notice that we as conscious agents can, to limited extents, willfully choose to stay up despite our total mind’s will of going to sleep. But again, whether or not this is itself due to metaphysical freewill on the part of the conscious agent is a separate issue.

All the same, if it needs to be stated, my own belief is that it is metaphysically free will in the form of the conscious agent bringing about effects from out of itself (its momentary identity of self) as cause - such as to the effect of which alternative it ends up pursuing … this even if the conscious agent is greatly influenced from without in what it ought to choose … but man, does this get into complexities. OH, just to be clear in advance, yes, I’ll likely be cowardly about things and chicken out of debating these complexities; if they get overly complex, that is … Just putting some possible perspectives out there.

Is it possible for the sub-consciousness, for example, exist without the conscious mind? — BlueBanana

First off, my apologies for not reading this thread earlier (I gave a half-behinded reply to this topic on the thread about contraception being murder).

To contribute, one can simplify things by framing the issue in terms of dichotomizing the following two, rough-sketched alternatives of mind: either a) mind is itself inanimate or, else, b) mind is itself animate. If the first, mind devoid of conscious awareness is itself devoid of agencies; if the latter, then mind devoid of conscious awareness is endowed with agencies (or can be in healthy circumstances).

To not seem like a BS-otoligist (sorry, maybe poor humor), been toying with this near-Hume like hypothesis. Rather than affirming as Hume did that there is no first person I/self to the commonwealth of mind, wouldn’t it be better to affirm that his bundle theory of self is a stratified hierarchy of agencies (all causally tied into the plastic operations of neural webs within the brain at the lowest levels of agency) which, then, builds upon itself till the pinnacle of the conscious I is obtained? If so, for example, when we go to sleep what would occur is that the conscious I, in a sense, dissolves into the lower levels of this stratification in the mind’s agencies; when we awaken, the conscious I becomes once again brought about by the agencies of mind as – to use a partly fitting allegory – a conductor to the orchestra of the mind’s agencies. When dreaming, this conscious I is only partly composed out of the mind’s stratified agencies and, furthermore, interacts with other aspects of its own total mind’s agencies … I think for most, in very symbolic means.

More complex examples, such as states of comma, or vegetative states wherein only the so termed ‘lower brain’ operates, can then also make sense in such a model of mind. Though, here, the threshold between integral, living person and non-person can, at times, become fuzzy.

Mentioned this alternative so as to not be so half-assed given my previously made reply to you … As to spiritual musings, I think such an approximate perspective could make sense of the soul in the sense of anima … also of mind in the sense of the animus … this without requiring there being a homunculus (such as the soul being present and functioning even when we’re asleep and not dreaming).

Nice try, but we do not have the ability to clone every single cell of every single person so the argument has a bit of a gap there, as we can afford disposing of some extra cells and still clone as many people as we have the capability of. — BlueBanana

Right, but the premise I was replying to is that of potentiality. So, every single cell of every single person has the potential to become a person ... just as do all those gametes stuck in the rain coat. No different.

Edit: one can work with this argument even further, though: every time a man ejaculates sperm into a woman's uterus, most sperm die and only one of these merges with the woman's gamete. Hence, carrying on the same logic, to try to reproduce is to "murder" well over hundreds of thousands with there only being a likelihood of one potential person being conceived--which isn't to say they'll actually be birthed ("natural" things sometimes happen along the way). Then, ought one murder hundreds of thousands of (potential) persons so as to, maybe, bring forth one (potential) person into closer proximity to, maybe, someday being a person? Going by the offered reasoning, doing so would be rather unethical, right?

Man, not to hound you, but, maybe: it's due to peer pressure? Cool is cool, and who wants to be a nerd, kind of thing.

Hey, a truly humorous depiction of an entire philosophical stance. Nice!

Can this sort of thing be justified? — jorndoe

Going by the illustration, I'd say it would first require the justification of ontically real homunculi. For instance, in Buddhist worldviews, where there are various sorts of afterlives, no such illustration would hold. ... Then again, Buddhists tend not to be substance dualists.

Corollary To P2: All (Potential Person Destroying) is (Actual Person Destroying) — Victoribus Spolia

I’m acquainted with the argument from “potential for being an integral human being”. As far as reasoning is concerned, the argument is logically flawed. My easiest way to illustrate this is by upholding this reasoning to encompass all human activity (and not only that of masturbation (the shame!!! :D ) and of contraception). We, today, hold the ability to clone a human being from any nucleus-endowed human cell (the details to this do not matter). Because each of my somatic cells holds the potential for becoming an “integral human being” (the details to what this legally is do not matter) I then, to use your terminology, commit mass-murder (why not even genocides) every time I use the restroom to defecate.

If "murder" is to be upheld as term, then we mandatory murder potential persons in order to live harmonious, peaceful lives -- such via the act of defecating, or that of exercise wherein muscles are built through the damaging of current muscle cells, etc. This though nullifies the very significance of the term "murder".

The goal post can be then shifted to what “is natural” or “God-given”. The conclusions will remain the same, however.

To be transparent, I acknowledge that I am exceedingly pro-life-quality – which, then, entails that I’m also pro-choice. Yes, there is some responsibility on the part of both parents for the aborted fetus – but this pales in comparison to the responsibility of both parents in giving birth to an unwanted human being who then lives a life of misery with the sentience of a human being (and not that of a gamete). Hence, to me, the pro-life movement is, at core, unethical, regardless of how good its intentions might at times be. Again, I acknowledge my bias in this regard.

How do you know? Your body does not, true, and your vital functions remain stable, but what about your mind? Do you have experiences of it existing while you're unconscious? There is no self awareness to eliminate if you're not sentient at that moment. — BlueBanana

If we (to me, as bundles of unconscious awareness when in states of dreamless sleep) would not be present when we slept, even in dreamless sleep, then the alarm clock would never wake us up. We as conscious agents have this experience of awakening to external stimuli which, in conjunction with experience-founded inferences, justifies that we as total beings of body and mind are alive and well while sleeping. (There then is also the empirical evidence regarding others and the workings of the body-brain-mind that harmoniously supports the same conclusion.)

Meta-physics simply being "physics not yet within our understanding?" — XanderTheGrey

That would be the favored interpretation of “meta-physics” by anyone who sponsors materialism / physicalism. But, then, in this view, nothing is in factual reality meta-physical; the closest one here can approach the meta-physical is via abstractions of the physical which are themselves physical in their nature.

You sponsor that there is no such thing as will (other than, maybe, a mechanistically emergent illusion); I conclude this through inference that is non-contradictory to what you phrase as mechanism.

However, were there to be some mistake in your currently held reasoning and, in addition, were there to be such a factual reality of will, will itself – regardless of how causally tied into the, here, not-perfectly deterministic causal processes of the physical – would itself be beyond-the-physical (meta-physical in this sense). As would then also logically be its final states of being - were such final states to also be ontically real – alongside other issues such as those of the principles of thought (e.g., the notion of identity and of non-contradiction).

So sponsoring the non-physical meta-physical, then, can lead one toward sub-stance dualism (such as Descartes’) or to some form of monism (such as Schopenhauer’s).

You just did the usual thing of treating awareness as a substantial state — apokrisis

sub-stance: that which allows things that stand to so be (yea, there's some allegory to etymology sometimes)

What can I say, you can in the same breath deny the presence of substance while affirming the triadic relation as the substance.

And yes, that is the metaphysical issue. Is awareness or something physical (triadic relations included) the sub-stance that allows other things to stand. [BTW, awareness devoid of telos is not something coherent (as I see it); so, by awareness, I do find a) other information-bound awareness (i.e., selves), b) a real telos, and c) interactions in-between entailed.]

But, hey, we're turning round, and round, and round, and, for now, going nowhere. I'll agree to disagree for the moment.

That kind of awareness would have to be sociocultural — apokrisis

How do you justify its presence?

Do you need a reasoning based on personal awareness? Or can you justify it without any personal awareness?

[Edit: this isn't to disagree with the notions of habit which you endorse]

The reason why Peircean semiotics impresses me as the most developed model of systems causality is because it turns things around. Epistemology also turns out to be ontology. — apokrisis

You’re trying to corner me by assuming me to hold perspectives that are easy for you to argue against.

Remember the old forum? That whole evolog business? Discussions about the episteme of the time coinciding with fossil finds, and the like. Point is, this too is a world view wherein epistemology is not metaphysically fully divided from ontology. But it gets complex, right? Especially when strangers to this perspective tend to perpetually succumb to the aberrant irrationality of solipsism. To end this story, I do happen to hold this view, as always - that of epistemology being a kind of opposite side of the same coin to ontology - but I’ve become rather shy about expressing it as openly as you’ve just done.

You’re still sidetracking the metaphysical issue, though. To use your words, “epistemology also turns out to be ontology”. OK, we’re both well informed enough to not ask the ridiculous question of “whose epistemology”. My question to you nevertheless remains: can there be epistemology sans awareness (quite importantly, entailing the awareness we all know to be via the experience of being first-person points of view)?

If not, the ontic presence / reality of awareness is the primary justification to all that can be rationalized.

No, apo. Not self-awareness. Awareness, period, regardless of how self aware or not it may be at any juncture. You keep on introduction the issue of a self while you yourself acknowledge that it's all process - with the sole exception of the end-state (maybe).

That awareness is formed (in part) by in-form-ation is a sidetrack from what I asked. I'll state the same differently: do you justify the ontic presence of reasoning/maths/logos via awareness OR do you justify the ontic presence of awareness via reasoning/maths/logos? Of course reality is a perpetual conflux of both, but that's not the question.

You repeatedly seem to treat awareness as a homuculus and then decry that other do so. That's not what this metaphysical issue is about. And yes, its largely about epistemological justifications of what is in fact ontic - this where one form of knowledge is that of knowledge by acquaintance / experience / awareness.

But maybe we're currently at a standstill here.

Reason and observation. The usual combo of metaphysical speculation and scientific test. — apokrisis

X-) OK, your joking with me by stating the superficially obvious. Good one.

Do you know of reason due to awareness OR do you know of awareness due to reason? That's the metaphysical question.

Hey, while I’m myself not fully certain of how to interpret your statement, to be clear, I’m addressing “the physical” in the sense interpret-able via a dual-aspect monism, be it termed neutral monism or objective idealism. Personally, I could give a hoot either way.

Our difference is that you seek what concretely must exist as a foundation, I instead think everything fluidly emerges. — apokrisis

No. Our difference dwells in justification for that which physically is. On what do you base your justifications that "everything fluidly emerges"?

Well, I’ll try to make myself clearer: When addressing aspects of our concrete reality, for example, are we founding things on the metaphysical reality of our experience (what it feels like to be aware (including of this and that) – this as one metaphysical reality that is a constituent of the total metaphysical reality) or on an abstract theory composed of what we take to be abstract, universal maths?

If on the former, the maths too—via which we quantitatively measure, and which you use to appraise physical reality—will be cognized due to the foundational metaphysical reality of experience. They will be a tool, but not the metaphysical reality of awareness to which the tools are of use (including those that occur on Platonic planes of mathematical reality).

If on the latter, than both our notion and awareness of experience will themselves be byproducts of an abstract maths whose axioms and conclusions can logically be as malleable and replaceable as would be the whims of a deity. (with no metaphysical reality being here established)

Needless to add, while we may agree on many facets of the physical, this is a metaphysical disagreement. For you to project this and that label on “my” perspective would be just that: projections of your own conceptualizations. But yes, that I find awareness (and not homnculi) to be metaphysically real then definitely precludes me from assuming the labeled of a physicalist.

The metaphor of maps and territories of course in reality demands the third thing of "an interpreter" - a further habit of interpretance. The map itself is the physical sign, the symbol, the information that connects the interpreter to the world in terms of the interpreter's own interests.

You will of course immediately jump to the presumption that the interpreter is now the conscious part of the whole equation. You won't see how this is just a continuation of a substance monism that you feel forced to impose on any framing of the issues. — apokrisis

I think what schopenhauer1 is getting at is that this interpreter, however conceived (else, we wouldn’t hold any conceptualization of it), is itself only an inference of the map in your current system. It’s reality is not evidenced to be real metaphysically - i.e. is not evidenced to be in any way the real territory - but is inferred/deemed real, when logically addressed via noncontradictory reasoning, only as an entailed consequence of a map - which, as map, includes within it the concepts of both territory and interpreter. Hence, it’s all map sans metaphysically evidenced reality of any territory.

I'm not sure what you mean here. Would you mind clarifying? — John Days

You’ve already quoted a post of mine where, I think, I was relatively harsh against the terminology of “unconditional love”, with my reasons for this there given. (your reply: )

I disagree with the terminology due to its easy misinterpretation by some – but not with the intended referent.

I see BC has given a damn good account of it in his latest post (and in his previous posts as well).

As for my own example:

From a materialist point of view, the referent to a perfect, unconditional love would be of itself considered spiritual (I would think by most materialists, at least). Instead of focusing on Christian doctrine, I’ll address as example the Eastern doctrine of Buddha nature/consciousness, in specific, that of universal compassion. There’s this goal in Buddhism most often know as Nirvana – a state of being wherein all suffering for all life ceases. Then, from the point of this Buddhist notion of universal compassion, there are those who are aware of this goal (with many not being aware of it yet still, in overall thought and deed, moving toward it) and there are those that are ignorant of this goal’s being. The latter will often seek to minimize their suffering via pursuit of other goals (subjugation; maximized supremacy over other; vis-a-visi the pleasure of lying, cheating, and stealing; other such things). To the Buddha consciousness of universal compassion, regardless of how vile their deeds, they will yet be empathized with as those who are yet ignorant / unenlightened / etc. of a truth which, were they to gain awareness of it, would naturally make them virtuous beings. Hence, this form of Buddha consciousness does not view those ignorant of Nirvana as evil sinners that need to be destroyed, tortured, enslaved, or any other such thing; but, instead, as fellow beings that require, in Eastern terminology, “enlightenment” via compassion, empathy with their plight, etc. This form of Buddha consciousness is then, for me, an example of the referent to what is termed unconditional love. In BC’s formulation, this Buddha consciousness is far closer to 100% unconditional love than what all of us regular folk can ever experience.

Having tried to illustrate the referent to the terminology of “unconditional love” via this example, we earth bound folk shouldn’t then think that conflict in self-defense should then be off the table. It’s part and parcel of what maintained justice in this world consists of. Were a thug on the streets to rush toward me for my wallet with a knife in his hands, me trying to emulate the Buddha by saying “dear fellow equal being, do you not realize that you are uninformed as to the best means for you to alleviate your life’s suffering … thereby helping me to alleviate my suffering, in turn helping you?” will not here help my situation out an iota. Actually, we people often get pissed at being told we're ignorant - gives off this stench of superiority – regardless of whether it might to be true or not.

Still, when not in active conflict, minimizing our hatred of other and doing our best to sincerely “understand/empathize with our foes” – this so as to figure out a way of getting them to a) be cordial and b) find deep, sincerely felt happiness within themselves in this cordiality - would, then, be a step toward our enactively holding this referent to the term “unconditional love” (such as in the example of universal compassion previously made).

[To the finger pointing crowd hereabout, I’m not there yet. Not trying to insinuate otherwise. But I acknowledge it would be a nice place to be.]

If you're interested, page 40 is a good starting point... — creativesoul

thanks

Should we really be assuming physical causation as a valid assumption at all? — Victoribus Spolia

Just saw this.

Well, I would argue that the issue of causation is first and foremost metaphysical. As to causation on the physical plane, who would for example deny that the motion of one billiard ball hitting another causes the other to move?

It’s quite the topic, though. Obviously, I don’t believe causation is limited to efficient causation.

Hey, not to get deep into this threads topics. And it seems out of context regarding Gettier. I’m reading along every now and then.

I'm thinking that knowledge is not as useful a term in epistemology as perhaps truth and certainty and belief. And that justification is near useless.

All just musings. — Banno

A different vantage: Justification is useful in discerning mistakes of reasoning (self-deceptions and the like) in that it follows the principle of noncontradiction. Where a falsehood is denoted as a self-deception (or some other kind of deception), a falsehood will contradict both that which is true (i.e., a non-deception) as well as any other deception that is of a different ilk. Assuming any form of realism, there will always be something true. So justification, by means of remaining noncontradictory, serves to ensure that one’s beliefs remains accordant to what is real - i.e., from the vantage of correspondence to what is real, true. Even the most elaborate coherency between willfully given deceptions, in light of their being something true, will eventually be evidenced non-justifiable given its contradiction to that which is true - this, at least, given a sufficiently long enough chain of justifications. It may not always pinpoint what is true, but a contradiction will always pinpoint that there is a falsity somewhere.

If anyone cares to comment, I’m interested in how this sits with others?

You seem to be arguing against the wrong guy here. Or maybe you haven’t read a single one of my previous posts on this thread. Befuddling, but what's new? I’m not pro the terminology of unconditional love. As to categorizing love, all the better to do so. Greeks did it, other cultures do it, and it has its advantages over a single term being used to declare both that “I love ice-cream” and “I love my kids”. Would one risk one’s life for both? Would one not risk one’s life for either?

Nope. It is not wrong at all for parents to expect that their children will respect their good behavior toward them. — John Days

There can be a subtle, but important, different between “expect” and “hope / anticipate”.

I can’t currently discern whether your reply is the result of an actual disagreement between us or is due to, maybe, a hasty interpretation of a sentence taken out of context, given the full paragraph (admittedly, maybe poorly worded).

If a disagreement, there are some people, some parents included, that will demand respect for that which they give. I don’t like the pejorative racial semantics to this saying, but the cultural term for it where I live is that of being an “Indian giver”. The mindset of “I gave you that so you must respect me in return or else” is one of authoritarianism—not, from where I stand, one of genuine love. And yes, it’s a sentiment that is explicitly conceptualized to be founded on conditions. When successful—and often times it is not--it leads to a certain type of respect: one resulting from fear of what the authoritarian power will do if their will is not fully complied with. I, however, do maintain that this respect is at a crossroads with a different type of respect which results out of genuine love existing between different people.

Parenting is a complex topic. Still as a loosely given generality, a parent with a healthy love, to me, doesn’t seek to be liked/respected via the act of reprimanding their child, yet via good parenting, the child will come to internally recognize the good intentions of the parent – and, yes, thereby find non-fear-driven, love-based respect for the parents.

Via example, I can well understand the following: if a parent is compassionate toward their children with the consciously pursued intention that the children will be there for the parent when he/she is old, this is a condition-based love and is not the real thing. It is closer to a willfully pursued manipulation of the other so as to influence the other to do something in one’s own self-interest. It, however, is not a genuine instance of reciprocal altruism, or of love for the other, as would be: wanting one’s children to grow up to experience greater degrees of happiness / health / wisdom / etc. than one as parent has ever experienced – something that naturally breeds non-fearful, or loving, respect in the children for the parent, including in the parent’s old age. Hence, in this sense just expressed, conditional love is fake love. (I say this though I still think the terminology of "unconditional love" is improper due to easy misinterpretation by those who desire it in their lives.)

Yet, the following sentence worries me greatly (ok, in a removed, existential sense):

"Unconditional" doesn't mean the same thing; within the context of love (via Christianity) the concept means a love that doesn't waver under any circumstance. — Noble Dust

“Any circumstance” encompasses many, potentially awful, things. One being manipulated by the other, one being maimed by the other out of a ruthless form of jealousy (which becomes itself interpreted as love), one being enslaved by the other in a basement … you can allow your imagination to complete this.

This quoted sentence contradicts your accord to other beliefs, such as a technical condition of love being just / fair. Yet it is what you conclude with.

At face value as expressed, how would such unconditional love lead to healthy things? In other words, how would it be something that is in any way good?

ps. Of course, there are more limited circumstances—such as “in sickness” and “for poorer”—in which genuine love will not in any way waiver. But that’s not what your statement states.