science cannot address even in principle [what value is] — javra


Can the question of what value is be addressed without regard to what it is that people value? Whatever answer we might give to the question "what is value?" wouldn't it be rejected if it is something that no one values? Is there a tipping point? Would it be an adequate answer if one person values it or only a few people? Does it matter who it is that values it? — Fooloso4

Your questions do not address my contention. Value is experiential, but in no way empirical (in the modern sense of the term); therefore, the empirical sciences can only presuppose its reality via non-scientific means, and cannot discern what value is via the scientific method. And, as to "what is value" a dictionary will provide commonly upheld definitions.

Maybe more concrete examples might help out:

What empirically falsifiable hypothesis can be produced to determine if “value” is a fallacious reification of a process? Moreover, by what empirical means could this hypothesis then be tested?

Whether value is a process cannot be determined by the empirical sciences, this in principle, because - be it in fact process or not - it is not something that can be directly perceived via the physiological senses, but can only be inferred from empirical observations that presuppose its reality. For the same reason, neither can the empirical sciences determine whether “extrinsic value” is an accurate conception of what can in fact occur. Nor can it (needless to add, via the scientific method) better delineate what intrinsic value might be, or if it is real. And so forth. While these are all experience-based issues, none of them are empirical (again, in the modern sense of the term).

And whether value is a process or not, to claim that it is unimportant is to directly engage in hypocrisy, for this would be an affirmation of value.

Etc.

How we might distinguish between what people say they value and what they actually value is something that experiments can help determine. — Fooloso4

Sure, but this, again, presupposes the reality of what value is. It, however, does not, and cannot, establish its reality through the scientific method of the empirical sciences.

Suppose "value" is a fallacious reification, and instead there is only valuing as a process that occurs. Could science study human valuing? — wonderer1

Suppositions can get rather arbitrary. Value is a standard English noun, and value was only one of the examples I've provided. It is fully synonymous to "worth". That said, as someone who upholds process philosophy, of course I take it to be a process - just as much as all other nouns in language are. But my only point remains, empirical science cannot be used to give us better understanding or knowledge of what value/worth is - even if it is rephrased as "valuing"/"worthing".

There are some who are critical of the notion of a political or social science, but many in academic political science departments, wanting to mark and defend their territory, regard what they are doing as science. — Fooloso4

They're worthy academic fields of study, but the vast majority of social sciences, and of political science more narrowly, do not make use of the scientific method which pertains to the empirical sciences. In rough parallel, many deem theoretical mathematics to be a science, which it is in the now largely archaic sense of "knowledge obtained via study" - but it in no way utilizes the scientific method as I've outlined it in my previous post. But then, in this archaic sense, in which social and political science are sciences, so too can be philosophy, here granting that knowledge can be obtained via its study.

With regard to value, a social or political scientist might study what it is that people value, putting aside or rejecting the question of what value is essentially. Does philosophy or any other discipline do any better? — Fooloso4

This can enter into an utterly different direction. My sole contention has been that the empirical sciences - again, which utilize the scientific method - cannot address what value is, this even in principle. Philosophy, on the other hand, can - in both principle and practice - with value theory as a primary example of this. That the field of philosophy arguably hasn't been so far very successful at pinpointing what value is will however be entirely unrelated to the stance I'm taking regarding empirical science's innate limitations.

Science is a process of selective limitation. — Pantagruel

Please clarify. Examples would be helpful. — 180 Proof

In relation to the scientific method of the empirical sciences—by which I mean falsifiable hypothesis, test with no or with restricted confounding variables, results, and the replicability of the later, all of which is verified via peer-review methodologies—here’s a partial listing of generally important things which science cannot address even in principle, this due to its intrinsic limitations of what it can address:

• What value is
• What meaning/significance is
• What justice is
• What goodness is
• What knowledge is
• The verity of the upheld epistemological tenets (e.g., fallibilism) and ontological tenets (e.g., the nature of time, space, and causality) upon which all empirical science is founded; otherwise expressed, the philosophical tenets encompassed by the philosophy of science which all empirical sciences make use of in their endeavors.

These, among others, cannot be addressed even in principle by science because scientific knowledge can only pertain to those aspects of reality which are in principle perceivable via the physiological senses by any and all people. This were one to have the inclination, and in some cases the technical requirements, to so look.

This isn’t to in any way detract from the importance of science, but it is to illustrate that science is quite limited in what it can address. And this because it has no choice but to select for understanding/knowledge in those topics which can be empirically verified and/or falsified.

In order to find harmony, religious belief needs to be excluded. But in doing so we lose the parts of religion that is of tremendous importance to our mental health and social bonding. The practices we have in rituals, mythological storytelling and exploration needs to somehow be reworked into a context of non-religious belief, which requires a new paradigm of how to live life. — Christoffer

as well as:

Where, more generally, do the ideas of 'harmony' and the 'collective' derive from, and why can't there be equal dialogue about them between the religious and irreligious? — mcdoodle

Apropos the interplay between religious and irreligious beliefs and praxis: Back in my early twenties when I basically was an atheist in all implied senses of the word (no gods, no spirituality, etc.) a friend once asked me: “If you don’t believe in anything spiritually sacred, then why not choose to piss on a gravesite rather than, say, near an adjacent tree when you’re in a cemetery and there is no one else around?”

It’s a male-centric question, I grant, but, its non-gratuitous vulgarity aside, I still find it to be a good question in regards to beliefs and praxis.

I had my psychological answers back then—basically affirming that respecting the spiritual beliefs of others grants me psychological warrant to then expect that my own atheistic beliefs be respected by them in turn. Other people’s potential answer to the question might well be different. But I think the question can go fairly deep in terms of distinguishing the sacred (to each spiritual person and group of such their own) from the profane; as well as in addressing how the atheist relates to this sacred/profane distinction made by theists.

Not much of an argument for anything. So there’s no real need to address this post. But I’m mentioning this viewing it to directly address the connection between spiritual beliefs and praxis—be the praxis on the part of the theist or the atheist. (Here presuming most atheists to have respect for the gravesites of the dead, despite not interpreting the gravesite as anything spiritually sacred.)

I see good and evil as inextricably intertwined. The knife is a tool and a weapon. — frank

I read this as entailing that being just in decision X is inextricably entwined with being unjust in decision X, or else that being right about what one ought to do is inextricably entwined with being wrong about one ought to do - and vice versa in both cases. Which paints a different impression of the thread's theme. In which case, never mind. It's not a tale I subscribe to.

I mentioned greed, not self-sufficiency.

Wiktionary defines greed as “a selfish or excessive desire for more than is needed or deserved [...]”. In parallel, Wikipedia states:

Greed (or avarice) is an insatiable desire for material gain (be it food, money, land, or animate/inanimate possessions) or social value, such as status, or power. Greed has been identified as undesirable throughout known human history because it creates behavior-conflict between personal and social goals. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greed

... which is in accord to what I was saying and contrary to your disagreement.

Greed is at direct odds with just deserts, aka fair appraisals of merit.

I first want to verify we're addressing the same thing - greed - before bothering to reply further.

American politics is comedy gold. — Tzeentch

More like a tragic travesty of democracy when you're a voter within it. Besides, American politics might also have some effect upon non-American politics worldwide, I'm thinking.

Historically, a society's myths and folktales would offer justifications for the social order. If you look at your own culture, you can pick up on these. — frank

Can’t help but comment on this. In as simplified manner as I can currently muster, there are two directly contradictory mythoi, or folk-tales, that are currently at work in—even our global—society:

1) Greed is good.

2) Greed is bad.

Mythos (1) directly underlies our current global economy: a pyramid structure based on the falsity of infinite growth with infinite resources, driven by materialistic consumerism by the masses, wherein those most greedy (hence, least empathetic toward other’s wellbeing) will always win by being closest to the pyramid’s zenith.

Mythos (2), however, underlies so much of our global day to day politics of human interaction (what in my anthropology classes was terms politics with a small “p”) so as to be nearly ubiquitous to humankind—and it is the small "p" politics of individual human interactions we all engage in that, in democratic systems at least, results in the prevailing capital "P" political systems by which individuals are then governed.

(1) is now prevailing worldwide. COP28 as just one noteworthy example of this. (The corruption of USA's political systems by corporate (else, monetary) interests as just one instantiation of this.)

I’ll leave it up to others to judge whether mythos (1) and mythos (2) lead to the same long-term wellbeing, eudemonia, among humans.

My main point here is that—given their direct, logical contradiction—mythos (1) and mythos (2) cannot both be right. This, at least, in so far as depicting that which we ought to strive for for maximal wellbeing. This conflict between the two mythoi being something that underpins a lot of the Trumpist and Leftist (etc., for other perspectives are also present) ambitions in terms of Politics in the US.

I see. :grin: I've never used this word before. — L'éléphant

:smile: eh, "javra" is the Romanian word for cur/mongrel, not that many people make a habit of using the latter.

His choices -- exile, renounce his beliefs, or death -- all points towards the destruction of his identity. — L'éléphant

Yes. Moreover, were he to choose exile and a renunciation of his beliefs rather than concede to his sentence of death, this would have served to obliterate the cause which he strove for. So, especially given that all choices pointed toward the destruction of his own identity, conceding to die was that one option what best served his cause. Doubtful that his ideas would have been held in the same regard historically without Plato having written The Apology of Socrates [edit] or if Socrates would have evidenced himself a hypocrite by choosing to not honor the results of this trial by jury. The Platonic Academy might have never emerged otherwise, for instance.

Isn't that the only way to rebel against a self-generating need-machine: to become the machine yourself? — kudos

no. You might want to address my first post to you.

:lol:

I have not words at the moment. — L'éléphant

Hey, as to being debased by others, “javra” does translate into “cur”. @kudos’s less than civil reply is nothing shocking.

But I’m glad someone is getting a good kick out of things so far.

How nice to know that I'm successfully tapping into the debased individuals who make up the NIN fanbase. Looks like we're getting somewhere good now. Didn't Trent and Manson both satirize the illusion of choice and agency? Through their spectacular debauchery they exposed the asymptotic strivings of the autonomic continuation paradigm. — kudos

Not that this reply in any way addresses my post, but your biased interpretations re NIN are showing. Check this out, for example; and if you want, let me know how non-spiritual, anti-choice, or anti-agency it seems to you:



At any rate, is this going to turn into a rock music is debauchery thing? Or do you have some meaningful content to impart in relation to the content I previously posted?

Would you represent this kind of character as common of someone who has been catered to every whim and pleasure their entire life? — kudos

As the Buddha is said to have been, this before his quest for enlightenment wherein he sat under a tree and nearly starved to death in his ponderings? Certainly the Buddha can be said to have "achieved control over the 'will to power' as regards his attributed circumstances" (this when power is understood as “ability to accomplish”).

From the OP:

I am interested in a self-destructive individual, and how self-destructive tendencies can possibly be a source of spiritual pleasure that overcomes the pleasure of survival and subsistence. — kudos

“Self-destruction” can signify many things and come in many forms. The want for ego-death, wherein the empirical ego is obliterated—and in some traditions said to then be rebirthed anew—comes to mind as one form of want for the destruction of the self. Even Nietzsche’s aphorism of the beast of burden whose back breaks from the load bared, turned into a carnivore combating the monster of “thou shalt and shalt not”, that after fully vanquishing the monster is then turned into a newly birthed babe to the world can easily be interpreted to address just such an ego death. In parallel, all forms of sincere love, such as compassion, will in due measure destroy an otherwise seemingly isolated selfhood—are the destruction of the self in this sense—this in part by opening up floodgates regarding the intrinsic worth of others such that one opens up to what’s commonly termed selfless acts, with altruism as an example.

But something tells me these trains of thought are not what you’re after as regards destruction of the self and spirituality?

To be honest, though, I’m mainly posting because the OP’s enquiry into self-destruction heavily reminds me of this song, which I generally like :smile: :



As artistic expressions go, there might be found some deeper truths in the lyrics dependent on their interpretation; e.g., assent to falsehoods is detrimental to one’s long-term well-being, even if somehow comforting in the short-term. More concretely exemplified, alcoholism is detrimental in just such a manner, yet some will prefer it to dealing with the hardships of life all the same.

But, unlike notions of ego-death for example, I so far don’t understand how such behaviors detrimental to one’s well-being can be said to be spiritual aiming or yearning.

Don't be shy, what do you think? — LuckyR

Already stated.

Think of it this way, the same can be generally applied to an innate attraction to justice. What is just is in one way subjective to individual judgments in concrete particular contexts while, in another maybe far more important way, can all the same be perfectly determinate in the sense of being universally fixed, this as something like "fairness in given and take".

Not an easy topic to address though. So I'll be shy from here on out. :smile:

That is fair, but, ¿in this view of consciousness, when can we say it starts? — Lionino

An addendum to my previous reply: To more directly address this first question, given the aforementioned post's contents, a human conscious being will then approximately commence with birth into the world and will end with corporeal death. As to the thread’s overall theme, were continuation of conscious being to occur subsequent to death—in this example, via reincarnations—it would then consist of ongoing periods of “a human conscious being’s life” thus understood: this in very rough analogy to how, during one’s life, one as a conscious being consists of ongoing periods of awakened states of being which are separated by periods of sleep (which individually commence with awakening from sleep and end with falling asleep at night). The principle difference, to my mind, being consciously accessible recollections or former periods addressed. Yet such periodic states of being, to my mind at least, do not necessitate that process philosophy cannot apply throughout.

though you're saying that "good" is subjective thus essentially anyone's chosen behavior can be labeled "good" if you equate intentionality with seeking to do "good". — LuckyR

I'll honestly say "yes" and "no" (at the same time but in different ways). But will keep it at that for now.

Is it not the inverse? Going by the first quote, it seems that space and time arise from objects, so space and time would need objects and not the other way. I feel like this could be a semantic nitpick on the way you phrased the statement; if it is, ignore it. — Lionino

I'm hoping an analogy might help. Here addressing space alone strictly via geometric points, which, as a reminder, are in themselves defined as volumeless: Conceptually addressed, were there to hypothetically strictly be one geometric point in all of existence, no space would manifest, for all that would here occur is one instantiation of volume-less-ness which, by its very attributes, is spaceless. However, once one allows for the occurrence of two or more geometric points, space (distance-between) will necessarily be coexistent with them. One can here say that space arises from (or is constituted by) a plurality of geometric points, yet here space would need a plurality of geometric points just as much as a plurality of geometric points would need space. Because they they can only be contemporaneous, it then doesn't make sense to ask whether space occurs first and the plurality of geometric points second or vice versa. The two necessitate each other at all times.

Also, as typically understood, objects are only one type of givens that are identity endowed. Thoughts, as well as emotions, can serve as another type of such givens. In so upholding, I then find that cognition is of itself spatiotemporal (although clearly not physical): As one example, because a paradigm (e.g., biological evolution) consists of multiple ideas (e.g., the ideas of species and mutation), a paradigm will then be "larger than" one individual idea contained therein from which it is constituted, such that this relation of "larger than" is here itself a spatial relation (albeit here, clearly not in a physical sense of space). I don't so much want to clarify this here (it would be very cumbersome) as to point out that when I previously mentioned identities I didn't mean to restrict them to objects (again, as objects are typically understood). A conscious being (to which thoughts, emotions, etc. pertain) being another identity that doesn't qualify as an object.

In parallel, if one as a conscious being experiences a new percept, one as the conscious being addressed will itself continue through time unchanged — javra

That is fair, but, ¿in this view of consciousness, when can we say it starts? And if we have a person as a five year old, is it the same consciousness as the same person 80 years later with advanced dementia (may it not happen)? — Lionino

You'll notice that the semantics are here subtly but importantly changed: this in the difference between "a conscious being" and "consciousness". I only know that I cannot know when consciousness started. In terms of a conscious being, however, this is always identified by type. For instance, in supposing that gametes are awareness-endowed and in this sense alone conscious beings, two gametic conscious beings can then unify to produce a different type of conscious being, that of the zygote's. The zygote will then develop and itself change in the nature of what conscious being is addressed till it becomes that type of conscious being which we identify as a human, at which point typically birth occurs. Then the conscious being further changes from a human infant, to a human child, to a human adolescent, etc.

Here, then, in the same sense that a human infant, or human child, and a human elder with advanced dementia (ditto to may it not happen) are different phases of the same exact human being, we can then safely affirm that the infant, or child, and the elder are two different phases of the same conscious being.

Having said this, the conscious being's consciousness will perpetually change throughout.

Here, then, each different type of conscious being will have a different type of quality and magnitude of overall consciousness: hence the sperm's awareness of direction, for example, is of a different magnitude than the awareness of the embryo in utero, is of a different magnitude than the awareness of the birthed human being as a whole.

But I fully acknowledge the many complexities involved. The aforementioned is nevertheless how I currently view the issue.

Now, do you think that, if the nature of time is continuous (and time here would be not relative but an independent substance/dimension within which bodies exist), it would favour a process philosophy view of consciousness, and if it is discrete it would favour quanta-of-identity, or that there is no correlation? — Lionino

Yes, this correlation is in keeping with my best current understanding, or at least my best current intuitions. Although I find that time can also be continuous and relative (this being the view I currently take - as in relative to a plurality of identities that are each endowed with the ability of causation).

So... sociopaths have no soul? — LuckyR

:grin: I could see how that could be allegorically stated. :up: Still, technically, I will argue that sociopaths too want to be good at what they do, and so are in their own way innately attracted to the good, even though their conception of it might be easily considered perverse.

Twice Socrates connects the just and beautiful and good (276b, 278a) — Fooloso4

I was aiming more at this conception rather than beauty as sexual/carnal attraction. If the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good are interwoven (if not in fact being the same thing), I'm thinking the motif of penetration commonly enough attributed to Pan of that age and specific culture could be interpreted spiritually using sexual intercourse as an allegory. As in being penetrated by the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good. All speculation, of course. This could however relate to:

In the mystery cults of the highly syncretic Hellenistic era,[16] Pan is identified with Phanes/Protogonos, Zeus, Dionysus and Eros.[17] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_(god)#Worship

Here assuming Hellenism to be in significant ways derivative of Plato's writings.

Still, the connection between the three ideals/forms mentioned - and a person's possible attraction, hence eros, toward this nexus - is where my main interests personally are.

That's also how i understand it, but am looking for a better insight into it. — Wayfarer

Not sure if this is in tune with what you're after, but the desire to become one with X, here spiritually addressed, would then be eros for X. X could then for example be God just as much as it could be a lover. In the context of this thread, the desire to become good (hence, to become one with the Good) would then be eros as well. As @Fooloso4 previously mentioned, although this desire is innate (everyone wants to be good at what they do, for one example), we don't quite know what the Good we're wanting to be in fact is.

If I'm way off in terms of what your asking for, maybe someone else could give a better answer.

---------

Edit: just realized, beauty, the aesthetic, too would here be classified as a form of eros and hence erotic in this sense. At least if by beauty we mean a pull or calling toward something not yet fully known that nevertheless beckons to us as a welcoming abode, or something to this effect.

I get your stance, but, again, I don't see things that way. I'm starting to question what it is you have in mind when the term "love" is used. Many disparate concepts, yes, but you've hardly provided examples of what these might be (though you have previously agreed on the distinction between strong-liking-of and something else altogether). Aside from which, I feel like we're starting to go in circles. So I'll leave the discussion as is for my part.

It seems the idea of eros and the erotic are quite different in these dialogues to the carnal desire it is generally associated with in modern culture. Almost like an allegory. — Wayfarer

May I be corrected if wrong, but I’ve so far understood Ancient Greek eros to in essence be passionate desire for or attraction, not necessarily of a romantic/sexual kind. This is most typically lacking in storge, philia, and agape, but since it's part of romantic/sexual feelings, the latter will be classified as eros. Still, so interpreted, a desire for or attraction to wisdom, Truth, the Good, or some such ideal would thereby technically be eros (rather than agape, philia, or storge).

Same I think could be claimed for most everything. But this conflates epistemic appraisals of what is true, which are fallible, with the ontic reality of what is true. At any rate, I find that one cannot have the former in the ontological absence of the latter.

But I'll let others continue the debate.

Who couldn’t use a little transcendence now and then? — 0 thru 9

:grin: :up: I like that sentiment. But I don't have an answer as to the typical atheist's views on something like "Pure Love".

It only need be the best among the options I see ahead of me, for any given decision to act. — AmadeusD

Wouldn’t it then be true that you believe it to be the best option? “Best” means “most good”. Hence, you’d be affirming that you judge “one not owning slaves is the best (most good) option” to be true. In other words, you are affirming that the stated proposition conforms to the objective reality of what is good by being most proximate to it, this given the other options available. But this, then, would be realism, since it presupposes an objective, else impartially real, good by which standard you are judging not owning slaves to be a best option.

Apropos, what then do you make of the proposition that "love obliterates ego in due measure with it's strength"? Otherwise stated, that one looses oneself with the attribute of love in due measure to the love's strength. This furthermore varying with the type of love addressed.

Thought this video might be appropriate here. I enjoyed and was inspired by it. — 0 thru 9

Yet this Sufi understanding of love would then be entirely contingent on what one makes of, else how one interprets, the term “God”. For instance, if "God" is understood in a more Brahman-like way, then a mutually shared romantic love (with its erotic sex included) will be one aspect of love thus understood.

At any rate, the video presents what is to me a pleasant alternative to the often-touted motif that one ought to have “fear of God”. Love as longing for unity with God, as the Sufis can be said to hold, and, on the other hand, the need to constantly hold a fear of God will generally lead to two very disparate and in many ways contradictory worldviews. (Via a very rough analogy, loving one's parent is a very different form of respect than that which occurs via fearing one's parent.)

Alright. Thanks

I suggest listening to part 1 and 2 of the podcast for more background. — schopenhauer1

Since I'm short on time, I'll try to listen to those podcasts if they provide an alternative evolutionary theory for how grammatical language developed - instead of merely being naysayers in respect to universal grammar theory.

Do they provide such an evolutionary theory alternative to how grammatical language developed?

Rather, many biologists think that language occurred drawn out over species, probably starting with Homo erectus, and for social needs, not as a unique, all at once event for internal self-talk or mentalese. — schopenhauer1

OK, to make use of some of that armchair stuff called reasoning, first off, when we address "language" what are we referencing: A) communication or B) a grammatically sensible series of symbols?

Bees have outstanding communication skills, to not yet address the great apes or even monkeys for that matter. (Or else trees, but I'll leave this last one alone.) Communication of course evolved among different species of hominids, most of which died out.

But when it comes to language as grammar-dependent communication, the issue drastically changes. You are, I presume, familiar with the mitochondrial eve notion. In parallel, when it comes to grammatical language, one hominid's beneficial mutation which granted it the capacity for grammar who, as such, was immersed in a population wherein no other was endowed with it just might have held a significant evolutionary advantage. Why can only be best speculation, but it could have included the ability to think in greater abstractions (self-talk as you term it). Still, whatever the reason, this one individual might then have had more mates, leading to reproduction of these genes, leading to an initially small population of grammatical-language speakers, eventually leading to us.

I'm not here trying to make a case for particulars. But, unless the same thing happened multiple times via analogous evolution which later turned into convergent evolution - highly unlikely to say the least - then our current species-wide grammar adaptation is then on a par to how all humans are descendants of some mitochondrial eve. Only that in the former, there was a significant mutation involved (in our brains, of course) which facilitated grammar usage.

Ok, then let me clarify. What I meant by this is that for Chomsky this new feature was not adapted for, but came by accident "all at once". This is him, not me talking, so I am not sure what you want to call that. — schopenhauer1

A mutation (which happened to be beneficial).

He seems to believe the notion that it was basically just a feature of a brain that developed a certain way for various happenstance reasons not related to enhancing that feature (of language use) and out of this change in brain architecture that happened, language appeared on the scene. — schopenhauer1

Of course. There was no grammatical language before grammatical language was. Its a quantum leap of sorts on account of a mutation, one that fits a punctuated equilibrium model of evolution.

See article above for one. — schopenhauer1

Can you help me out in pinpointing it by giving a specific quote from the article.

And I am just holding the empirical tradition to its own need for empiricism. — schopenhauer1

You are aware that nucleic acids, neurons, and brains don't fossilize - much less behaviors. Which leaves us with best inferences when it comes to the evolutionary history of psychological attributes such as human language.

There are some, Chomsky comes to mind, who are both naturalists, but not evolutionists when it comes to language origins. Using simply his powers of incredulity, he supposes language came about in one major exaptation (not adaptation) via a massive rearrangement of brain architecture or some such. — schopenhauer1

This is a somewhat cringe-worthy statement.

The process is called punctuated equilibrium - a well respected theory of evolution which is perfectly capable of accounting for a relatively sudden exaptation of a universal grammar among humans in our evolutionary timeline.

Also, exaptations are adaptations - !?!?! - just that that which is addressed is adaptive due to a secondary function relative to that function it initially had when it first emerged. Wings used for flight are one example of this. But one doesn't claim that this major exaptation is not adaptation.

As to evidence for universal grammar, there's plenty. Pinker's book The Language Instinct, for example, is a work that makes a very good case for it.

According to [Chomsky] of course, he needs no evidence. — schopenhauer1

Interesting. Can you provide some reference that substantiates this otherwise vacuous claim.

I, in the present, still hold 'myself' responsible responsible for a reprehensible thing 'I' did in 1978: but it cannot be made good by the present I, only acknowledged and, perhaps, entered as a debit on a ledger where moral credits are also claimed. — mcdoodle

Speaking in generalized terms, the same applies here. As to regret, in keeping with some of Nietzsche’s writings as I best interpret them, regret that causes dysfunction, any form of paralysis of being, is unhealthy and should be done away with. Having said that, regret still serves an important purpose in the here and now—even if full atonement for the past deed(s) cannot be obtained—in that it plays a rather crucial role in one’s not repeating past mistakes/wrongs in the present and in the future. If there is no regret for X, one will again willfully do X whenever conditions allow. With regret, however, one is often left with (re)paying things forward, so to speak. Although I don’t mean to be preaching to the choir here. But yes, regret is one aspect of psychological being that directly points to the continuation of one’s psyche over time. :up:

That is conveyed in the rather poetic Buddhist term of the 'citta-santana', the mind-stream — Wayfarer

Thanks for the link. :up:

So I guess that, beyond functionality (final cause in Aristotelian terms), spatiotemporal continuity is also important? — Lionino

Aye. If one gets into the mindset outlined, and if, for example, here tersely outlined, one chooses to understand space as distance-between identities and time as a duration-between a) causes produced by identities and b) their effects/consequences—further deeming that space and time when thus understood are logically inseparable—then, spatiotemporal continuity is part and parcel of there being coexistent identities (in the plural). No coexistent identities—as is said of Moksha or of Nirvana without remainder or, in the West, of the notion of “the One”—then, and only then, one would derive there being no spacetime. Here isn’t an issue of which came first or of which is more important but, rather, that coexistent identities logically necessitate spacetime (when understood as just outlined, and not necessarily in a physicalist sense).

Are we gonna die in the next second, or is our conscious experience persisting across time?, is basically what is being asked. — Lionino

Addressing this via analogy to Theseus’s ship, if one for example replaces one plank on the ship, the ship itself continues through time unchanged (it currently seems to me uncontroversial to so stipulate). In parallel, if one as a conscious being experiences a new percept, one as the conscious being addressed will itself continue through time unchanged. My affinities are with process philosophy, so to me it is a continuation of ontic being as regards both the ship and one’s consciousness. This instead of identity consisting of individualized quanta-of-identity that are perpetually obliterated and (re)created over the course of time.

Did you have something else in mind other than the bifurcation of possibilities just specified?

Also, I quite liked your art. The way you use gaps and separation on the canvas is something that I have never seen before. — Lionino

Ah, this gave me a very good blush. Thanks for so saying.

The issue of identifiying something as that which undergoes change is for me a very deep issue that involves, among other things, mereology and semantics.
Because of that, I summon Theseus' ship. I ask you: is it the same ship? — Lionino

In keeping with what a few others have mentioned:

Not that the Ship of Theseus has been satisfactorily resolved by anyone to date, but one way of looking at things in general is that any given’s identity is constituted of context-relative functionality. The ship remains the same ship in terms of context-relative functionality if the parts replaced relate to each other in such manner that the ship’s context-relative functionality is unchanged. I say “context-relative” because two different ships will hold the same functionality as ships, but their functionality will not be the same in terms of their immediate spatiotemporal contexts.

This, however, can get very abstract in the details of analysis.

All the same, as a thought experiment, I find that the sci-fi notion of teleportation operates on the same basis of identity just mentioned, this in fiction. Or, if a person were to lose a finger, for example, they would remain the same person X; but if a person were to so drastically change in terms of context-relative functionality, we will often state that they are not the same person they used to be, as is sometimes the case for extreme cases of dementia. Or else as can be the case when someone claims “he’s been a completely different person since he joined that click”.

This notion of identity seems to me particularly important to any version of a process philosophy wherein everything spatiotemporal, without exception, is in perpetual change. But then, in this interpretation, identity isn’t anchored to material particulars, being instead anchored to, again, a context-relative functionality.

With this perspective in mind, more directly addressing the OP, a person’s identity as a context-relative functionality can then be construed to persist subsequent to corporeal death, such as via reincarnations—granting both extreme outliers and continuity between these, such as in the same person’s life commencing with birth as an infant and possibly ending corporeal life with extreme changes in psyche. And, just as a river rock will be relatively permanent in comparison to the rushing waters that surround it, so too can one appraise that some core aspect of a psyche is relatively permanent in comparison to the percepts, etc., it experiences. This core aspect of psyche (which, for example, could conceivably persist from one lifetime to the next) can then be appraised as "that which undergoes changes". I however will emphasize: this does not then entail that there is such a thing as an absolutely permanent soul which thereby withstands any and all changes for all eternity.

This isn’t an argument I want to spend significant time in here defending. It would be quite a doozy. But it is the outline of a perspective that, notwithstanding the many details that would yet need to be ironed out, currently makes sense to me.

Later in the same post, you went on to clarify the distinction between "strong-like" and "unity of being". This wasn't your attempt at an exhaustive list, and I'm confident there are many more distinct perspectives on love that you could bring up, but even so, you effortlessly brought up so many.

Isn't that true? It's confusing to be asked whether love is "an abstraction...", you should know that there's more than just one. Explain your thoughts on this. — Judaka

As relates to the English term "love", I so far maintain that it can only bifurcate into "unity of being" of various types and into "strong-liking-of", which again can come in various types. Both seem to me to belong to the umbrella concept - itself an abstraction - of "affinity" but that, whereas "love" can be a verb, "affinity" cannot - to my mind partly explaining why love can in English be used in both senses.

As to more than just one type of unity of being, yes, of course. Greek comes in handy in distinguishing philia, from storge, from eros, from pure agape, for example. But all these different types of unity of being shall yet be a unity of being. Else expressed, all specific types of love (in the sense of a unity of being) shall yet be love (a unity of being). This just as there are many different types of animal but, from fish, to birds, to amphibians, etc., all are yet animals (here, at least, going by the science-grounded definition of "animal" ... a little more on this below).

Certainly love, be it understood as a unity or being or more broadly as affinity (wherein strong liking can be incorporated), is globally distinct from envy, for example, to not once again express the attribute of malice. As such, all variations of love will share a commonality.

To my mind, it is this commonality which the question of "what is love" seeks to better explore.

You've agreed with me that ethics plays a role. This alone destroys any chance for love having consistent properties. Think about it, how can ethics influence our interpretation of an intensely personal feeling? The same feeling could exist in two scenarios, classified as love in one, and not the other, because of how we interpret what makes a relationship toxic or unhealthy. Are these the properties you're referring to? — Judaka

I myself don't situate thing in terms of ethics playing a role in love, but of love playing an integral role in ethics. I'm coming from the vantage that love, unity of being, is ethical - in so far as being good, if not what's sometimes been termed "the Good" (neo-Platonic notions of "the One" for example come to mind, wherein the One is a literally absolute, hence complete, and perfected unity of being). It is then our all too human deviations from love - such as the inclination toward possessiveness in romantic love, or of domination in parental love (to list just two among innumerable examples of how love can go wrong, which will also include the opposite of holding laissez faire attitudes in either type of relationship just mentioned) - which leads to the unethical, i.e. to that which is bad. The more we deviate from the ideal of love should be, the worse, and so more bad, the situation becomes, despite the feelings held. And it is in this latter case alone that institutionalized ethics, morality, then influences our interpretation of intensely personal feelings. But I grant that this plays into an ontological interpretation of love which doesn't fit that of it strictly being a biologically evolved set of emotions or feelings. And it might be this which we at base actually disagree on (?).

If there's even a single truth condition that's dependant upon interpretation then the properties you refer to include factors that differ by person. — Judaka

I so far find the same can be said of consciousness, for example. Yet I'm not one to entertain thoughts that one's person's consciousness is another person's cauliflower. :wink: More soberly, I do maintain that something which the term "consciousness" tacitly references is universally shared by all conscious beings, regardless of culture and so forth, and this despite what it exactly is not yet being adequately defined.

The parable of different blind men interpreting what an elephant is based on their strictly localized experiences of its body comes to mind. One will define it by its trunk's properties. Another by its tail's. But the elephant remains and elephant all the same. Same I think can be said of consciousness, as well as of love.

That's what gives a term like "animal" its universal attributes, they're universal because they do not differ by person. Each organism that qualifies to be an animal must have these properties. — Judaka

When it comes to the term's scientific definition, yes. But in everyday life most certainly not, and here the scientific interpretation is just one variant among many. Most will maintain that a coral, for example, is not an animal. And many adamantly hold that humans are not, this on the opposite side of the spectrum. To give just two examples of how "animal" doesn't hold universal attributes as abstraction among all people that utilize the term. (Even the typical scientist won't like it much if termed an animal by some other.) But yet when looked at more impartially, what an animal is can be pinpointed with relative stability, this as biology does. Of course, a main difficulty here is that love, unity of being, is not biological in any empirical sense but psychological and intangible. This, though, I argue does not make love either unreal or else unimportant (immaterial in this sense). As to its common property, I tried to already speak to this; namely, all forms of love will be a unity of being, differing in the specifics of between whom.

All this not so much in attempts to convince but more in keeping with sharing perspectives.



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I think you just present a false dichotomy or odd straw man. — schopenhauer1

I don’t. Although I don’t want to here get into a debate on how deontology’s sole justification is consequentialist in nature, consequentialism, which includes eudemonism, certainly enters the picture. And the perspective addressed is not that of some abstract notion of “harm to anyone”. As one example of how this dictum is often ill-fit, sustaining equality of rights FORCES direct harm onto tyrants—but this doesn’t justify a morality in which tyrants are given the freedom to tyrannize.

The perspective is simply that of an individual subject’s reason for choosing between future acts of malice and future acts of love—this when both are deemed to hold the same bad consequence of suffering for the individual subject in question.

But I get the impression that we’re on very different wavelengths here. Pity in a way, since I believe that the topic of love and suffering is rich with nuances and, indeed, with exceptions—thereby justifying the prescription of love over malice. But so be it then.

For about two days now you’ve touched upon just about anything and everything but the core issue I’ve raised in every post I’ve made to you.

I’ll try one last time, but, if you again evade the issue and don't provide an answer, I’ll then be convinced you’re doing it intentionally on account of not having a rational answer to give:

• If suffering is to be deemed bad, and if all endeavors inevitably lead to suffering regardless of their quality, effort, and means—as Schopenhauer and you maintain—then on what grounds are love-antagonistic endeavors, such as that of becoming a mass murderer, to be proscribed in favor of love-cherishing endeavors, for both endeavors will share the exact same attribute of resulting in suffering, making the first category of endeavors just as preferable as the second.

(To spell things out a little clearer, what I’ve been repeatedly asking you is a morality question of how any ethical ought can be obtained given the premises you uphold. And yes, most will in simplistic terms maintain that love (be it pure agape or else agape-endowed storge, philia, or eros) in general is a good, whereas malice in general is a bad. But, again, why should this generalization be upheld when both necessarily result in the same bad outcome? It’s a simple enough question regarding reasoning.)