↪Wayfarer
Meaning? — Agustino

We certainly have a harder time forgiving and forgetting …

Perhaps it's a human prejudice to think that we, as linguistic beings, are the only animals capable of abstract thoughts such as 'I will die'. Can we imagine any way in which such a thought could occur to a non-linguistic being? — John

No lesser lifeform has a narrative of what pain is, yet they all react to it the same way we do. So doing requires some degree of non-narrative thought on their part—this in terms of deciding between alternatives. I'd argue that choosing between alternatives is not possible without some type of forethought, i.e. best means of attaining a desired end (in conjunction with some type of memory—with which to form a contextual structure of limitations).

At least one zoo-kept elephant has been known to enjoy placing pain on canvas. Octopuses are very efficient as solving puzzles. Other examples can be given. As to communication, our common associates, cats and dogs, will communicate by tail-waiving and teeth-exposure (among a number of other means, ear-direction, body-posture, etc.). These are communications that we as humans comprehend just fine though not of a spoken narrative—and, through anecdotal evidence, I know that dogs sometimes can even (try to) deceive via their communications. Communication requires thought, such as regards the interpretation of another’s intentions/state-of-mind. The only explanation for the aforementioned is that non-linguistic, abstract thought can and does occur, imo.

Once this is accepted, then the difficulties reside in figuring out how. This “how” obviously will itself be on a cline of complexity—from less intelligent to more intelligent lesser life forms.

But, as to awareness of death:

Imo, no lesser lifeform suffers from an existential angst of what live and death signify. Many, if not most, are aware of when some other is alive and when it is no longer alive--as known via reactions. Some are aware of personal loss when another of their cohort dies, as is exemplified by signs of morning/depression/etc. And the instinct of self-preservation is built into everything that is alive—though it often enough doesn’t take the form of “my importance is greater than that of everyone else’s” (e.g. during parenting and within social species). And there’s certainly aversion to that which leads to death. Oddly, whether great apes are aware that they are mortal can be tested: this by attempts to communicate with them via sign language, etc. (Though I’m not comfortable with such attempts being recommended, this on ethical grounds.) But, as to contemplations of whether life in any way continues on after mortal death (or not), we do not have any indication of this till we arrive at Neanderthals (which buried their dead with flowers). This species of hominid, however, likely had more complex means of communication that the non-verbal communication of lesser-animal species: hence, they likely had some form of linguistic narrative.

As regards the historicity of the yin/yang, this makes sense to me. Thank you.

In your view, is all this talk about strength/weakness—as the terms are interpreted in western cultures—historically accurate?

For example, just because Earth is receptive I wouldn’t call Earth weak.

As to the “we all have some masculine and feminine within us” motif … our perceptions are all receptive; our tongues are creative. Yet I wouldn’t consider perceptions a weakness, for example; nor does a guy who never stops talking represent strength. Rather, imo, strength emerges from a proper balance between listening and talking.

I esthetically prefer the view that yin and yang represent different strengths, and simultaneously different weaknesses.

It’s how I then come to interpret the balance between the two to be strength; imbalance between the two as weakness, regardless of which of the two the imbalance favors. This perspective also to me chimes true with many Eastern appraisals of the Middle Path.

But I lack knowledge of how accurate this perspective I’ve just expressed is historically. (The perspective that men are the stronger sex and women are the weaker sex can certainly be found in many cultures both Eastern and Western, for example.)

[...] but it just demonstrates that dualism is necessary in order to properly understand the existence of individual entities. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear about my personal stance, the duality I uphold is other than Cartesian. It’s not easy to adequately define in a few words, but it is akin to a view of self holding within it a holistic substance that is not the self of information, be this information of the mind or of the physical. Both of the latter to me are different aspects, or manifestations, of the same substance. This holistic substance—that of a form which holds potential to be, to exist, devoid of the information by which it gains its manifest-form within time and space—I in some ways liken to the selfless being which Buddhists term Nirvana. Hence, while I personally don’t disagree with dualism, my view is not that of substance dualism in terms of a duality of information. (This, of course, is not to deny different aspects of this same substance of information.) All this to be upfront about my own dualist stance.

That stated, in the modern sense of substance, even if one were a substance dualist, there would via material identity alone be found no means of discerning between different givens of each of the two substances. One idea would be indiscernible from another due to both being of the same material identity. One physical object would be indiscernible from another physical object. Etc.

Material identity to me only makes sense due to the functionality of the individual materials addressed. For example, a wooden X is different from a metal X only in so far at the wood holds different properties of functionality from the metal.

I have to admit that I didn't understand your argument for identity from purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hopefully this won’t further confuse matters: Functionality as I interpret/intend it can be readdressed as the context-specific role of the given. This context-specific role of the given is one of kinetic and potential interactions with other(s). I’m very aware that such metaphysical approach can become confusing devoid of an entire metaphysics to support it. Nevertheless, to me it’s intuitive that one rock is, in part, different from another due to its context-specific interactions, both kinetic and potential—in short, due to is context-specific role or, else stated, its functionality relative to its surroundings. One rock’s presence (even if it is statically placed) will be different from any others, for example, in terms of what its removal from the given environment would causally signify. This perspective, then, takes into account causal relations between givens, locally and globally. Still … this isn’t the place to attempt to properly justify this perspective. I’ll address more particular examples below.

I don't see this as an argument for identity, I see it as a way of defining a term. You say that an object must fulfill certain conditions before it can be called a flower, so this is to define what it means to be a flower. But I understand the act of identifying to be the inverse of this. Rather than saying what it means to be a flower (that is defining rather than identifying), we take a particular object and say what the object is, that is identifying. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m thinking of identity in terms of discernibility: If we can discern X than we do so only with the backdrop of not-X. Any discerned X then, for me, holds identity to us which discern; i.e., we identify X the instant we discern there being X--though we many not necessarily fully understand that which we've identified/discerned. This approach doesn’t rely upon narrative; rather it relies upon perceptions, sensations, and understandings. Hence, lesser animals can discern X from not-X as well—say, predator from not-predator, etc.—though they do not use narrative (words) to do so.

Being of this perspective, I’m not having an easy time interpreting you’re position. For instance, I can discern a broad quantity of givens at any particular moment thought I don’t use narrative to so discern all the givens that I do. Rather, I use narrative to convey that which I discern—either to myself during reasoning/thinking or, else, to others. To me then, discernibility is primary; narrative about that discerned secondary.

So from my perspective, why do you think that your definition of "flower" is more "real", or states more precisely what a flower really is than another definition? If objects don't have a real identity which is proper to themselves, how is our naming of them anything more than arbitrary? — Metaphysician Undercover

I interpret you as enquiring into the objective identity of things. My best resolution so far is to rely upon universals of psyche. This approach doesn’t create crisp thresholds between all things. For example, between when a flower bud is a flower bud and when it is a flower (a temporal distinction); or between when a heap is a heap and when it is not (a spatial distinction). What it does do is solidify X and not-X for all members of a populace … this in manners that do not always mandate an excluded middle (such as in the two examples just given).

As to what makes that discerned as flower—by us humans, by hummingbirds, by bees, etc.—more real than merely an arbitrary concept by all concerned: I would again largely found my arguments on the flower’s causal role/purpose/functionality relative to its context, as previously addressed. Hence, as I currently construe things, the role of a flower will remain more fixed than its shape or material content. To address one of Heraclitus’s better known analogies via the just stated: one cannot step twice into the same shape or material content of a given river; yet the river as context-dependent role will nevertheless remain the same (identical over time). Clearly there’s more to the river than just context-relative purpose-form, and its context-relative purpose-form too is in flux, yet this context-relative purpose-form is what remains stable relative to ourselves as separate process-bundles. The context-relative purpose-form is the gestalt which is “the river” and not any of its parts. Though not the only element involved, it plays an integral aspect in our discerning the given river to hold an objective identity. Devoid of this, there no longer is discerned “a river” but, maybe, any number of the river’s parts—each with its own context-relative purpose-form. These context-relative purpose-form, to me, are then ontic—as ontic as any river, flower, etc. is.

On a more psychological train of thought: This context-relative purpose-form of things is something I believe we all intuitively apprehend. And, as intuitions go, they’re more sub/unconsciously reasoned than consciously reasoned.

No worries if there are disagreements. I mainly wanted to better clarify my position regarding functionality and identity.

The point is that we just name the material "A". Then the material continues to just be "A" no matter which form it has, the ship, the cabin, or the other ship, it is always just A. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless one endorses substance pluralism, wouldn’t everything then hold the material identity of A? This then would make individuality indiscernible.

The real problem with material identity is in deciding what does and does not constitute the material of the entity. So if a part is taken off, and replaced by a new part, or just if a new part is added, what determines how the old part ceases to be, or the new part becomes, part of the material entity? Like when you eat, and defecate, how is it possible that you gain material, and lose material, yet you maintain the same material identity. So "change" is like a coin, we look at it from two sides, form, and matter, but both sides give us difficulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

The contents of the digestive tract in vertebrates don’t to me seem a good example. The contents are not part of the physical being … only when some of it at the molecular level enters the bloodstream to feed the individual somatic cells of the body can it become argued part of the physical being. But, even then, contentions could be raised in terms of—by analogy—a fire being other than that which fuels it. To say this more simply, we are not that which we eat; we assimilate portions of that which we eat into ourselves. The contents of the digestive tract—wherever found—will hold a different identity from that which it is digested by.

Is it due to disagreement that you’ve bypassed my argument for identity resulting, in part, from purpose/functionality?

I’ll provide another example. Take something organic like the flower of a fruiting plant. We could give it any other name but it will still be that which it is. At which point in the bud phase does it become a flower? And, how many petals must wilt off before it ceases to be a flower? My argument is that it is a flower between a young bud and before the beginnings of it being a fruit (if pollinated and if of a fruiting plant) due to its functions/purpose as a flower. This both conceptually and physically.

Logical identity taken to its extreme will not apply. Neither will identity via material content—for the flower, being organic, undergoes a perpetual change of material content. Yet it will nevertheless be a flower somewhere between being a bud and a fruit. How so if its functionality is considered completely irrelevant or nonexistent?

Again I don’t maintain that purpose is the only element to identity; rather that it is an integral element of identity among others.

This same argument for the functionality of that considered then would also apply to the identity of a physical being as addressed by you in your example of digestion.

No, that doesn't change that fact, but that doesn't imply that the past exists and contains things.

It's not that the past isn't independent of the present--of course it is, as it doesn't exist any longer. — Terrapin Station

I am forgetting: you’re a materialist/physicalist. If I understand you properly, the past no longer exists materially.

My current label of choice is that of an "objective neural-monist". So, to me, just as a thought hold’s presence—exists in this way—so too does the past exist: as information that holds presence. Only that it’s a lot more complex than a mere thought that one is having.

I say we call it Dutch. X-)

* I'm also pointing out that all of this stuff occurs in the present. It in no way suggests that a past still exists . . . and I have no idea why anyone would take it to suggest that, as it seems like quite a bizarre thing to believe in my opinion. — Terrapin Station

We’re again talking past each other.

If Joe (say, via some form of conscious or subconscious self-deception that occurred yesterday) now honestly remembers that Betty wore a blue shirt yesterday, does that then change the fact that Betty wore an orange shirt yesterday?

I say “no”—this for reasons I’ve already in part previously addressed. The past contains facts that remain unchangeable and, in this sense, the past exists independently of the changing present (this with a heads up to a great deal of potential complexity that, due to universals, nevertheless ends up being the same thing for all intended purposes).

But the onus is on you to clarify what you’re implying.

Then also address this part:

And if those things [the doctors' memories ] also are, then isn't there a commonly shared past independent of the individual's memory? — javra

"There being things they remember" is all that is. — Terrapin Station

So the things that the doctors remember isn't?

And if those things also are, then isn't there a commonly shared past independent of the individual's memory?

Amnesia is a memory problem. — Terrapin Station

Yes, I’m aware of what it is and its mechanisms as much as any other.

The issue is in expressing the different between there being a past for the person prior to amnesia, after which the person’s past no longer is.

Again, all this is in reference to your remark that the past does not exist.

I'm not sure what you want me to embellish. It seems very straightforward to me. Obviously I'm not saying that we don't have present memories, but that doesn't amount to the past existing. — Terrapin Station

I’m not sure how to do this without dreary examples, so I’ll use forth-person: One is fine up until the day one gains amnesia. When one is fine there is a (nonexistent?) past. When one gains amnesia, this (nonexistent?) past is no longer existent within one’s duration of the present moment.

(a) Correct this wordage so that when one is fine there is a past relative to oneself.

(b) Then, using this corrected wordage regarding the past, how is the past which applies to one and all not existent (i.e., devoid of being; aka. “is” not)?

Before we get lost in what (b) intends, resolve (a).

Talking about changing the past, then, is talking about changing changes that no longer exist. — Terrapin Station

But hey, no cheating: what about your claim that the past doesn't exist? Care to embellish this some.

Right, you’re not one for universals. I was instead thinking in terms of all of us sharing a common understanding of basic aspects of reality, such as what up and down is, for example—this due to a fundamental universality of our individual experiences, even when unexpressed. And it of course then can become more complex via culture (in the anthropological sense) ... which includes a commonality of memories regarding the same events as referents.

We might need to do the old agreement to disagree on this one.

and "intersubjectivity" doesn't amount to anything more than the fact that we can utter things to each other including agreements. It's nothing like literally sharing subjectivity. — Terrapin Station

Different topic but: we can and do share unspoken understandings. You disagree?

Still, what I was trying to get at is that the past yet holds presence--exists in one way or another.

I wonder if Wait arrived at this via his own intuition? — Rich

I've no way of knowing. But a lot of his lyrics indicate that he's well read.

The past consists of the changes/motion that occurred, but that are no longer occurring (and it no longer exists, of course--it rather existed). Talking about changing the past, then, it talking about changing changes that no longer exist. — Terrapin Station

I keep on coming back in my thoughts to a Tom Waits lyric: “time is just memory mixed with desire”

To argue the past no longer exists in some ontological way is not necessarily contradictory; but one cannot claim that the past holds no presence whatsoever. Yesterday was there for me and it was there for you too. Yesterday, then, is more than an intra-personal memory. It holds presence within all sentience … even if only as an intersubjectively shared memory of what was (not barring personal deviations from this intersubjectively shared memory). In this sense, the past exists independently of us as individual beings.

In other words--thought I think I get what you’re saying--the past is yet there for all of us and it is yet remembered (usually) in a third-person, “t1, t2, t3” manner … such that we are no longer present within the events of the past but, instead, look upon these events from the outside. This “outside” being the duration of the current moment.

The Ship of Theseus problem takes the two distinct forms of identity, logical identity as claimed by Terrapin, and material identity as stated by Aristotle, and creates ambiguity between them. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your conclusions regarding logical identity, but disagree that the Ship of Theseus is an issue of material identity.

Suppose Theseus takes his ship (ship A) and uses its material to build himself a cabin. It’s the same material but no longer a ship, so the identity of that addressed has changed. A week following, Theseus changes his mind and uses the same material, now a cabin, to rebuild the same ship he had before (ship B). It becomes Theseus’s ship again. Complexities could ensue as regards identity, but to the extent ship A and ship B are the same ship (as would uphold someone off for the month in which it was rebuilt in to a cabin and back), it would be the same ship for what reason? Neither due to logical nor material identity—the latter, on its own, would make the cabin identical to the ship.

It at least in part would be the same ship due to its functionality as form: e.g. were it to now have two masts instead of one its functionality would be different, even though the total material would be the same and even though it would still be a ship. Functionality, in turn, is entwined with purpose; and purpose, in an Aristotelian view, is a product of telos.

Using functionality as a means of arriving at identity, Theseus’s ship could then have half of its wooden planks replaced with plastic planks (different material) and, as long as its functionality would be unchanged, it would remain the same ship. However, were all its material to change, its is very unlikely that it would retain the same functionality, and would thereby be a different ship.

I’m not affirming that there isn’t more to identity. A crushed aluminum can is the same can it previously was when uncrushed, for example. But I do believe there’s more to identity than that of material form.

But to answer your question. Bergson views the future as virtual action. It is what is intended but has not been. At this time, not having pondered this too much, it seems reasonable. — Rich

thanks. Only read Bohm so far. Might give Bergson a read.

For example, how do I know that I exist and am evolving? It is the memory of myself juxtaposed on a prior memory of myself. The two memories create time. The time of scientists, or click time, is different. — Rich

I’ve expressed this in other places: I’m by comparison anything but erudite when it comes to the in-depth physics of time. Not to say that I’m utterly ignorant either. However, a quick glance at Wikipedia didn’t reveal any information on what click time might be—and I haven't previously come across this term.

The view I’ve been holding onto is that time—both physical and experiential—is a hybrid between cyclical and linear: spiralar (but I’ve so far found no term that sounds good to the ear). From grandfather clocks to atomic clocks, time holds periods demarcated by repetition that nevertheless is always different with each new cycle. Like a more poetic dictum that every sunrise is the same, though no two sunrises in the history of Earth have ever been identical. This can be argued for digital time as well: the same quantities repeat as they accumulate into cycles.

I can in my own way then understand the sense of time being memory—for it is via memory, as you've addressed it, that this linear-cycle of information occurs (maybe better said, holds presence).

Not to contradict, but out of good natured curiosity: I associate forethought (prediction of what is to come) to the future, much in the same manner I’ve (maybe all too poorly) described the past as memory. I’m wondering if you currently hold an interpretation of memory as time that also incorporates this experiential property of forethought?

I believe I understand what you’re expressing. And, at least as pertains to my current understanding, I'm in agreement with you.

Yet there is the issue of other(s)’ memories-embedded-with-the-present as well. Here, a simple argument of taking two people as example will be overly simplistic. Each cell within one’s body—to the extent it too is in some way sentient—will hold its own memories within the present. (This, I grant, will be contentious with many). Still, sentience is not limited to one individual. Every person I’ve ever interacted with will hold some memories of each and every interaction. Memories of what was said, seen, etc. These memories of (at least) sapient beings will, furthermore, themselves need to be noncontradictory in order to be intelligible: one can’t remember there having been a house at place and time X and there not being the same house at the same time and in the same way.

If we are to use a holomovement view, then there’s a complex interplay of memory between all individuals that in any way have ever interacted (for clarity, individuals which nevertheless presently coexist) which would then create a stable global memory of what was.

Hopefully I’m not being too abstract about all this. My basic point being that the past would be a complex web of causal interactions between a multiplicity of beings which, as such, would stabilize into what would for all intended purposes result in a changeless past.

For example, were I (knock on wood) to gain Alzheimer’s in later life, my past would still remain stable in space and time—this despite me no longer having a personal memory of when I was birthed, for example.

So, I’m still inclined to argue that—nitty-gritty metaphysical analysis of a non-B-series time aside—the past would still be a permanently fixed set of events that have already passed by … this from the vantage of all coexistent sentience (by which I myself include microscopic life as well, even that of somatic cells).

It appears to me that the past is constantly changing. In fact, it is the only thing that is changing as it evolves into a new past. — Rich

Please expand on this if I’ve misconstrued you.

My position is that within nitty-gritty metaphysical analysis (or, alternatively, in contemplating some interpretations of QM) maybe some aspects of the past can change. But things such as our birthdays when we first came into this world yet remain static in the past. It’s just that the past keeps on expanding with every present moment that goes by.

I’m so far inclined to think that we agree on this.

The [...] purpose of both logic and intuition is to satisfy the emotions. — MonfortS26

The quote is reminiscent of David Hume’s view.

Imo, emotions is an umbrella term for many, in some ways different, aspects of psyche. There are emotions you can be affected by without enactively being unified with (e.g. love/hate; like, having a romantic attraction to someone you as a conscious being would rather not have), there are emotions that are enactively present to us as conscious beings which prod us or pull us (desires) and are integral to intentions or motivation (these sometimes can consist of the former drives, e.g. love/hate), and then there are emotions that are enactively affective responses to stimuli (pain/pleasure and suffering/happiness … where the two are distinguished).

I’ve for a long time held the belief that all emotions hold their own imbedded reasoning—though, obviously, more sub/unconscious than not—as can also be stated of intuitions. Envy, for example, has its reasoning of “I should have what I don’t have but the other does”; other emotions are harder to pinpoint. One’s conscience—e.g., to counterbalance feelings of envy—can in this sense itself be appraised as another emotion.

Still, I agree. One cannot reason without some underlying emotion (in the broad sense previously outlined); however, one can hold emotions without actively reasoning.

In similar enough manners to Hume's arguments, reasoning can then in part be appraised as an emotive means by which we endorse some emotions and veto others.

For instance, what philosophy—however formal—can be pursued without emotions such as those of interest or curiosity?

The problem with that on my view is that "changeless time" is a contradiction. — Terrapin Station

Hey, I’m all about Heraclitus’ flux. So I don’t subscribe to B-series time either. Nevertheless, when we address past, we all use the notion of changelessness as it pertains to events gone by. It’s why I improvised the term, “observer-devoid time”: not exactly B-series time but it’s yet applicable to our cognizance of the past … a temporal duration where things no longer change (at the very least in terms of how we conceptualize the past).

To me it seems like the simple dichotomy between A-series and B-series is overly simplified.

All the same, how would you demarcate the past if not for it being a "changeless time(span)"?

No, they are the same chair at two different times. It's just the natural effect of passing time (what you call change), that the very same thing will not be logically identical at two different times. How could they be logically identical if the passing of time is change? But this doesn't mean that it's not the same thing, just because it's changed. — Metaphysician Undercover

My own argument would be that, as with the Ship of Theseus problem, the parts of the chair can change but as long as the whole, the gestalt, remains unchanged in form and/or functionality, it remains the same chair. Darn it though, this gets into issues of identity and change. ... But I too am an curious to see what Terrapin has to say.

Whether there's any "continuity of existence" depends on whether you mean by that that the chair is logically identical at T1 and T2. If so, then there's no "continuity of existence." This doesn't imply that the chair at T2 has no connection to the chair at T1. They're developmentally, causally, continuously related. — Terrapin Station

In trying to understand this better, you’re saying that there’s no continuity to some perfectly static existent between T1 and T2, right? Not that there’s no continuity to a given we can all discern as having remained the same …

--------

Terrapin, I’d like to see how you—and others—might disagree with this:

T1, T2, T3, etc. is an abstraction of time wherein the observer is no longer present. I’ll call it “observer-devoid time”. Observer-devoid time is typically applied to the past by all of us (unless our memories are of former personal experiences which we relive) and, when further abstracted, can then result in the notion of B-series time (objective time being a changeless, tenseless time).

Time you term the present phenomenal experience, however, holds within it the extremities of past and future in a manner parallel to observer-relative spatial dimensions. For simplicity, we can solely appraise the dimension of up and down as always relative to our personal spatial location as observers: There is no absolute top and absolute bottom to space; there are only relations to ourselves as observers; as we change our spatial positions relative to each other and to an inanimate context, so too changes what is up and what is down relative to us. Placing a whole bunch of us together in the same interactive space further stabilizes up and down for the cohort. As with observer-relative spatial dimensions, so too is past and future a temporal dimension held within awareness relative to that which is the experienced present duration … with there being no clear threshold between memory and forethought that takes place in the present experience. This then results in A-series time (tensed time)—or, “observer-endowed time”.

In B-series time before and after is always relative to abstract events from which the observer is removed—and, as previously stated, an observer-devoid time is typically applied to the past, especially when cognized in the third-person. In A-series time before and after is always relative to the concrete reality of a present phenomenal experience.

One can build on this, but I’m curious to see if there’s any significant disagreement with what was just stated.

If there’s no significant disagreement, then a lot of the former arguments I've read have been about equating apples with oranges … this by overlapping or else mistaking A-series time to B-series time.

You're aware that Bohm's reputation in US academia had already been permanently affected by his early association with communism? — Wayfarer

I wasn’t knowledgeable of this. … Them community-lovers. (there’s sarcasm here somewhere).

I was having a discussion here a few months back about an interesting feature of the double-slit experiment, which is that the interference patterns are not rate-dependent. Whether you fire one photon at a time, or many together, you end up with the same pattern (up to a certain point). I posted a couple of threads about this on physics forums. — Wayfarer

Although I understand what you're referring to, I yet want to acknowledge the following: I can easily get lost in the maths with which modern physics is deeply entwined. [Could barely keep up with the more complex maths of ecology: When they started talking about 16-dimensional models of what was going on on the ground is when I started doodling things in my notebooks … pondering about the premises/axioms these folks used.]

It strikes me as being philosophically significant, although nobody on the physics forums were prepared to acknowledge that. To me it signifies that the probability wave is not a function of time, and from a relativistic point of view, therefore not of space-time. — Wayfarer

If I’m interpreting your statement properly, I agree. Still, in candor, you are addressing far more detailed concepts of physics and its notions of time than I’m currently making sense of, imo.

But the overall reason why I agree:

QM relies upon time that is Newtonian like; Relativity deems time non-absolute but, traditionally, deterministic so that one obtains a Block-Time. Both these notions of time can be deemed problematic. The absence of a physical theory of everything which combines QM and Relativity attests to this, imo. Neither, imo, do theories fare better when attempting to unify QM with Relativity by declaring time to be non-real … although I’ve read one book where this was done.

The philosophical qualm then becomes the question of what time is, this meta-physically. Obviously, this is not an easy issue to resolve. However, as always, once the metaphysical construct of what time is becomes better appraised by us, then we’ll hold new axiomatic foundations with which to address and remodel the mathematical representations of what’s going on. Otherwise, we will continue to gauge reality through use of inappropriate axiomatic notions of time. Like Newtonian physics, this is useful to some extent--but, due to the rudimentary errors involved, it will not be able to resolve the questions which we current seek answers to. The implications of QM here come to mind.

I think that Bohm was necessarily cautious about declaring consciousness and/or free will is necessitated by QM. — Rich

Bohm dared not go so far though he's clearly implied it was there. — Rich

Yes, we all know how that goes in certain academic circles. There the making a living part that goes hand in hand with reputation.

Though nowhere near as eruditely as others, I investigated Bhom’s views after first discovering this experiment. This in what then were my attempts to hold onto determinism.

Of course, the observer who also participates in the field has an effect. With the possibility of free will, we have a casual model of QM which permits creative actions. — Rich

That is the crux of it, at least for me: does or doesn’t the causal factor which we term freewill take place? I couldn’t deny the implications of the delayed choice quantum erasure experiment—basically, that consciousness is in some way integral to the causal factors of the physical world as we know it. Which then brought me into numerous reveries regarding how determinism and freewill could mechanistically co-occur. Though I’ve lost count of the details then read, I remember Bhom’s interpretations of determinism somewhat lacking in this regard—though very aesthetically pleasing in numerous other ways. I’d have to reread things to better understand/remember the De Broglie-Bohm interpretations.

What I was intending to get at is that the experiment appears to fully substantiate that consciousness has some top-down causal role in what physically, presently is. And it does this by accounting for all variables that could lead to alternative conclusions. I, at least, wasn't imaginative enough to find any. [just remembered, there's the multiple world scenario, but spiritual unicorns being on occasion seen by some is to me a far more plausible reality than that of the multiple world scenario]

This is the experiment that got me to change my mind about hidden variables some time ago:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delayed_choice_quantum_eraser



I’d be impressed to see how people disagree with this experiment’s concluded implications in a manner consistent to the experiment’s methods and data.

I'm intrigued but confused by this. I'm also struggling to understand the ensuing paragraph. — Noble Dust

Seems worth expanding into a longer from, though. — Noble Dust

Thank you for the invitation to do so. Cop out though this may be, I’ll not now expand on the perspective. This, basically, because I get lost for words with which to properly express it in the span of a few paragraphs.

Well, my response may have been a little over-zealous. I was maybe reading a pet peeve of mine into your post. Apologies. — Noble Dust

No need, and no problem. :)

I think I agree with this concept if I'm reading it right, I just use the word objective in a different sense. I think of the physical world as an objectified form of spirit. Which is ironically sort of an opposite use of the term, so maybe not. — Noble Dust

Or maybe not. [edit: maybe your not wrong in thinking of the physical world as an objectified form of spirit; its close to what objective idealism would affirm ... though I've come to see myself more of a neutral monist. Sorry for the ambiguity.] What objectivity is is something we all hold an intuitive sense of ... but different folks, imo, will crystallize this concept in different ways. Its a heavy duty topic of metaphysics in which I obviously have some opinions--not always accordant to others.

So what would bring about that state, evolution? — Noble Dust

No, it's more like that state exists as a future potential that nevertheless predates all being as telos. Evolution by natural selection would be one repercussion of it given a plurality of agencies that each desires to satisfy its own interests. Did I mention that this perspective requires the metaphysics of freewill? So there's degrees of freewill to be closer on equal terms with others (given the limitations of the physical world and one's own biological phenotype, etc.) or to dominate others for one's own personal advantage. Fast forward to competition among various agents of various freewill capacities and it kinda unfolds into Darwinian evolution among life.

Like I said, its a long spiel. And in summative form it can well be less than cogent. (Still working on it by the way.)

What's so sacred about overcoming biases at the altar of Lord Science? I've never understood that. If the entire world shed it's biases and accepted an analytic, rational, scientistic belief system, how would this serve some sort of evolutionary telos? What exactly would be accomplished for mankind? What would mankind accomplish by doing this? I'm not interested in living in a world full of philosophy forum members. :P — Noble Dust

Just so it’s said, I wasn’t intending to be ironical-ish in any way.

I could try to make a better case for what I hypothesized. But this isn’t the place for a well-argued thesis. Still, the gist of this better argument would be that objectivity is not physical reality but the metaphysical Real/Truth … to which we are all subjects of. With the presumption of such telos, physical reality would indeed be objective, but objectivity itself would be equivalent to an existent state of being that could be expresses as perfect selflessness and, thereby, a perfect equality of being. Fairness, impartiality, and an unbiased opened mind/heart all then could be expressed as facets of being closer to this metaphysical state of objectivity—which could also be expressed as perfect innocence. (All this is where at least all the physicalists get … um, uneasy? And I can just see them now stampeding to demolish my little ol’ hypothesis.) And this isn’t to say that daydreams and fantasies are somehow wrong. It’s a long spiel. But, on the other hand, the same metaphysical objectivity as telos would mandate that all life prioritizes the objectivity of the physical world over such things as fantasies. We can fantasize that we can fly like birds but let’s not try to actually fly off of tall things—kind of a thing.

It’s a long complicated perspective, now that I think of it. Still, as a brief summation of this view, I think that what I’ve previously said can still hold. And no, it’s not a variation of physicalism—even though the scientific method of the empirical sciences is endorsed.

Point taken though.

As I've said elsewhere, I'm a sucker for teleology. What more do I need? I need to know the secret to the whole thing; I need to know where this thing is going. That preoccupies my philosophical interests more than anything else. — Noble Dust

Whether evolution does or doesn’t hold a telos would be part and parcel of whether existence does.

But, via induction, I suppose that evolution might hold the telos of “adaptation and acclimation to that which is objective”. And this can be translated into being in accordance to that which is regardless of biases.

Not that every lifeform sits on its ass to ponder what objectivity may be. It takes sapience to do that. It’s just that life that becomes overly discordant to that which is objective tends to no longer be.

Contingent on the hypothesis being valid, this would make objectivity good.

I get what you mean by comfortable pessimism … in some ways reminds me Pink Floyd’s “comfortably numb”.

The active pessimist would be active in trying for a better context; from a better personal life to a better world, as the case might be. This requires some measure of hope in what could be by definition.

The presence of hope in some possible future may then not equate to optimism. But does it still warrant the label of "pessimist”? If so, how so?

---------

BTW, a quote from a guy named George Will that I find fitting:

The nice part about being a pessimist is that you are constantly being either proven right or pleasantly surprised.

A new trend in presentism is to give the present a separate temporal dimension, I call it breadth. [...] What happens is that the present is now not a dimensionless point, but a point with its own dimension. — Metaphysician Undercover

I like that. Rather than a geometric point, a sphere whose volume is in perpetual flux may be a better mapping of the present’s breadth. This fits in well with my current views.

There’s the present of experience. Then there’s the objective present of the physical world—which, as per what relativity expresses, can be more complex than not.

The present of experience, what William James termed the “specious present”, is always in flux. In listening to some sound, say a birdsong, there’s the breadth of time that the duration of song is within the experienced present prior to it becoming experienced memory. We like to quantify time. Nevertheless, in listening to a bird’s chirp (simpler than a melody or a conversation) there’s always an extended duration of the present moment that is not itself quantifiable. It’s not moment 1; stop of moment 1 and start of moment 2; moment 2; etc. It’s a fluid transition without discernable, temporal parts—resulting in a fluid whole that nevertheless is. What’s more, the present moment consists—at least in part—of the same fluid transition to an extended duration applicable to all that is taken in by all senses and introspections. Furthermore, part of what I mean to say by the experienced present moment being in flux is that this extension of the present moment can be wider or narrower—this to certain limitations. For example, an intense stimuli will be brief and acute, often resulting in narrower duration of the experienced present moment relative to what is normal.

So while I find the breadth of the experienced present to be in flux I nevertheless deem it present to awareness; in other words, the experienced moment is to me real and not specious.

The difficulties for me are in going from an acknowledgment that all sentience (and not only sapience) experiences some breadth of the present—this by definition due to their capacity to sense/perceive information—to … well, to physical time (aka objective time). But, again, if each sentient being is its own frame of reference, then objective time would in one way or another unfold due to simultaneity resulting from interactions … similar enough to what relativity endorses.

Eah, a difficult topic. Thanks for the heads up as to the new research in presentism. I’ll do my best to look into it.

My argument is simply that any instance of a present occurrence which we refer to, can, upon analysis, be determined to be a combination of part past and part future. This is also the case when we refer to a present experience, what we refer to is part past and part future. — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s interesting to me that when taken verbatim, the same can be upheld for a metaphysics of presentism. I’m not confusing your metaphysics with that of any presentism. It’s just that for presentism to be consistent, the present will logically contain both past and future.

Here, though, the psyches/sentience of all living beings would be somewhat prioritized, this in all its horrid splendor of complexity. In simple terms, for example, when two or more sentient beings in any way interact, their frame of spatiotemporal reference will synchronize, and this may be further argued to result in the past being fixed, the present being a reality of active interaction, and the future being a realm of possibilities contingent on the fixedness of the past in conjunction with the interactions of the present. And, of course, this can all be constrained by a holistic telos that interacts with all the particulars of any given present.

This is closer to my own current affinities, and not a projection upon what you're saying, of course.
… but the problems are always in the details.

Though, of course, I like many think the significance accorded to Nietzche's views to be spurious, his ideology having served in turn for example to provide a pseudo-authenticity for Neo-Nazi ideology as currently resurected by the extreme right - claiming as it does to constitute an ultimately 'invarient objective good' and using the tired old line to justify ignoring 'conventional' morality, "You can't make an omelette without breaking eggs"! — Robert Lockhart

I want to break this down into what I take to be the bare elements. There’s domination imposed upon sentience by sentience as a good, and then there’s egalitarianism as a good. The first can lead to enslavement and tyranny; the second can lead to peace, love, and understanding … also to democracy [something that to me is vastly different from mob-rule, i.e. mob tyranny].

Within moral relativism, whether domination of equalitarianism is good will be relative to opinion.

Within the framework of there being an objective good, the leading philosophical issue is which of the two equate to what is morally good. Here isn’t the problem of particulars but of what is the universal right/correct/non-fallacious good; otherwise stated, within this framework one of the two “oughts” is an illusory good (that leads to bad in the long term) and the other is real (a good that, where it not for bad intervening, would be a stable good in and of itself).

Both moral relativism and the upholding of an objective good have their own internal difficulties.

Again, though, it’s not in any way contradictory that there be an objective good and that multiple moralities co-occur.

To illustrate via use of a relatively weak argument that occurred in ancient western cultures: one can, as an example, simplistically argue that all bad (e.g., hatred, resentment, envy, etc.) stems from fear of good (i.e., love). It’s a simpleton/laconic argument, I acknowledge. Yet, even in its simplicity, it is noncontradictory to there being an objective good in conjunction with many mores/morals that are opposed to it. More complex arguments can at least potentially be brought up that, nevertheless, address the same pivotal relation between an objective good/right and an objective bad/wrong. (The objective bad/wrong being nothing else than an illusory, or fallacious, good/right).

For emphasis, I’m only arguing that an objective good is not contradictory to a hierarchy of morals.

They don't require a period of time--they are what time is in the first place. Time isn't something separate from changes/motion. — Terrapin Station

The "morphing" is the present. — Terrapin Station

We’re in agreement with this.

I think what most of the others are getting at is that, were the present as we experience it to be real, our non-illusory sense of the present would not of itself resolve the many problems in physics regarding the nature of time.

This can be viewed in parallel to Zeno’s paradoxes: I choose to believe there’s something wrong with the conceptual premises of the paradoxes rather than choosing to believe that motion/change is itself a nonreality. This, though, doesn’t in itself resolve Zeno’s paradoxes … and the premises used for the paradox are common to measurements/maths of space and time; e.g. geometric points, lines, etc.

I thought nature/reality used mathematics like computers use code. It would seem silly to think the mathematics is fundamental and reality is then built on top of it because where would it exist "fundamentally"? — intrapersona

Hey, I agree. But to some reality pretty much is equivalent to mathematics, thereby making nature the product of maths. For such, maths—or at least the quantity they address—becomes of itself a monistic substance of sorts, encapsulating both quantity and quality without exception. And it’s an old appraisal of reality: Pythagoras was the first recorded person affirming it, me thinks, and stands in contrast in many ways to Heraclitus (this being the guy who spewed mystical stuff about Logos).

This sounds similar to the concept of universals and how they have some existence outside of the concepts that "the form" is inhabiting in reality. IE "the perfect triangle exist abstractly even though there are no perfect triangles in reality" I call bs on that. — intrapersona

Animals exist in reality—and they’re distinct from plants in reality as well. Yet their both abstractions and universals; I say this while denouncing there being any such thing as a perfect form of either. Animals include particulars such as real cats and dogs. But cats and dogs are abstract universals as well. It’s only when one addresses a particular physical instantiation of an animal that you’re then addressing something concrete that isn’t a universal. But now, you’ve lost sight of what an animal is: a bird, a fish, an ant, a whale, a nematode, and even a sponge—all these are animals but none in its concrete presence establishes the reality of what an animal is. Yes, the universal of animal can hold relatively fuzzy borders to us epistemologically, but these borders become distinct when distinguished from the universal of plants. And again, both animals and plants are ontic--this, in part, via all their particular physical instantiations, none of which can on its own equate to the universal of “animal” or "plant".

Our abstraction of "animal" is the concept; the reality of animal-ity is the universal that exists independently of our concepts.

I’m anticipating disagreements. But I’m still upholding that universals are not bs. The headaches, btw, start only once you acknowledge their presence 8-) … this concerning issues of what governs what. It’s like an age old problem in anthropology: does culture govern people, vice versa, or both. It’s when you accept that it’s both that you venture into the perils of uncharted territory.

As to geometric forms, they’re not my foremost interest. Like up and down and the geometric expression of this dimension, I acknowledge that they make sense as universals as well. But I’d rather learn of your take on animals and plants being, or not being, real universals of which we hold epistemological understandings of. (Using what I said above; without use of Platonic forms as typically interpreted.)

At any rate, though they may seem similar—the idea of maths as monistic substance and the idea of universals—universals can well occur without need to be derived from a foundation of maths. … I so argue.

1. What determines a measurement? Even molecules can exhibit the same behavior that electrons and photons do in the double-slit experiments. — Marchesk

Even proteins (large molecules). So in the normal functions of a cell, some of its microscopically observable parts can hold particle-wave duality when on their own. But can the cell still be a functioning whole if its molecular parts do not pertain to a stable macro-reality? When looking through a microscope at microscopic life we all say “no”. Beats me how this happens; however, given what we know of QM and bio, it nevertheless does: macro-level reality as we know it becomes stabilized at the level of microscopic life--or, if one prefers, microscopic sentience.

4. Do normal, macro-scale objects exist when we're not "looking"? I recall reading that Bohr and Einstein debated whether the moon was still there when they turned their backs. Bohr, being the champion of the Copenhagen Interpretation, argued it was just a range of possible states. — Marchesk

This then is part of the stable macro-reality that, as aforementioned, somehow gets stabilized at the level of microscopic life. The question posed might be more applicable to the physics of multiple worlds than to the issue of QM.

I’ll for now skip my opinions on the other questions (not that I have an opinion for all of them).