Neural processes however are deterministic. So I am wondering how can deterministic processes lead to the realization of options. — MoK

I deem this the crucial premise in the OP that needs to be questioned.

IFF a world of causal determinism, then sure: “neural processes are deterministic” (just as much as a Roomba). However, if the world is not one of causal determinism, then on what grounds, rational or empirical, can this affirmation be concluded?

A living brain is after all living, itself composed of individual, interacting living cells, of which neurons are likely best known via empirical studies. As individual living cells, neurons too can be deemed to hold some sort of sentience – this in parallel to that sentience (else mind) that can be affirmed of single-celled eukaryotic organisms, such as ameba. Other that personal biases, there's no rational grounds to deny sentience (mind) to one and not the other. And, outside a stringent conviction in our world being one of causal determinism, there is no reason to conclude that an ameba, for example, behaves in fully deterministic manners. Likewise then applies to the behaviors of any individual neuron. Each neuron seeks both sustenance and stimulation via its synaptic connections so as to optimally live. It’s by now overwhelmingly evidenced that neuroplasticity in fact occurs. Such that it is more than plausible that both synaptic reinforcement and synaptic decay (as well as the creation of new synaptic connections) will occur based on the (granted, very minimal) volition of individual neurons’ attempts to best garner sustenance and stimulations so as to optimize its own individual life as a living cell.

And all this can well be in tune with the stance that neural processes are in fact not deterministic (here, this in the sense of a causal determinism).

To this effect, linked here is an article regarding the empirically evidenced intelligence, or else sentience, of individual cohorts of neurons grown in a petri dish which learned how to play Pong (which can be argued to require a good deal of forethought (prediction) to successfully play). Some highlights from the article:

Summary: Brain cells grown in a petri dish can perform goal-directed tasks, such as learning to play a game of Pong.

[....]

“But in truth we don’t really understand how the brain works.”

By building a living model brain from basic structures in this way, scientists will be able to experiment using real brain function rather than flawed analogous models like a computer.

[...]

To perform the experiment, the research team took mouse cells from embryonic brains as well as some human brain cells derived from stem cells and grew them on top of microelectrode arrays that could both stimulate them and read their activity.

Electrodes on the left or right of one array were fired to tell Dishbrain which side the ball was on, while distance from the paddle was indicated by the frequency of signals. Feedback from the electrodes taught DishBrain how to return the ball, by making the cells act as if they themselves were the paddle.

[...]

Kagan says one exciting finding was that DishBrain did not behave like silicon-based systems. “When we presented structured information to disembodied neurons, we saw they changed their activity in a way that is very consistent with them actually behaving as a dynamic system,” he says.

“For example, the neurons’ ability to change and adapt their activity as a result of experience increases over time, consistent with what we see with the cells’ learning rate.” — https://neurosciencenews.com/organoid-pong-21625/

Again, if one insists in the world being one of causal determinism, then all this is itself determinate in all respects. Fine. But if not, empirical studies such as this strongly indicate that neural processes are indeed indeterministic, aka, not deterministic.

The inquiry into options available and the act of choice making itself would then follow suit.

The issue of duality is not a matter of how the conscious I relates to its conscious experience, and how the conscious I remembers a dream. Those ar both part of the wakened experience. It is a duality between the way that the conscious I remembers the dream, and the way that the somnio-conscious I exists, as itself, in the dream.

If we insist that the only true "I" is the conscious I, then we need to account for the appearance of a somnio-conscious I in the dreamworld. — Metaphysician Undercover

Having read your entire post, do you then find it fair for me to characterize the duality you are addressing as a duality between an illusory conscious I-ness and a real somnio-conscious I-ness? And if it is a fair interpretation, that you then interpret the real somio-conscious I-ness to occur while the waking conscious I-ness is also occurring – only that the former is unconsciously occurring relative to the latter? Or is this not quite right? If it’s not correct, then I still don’t quite understand what do you intend to express by “duality” of I-ness.

Maybe my addressing the notion of agency might better illustrate my current best understanding.

Don't you consider the living being itself, as a unified body, with all the organs, heart, lungs, brain, etc., working together in a unified way, to be itself "an agent". If all the parts of the body act together in a unified way, and the body itself acts in a way which can be said to be the act of an agent, shouldn't we conclude that even if the acts of that body are unconscious acts (dreaming for example) they are the acts of "an agent", referring to unified agency. — Metaphysician Undercover

The notion of “agent” is to me not at all simple, such that that referred to as the (first-person) agent can readily change within different contexts of contemplation, but I do find the notion coherent despite these complexities.

To first define “agent”, to me it is any (at least relatively unified) identity which holds agency. In turn, also in keeping with common place notions, “agency” to me is the ability to accomplish (more explicitly to accomplish some end) and hence to do or undergo something - thereby meaning “the capacity, condition, or state of exerting power (“power” here in the strict sense of “ability to do or undergo something”) and, therefore, the capacity, condition, or state of engaging in actions (i.e. in this context, of intentionally doing things)”.

One could differ as to the definition of “agency” and thereby of “agent” (i.e., that which holds agency) – and if so, I’d very much like to know how – but for now granting this definition of “agent”:

Yes, a total self (to include both its physical and psychical/mental aspects), else a total organism thus understood, can well be construed to be an agent per se in many a context. Yet in other contexts – such as those philosophical contexts that seek to address the possibility of libertarian free will – the total organism cannot possibility be the agent in question – for one example, because the alternatives between which it as agent chooses can very well completely be aspects of its own total self's discordant agencies of (unconscious) mind. In these latter contexts, then, the addressed agent is what William James terms the pure ego (the knower of one’s own total self) – rather than the empirical ego (the total self which is known).

I-ness, in turn, can likewise address the total self (e.g., I am tall, hence tallness as a constituent aspect of my very I-ness, this being contingent on the physiology one as a pure ego knows oneself to be as an empirical ego) – which, maybe importantly, of itself as total self pivots on the occurrence of the pure ego which is so aware of its empirical ego. Else, I-ness can strictly address the pure ego per se (e.g., that I-ness which can validly affirm “I am aware of my body or thoughts”; else: I am joyful rather than sad, I am psychologically at ease rather than upset, etc.; else: I choose X rather than Y or Z; all these here then being either activities which the pure ego of itself engages in or states of being pertaining to the pure ego of itself). I find that this subject can indeed get very complex. But when I expressed I-ness as “a first-person point of view” I thereby intended to address the pure ego as agent – this rather than the empirical ego, i.e. the total self of which the pure ego is aware of, as agent.

Having roughly addressed what I reference by the term “agent” (again, that which holds agency as previously defined), I’ll again affirm that I interpret a total human (or else relatively developed; e.g. birds, mammals, etc.) mind to be an almost literal commonwealth of agencies – which are sometimes partly discordant and sometimes fully unified in at the very least that which they intend as agencies. It most certainly won’t sound right due to the connotations which we’ve been habituated to understand by the term “agent” (this being one reason why I find the need for new terminology to address this in my own philosophical endeavors) but, when looking at the definition of “agent” that I previously provided, one could then appraise each and every distinct agency of a total mind to be a distinct – though transiently occurring – agent, replete with its own pure ego of sorts that apprehends and reacts to at least certain phenomena.

So construed as a commonwealth of agencies, I again take it that some such then converge in the non-manifold unity of the conscious I as pure ego – this in waking states of being. And that when asleep and dreaming, the same convergence of certain agencies of the commonwealth of total mind occurs so as to produce the non-manifold unity of the somnio-conscious I as pure ego.

Just as the conscious I as pure ego dissolves upon falling asleep, so too does (I take it) the somnio-conscious I as pure ego dissolve into the various agencies of the total mind in-between periods of REM sleep – such that it is reunified as a dreaming pure ego in each period of REM sleep. Upon awakening, the unified pure ego of dreaming states can then become further unified with other agencies of a total mind such that it once again remembers waking states of former being while also (sometimes more than other times) remembering some aspects of what the sleeping pure ego experienced during the dreams of the night.

In so construing, I then interpret a continuity in the pure ego as agent– both in the pure ego of waking states from one day to the next and in the pure ego which occurs during dreams in between awakened states. I’d don’t find reason to believe that the pure ego of dreams continues to occur unconsciously while the pure ego of awakened states occurs. This such that I find the conscious I as pure ego to be no more real or else illusory than the somnio-conscious I as pure ego, and vice versa. It's just that the conscious I as pure ego interacts with the world whereas the somnio-conscious I as pure ego interacts with various unconscious agencies of its own total mind.

Also, because I look upon a total human mind as a total commonwealth of agencies, I don’t find reason to presume that there is a division between the conscious pure ego as one agent which interacts with its unconscious mind as a then separate agent in total. There can occasionally be found certain interactions between the conscious mind (the conscious pure ego as I-ness) and certain aspects of its unconscious mind (with one such example being consciousness's interaction with its conscience), but I don't find evidence for the unconscious mind being of itself a unified, and hence singular, agent in some way divided from the conscious mind as agent.

I could continue, but I’ve written a bunch as it is – and I don’t know the extent, if any, to which you’d find significant disagreement with what I’ve so far expressed.

In short, though, yes, the total person as a total self can well be considered an agent, but that is not the agent I was referencing when addressing the “I” as a first-person point of view (the latter instead being what William James termed the pure ego).

This leads directly toward the complexity you mentioned. I agree that the conscious mind looks at evidence, ideas, principles, and actually makes judgements. And this, the act of making a judgement, is a sort of act. There is a problem of complexity though, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Aye, it can indeed get very complex, agreed. To my mind at least, consciousness and unconsciousness are at all times interconnected, hence never in any way divided, and perpetually influence each other via top-down processes (formal causation in Aristotelian terms) and bottom-up processes (material causation in Aristotelian terms (which is not to be confused with what we today construe to be “mater”, as I so far believe you very well know [Aristotle, for example, gives the example of letters being the material cause of syllables (for syllable are made up of letters) or else the example of parts (say the ideas from which a paradigm is constituted) being the material cause of the whole (here, the paradigm of, say, biological evolution itself]).

This indicates that the rational conscious mind does not have "the final say". The rational judgement of the conscious mind is not the actual cause of an individual's actions, as is demonstrated by a propensity of some people to act contrary to their conscious judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’d say that while conscious decisions will typically have a final sway (rather than "say", here in the sense of dictatorial authority) over what the unconscious mind proceeds to do, it can often enough be the case that the unconscious mind vetoes the consciously made decisions – with a good, and relatively extreme, example of this being a heroin addict who consciously chooses to no longer take heroin no matter what but (even when construing this choice to be that of libertarian free will on the part of the conscious pure ego) then is compelled in extreme manners by the unconscious mind in any number of ways to continue so taking despite the conscious choice made.

Notwithstanding, the only chance a heroin addict has of no longer so being is to repeatedly make the same conscious choice to no longer so be - this until the consciously made choice at last has the ability (the power) to convince the majority of the unconscious mind to so no longer take in heroin despite the transient unpleasant consequences of not so taking. Which is to say that, to me, consciousness still has a significant role to play as agency relative to the total mind's doings.

:roll: I give up.

OK. So, first let me say, I'm not interested in convincing you of compatibilism. I can't do that. I don't want to do that, it's beside the point. I'm not even interested in convincing you compatibilism is *coherent*. All I'm interested in is if you're able, after this, to translate someone saying "I'm a compatibilist" into a more broken-down paraphrasing of what they're probably saying. — flannel jesus

I'm not interested in you convincing me of squat either. For Goddess's sake, I am a hardcore compatibilist - this of an indeterminsim ilk. Nor am I trying to convince you of anything either.

Re-read what I posted and rationally explain how a compatibilist notion of free will can make sense in the context of "an indeterminist compatibalist that does not uphold an indeterminist free will while upholding compatibilism.".

Because so far its about as irrational an affirmation as I can find.

Shall we start with step 1? — flannel jesus

Step 1 it is. Yes.

A compatibilist one — flannel jesus

And what is "a compatibilist one"?

As best as I so far can tell: Either "compatibilism" is defined thus and is thereby accordant with certain forms of indeterminsim or, else, it is a compatibilism that upholds causal determinism and hence can not at any juncture uphold an indeterminist free will.

If the first, an indeterminist compatibilist can only uphold an indeterminst notion of free will.
If the second, the only logical possiblity is a determinist notion of free will - which is utterly incompatible with the indeterminism upheld by the indeterminist compatibalist.

So what other definition of "compatibiliist" do you have to offer???

your description of an indeterminist compatibilism — javra


I didn't describe an indeterminist compatibilism. I described an indeterminist compatibilist - a person who is a compatibilist, who happens to be an indeterminist.

The two positions aren't related. It's just a person who holds both positions at once.. — flannel jesus

Right. Glad you made the correction you made. Still. True. You didn't describe indeterminsit compatibalism, you described a person who upholds the position of indeterminist compatibilism: ergo, you described a indeterminst compatibilist.

All this being a difference that makes absolutely no difference whatsoever in respect to this:

If your description of an indeterminist compatibilism compatibilist does not involve an indeterminst concept of free will, what on earth kind of free will can your description of an "indeterminst compatibilism compatibilist" possibly entail?

(I can so far only assume it then mandates a determinist concept of free will. But then how does one get a determinist concept of free will - i.e., a free will whose doings are causally inevitable in all conceivable cases - to in any way cohere with an indeterminist compatibilism compatibilist's view???) — javra

I don't much like sophistry, considering it a waste of time, and your response sure as fuddle so far seems to me to so be.

So, to get to the point: What the heck is a non-indetermistic notion of free will that can in any coherent way (i.e., any non-double-think or otherwise insane way) apply to an indetermistic compatibilist's views?

The universe being indeterministic doesn't seem to give any more room for free will than if it were deterministic. — flannel jesus

Especially in light of statements such as this, for the life of me i don't understand your reasoning. I'm presuming the best here, and am earnestly trying to understand. In then going back to this:

You don't see that an indeterminist concept of free will is logically contrary to a determinst's concept of free will — javra


My description of an indeterminist compatibilist didn't involve an indeterminist concept of free will. — flannel jesus

If your description of an indeterminist compatibilism does not involve an indeterminst concept of free will, what on earth kind of free will can your description of an "indeterminst compatibilism" possibly entail?

(I can so far only assume it then mandates a determinist concept of free will. But then how does one get a determinist concept of free will - i.e., a free will whose doings are causally inevitable in all conceivable cases - to in any way cohere with an indeterminist compatibilism???)

An indeterminist compatibilist is quite simply someone who is an indeterminist, and a compatibilist. Of course it is, why would it not be? A black horse is a creature that is a horse and is black. A rapping Asian is a person who is Asian and is rapping. An indeterminist compatibilist is an indeterminist who is a compatibilist.

I don't see which part you think is a jumble of words. — flannel jesus

You don't see that an indeterminist concept of free will is logically contrary to a determinst's concept of free will - even when either will claim their own versions of compatibilism. Given the span of this discussion on this topic, don't know what more to say then.

Maybe that is why you don't address this question via reasoning or examples. Again:

What is "I could have chosen otherwise"- this being indeterminist free will (the many potential details and varieties aside) - in a universe where everything is causally inevitable? — javra

I'll reply if you do address this question with some sort of explanation. Otherwise I won't. No biggie.

This is a jumble of words without definition and can potentially be as meaningless as would be "the black rainbow is both white and purple"

So it would really help out if you could answer this question as pertains to what you're attempting to argue:

What is "I could have chosen otherwise"- this being indeterminist free will (the many potential details and varieties aside) - in a universe where everything is causally inevitable? — javra

Because that's what compatibilism means. Compatibilism in this context literally means, my concept of free will is compatible with determinism. — flannel jesus

Yes, but you specifically specified - or attempted to - the definition of an indeterminsit compatibilist.

So an indeterminist compatibilism is just someone who believes we have free will, that we live in an indeterministic universe, but that if they happened to find out that we didn't live in an indeterministic universe, their understanding of free will would remain in tact. — flannel jesus

How do you figure that when a non-indeterminstic universe can only equate to a deterministic universe, which in today's parlance can only equate to "everything is causally inevitable". What is "I could have chosen otherwise"- this being indeterminist free will (the many potential details and varieties aside) - in a universe where everything is causally inevitable?

Yes, sure. But I didn't intend to say they are the same thing. To restate more explicitly: a (type of) indeterminist compatibilism.

But then again, given that compatibilism signifies a compatibility between free will and the necessity of determinants, what do you have in mind as a non-libertarian form of indeterminist compatibilism?

Yes. And liberarainism can only be indeterminist by today's semantics. Hence: an indeterminst compatibiliism.

did you know you don't have to be a determinist to be a compatibilist? — flannel jesus

I don't get the question. The possibility of indeterminst compatibilism is what I've been arguing for, after all.

I think you've given the definition of determinism and called it "compatibilism". — flannel jesus

OK, it was laconically written and so incomplete: add to it "and free will does occur". (I thought this would be implicitly understood.)

But, again, today's meaning of determinism is that "everything is causally inevitable" - so the definition I provided is not equivalent to determinism as understood today.

Are those your definitions? — flannel jesus

What fault can you find with them?

For me, "free will" alone, without the term "libertarian" attached, is the general term. Attach "libertarian" and you're talking about the subclass of free will ideas which are not compatible with determinism. Apparently that's consistent with how the word was coined:
— flannel jesus

The first recorded use of the term libertarianism was in 1789 by William Belsham in a discussion of free will and in opposition to necessitarian or determinist views.

For what it’s worth, as pertains to the history of ideas, the concept of compatibilism was developed by David Hume (see for example this SEP article) within the following context of ideas: free will and the necessity of determinacy are not only not mutually exclusive but in fact require each other to in any way work and make sense of the world.

With that in mind, here’s a simplified explanation of a libertarian compatibilism.

Working definitions:

Libertarianism: it is metaphysically possible that one could have chosen otherwise than what one chooses at any juncture of choice making.

Compatibilism: it is metaphysically impossible that any event, including that of choice making, can occur in fully undetermined manners; i.e. all events, including that of choice making, must be in some way determined by necessary determinants.

Premises:

P1: There can be no free will, libertarian or otherwise, in the absence of intentions.
P2: There can be no intentioning in the absence of at least one intent (i.e,, goal) which one seeks to actualize.
P3: The intent of any conceivable intentioning will always determine the actions one takes so as to actualize the given intent.
P3.1: An intent one pursues is thereby always a determinant of one’s actions, including those mental actions taken during moments of choice making.
P3.2: An intent is thereby always a subspecies of final causes, aka of teleological determinants.

Conclusion:

C1: Were libertarian free will to occur, it would necessarily be at all times minimally, but thoroughly, determined by teleological determinants.
C2: Using the working definitions provided, libertarian free will shall thereby at all times be necessarily determined by determinants if it is to in any way occur, thereby mandating a libertarian compatibilism: such that libertarian free will cannot possibly occur in the absence of the necessity of being itself determined.

In other words: no such thing as undetermined libertarian free will can occur, which (given the working definitions provided) would then be classifiable as a species of thought as “an incompatibilist libertarianism” – again, specifying a libertarian free will that is in no way determined by any determinants.

but now we've come full circle and you're not saying that your particular brand of libertarian free will IS in fact incompatibilist. — flannel jesus

No. Please take the time to read what I post, as in this post here.

That initial post says it better, but to recap: libertarian free will can be an indeterminsim (as per the official meaning of the term "determinism" today in philosophical circles - with "indeterminism" then basically saying that at least some things are not causally inevitable) that is nevertheless compatible with determinacy (determinants and that which they determine). Ergo, libertarian compatibilism (for otherwise it would be soft-determinism compatibilism, which denies the possibility of libertarian free will).

After all, in a number of agentially libertarian forms of free will, the agent of itself is the efficient cause of the decision taken as effect - such that, despite potentially being influenced this way and that, it as cause to the decision as effect is at that juncture not predetermined in what it will decide by any other cause whatsoever. It's not determinism (everything is causally inevitable), but it is of itself a form of determiniacy - thereby fully compatible with a cosmos composed of determinants (again, of the four Aristotelian kinds).

Maybe you are confusing "indeterminism" with "incompatibilism" as terms?

I'll check in later. Spent enough time today at doing this.

an extremely unnecessarily narrow view of determinism fails, perhaps. — flannel jesus

OK. I'll nevertheless repeat myself once again, if teleological causes and formal causes ontically occur, then one cannot logically maintain that everything is causally inevitable. Period.

So this broader view of determinism is not what is referred to by the term in today's philosophical literature. This broader view of determinism is instead logically contrary to it: thereby, in today's lingo, being in fact an in-(non)-deterministic metaphysics.

Man, read the first two sentences of the second paragraph

In general, a process can have multiple causes,[1] which are also said to be causal factors for it, and all lie in its past. An effect can in turn be a cause of, or causal factor for, many other effects, which all lie in its future.

and then read the last sentence of the third paragraph:

Of Aristotle's four explanatory modes, the one nearest to the concerns of the present article is the "efficient" one.

And then reread what I previously said. (I feel like I'm spoon-feeding, and I don't like doing so.)

If you then still disagree, give some reasoning or references for so disagreeing. Please.

Are teleological and formal causes the *reason* why some things happen? — flannel jesus

They are merely "reasons" when one denies their ontological occurrence as determinants. And, once again, if they are ontologically occurring determinants, then determinism (as expressed in my linked to quote) fails.

Oh, shucks. I provided reasoning for what I upheld and yet uphold.

Go to the Wikipedia website linked to and click on the term "causally" and you will indeed see for yourself that it does strictly address efficient causes (wherein the cause temporally precedes the effect - this is not the case in either teleological causes or formal causes (in both of the latter, the determinant occurs, and can only occur, at the same time as that determined).

Don't now have time to look for more in depth references. There's this for starters.

Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.[1]

Both formal causation and teleological causation directly contradict this proposition. Why? To express it briefly, and I acknowledge imperfectly: Because if these two forms of causation do occur, then some things are necessarily determined by determinants other than (efficient) causes per se. This such that some efficiently causal chains, or webs, can be (or at least in certain metaphysics can be viably upheld to be) altered via the two alternative forms of causation that are excluded. Which would then annul determinism (as it is specified in the quote). (Whereas material causes can be accordant to determinism as just specified.)

Most of today's compatibilitsts are so called soft-determinists. They uphold the determinism specified in the quote and further interpret "free will" in non-libertarian manners to conclude that there is compatibility between determinism and free will.

Therefore, most (at the very least I as one exception) will then conclude that libertarianism necessitates an incompatibility between libertarianism and determinacy - this on grounds of today's compatibilitsts being in fact determinists (who, again, reject the very possibility of both formal causation and teleological causation, basically to uphold the coherency of determinism thus understood as fully constituted of events made fully inevitable by efficient causes).

Why is it so common that people think that, pretty much -by definition-, libertarian free will means incompatibilist free will?

-edit- I even see Stanford Encyclopedia saying the same thing. — flannel jesus

In a nutshell: because people today - both academic and otherwise - have been habituated into believing that determinacy can only apply to a conflux of material causation / determinacy and efficient causation / determinacy - this to the necessary exclusion of teleological causation / determincay and formal causation / determinacy. But this is patently wrong.

To anyone who believes that it is not patently wrong to so exclude, please logically evidence how the latter two types of causes / determinacy must be logical impossibilities within metaphysics at large (or at least point to someone who so logically evidences).

Why do you think libertarianism isn't a subcategory of incompatibilism? — flannel jesus

It can strongly depend on what one makes, how one interprets, determinate state of affairs. This, for one example, can hearken back to the possibility of teleology determinacy - as one of many examples. Something that today's notions of determinism denies. Yes, I get that this outlook is by no means common nowadays, but I can find nothing to evidence the metaphysical, to not mention logical, impossibility of such forms of determinacy. But since teleological mechanisms are generally speaking jargonish to you, I'll skip the details. All the same, yea, I for one am a libertarian compatibilist. Have been ever since I read David Hume (maybe a different issue). So liberarianism is not necessarily a subcategory of incompatibalsim (namely, a lack of compatibility between libertarian free will and deterministic processes). One could also think of this stance as a form of "semi-determinism" - one which thereby endorses indeterminism (in the sense of today's notions of causal determinism) but denounces the notion of incompatibilism (again, between libertarian free will and determinacy).

I duly grant it isn't a common outlook nowadays, but it does illustrate the case when it comes to logical possibilities regarding libertarianism and incompatibilism.

Here's the way I look at it. When I raise my hand, it can be the result of a variety of things:

1. I internally desire to raise my hand, so I raise my hand.
2. I have no desire one way or the other, but someone raises my hand for me.
3. I have a spasm and my hand flies upward.
4. Someone shocks my brain and me hand goes upward (I meant to say "me" here so I could sound like Oliver Twist).

I think we can say that 1 is the result of free will. — Hanover

I see this as a misconstruing of what libertarian free will entails, aka that divine spark you mentioned, as some might interpret it.

How can there be consciousness's free will involved if there is no conscious deliberation involved as to whether or not one should raise one's hand? Yes, I get that we intend outcome X and then it happens without being in any way obstructed. We willed X (in this case to raise the hand) and it became real as we intended without any bars, so to speak, to our so doing. Many thereby deem this a volition, will, that was free to do what it intended, and ergo conclude it to be "free will". All the same, it's ain't the conscious agent which so decided between alternatives that it do so. Not unless there was that conscious deliberation which I just mentioned in which one deliberates between which alternative to choose.

Most of what we do on a moment by moment basis is freely willed in the sense of being done as we consciously wanted without any obstruction. We don't for example, deliberate on which words, what intonations, what volume of sound, etc. to express when speaking a sentence to another - and we end up (usually) communicating that which we wanted to communicate. Willed without obstructions to (or constraints upon) our so realizing and hence free in this sense, but this misses the point of that spark which is pivotal to the issue of what in philosophical literature is formally termed "free will".

And I find that this can easily converge with #4 which you've presented. No deliberation between which alternative to pursue, no (technical) free will. The electricity to the brain stimulates the same unconscious processes (a complex topic I'm seeking to keep as simple as possible) that determine our voluntarily raising our hand in manners devoid of deliberation. If there are no second thoughts to do so between which we deliberate, then there is no free will in the sense of that spark involved.

But whenever one deliberates between alternatives, then one does, or at least can be argued to, make use of one's libertarian free will as conscious being.

Technically, free will is defined as freedom of which choice to make in moments of choice-making. And not doing that which one as a total mind (conscious and unconscious) wants in the absence of any conscious deliberation (i.e., conscious choice making) so long as the outcome is not obstructed.

I'll keep this short and see how that goes. So I'll stop here.

I personally believe that in dreams the somio-conscious "I" is constituted of a lesser quantity of yet unconscious awareness-endowed agencies, a sleeping "I" which then interacts with fully unconscious agencies via imaginary phenomena that are mostly intended by these unconscious agencies of mind. — javra


That is what led me to think you were proposing a duality of I's. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. I did however clearly express "the somnio-conscious 'I'". I don't find how consciousness and somnio-consciousness can co-occur to thereby present a duality of I's. I, for example, can still vividly recall certain dreams and nightmares I've had decades ago: to me, I am the same I I was in these dreams and nightmares as a first-person point of view (with differences in my empirical ego, contexts, etc., of course): same first-person perspective regarding otherness, same affinities and aversions, etc. Hence, to me, a continuity rather than a duality of I-ness.

The unconscious agent can be known to be permanent, because it is there all the time, [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I can see what you mean, but I myself don't subscribe to the unconscious mind being an agent (a unified agency). Again, I find reason to believe that the unconscious mind is constituted of a plurality of sometimes discordant agencies, themselves always changing. As one example, when awake and experiencing a pang of envy one can at the same time likewise experience one's conscience influencing one against becoming envious oneself: here there will then be two distinct agencies that are antagonistic to each other, each emerging from one's unconsciousness, each attempting to influence one's future course of action or of personal being. This as one example of how the unconscious mind can well consist of a plurality of discordant agencies.

I don't think we can draw this conclusion validly. Evolution, and life in general consists of a lot of trial and error. The errors are a sort of dead end process which is not consistent with success. So if we assume that there is an ultimate goal or purpose, we cannot automatically conclude that the way of being which is current is necessarily conducive to the ultimate end. It could be an erroneous 'dead end' way. This lack of necessity, which is involved with teleological relations in general, makes teleology very difficult. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. I did say that it can get very complex. If free will is to be upheld, for example, there's always choices between, for one example, further sustaining and growing one's (dualistic) ego at the expense of others' well-being and becoming more selfless in one's mindset and doings. Assuming that selflessness as an ideal is good and that selfishness as an ideal is bad, many will willfully chose the latter - this even if something like absolutely selfless being (which can conform to many a neoplatonist notion of the One) were to be the ultimate telos of being. But all this is simplified examples regarding the complexity I had in mind.

This supports my proposal that the conscious mind is an observer only. It does not even provide options for judgement, it only observes them, memorizes them, etc.. What actually resolves disagreement within oneself? The conscious mind provides all sorts of information, to facilitate judgement, but what part of the person is actually responsible for judgement? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not intending to engage in debates about this. What you here say indeed reminds me well enough of many a Hindu interpretation of atman, "witness consciousness". Yet, myself, I'll heavily lean toward this same consciousness being that which actively judges which alternative is optimally beneficial and should be manifested - this at expense of all other alternatives, i.e. of all other possible courses of action or of manifestation which then become rejected - and thereby chooses. In my own understanding, then, the agent (the conscious mind) always holds responsibility for the choices it itself makes, this in accord to its own judgments.

Yet, again, in this I don't intend to insinuate a division, else a duality, of mind. As per the iceberg metaphor, to me its the same total thing; only that some aspects of it as a commonwealth of agencies converge into consciousness and others don't.

For example, I awaken from a dream, and after a brief moment of reflection I make the judgement, that was just a dream. Prior to this the dream was judged (in some way) as reality. So my conscious mind has created a sort of narrative, a history, and as soon as I awaken I reflect briefly on these memories, and assure myself it was just a dream. I suggest that it is not the conscious mind which makes this judgement, because it doesn't even need that judgement. The conscious mind was never a part of the dream, and when I wake up not from a dream I have no question of whether this is reality or not. The conscious does not judge whether what it experiences is reality. So in actuality, the unconscious was in the dream, and it gets reassured by the consciousness that it was just a dream, and it makes the judgement that it was just a dream. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know. Doubtless that the unconscious mind influences consciousness in many a way. But, at the same time, I find that the conscious mind can via its judgments choose to believe in many a weird thing. To my shock, having partaken of this forum (and the previous one) for some years, I've learned that some conscious minds will for example choose to believe in solipsism - such that what we know to be our waking states of being they interpret as also being a dream produced by their individual mind (sometimes reduced to their individual brain). For starters, it's a rather egotistic, selfish, else self-centered means of interpreting the world at large, but all the same it can happen.

This page seems to give a good overview of teleology, but is considerably longer than this page, which also give an adequate overview. Notice that I'm not linking to articles that further these concepts in jargon such as "distal", etc., but simple to understand Wikipedia pages written from as broad an audience as one can get.

A "final cause", aka "telos" is far more than what you've succinctly and clearly expressed in plain language paraphrasing - with the latter being only one subsection of the former. And I'm fairly sure that without understanding what a telos is it's going to be more pointless than not to engage in discussion regarding how free will can be neither deterministic nor random.

That's all I've got for now. Sorry dude.

Alright. Maybe I'm tired and it shows in my expressions. Maybe you could bother to look into the rather basic wikipedia page of final causation I've linked to to better understand it. It's terminology and concepts that have a history of two millennia. Though not often addressed in today's materialist metaphysical understandings.

Thing is, teleology can easily reduce to basic concepts, yes, but - to my best current appraisal - to grasp the implications of teleology in the context of free will requires more than just today's basic concepts of causation and randomness. It's like discussing what fitness means in the context of evolutionary biology without any comprehension of the basic biological paradigm, a little like debating the issue with someone who replies "but the animal fits just fine in the box over there, so what do you mean it has no biological fitness if it never reproduces? And why can't you use ordinary language rather than a specialized meaning for 'fitness'. It fits in the box after all."

As I've said, maybe I'm largely at fault in my expressions, but I've got no problems in letting things be as they currently are, lack of common understanding on the subject though we currently have.

You've imagined a statue that you want to make. It becomes your goal to make it. You make choices to achieve that goal. The desire to achieve your goal is part of what determines your actions, while you still haven't achieved it yet.

Is that right? Is that it in a nutshell? — flannel jesus

That works. But to me it excludes things that are themselves important. Such that each alternative one chooses between, at the time of the choice making, is of itself a goal, or aim, one then chooses between.

"Distal end" sounds like a fancy way of saying end goal. Is that right? — flannel jesus

Sure, but the "end goal" is almost always relative to context. For most any end goal invisions, there is almost always a more distant or abstract end goal to which the first plays a more proximate part. E.g., you're aim is to satisfy you're hunger, but this in itself can have the further down the line end goal of staying alive. Etc.

What does "not yet actualized future actualized statue" mean? That's a very difficult phrase to parse. — flannel jesus

OK, not written as good as it could be. End is a not yet actualized statue that you intend to actualize at some point in the future - otherwise you actualizing the statue you have in mind will not be a personal aim you actively hold (say you're only imagining a statue for the fun of it with no intention to bring about any such thing in reality at any point in your life).

Ok. There's an intent, a goal, a not yet actualized end which you want, or desire, to make real at some point in the future. It could be a classic example of having made a statue, or it could be that intent os satiating one's hunger or thirst. Whatever it is, that's the end pursued.

So lets say you have a statue in mind as final product which you want to actualize. For as long as you move toward this - in this example - distal (or distant) end/telos you will likely make certain choices between alternatives (each being its own potential and more proximal end/telos) that best satisfies the accomplishment of you distal end.

The distal end, in effect, then to some significant degree determines which proximate alternative you will likely choose in your efforts to actualize the distal end.

The not yet actualized future actualized statue is then the final cause of your current actions, say chiseling a block of stone. Hence, the telos/aim/goal/end you actively hold in mind teleologially determines your current activities toward it.

So far so good? Or do you have objections?

Are you at all familiar with the notion of final causes?

In today's terms and commonly accepted metaphysics they're considered to not be causes but explanations. I term the process "teleological determinacy" to hopefully explicitly emphasize that intents/teloi/ends can and do in fact determine present motions - in the content of the OP, this as regards will.

If you're not at all familiar with this notion of determinacy which is more commonly termed final causation, then I get why the question makes no sense to you.

Can you please answer my question first. It still applies.

Right? Does that make sense? Like, even if you don't think it's true, do you at least understand the reasoning there? — flannel jesus

Yes. I do understand the reasoning. And it's that very non-teleological reasoning that I initially replied to. Somehow feel like we're going about in circles. So I won't repeat the summarized argument I previously expressed.

Do you still maintain that there can be no teleological reasoning or determinacy? If so, unless you can provide rationally justification for excluding the very possibility of teleological reasoning and determinacy, I'll maybe call it quits. I'm not intending to argue against unjustified affinities toward certain metaphysical outlooks that others nevertheless prefer to maintain - this despite their lack of justification.

Yea. I got that much.

I thought you said "theological" lol. — flannel jesus

Oh. OK

None of that looks to me like it has anything to do with what I said. I never said any of those things at all, I don't think. — flannel jesus

It's based on best interpretations of this comment:

The article (and I grant I haven't taken my time in reading it) completely forsakes teleological reasoning and teleological determinacy — javra


Thank god for that — flannel jesus

How else ought this comment of yours be interpreted, especially when taken into context of what I was expressing about intentioning's teleological reasoning and determinacy?

Have fun doing whatever you're up to. — flannel jesus

Visited my father's gravesite with other to commemorate his death. Not exactly what I take ought to be fun. But thanks anyway.

It's my understanding that they're mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive. I've never been given a coherent reason to think otherwise, and I don't currently think there is a coherent reason to believe otherwise. I'm actually inclined to think it's basically tautologically true that, for any given evolution of a closed system from one state into another state, either that evolution is deterministic or it involves some randomness. — flannel jesus

On what grounds do you justify this rather stringent opinion?

As I previously alluded to, I disagree with it on grounds that I take the teleological reasoning of intentioning to be ontically occurrent and hence real. And it can neither be efficient causation nor randomness.

At any rate, glad you're aware enough of your own convictions.

But, to be honest, I'm mainly replying due to not then understanding what you intend by the word "will" other than something which lacks an ontological referent, as in this sentence:

... well, maybe something different might happen, but you can't attribute that difference to your will. — flannel jesus

To be clearer, if will, volition - be it conscious or unconscious - has nothing to do with intentioning and hence with teleology (succinctly, the movement toward ends such that the not yet actualized ends pursued to some measure determine the actions taken in the present), then what is "the will" to you?

Yes, but again, you are presuming a forced choice between randomness and causal determinacy - with a "thank god" attitude for not entertaining teleological reasoning of intentions.

Why doesn't 1 + X = 2 irrespective of whether one equates X to 0 or to 2? Because it cant.

I'm off for now.