Do you disagree that love is an abstraction abstracted from, ultimately, concrete particulars?

If it is, then as abstraction it will hold its own properties which equally apply to all subspecies of love, each its own abstraction, which in turn will each hold properties applicable to, ultimately, concrete particulars.

Via analogy, animal is an abstraction of, for example, mammals, reptiles, invertebrates, etc., with each such subspecies of abstraction ultimately being abstracted from concrete particulars. As such, the abstraction of animal will hold properties applicable to all subspecies of abstraction and, ultimately, all concrete particulars it is an abstraction of. And an animal is utterly distinct from a plant, or fungus, etc.

Love, then, would be endowed with a fixed set of universal attributes relative to what it is an abstraction of in like manner to how animal, for example, is so endowed.

No I agree with you. That doesn't negate that it causes suffering nonetheless. I never said "thus we don't need eros". Rather, it is part of being alive as a human. Even ignoring, downplaying, or eradicating love from one's life (or attempts thereof), is having to deal with love, but in the "negative" sense of negating it. One is still contending with it on sociological and personal level. — schopenhauer1

I’ll try to simplify my perspective: granting that suffering is unwanted by the sufferer(s), if all paths in life end up being “just another avenue toward suffering” then: 1) that some path is just another avenue toward suffering makes no difference whatsoever in respect to the path’s worth in comparison to any other path and 2) the intent to minimize suffering in oneself and in others would then become warrantless, for this too would then in itself be just another avenue toward suffering.

This digs its heels into a much broader issue than that of love. To me something is very wrong with this outlined reasoning. (The only out that I so far see is if some paths in life were to lead to liberation from suffering in principle—at the very least to a far better extent relative to other paths. This as in the overly simplified affirmation that "only love can conquer hate", wherein love is deemed to be such a path toward liberation from suffering. But this is something I so far presume you disagree with.)

This stipulated wrongness however, whatever it might be agreed to be, then directly applies to the affirmation that love (even if strictly understood as eros) is just another avenue toward suffering. It’s then a difference that makes no difference whatsoever. But underlying this is the far broader issue just mentioned.

All this being relevant to the issue I initially raised, which I summed up in my last post as that of:

why one should prefer an unloving life to a loving one (or else a loving life over an unloving one) - irrespective of the type of love addressed. — javra

:up: — schopenhauer1

Well, OK, thanks, but it doesn't answer why one should prefer an unloving life to a loving one (or else a loving life over an unloving one) - irrespective of the type of love addressed. I deem this to be a rather important question. But maybe its just me.

The distinction between agape and eros is all fine and well. But it doesn’t satisfy the issues posed.

First off, while agape can certainly be had in the absence of eros, eros devoid of any form of agape … well, many adjectives can be used, but I’ll keep to the point and say is dehumanizing, or else dehumanized. Rape as a good example of this. It’s never been my thing so I’ve never personally partook, but from what I’ve gathered from others and from reading, even threesomes and orgies – from ancient to modern - typically contain some form of agape, however minuscule – as in compassion for the other’s being (such as via respect for the other’s limits of comfort despite maybe depriving one of fully satisfying one’s own cravings) – if they’re not to be dehumanizing at best, violent rape-fests at worst. Ditto for some presence of agape in masochism (if one actually studies one’s fair share of anthropology and doesn’t go by pre-judged cultural stereotypes).

An interesting issue, actually: When one mentions “eros” does one strictly mean “sexual gratification”, so that one construes rape to be a form of eros? Something about this to me is utterly wrong – so that eros necessarily implies some measure of agape. But maybe others disagree?

But then the same to me applies to philia and to storge: devoid of any agape whatsoever they become meaningless. Then again, agape is itself fairly hard to define.

At any rate, in reference to my previous post, love as agape (say, one devoid of eros, of philia, and of storge) can and does most often incur the very real risk of suffering on account of the agape held. Minimally in the form of disappointment. If, for example, one holds agape for humanity, and humanity behaves like a bunch of shortsighted lemmings about to drown themselves in the ocean (say, for example, by ever-accelerating climate change), one will experience dire disappointment on account of the agape held. Which would never have been in this agape’s absence. Not to even mention the possibility that one such fellow human might commit violently unjust crimes against the agapeist in question, or something to the like.

Furthermore, agape too has its often felt ideal it pursues, one that many of us will proudly gripe and whine about being an unrealistic future only idiots believe in. (As though this is what children should be somehow taught by us jaded adults so as to live more ethical and upright lives. Apropos, sarcasm 101, if it needs to be translated.)

Agape, as with eros, will far more often than not lead to suffering. Exceptions occur in both cases, yes, but it is not the norm.

So then what makes pure agape a more preferable love to maintain and pursue than an agape-consisting eros? For, in the first place, both can equally be almost guaranteed to result in suffering on account of being held or pursued and, in the second place, as the individual persons we all are, most of us stand a far greater chance of gaining more eudemonia from a sustained, agape-consisting eros than via an agape alone. The ideal romantic relationship in the extended moment is persists – this, for some, being well over 50 years of loving marriage (with personal relatives as examples, if nothing else) – can enrich one’s life with both warmth and wisdom gained from the other’s perspectives far more than can a universalized compassion for mankind, for example.

There’s no reason why one can’t have both; Noam Chomsky as one well enough known example of this. But if one is to draw a line in the sand between agape and eros, why should the likely suffering to be incurred by the former be prescribed while that to be incurred by the other be proscribed? After all, both can be addressed by your previous affirmation of being “just another avenue toward suffering.”

(And, for the anti-natalists out there, the bringing forth of offspring is not essential to the occurrence of a romantic relationship: the latter can well be held just fine without the former.)

-----------

BTW, since you were getting into a little bit of anthropology, just wanted to mention as an aside that polyandry has also been known to occur in addition to polygyny. Irrespective of polygamy type, though, compassion and the like are inextricable from such sexual relationships if they are to be in any way happy for those involved. (Most polygamies in our history as humans don’t revolve around kings or emperors. If this needs to be said in general.)

My main idea is that "love" (similar to Schopenhauer's view) is just another avenue for suffering. — schopenhauer1

And since suffering is implicitly deemed bad, the only logical conclusion that I so far find to this affirmation of supposed fact is that love in all its variations is a bad thing to maintain or pursue.

The ethical ramifications of this logical deduction from your given premise being what exactly? That Hitler and Stalin are good guys on account of their unlovingness but the Dalai Lama and Mother Teresa are bad? So it's said, both camps suffer/ed in life (the present Dalai Lama still kicking it), but in utterly different ways and for utterly different reasons.

In short, given the premise you've affirmed, what then makes an unloving life preferable to a loving one?

Darwin saw a parallel, with "Selection" by human minds, in the workings of Nature. Both are Natural in the sense of A> a teleological act by a physical organism, and B> a mathematical computation of inputs & outputs. — Gnomon

In his "On the Origin of Species", I don't recall Darwin mentioning natural selection to necessarily incorporate "a teleological act by a physical organism", or by any other type of psyche whatsoever for that matter (this being strictly limited to artificial, rather than natural, selection). One can find arguments such as this paper presents that Darwin was in fact utilizing teleology (one can simply read the article's abstract and conclusion for the general idea), but Darwin was by no means one to believe in a global-watchmaker-god sort of mindset as concerns any of the teleological processes involved in natural selection. Nor does he anywhere mention anything close to "a mathematical computation of inputs & outputs" - Malthusianism is certainly not that, for example. To the extent that I find the quote above rather jarring.

I would be interested in an update, that attempts to explain Natural Selection on a cosmic scale. — Gnomon

Yes, so would I. My own criteria for accepting any novel idea in this regard to me seems rather simple: does it manage to ontologically explain how life and its biological evolution evolved from nonlife and its here assumed cosmic evolution - this rather than merely supposing that it somehow did. If yes, then I'll bite.

----------

ps. "On the Origin of Species" is a very worthwhile read. And one can arguably find heavier leaning on teleological reasoning - i.e., explanations in terms of ends, or objectives, etc. - in his third book "The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals", which to me is an essential read for the field of psychology (and this coming from a present non-physicalist).

Apropos, what would your take then be regarding this generalized proposition: every "ought" translates into "an optimal means" of actualizing some future "is" (i.e., some conceived of future state of being that can in the future become reality) which is desired.

Of course this in part leads into the question of "desired by whom"; still, as a statement of fact all the same, do you find reason to object to this just offered proposition being true?

Okay, so we have propositions about what will be that can be true or false. But that isn't the same thing as saying that future states of being or of the universe are false, and a relevant telos is a goal with what I would presume to be a state of being as its end - something that I now grant can be false when referenced against what is actually possible - even if fictitious, and not to make a proposition true. But I get what you are saying now. — ToothyMaw

Awesome. It's good to know. Thanks.

I could go on but to summarise, without specificity, we're wandering aimlessly. That's completely unlike "animal", and especially the "grey rat". Grey rats aren't fundamentally changed by context or circumstance, nor who is speaking and how they interpret the term. — Judaka

Although @Count Timothy von Icarus already addressed this, I wanted to also point out that "grey" and "rat" (I did say mouse, though) are both abstractions as well: grey comes in many different shades; rats (or mice) come in many different sizes, shapes, hews, personalities, etc.; so both terms convey abstractions; abstractions the most definitely can change by context, circumstance, speaker, and interpreter. To that effect, as far as I can discern, all of our linguistic thought - i.e., all which can be conveyed via language - is strictly composed of abstractions, be they of things, processes, or otherwise. Concrete particulars are only what we immediately experience, like our perception of "that grey mouse over there", but then, in the nitty gritty, even such immediate perceptions are in part there due to pre-established abstractions which we already hold that, furthermore, at least hold the potential to perpetually evolve given novel experiences. Its a very complex topic to me. And, to me at least, language only strongly accelerates but is not foundational to such abstract cognition; otherwise no lesser animal could, for example, discern such things as "prey" from "predator", language-less though they are. And all this without introducing the concept of universals.

But this sure seems to deviate from the thread's intent.

This is why the God of Plato and the Patristics "all loving," as opposed to being indifferent, jealous, or wrathful. Hatred involves being determined by that which is outside of one: — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up: Nicely said. Although I'll be currently shying away from embellishing this on account of it getting into non-physicalist ontological notions of "unity of being"--of which the sensations of love which we emotively feel, both the pleasures and tribulations, could be deemed a microcosmic expression of a macrocosmic force, or impetus, as universal as that of gravity. The topic of Stoic/Heraclitean Logos partly comes to mind here. But no doubt its one of them out-in-the-left-field notions that's bound to get easily misconstrued. So, having said my peace on this issue, I'm shushing up about this possible vantage of love/unity-of-being. :razz: Back to the issue of love as we experience it.

Lots of questions and issues. Thank you for them. In my defense, I did mention that the post would likely be wanting of sufficient justification and only a rough outline, or something to the like, this in my post’s opening sentence. Also, it’s not intended to be about morals, which are prescriptive, but about meta-ethics, which is purely descriptive.

I'm sorry, what? How can a state of being, even unrealizable and future, be false? — ToothyMaw

I’ll for now only try address this issue of truth and falsity as these pertain to teloi, aka, aims/goals/ends one pursues in hopes of fulfilling said aim/goal/end as a future reality.

Any proposition regarding future states of affairs can either evidence itself “conformant to the reality of what will be” and thereby true/right/correct or, otherwise, “to lack conformity to the reality of what will be” and thereby be false/wrong/incorrect. For instance, the proposition that “the sun will rise again tomorrow” can either be true or false, as will be evidenced in the span of the subsequent 24 hours.

If this is generally agreed upon, then: teloi are not propositions (at least not normally) but will nevertheless hold the same general property: either they can be accomplished, as one consciously or unconsciously believes they can when they are actively held, or they cant. Take a hypothetical madman who aims to jump so high as to land on the moon and who proceeds to so jump on account of this goal being actively held. We’d label him a madman because we know that this goal he momentarily holds is unrealizable in principle, and believe that a sane person should know better than to hold such an aim. The stated aim here does not conform to the reality of what can be. It is a false hope, so to speak. And, in so being, it is then a fully fictitious, and hence false, presentation of what will be given the invested effort and means.

Regardless of aim—from that of scratching one’s nose to that of interstellar travel, etc.—the aim could either be realizable in principle or, else, it might not be. Any unrealizable aim will then be pure fantasy concocted by our imagination, devoid of any reality in terms of being an end that is actualizable given the invested effort and means. In this sense alone, the unrealizable aim/goal/telos will then be false, deceptive, for although one aims X one will never obtain X even in principle. However, if the aim toward X conforms to the reality or fact of X’s obtainment upon given effort and means, then it will be true that X can be obtained given the required effort and means: making the telos/aim/goal true in this sense alone.

What I was saying, however, goes beyond this. But on seeing the many complexities and misunderstandings you find in what I previously wrote, I’ll leave all that for some other time. All the same, let me know what you think of what I've just written if you disagree. But again, there are more valid senses to truth and falsity than those that strictly apply to propositions.

Does God qualify for "interpersonal" love? — Judaka

Under the conviction that God = Love, interpersonal love will be one aspect of God. Else, of being closer to God than otherwise.

What do you mean by imbalanced and unharmonious? On what basis does this love "typically result in psychological pain..."? — Judaka

Though more complex than this, it boils down to being in a toxic relationship, be it romantic, filial, or any other, wherein on loves the other. As to the second question: On the basis that at least one party gets abused and/or betrayed in some manner.

There are many cultures around the around that don't practice monogamy, that have arranged marriages, that are patriarchal and practice other forms of imbalanced or unharmonious relationships. Opposition to such structures is generally ethical in nature, as opposed to spurred on by a philosophical view of love. Ethical stances should be the best predictors of how one views this subject of imbalanced love. Do you agree? — Judaka

Regardless of relationship (arranged, polygamous, etc.) it could be toxic for those involved to those involved, or it could not be.

Also, in one way or another, I also find (nontoxic) love to be inextricable from issues of ethics. Compassion, for example, is one form of love (unity of being). What would ethics amount to in the absence of compassion?

I for one fully agree with (authentic) love being a drive to maintain and increase unity of being, a "transcendent unity" so to speak. — javra


Another linguistic issue. Do you appreciate that you're the one who judges the love that qualifies as authentic? Your reasoning separates authentic love from inauthentic love, because your reasoning determines authentic love from inauthentic love.

It's understandable one might resist admitting the importance of ethical or value-based elements, but the correlations will always be striking. Those who despise homosexuality won't recognise love between same-sex couples as "authentic". Those who despise pedophilia won't recognise romantic love between adult and child as "authentic". We probably wouldn't describe love borne from Stockholm syndrome as "authentic". Most won't want to label either a very jealous, toxic love or a possessive, controlling love as "authentic".

What's your opinion on this? — Judaka

You're here focusing on a sense of "authentic" unrelated to the one I made use of in this context: love as unity of being as being authentic love, with strong-liking being inauthentic love.

Unity of being occurs in homosexual marriages/relationships irrespective of whether others approve. Pedophilia, to me, is sexual in nature, and there need not be any sense of unity of being for sex to occur, as is evidenced in rape. If there were a unity of being between adult and child that would be romantic in some sense, I can only imagine the adult would want better for the child than that the child engages in sex, especially with an adult. As to Stockholm syndrome, it might be twisted, but if it were to result in a unity of being between the abductor and abducted, then it would be a unity of being. Ethical judgement calls on this being a different matter, typically revolving around the toxicity involved.

Lastly, a very jealous, toxic love or a possessive, controlling love most always does not have both parties valuing the other's worth on a par to one's own, this as more or less occurs in a unity of being between parties. Otherwise there would be enough respect for the other to not engage in such toxic/controlling love wherein the other suffers (incurs psychological pain), but instead always granting the freedom of the other. So no, here the love would not be a balanced/nontoxic unity of being.

my argument that "love" is a concept we invented, not a thing to be understood or discovered. — Judaka

It's an assertion more than an argument. One on par to asserting that "pain" is a concept we invented, but not an aspect of our reality as psyches to be understood or discovered. As though everything psychological concerns concepts we invent rather than aspects of our own ontological being we discern introspectively (?).

However, in terms of my own personal feelings about love, and I'm no exception, I also define what is and isn't love by my values and ethics, I strongly agree with you. Love, for me, in the contexts I imagine you to be using, entails this kind of prioritisation and importance you describe. This is completely different from the "strong-like" one has towards something like ice cream. — Judaka

On what rational argument or via what data do you find reason to doubt that this rudimentary distinction between unity of being and strong liking is a human universal?

I reject the entire question of "What is love", and view it as a misunderstanding of language. — Judaka

I get that. But if "words are not concepts" then words will convey concepts, and concepts are nothing more then abstractions (e.g.,"animal") of concrete givens (e.g., "that grey mouse over there"), with concrete givens including the states of being we experience as psyches.

So, in English (not to forget that different languages occur, both at the present time and in the past) the word "love" can either convey different types of "unity of being" or, otherwise, types of "strong liking". But I maintain that just as one is not sincere in the literal stance that an ice-cream cone is "to die for", so too will one not be sincere in the literal stance that one "loves" the ice-cream cone. It's right up there with food being "fun" to eat. This despite all three expressions being used commonly enough in our society to express concepts nonetheless.

I'm here not analyzing words but two different subspecies of states of personal being which in English are expressible by the same word.

Lots written. But in sum: We so far seem to basically agree on the difference between unity-of-being and strong-liking-of. I don't much want to engage in a debate regarding the nature of language. Again, I basically intended to make the case that the two sense of the word "love" are distinct. And that when we love another, we typically hold a unity of being with them, rather than a strong liking of them (although of course the latter can overlap with the former, the two nevertheless remain distinct states of psychological being).

There are no worthwhile goals. — unenlightened

Damn, this so far feels like some really melancholically pessimistic stuff. Maybe it’s not. Maybe you’ve obtained a state of being devoid of both needs and wants. In which case, bravo and keep it up. Still, in my experience, day to day wants such as that alleviating thirst, or hunger, or an itch, or of getting sufficient sleep sure amount to worthwhile aims when held for good reason, and generally pleasure-producing when the goals are not obstructed.

Here’s two poems for you, whose vibe I generally hold only in the best of times, but they seem a worthwhile state of mind to express all the same:

-----

A SAIL

White is the sail and lonely
On the misty infinite blue;
Flying from what in the homeland?
Seeking for what in the new?

The waves romp, and the winds whistle,
And the mast leans and creaks;
Alas! He flies not from fortune,
And no good fortune he seeks.

Beneath him the stream, luminous, azure,
Above him the sun’s golden breast;
But he, a rebel, invites the storms,
As though in the storms were rest.

(by Mikhail Lermontov; translated by Max Eastman (I like this translation but can’t find it online))

-----

“Let me live out my years in heat of blood!
Let me lie drunken with the dreamer’s wine!
Let me not see this soul-house built of mud
Go toppling to the dust a vacant shrine!”

(by Jack London, from the opening of his book, Martin Eden)

-----

Potentially noble and thereby worthwhile goals, I say. At least, if one’s into this kind of thing.

My point was that an eye for an eye response to life is inconsistent with Jewish thought regardless of ratio — Hanover

Reading this charitably, I already knew that. "Do not commit undue harm" to me seems more in keeping with the Jewish thought I've been primarily exposed to. But this does not nullify the validity of heuristic I've previously expressed.

as if to imply an [the current] Israeli response is inconsistent with Jewish morality — Hanover

I, personally, uphold this to be true. See, for example, the aforementioned.

I've perused the link offered. Why should I take this interpretation of monetary compensation as authoritative?

After all, given what I've gathered in my life, the dictum, though metaphorical, makes plenty of sense at multiple levels of interpretation: generally, when someone does you unwarranted wrong retribution should be in like measure (even if in a different form), but going beyond this leads to you then doing unwarranted wrong against your opponent (as in, fully blinding him when he did not do that to you) ... and thereby leads into a downward spiral of wrongdoing, since your opponent is the justified in seeking retribution against you.

More mathematically speaking, this very strategy has been evidenced to be the optimal means of assuring reciprocal altruism. As a brief synopsis:

Game theory

Tit-for-tat has been very successfully used as a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The strategy was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod's two tournaments,[2] held around 1980. Notably, it was (on both occasions) both the simplest strategy and the most successful in direct competition.

An agent using this strategy will first cooperate, then subsequently replicate an opponent's previous action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent is not. This is similar to reciprocal altruism in biology. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tit_for_tat

I can expand on this at some later time, but I'm still interested in an answer to my initial question.

I see a lot of materialism consuming, polluting, and destroying. I don't see a lot of "materialist conservation." I do see a lot of spiritually motivated conservation efforts, people who are aware of the significance of the health of natural systems in a cosmic sense. — Pantagruel

I’m in overall agreement here. Indigenous peoples the world over, all of which are spiritual, come to mind as frontliners against the destruction of the ecosystem (of "Mother Earth"); with many of them having been unrighteously (if that needs to be said) terrorized and assassinated for their convictions and generally peaceful actions. Materialists the world over not so much, by general comparison of populaces at least.

Wanted to add: as per Buddhism, for one example, there is no need for an absolute creator deity belief to uphold that corporeal death is not the end of the road.

Secondly, any belief system which deems one “saved/liberated/freed” from all suffering after corporeal death—fully including i) conviction that death is a transcendence into absolute nonbeing and ii) conviction that death results in an instantaneous beam-me-up into a suffering-devoid eternal Heaven—will generally give no rational warrant to be moral/ethical, this despite many such people persisting to be moral/ethical. The typical atheist might yet feel a kinship to life, or at least one’s own species, in general (I know I used to, at least, back when I was a materialist). The typical theist might yet deem deeds to surpass faith as that which determines one’s Abrahamic abode after corporeal death. Yet, those who mass murder their own families and then commit suicide, for example, only do so due to the belief that death is a cessation of being (to not address those atheists who hoard wealth via offshore means at expense of the general community’s wellbeing, etc.)—activities which become logically rational given the end addressed. Likewise, those who deem themselves necessarily saved strictly on account of holding unwarranted convictions regardless of how they act couldn’t give a damn about stewardship of the plant (etc.) for humanity at large.

This to illustrate that it isn’t so much about what you’ve specified as Transcendentalists but about not having an absolute conviction that corporeal death is an end to all conceivable suffering (something that can apply to theists just as much as to atheists).

Your literalist, four corners reading isn't consistent with how those who actually use that document for moral guidance interpret that passage of Leviticus. — Hanover

So how ought it to be properly interpreted? You take out one of my eyes and I take out both of yours, kind of thing? Or something else?

But an eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth could be freely and even positively interpreted to not retaliate in kind. — Vaskane

:100:

As a slight interlude: The ethical dictum of "an eye for an eye" strictly upholds a 1:1 ratio of retribution as moral. So both a 100:1 or a 10:1 ratio would be misaligned to it, and thereby immoral.

Just wanted to say it.

I think that you as well as I are certain people should not be harmed, and that also explanations do have to end somewhere. I just like to discuss meta ethics as it is really interesting to me. — ToothyMaw

This will likely to be very incomplete reasoning, but I’ll give outlining my current idea of metaethics a best shot:

First, consider that all ethics results first and foremost from what one oneself wants to obtain in the future given a) that one as agent is compelled in an ontologically fixed manner to optimally minimize one’s own present and future suffering (a premise which I grant can get very complex when looked at in detail) and b) that one is not alone in the cosmos as an agent described by (a) but that, instead, all coexistent agents in the cosmos are likewise described by (a).

Any conceivable end, or telos, that satisfies (a) given (b) will then be that which is good for oneself. One can of course envision more than one such possible future state of being. Yet some such envisioned future states of being will be unrealizable and, thereby, false. Pursuit of such a false state of future being will not minimize one’s own suffering but intensify it, thereby being a wrong notion of what is good. To pursue such false ultimate telos would then be to do what is wrong, or else bad, for oneself.

Here tersely outlined, (a) given (b) is first off taken to be an objective fact. Addressing just this part, one then gets into the riddle of how no matter what one does one can only be in pursuit of the good. Next addressing that telos which, ideally, perfectly satisfies (a) given (b), one can again likely obtain more than one conception of what it might be. Given that these alternatives will be mutually exclusive, were any one alternative to in fact be fulfillable as a telos/goal in principle, it would then be the objectively true good, with all other alternatives then necessarily being objectively false, hence wrong, hence bad goals to pursue. Here, then, some things one could do to satisfy (a) given (b) will be objectively good (for they approach the objectively true telos just specified) and others will be objectively bad (for they approach objectively bad teloi at expense of the objectively good telos). Furthermore, because of (b), that which is the objectively good end to pursue for yourself will then likewise be the objectively good ends to pursue for all others.

Indulge for the moment that the dictum of “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” serves as a steppingstone toward one conception of what this objectively good, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 1”

Also indulge for the moment that, as an alternative to this trajectory, the dictum of “It’s good to be the absolute ruler over everyone and everything other” serves as a steppingstone toward another conception of what the objectively true, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 2”.

The two will be mutually exclusive and thereby contradictory: one cannot gravitate toward both at the same time and in the same way. One will be objectively good and the other thereby objectively bad. If one were to figure out which of the two just mentioned teloi is the true objective good, one then would furthermore figure out an existentially fixed (though non-physicalist) “is” via which “oughts” can be established.

Next, take the ought that “people should not be unduly harmed”.

Were telos 1 to be objectively true—hence, an existentially fixed telos that is actualizable in principle and that awaits to be fulfilled—then it would substantiate the just addressed dictum rationally, thereby making the proposition that “people should not be unduly harmed” an objectively good ideal/goal/telos to pursue, for it as such satisfies closer proximity to telos 1. However, were telos 2 to be objectively true, then “people should not be unduly harmed” would be unproductive to bringing oneself into closer proximity to telos 2—thereby signifying that this ought is an inappropriate and thereby bad ideal/goal/telos to pursue.

At core issue would be, not so much what most people deem to be good or bad (hence, current normality) but, instead, which ultimate telos specified is actualizable in principle and which is not. The former will be the right telos to pursue—what some in history have termed “the Good”—and the latter will be the wrong telos to pursue.

All this as an exceedingly terse outline of how I so far approach the issue of metaethics. And, of course, none of this makes any sense in a world wherein no teleological processes (and, hence, wherein no teloi) occur.

And, as a reminder, metaethics isn’t about prescription but about description. If telos 1 were true, it would justify the given ought. If telos 2 were true, it would not justify the given ought. The issue, again, is which conceived of ultimate telos is true and thereby conforms to what in fact is.

While I respect the overall sentiment of your post, I disagree in war never being an act of self-defense.

One could address the issue via individuals or via groups of such. War, or course, consists of the latter. But since addressing individuals is far more simplistic:

If person A is walking home and person B assaults and batters person A, person A can either do nothing and potentially end up dead or could defend themselves for as long as person B persists their aggressions. This, I believe, would be a just use of aggression on the part of person A. What would be an unjust use of aggression would be for person A to then assault person B beyond what is needed for person B to stop their unprovoked violence. (To not here also address person A's aggression toward non-aggressors as being unjust.)

Same, I so far believe, can be said for groups of people - where the term "war" can become appropriate. If group B assaults and batters group A, then group A is justified in using aggression in the same manner as person A is, and this to the same limitations: no more aggression than is required to desist group B's aggression, and no willful aggression toward non-aggressors.

Would you disagree with the examples just given?

In term of tribalism/patriotism there is a vague case here maybe. Vague though. — I like sushi

Short of immorality in willfully killing innocents, can you spell out the "vague case" here. I'm so far having a hard time understanding it.

You have 2 competing rules:

1. You have the right to defend yourself.
2. You are forbidden to kill the innocent.

Your question is what happens when the killing of the innocent is required to defend yourself, which is often the case in war. — Hanover

Required? The "Fog of War" syndrome is working overtime here. Mistaking an innocent for an aggressor is one thing in war, but one being required to kill non-aggressors so as to defend oneself from aggressors is incredibly topsy-turvy reasoning.

Person A holds an innocent child in front while holding a loaded gun at person B. Person B is not thereby required to shoot the child. Person B has options; the more forethought, the more options available given the particular context. And if person B were to have no other option while being an upright individual, person B's then murdering of the child (the newspeak Orwellian language of "collateral damage") so as to save their own life would weigh heavy on person B's conscience. For why ought person B judge their own life more valuable than that of the child's?

[...] self-preservation is of the highest priority, meaning you have the right to kill the innocent to save yourself, meaning I prioritize #1 over #2 when there is a conflict.

[...] The concept of self defense being a duty (not just a right) also has roots in secular Western philosophy, meaning pacifism for the sake of protecting the innocent among your enemy is itself immoral. — Hanover

So what, then, makes it immoral for one or more of those innocents you speak of to hold the same exact views toward their assailants (e.g., in regard to their assailants’ innocent loved ones) in the name of “self-defense”, and to then act accordingly in return?

Very much appreciate the Nietzsche quotes. Its been a very long time since I read him with zeal, and I've forgotten much of the details, but reading these aphorisms is heartwarming to me.

To me, love seems to be about wanting the best for a person, but also a sharing in that goodness through a transcendent union. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Love is just a word and how similarly it's being used in different contexts isn't necessarily indicative of anything. What does it say if certain aspects of love between parent and child weren't present in how one loves food? Surely, the answer is close to nothing. Is the love felt towards one's parents only truly what you can also say about how one loves music and food? — Judaka

It’s often been said that “love is nothin’ more than chemicals in the brain”. But then, what of anything cognitive—percepts, convictions, thoughts, disdains, etc.—that relies upon the brain’s operations doesn’t consist of neurotransmitters? So then why do so many out there want to downplay love by insisting on a difference that makes absolutely no difference whatsoever?

Not that frivolous a question to me. Since antiquity love has been deemed by some to be “supra-physical”, so to speak, and far more important than a mere emotion to add to the collection. One form of this which is relatively commonly known to moderners being that of “God = Love (this rather than an omnipotent and omniscient male psyche somewhere up in the skies)”. No one doubts that imbalanced, or unharmonious, interpersonal love typically results in psychological pain to one party if not to all. Yet, in so affirming, the implicit issue becomes that of what a perfectly balanced, or perfectly harmonious, love would be—and it is the latter which idealistic youngsters (to name a few) typically aim for. All the same, the notion of a non-physicalist interpretation of love can get exceedingly complex even when only addressing the animate world of agents and our interactions. So, I won’t further pursue this ontological issue.

I for one fully agree with (authentic) love being a drive to maintain and increase unity of being, a "transcendent unity" so to speak.

I here mention the qualifier “authentic” because love as extreme liking is readily discernable as, well, intense liking but not as authentic love (regardless of form the latter might take): When one loves another sentient agent, aspects of the other’s being become an integral part of oneself for as long as the love persists, and, in due measure to the love experienced, one will be readily willing to risk personal suffering and corporeal death so as to aim at preserving the love which is, if such risk is required. When one loves raspberry ice-cream, however—this contextual expression here conveying “strong liking” and not “authentic love”—one does not intimately experience an emotive union with the raspberry ice-cream’s being. An English speaker can even state that the ice-cream is "to die for", but one would in all likelihood be pathologically disturbed to hold authentic love for the ice-cream cone which one is about to eat—such that one feels the death of a part of oneself with the eating of the “loved” ice-cream, or such that one will be readily willing to die in a conflict/war for the wellbeing of the love, the unity of being, between yourself and the ice-cream cone.

Mainly want to make the point that there is a substantial ontological difference between love as unity of being and love as strong liking of. The two are distinct.

Doubtless to me that the equivocation in semantics which many hold between the two senses of the word, despite the different contexts of use, is in large part resultant of an ongoing materialistic/physicalist worldview.

-------

Ps. As long as I’m at it, here’s an affirmative stance irrespective of one’s views regarding the ontological nature of love:

Love (in the strict sense of: an either conscious or unconscious drive to maintain if not also increase unity of being) is perpetually present and inescapable for any lifeform which perpetuates its own life, this minimally in the form of self-love (although one need not also like oneself for this self-love to be). In contrast, its opposite of hatred need not be experienced in order for love (at minimum, self-love) to occur and, furthermore, will always be contingent on the presence of self-love (for oneself or one’s cohort, of which one is a member) when experienced.

Due to this, there is therefore no necessary dyad between love and hatred: while the later will always be dependent on the former, the former can well occur in the complete absence of the latter.

Maybe "cosmic evolution" would have been a more appropriate term to use? The concept itself is that every "thing" within the universe/cosmos evolves via some form of selection that is fully natural. Back in my twenties, I upheld physicalism and causal determinism with a "naturalistic pantheism" worldview - held for ontological reasons. Things have since then changed for me. But the concept I've just outlined intrigued me back then - as it still does, though now within a different ontological frame of mind (one of non-physicalism and of a partially determinate indeterminism).

I'm currently not antagonistic to to Chardin. But, back then, I couldn't have cared less.

Hope that clarifies things.

so again, it is an weasely way of framing that question because the history went hand in hand with an Israel as reality and the Nakba.

I'll answer the rest later.. I haven't looked at it sufficiently yet.... — schopenhauer1

Your answer does not answer the question. But why even discuss with someone who's "weaselly" to begin with.

I've been more than forthright all along. Have a good one.

BTW, used to contemplate the notion of universal evolution a lot in collage days. . . . . At any rate, a universal evolution would help explain how life evolved out of nonlife, but its mechanisms would need to be ironed out properly in order to be taken seriously, or at least so I find. — javra

By "universal evolution" are you referring to the theory of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin*1? — Gnomon

In relation to what I said, most definitely not.

As I understand it, such a teleological process is directed by divine Will (intention ; orthogenesis ; programming ; elan vital)*2 — Gnomon

I'm in agreement with here.

Is there a Final Form toward which the world is enforming? — Gnomon

Most all cosmologies speculate on what the "final form" of being might be. Here fully including those cosmologies of eternal return that postulate no final form whatsoever. As to the commonly accepted variants that can be currently found, there's a big freeze, a big crunch, a big rip, etc. And then you have the big bounce which fits an eternal return model.

Teilhard's final form, what he termed the omega point, is most certainly non-materialist in nature. As can also be said for notions such as those of Moksha or Nirvana. But that doesn't mean that materialists uniformly reject there being a final form of the world.

So the question is not as esoteric as some might make it out to be, this even from a materialist's pov.

Jesus Christ man, I did not say or imply that, just the formation of Israel. I knew you were going to bad faith argue by technically saying the "Nakba" which went hand-in-hand with the 1947 UN Resolution and the formation of Israel. — schopenhauer1

I asked for clarification in what of the Holocaust and of historical antisemitism justified the Nakba (as per Wikipedia, aka, “the violent displacement and dispossession of Palestinians, and the destruction of their society, culture, identity, political rights, and national aspirations” … which is a lot easier to express by use of one term). It wasn't a "bad faith argument". I also don't personally know you, and so I made it clear that I assume in good faith that what I expressed is not your view.

Your reply in no way addresses the issue.

To be clearer in where I presently stand, I can definitely see how the messianic traditions in both Christian and Judaic cultures would justify the establishment of a Judaic nation in the region from an overall Western pov. But I, again, so far fail to understand how the Holocaust and antisemitism in general does. Again, for example, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 could have established plans for a future official Judaic homeland in an area that wasn't already populated with an established peoples - thereby not requiring a Nakba or anything close to it for a Judaic state to occur.

Do Gypsies have a tradition that always points to a homeland that they mention daily in prayers, in traditions, etc? — schopenhauer1

Definitely not. Please let me know how this relates to what I previously stated regarding the Jewish people historically being nomadic for the greater portion of the past two millennia on account of not having a homeland (and of how a fair sum of antisemitism relates to this).

I would argue, by-and-large "Jews" define themselves more as an ethno-religion, and it is exactly Enlightenment movements (especially Reform Judaism) that made it less about the ethno and more about the religion to match their Christian peers. — schopenhauer1

Hm. Though I'm appreciative of the reply, this take on Reform Judaism conflicts with both my limited experiences and with what Wikipedia states:

Reform Judaism, also known as Liberal Judaism or Progressive Judaism, is a major Jewish denomination that emphasizes the evolving nature of Judaism, the superiority of its ethical aspects to its ceremonial ones, and belief in a continuous search for truth and knowledge, which is closely intertwined with human reason and not limited to the theophany at Mount Sinai. A highly liberal strand of Judaism, it is characterized by lessened stress on ritual and personal observance, regarding halakha (Jewish law) as non-binding and the individual Jew as autonomous, and great openness to external influences and progressive values. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_Judaism

Not-so-long-ago Palestine wasn't a thing. It was a province of "Palestine" (not a nation-state) under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire. — schopenhauer1

My bad. I should have said "Mandatory Palestine". Which was not "under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire" for nearly 30 years, this after the Lawrence of Arabia days during WWI. A complex historical issue, true. But that the Arabs were betrayed by the West, specifically by the United Kingdom and France, in not being granted autonomy after helping in driving away the Ottoman Empire as they were promised is a staple aspect of this history.

And indeed, that is really the real questions. What does a nation in wartime do? How does one "get rid of" an enemy? — schopenhauer1

Well, to run through the some of the options that come to mind:

a) One can completely kill off "the enemy", in full (man, woman, and child) when the enemy is a populace, so that the enemy no longer is. Which to me is reminiscent of what the Holocaust attempted to do. I.e., this would be a deplorable thing to try to do for various reasons.

b) One can completely subjugate and segregate the "the enemy" to ones despotic interests. This, however, tends toward perpetual revolt toward and animosity for those who subjugate.

c) One can find common ground with "the enemy". As one very simplified example: the enemy is pissed because they don't have water to drink; you then give them water in exchange for something you want (hostages for example); then there is a commonly understood situation wherein "the enemy" gets to drink water when needing it and you don't have hostages taken from your group. When either side breaches this commonly promised situation, then you can again stop their water supplies and they can again take hostages violently. Or something along these lines.

In addition, according to The Art of War, there's also this: the best way to win a war/conflict is the get what you want from "your enemy" before any war/conflict commences, this so that no war/conflict occurs. But it's a little too late for that.

I'm personally strongly in favor of option "c".

My guest got delayed for the time being. So I’ll go back on my word and make reply now.

Does this give us any reason to suppose that "perspective" of some sort is relative to all physical interactions? — Count Timothy von Icarus

To suppose, why not? But this would lead into supposing some form of animism/panpsychism, which I so far can’t make sense of. To accept? I’d so far say “no”.

His point was that the information content of things varies by context, even at a very basic level. The relevance here is that discoveries about the natural world sometimes require looking into interactions that only a handful of individuals are ever going to see, because they only occur in contrived lab settings, so they won't be part of most people's experiences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course. Trust is a big part of both society and the knowledge spread within. But then these discoveries ought also be replicable by anyone who so cares, making the data equally available to all that would be interested (and have it within their technical and financial means) to empirically experience the same data. Otherwise, one would quickly run into bogus claims and authoritarianism.

I'm not sure if that becomes a problem or not, but it does seem like advanced instrumentation can help create a more authoritative view on "what there is," even if most people aren't privy to using or understanding it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I so far don't see how this would in any way conflict to what I theorized about the nature of physical objectivity, and agree with the observation.

The other problem is that the majority of any sort of "community" can obviously be wrong about facts, which gets at the idea of "justification" of claims. So maybe "everyone would agree on x if given the same data," not "everyone agrees about x." Historically, there are well accepted "objective facts," that it has nonetheless taken time to discover and satisfactorily demonstrate. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, I don't find disagreement with this overall picture. Examples might help: that the planet is roughly spherical is an objective fact that has taken time to discover and satisfactorily demonstrate. Yet not everyone agrees (if one can take flat Earth society as a serious enterprise by some), and such will disagree due not to greater intelligence or rationality or better data regarding the matter but due to, here it comes, biases to which they seek to conform the data of which they are aware. (This where "a bias" is roughly understood along the lines of favoring what one wants as an ego at the expense of what in fact is.)

I'm curious. If you have an ontological understanding of what physical objectivity consists of, as I presume you do, how do you go about demarcating the notion of "the objective world"?

Currently short on time, but yes, in many ways very much agree with your post. I mentioned the spatotemporality of a rock as objective on grounds that time and space will themselves be equally intersubjective to all coexisting beings that in any way interact (though, when further enquired into, this gets into parallels with the Theory of Relativity: whatever is in close enough proximity to causally interact will share a common space (distance between givens) and time (duration between the commencement of significant changes) ... but not necessarily so otherwise).

But yes, to simplify things, to my mind: a certain flower, for example, will have a certain pheomenal appearance to (almost) all members of the human species, which here share a common intersubjectivity as a species (with deviations deemed un-normal, such as with color-blindness). And so the flower's color being, for instance, red will be deemed objectively real by all humans. Different species of life, however, will perceive the same flower as holding different phenomena - all yet bound to the same spatiotemporal limitations of what the flower objectively consists of. So a bird, or cat, or insect will see the flower differently according to their own species-spacific intersubjective reality. Etc. With plenty of overlap between species in terms of phenomena.

If one likes, the objective world is however constituted of Kantian-like noumena.

As to issues of identity, that does get complex. But I'd yet maintain there occurs an intersubjectivity equally applicable to all sentient beings all the same when, for example, a bee, a human, and an extraterrestrial (if they occur) causally interact (such as by perceiving each other in relation to what the human sees as a red flower).

I'll revisit tomorrow. Thanks for the input.

:up:

Sure, there is obviously some bracketing here. The "closed" sign on a store objectively means "the store isn't open for business," but that doesn't mean that such a meaning is accessible from the viewpoint of a passing cat or dog. There is a context that is relevant. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is use of the term "objective" in the same relative sense we use terms like "good" or "perfect" or "selfless"; relative to that which is less [X] that address is [X]; which leads to humorous tropes such as something being "better than perfect" (i.e., better that what was required for a proper fit, for instance).

Yet an objective rock will hold the same spatiotemporal properties to all humans, cats, and dogs; to all coexistent beings that happen upon the same rock in practice.

Getting back to what Joshs was saying about objectivity being intersubjective, hypothesize there being a reality which affects all coexistent psyches equally - this in principle at least - this irrespective of species of life or of the life addressed being earthbound. This I would term objective physical reality. Then, given this premise, one can either hold a materialist-like view of it or a constructivist-like view of it. In exploring the latter view, objective reality would then be that singular intersubjective reality (such as a language or a culture) which is common to all beings in the cosmos. This can then be inferred to lead to an idealism of sorts very much in keeping with Peirce's notions of physicality being effete mind that is itself always perpetually evolving, with universal laws being global habits. Here, objectivity is singular and, because it pertains to all equally, it pertains to no one individual being or cohort. Yet it is still "that actuality which, in being equally actual to all, is perfectly impartial to any one psyche or grouping of these", in this sense being (individual) mind independent. An objective reality we as individual minds perceive intra-subjectively via our inter-subjective filters of interpretation. Physical objects as those physically objective givens that invariable stand before us as subjects irrespective of our wants and desires as individual minds or collections of these.

I get this is an extravagant and, currently, idiosyncratic view of what objectivity entails. It's been my modus operandi for some time now, all the same.

If anyone finds inconsistencies with this given view in terms of what objective reality is, I'd love to know about the proposed inconsistencies.

(Within this worldview, an objective good - in the sense of that which is factually good for all when all biases are removed - can obtain. But this doesn't focus on physical objectivity, instead addressing that which is objectively real for all psyches, and which, in part, would govern the evolution of physicality's natural laws which C.S. Peirce for example makes mention of. But this is a mouthful - and I likely won't be able to adequately argue for it in a forum format. I would be grateful for any criticism regarding physical objectivity as just outlined, though.)

Why so? For instance, what other interests do you find occurring in Western Civilization post Enlightenment which justify what Palestinians term the Nakba? — javra

The Holocaust, historical reasons, and antisemitism in general in the West. — schopenhauer1

I don't yet understand how the Holocaust and the history of antisemitism justify the Nakba. To make myself better understood, it so far seems to be affirming that because the Nazis (and many others) considered Jews as "sub-human", Jews in Israel have had the right to consider Palestinians as "sub-human" in relation to their own worth. But I so far doubt this is what you're intending to say.

"To the Jews as individuals, all rights. To the Jews as a nation, no rights." was what came out of the National Assembly convention in 1789. — schopenhauer1

OK, but back then Jews as a people did not have their own nation. (Having heard, lets say, plenty of bias against both, this is the one thing that Jews and Gypsies have traditionally held in common as otherwise two very different peoples: they were nomadic peoples.)

Another very touch topic, but is a Jew defined as Jewish - this throughout history - by an ethnicity (something that, for example, can thereby be traced with mitochondrial DNA nowadays), by the specific religion of Judaism, by a nationality, or necessarily by all three simultaneously? I've heard of or encountered plenty of Jews that are either not religious or else hold onto different religious convictions (this, particularly, in the modern neopagan community; e.g. Starhawk), but Jews they nevertheless are. As to a Jew being necessarily defined by a nationality, namely that of ancient Israel (as in “Israelite”), this is to me strongly connected to religious convictions themselves. Which in part gets to the quote you've provided (given its proper historical context) and, in part, gets to many a non-Zionist Jew who do not identify with any nationality other than that nation in which they have grown up in (this not being that of modern Israel).

So the Nakba came about from internal conflicts that were ongoing right before the UN 1947 declaration, and after that turned into a regional war. And indeed it is about land rights, and whether to acknowledge a Jewish state. — schopenhauer1

Yet, that the establishment of a Jewish state after WWII happened to be within not-so-long-ago Palestine, this rather than somewhere else in the world that was not already populated in an established way, to me, at least, directly coheres into the very messianic prophesy I initially brought up.

More-or-less, yes. That is to say, the way history unfolded, the reality is these "nation-states" are fully European in origin, not a sort of political entity indigenous to X (regions in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, etc.). So excuse my language, but WTF would one be talking about when discussing "self-determination" when it is already confined to YOUR (yes YOU Western person who claims to be pro-underdog) who has thus defined it to be self-determined in YOUR Westphalian/Atlantic Charter/Post-Colonialist way?

But you see, there is NO GETTING OUT of the system either. You cannot turn back post-colonialism to so pre-colonization time. So what is one to do? — schopenhauer1

Speaking for myself, I don't favor underdogs on account of their simply so being. And true, there is no going back. Something that Native American Indians (First Nations) know all too well, for example. The issue isn't about how do we go back to the way things once were but how do we move forward from here on out.

But to be blunt: My little mind foresees a lot more hatred of Jews, hatred of the USA, and hatred of the West at large if this conflict can only be resolved via the extermination of the Palestinians from their current land ... or else gets turned into the largest concentration camp the world has yet to witness. This increased inter-cultural hatred is not something that I want. But the world at large is watching. And every Palestinian child that escapes death and will grow into an adult will likely not hold kind thoughts regarding the three populaces just mentioned - to which I pertain. This as just one little - but maybe all the same significant - example of what will await in our future. This apropos a ceasefire that stands relatively little chance of occurring anytime soon – as in, right now.

So, at to "what to do", from where I stand, those who are more quote-unquote "civilized" should be the first to stop the killing of innocent people - on the streets, in shelters, in hospitals, etc. - and this for their/our own future interest in both the short-term and the long-term.

No worries mate. :wink: — Gnomon

:grin: :up:

Regarding Causation, the origin & direction of causation (First Cause ; Teleology) is not important for materialists. What matters to them is tangible results. — Gnomon

Hm. I rather think that explanatory power is the principle issue, and that this is the "tangible result" that most are interested in. For instance, between things such as "getting what is the point of this life/existence" and things such as "having a gadget that technologically surpasses all gizmos previously owned", I'm wagering that most would choose the former (granting that it manages to make any coherent sense)

But in the absence of the former, as most of us happen to be, the latter serves as a very good means of distraction and, thereby, amusement. With a little bit of functionality thrown in.

I suppose the postulated New Law of Evolution will be judged, not by its abstract universal Truth, but by its concrete lab Results. :smile: — Gnomon

This gets back to its explanatory power, I think.

BTW, used to contemplate the notion of universal evolution a lot in collage days. Given a) some ready established forms and b) a force placed upon them, they will most often naturally develop into a new structure whose form as such was selected by (a) and (b). For instance, take ten randomly placed coins in one's palm or in a cup, randomly shake them, and they will naturally organize into one or more columns. Same can be said for most anything, with no life required for this selection of form. But the philosophical underpinnings here get complex. At any rate, a universal evolution would help explain how life evolved out of nonlife, but its mechanisms would need to be ironed out properly in order to be taken seriously, or at least so I find.

I don’t know if it’s that simple. Now you are reducing this conflict more than probably the case. — schopenhauer1

Why so? For instance, what other interests do you find occurring in Western Civilization post Enlightenment which justify what Palestinians term the Nakba?

No, I specifically defined what I meant by 17-18th Enlightenment movement. — schopenhauer1

Ok. I then take your reply to indicate that criticism of Western civilization at large by westerners is not something that is to be proscribed? The proscription simply applying to the potential denunciation of the ideal of "universal rights for all people" and the like?

Well, "apocalypse" means a sort of "revealing or revelation" and can mean some sort of esoteric secrets like the beginning of the world, the end of the world, heavenly realms, heavenly hosts, etc. In other words, its very esoteric. — schopenhauer1

Right. And so understood from a non-Abrahamic perspective (here written as an umbrella generalization and not looking at what more often than not are deemed heretical variants--with aspects such as the Kabbalah as exceptions), an apocalypse is always a strictly personal experience regarding the nature of reality - i.e., mysticism 101 (of which Gnosticism is one variant) - rather than about the living dead rising up from their graves or some such.

So I would say it is a bit of a misnomer to say "the Christ arrives for fundamentalist Jews". The idea of the messiah being "The Christ" is a very "Christian" concept (mainly from Paul and his writings). Messiah comes from the Hebrew "moshiach" and was meant to refer to a leader who would bring an end to any occupying civilization and restore the old kingship back to the an heir from the lineage of the House of David. Later versions (starting around the Book of Daniel we'll say), had a more apocalyptic aspect where the dead will rise, and there will be universal peace (lion lies next to the lamb, etc.). Some versions around the time of Jesus had an apocalyptic aspect of the warring of the "elect of Israel" and the rest, etc. (the Dead Sea Scrolls is a good source for this more apocalyptic version of events). Some of that may still be in there, but the beliefs of the mystical aspects are more fluid and open to interpretation. The basic gist is that it is a Jew (literally a Judhite as David was from the tribe of Judah) restoring the kingship of Israel.

The Christ is Paul's notion that the messiah has a metaphysical component. He may be pre-existing (though in Paul's letter that might not be the case), and eventually tied into the notion of a literal Son of God, and that his death acts as a sacrifice abrogates the original covenant such that the Laws of Moses become nullified. This is actually the real split from Judaism, not believing that "Jesus was the Messiah" (though that didn't help too between the very early group after his death, because a dead messiah doesn't seem plausible as restoring the kingship.. If he is dead, he cannot fulfil that). — schopenhauer1

Hm. From what I know, “Christ” or, more accurately, “Khristos” is the Ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew word for Messiah, ”מָשִׁיחַ”, both having the same exact meaning of “the anointed one”. For both religions basically meaning the chosen one who will lead his people into salvation of one type or another. Let’s not forget that all “Christians” were in fact Jewish and pagan (if Gnosticism-like beliefs held by former polytheists get so labeled) before the first Council of Nicaea with its newly found doctrine of the Trinity. But yes, today “Christ” distinctly connotes Christian religion whereas Messiah tends to connote Judeic religion. Thanks for the correction in that regard.

Anyway, yes there is a strong tie of Evangelical theology with Israel as the belief is that if all Jews go back to Israel Jesus would come back and then send the non-believers to hell and start the whole rapture and the like. — schopenhauer1

Right. This state of affairs has always made me doubtful of the sincerity of a two state solution as sponsored by the USA and Israel. I used to hope for the best in this respect—thinking that this would best facilitate relative peace given regional politics—but constantly saw all signs indicating that this “two state solution” proposal was nothing but a facade for stopping any opposition to the forceful disappearance of all Palestinians from the former state of Palestine … this to facilitate the coming of the Messiah/Christ at nearly any cost. And today’s activities in these two countries in no way contradicts this in fact being so. I know it’s a very touchy topic, but there you have it. To non-extremists—be they Jews, Christians, Muslims, pagans, Buddhists, atheists, or what have you—were this to in fact be so, it can well be looked upon as an unwholly alliance between two otherwise antagonistic extremist factions … which as alliance is set on destroying what we have of global harmony so that they might have their personal salvation in the here and now.

My questioning, though, was more in regard to what constitutes this “Western Civilization” of ours that should not be derided by us westerners. Many fundamentalists will maintain that it is the very fundamentalist interpretation of scripture—including that of the Messiah’s/Christ’s coming—around which Western Civilization pivots. And I can see this argument: from “in God we trust” written on money to bibles in trials and more (although, to me, were Cleopatra to have succeeded in her endeavors, and were ancient Egypt to have united with ancient Rome, it would still be Western Civilization—albeit one likely not pivoted around anything Judeo-Cristian).

But then, are you saying that us non-extremists are wrong for wanting this aspect of current Western Culture, which longs for some violent apocalypse to occur, to no longer be of any influence in politics (or in society at large for that matter)?

-----

ps. Personally dislike this use of “apocalypse” to address supernatural doings, like the reawakening of the dead of which you make mention. It initially strictly meant a revealing—literally, an un-covering of what is (which makes far more sense in a gnostic-like interpretation of the world). Bummer, that’s all.

pps. Grew up around more than a few non-extremist Jews, many of which are still good friends of the family if not personal friends. That said, in high school had one Orthodox Jewish friend who latter on became extremist. He for example once informed me that Palestinians were “sub-human” … the same rhetoric used by Germans toward Jews before the Holocaust … and he claimed to have quite a following online, this a few years back. Gained a rather bad impression from this now no longer friend in respect to extremists.

It seems I might have been too terse in my reply. Certainly: science is thoroughly founded upon philosophy and in no way the other way around. By “science” I am here strictly referring to the scientific method regardless of domain—which is fully fallibilistic in both theory and practice (this as per fallibilism …. aka, a newly coined term for the academic skepticism of ancients such as Cicero)—and in no way things such as technology, scientism, or the like. So understood, science is strictly in the business of gathering dependable data, which is equally available to all in principle (overlooking its sometimes corporatized aspects, e.g. typical pharmaceutical research), via which to validate our best suppositions and to falsify our erroneous beliefs. In so being, it is strictly limited to those observables that are observable by all in principle (this leading to the somewhat different issue of things such as consciousness not being scientifically evidenced, this in the strict sense of science just expressed). The theory or evolution and that of relativity were not in and of themselves in any way developed through the scientific method—but are very well supported by data that has been thus obtained while providing best explanatory power for the said data to date, and are thereby scientific only in this latter sense. These two examples of scientific theories illustrate how science is founded upon philosophy, but things in fact get more complex, for all science (be it today’s, yesterday's, or tomorrow's) is founded upon metaphysical postulates, such as that of causality as we currently interpret the term.

In large part due to Descartes, we now largely consider two out of Aristotle’s four causes to lack ontic reality (this contra the reality of someone’s mind and belief structures therein): formal causation and teleological causation. Moderners thus do not believe that there are teleological causes in the world, but answering the question of “What caused you to rob the bank?” with “I needed money” is in no way outdated, being deemed a rational (if in no way reasonable) answer to give. Here, then, is teleological causation: “the want to have money in the future” will, as telos/goal/aim, significantly determine what one presently does or formerly did.

At any rate, science cannot establish via its data acquisition whether teleological causation is real or only imaginary, for example. Were there to be an ontology proposed which incorporates teleological causation, it would nevertheless need to not contradict the established data obtained via the scientific method (say, like insisting that dinosaurs and humans once coexisted so as to fit data into a Young Earth Creationism account of things—which would contradict the established data of fossil records in layers of earth; else, were free will to be real, it could not contradict the established data regarding our central nervous system’s operations). Again, the occurrence or absence of teleological causation is not something that science can establish. Current science operates upon the philosophical position that teleology does not occur. Yet an ontology of teleology, in order to be coherent and consistent, would a) need to hold a greater explanatory power than the established philosophically metaphysical position that teleology is nonexistent and b) be conformant to all data (rather than theory) we hold regarding the world and ourselves. Were at least (b) to occur, then one could then uphold a new metaphysical postulate (relative to current day postulates) in coherent and consistent manners. And the scientific method as practice would continue just as before.

I hope this better presents my position regarding science and causation (as just one example of science and metaphysics in general).

The most common argument against the existence of objective morality and moral facts besides moral differences between societies is that they aren’t tangible objects found in the universe and can’t be measured scientifically. Are there any refutations or arguments against this?- — Captain Homicide

Same can be said of psyches … if by “universe” one here intends the physical universe.

Here’s a premise: good = preferable. Good/preferable to whom or what if not to psyches themselves? Seems to me that if there are no psyches, then there cannot be anything good/preferable.

As to objective good, this would translate into that which is objectively—i.e., impartially or unbiasedly—preferable to all coexistent psyches in the cosmos (who might or might not then be ignorant of what this objective good is). And this postulate of an objective good would in turn be in part contingent on there being underlying universal(s) to all coexisting psyches.

If no such universals to all coexisting psyches—to simplify, let’s just say consciousnesses here—then no such thing as an objective good. But then, there wouldn’t occur such a thing as consciousness as a commonly occurring, or else commonly shared, property of being; i.e., the very word “consciousness” would then become meaningless, for it would mean something different, and utterly unrelated, to each and every individual [… ?].

By this general account I then take it that there are universals to all coexisting consciousnesses. Which then facilitates the possibility of an objective good.

This is a bit like preaching to the choir, here. :smile: I’ll only add that any new metaphysical postulations (e.g. as to the nature of causality) will need to remain conformant to established data obtained via the scientific method. But maybe this goes without saying.

There is no going back. There is no way out, for good or bad. Mine as well embrace what makes the West work, as you are living in that framework. — schopenhauer1

Apropos an underlying current that's been in many of the more recent posts I've read regarding the Israel / Palestinian conflict on this tread:

First off, I am extremely in favor of a cessation to all antisemitism worldwide. (To the antisemites out there this would make me a hardcore “Jew lover”.) However, I am also one to sternly believe that a Semite—which, let's face it, is a technically inappropriate and often derogatory slang for “Jew”—is not to be absolved of all wrongs merely on account of so being Semitic.

As such, I am very opposed to the slaughter of innocent Palestinians (btw, don’t know how more innocent a person can get than being a child) by the Israeli state … which indeed is, from at least my pov, nowadays in large part internally supported by Judaic religious fundamentalists rather than Jews who take views such as that of “not in our name”. (such as those who some years back outlawed interracial marriages between Palestinians and Jews, if memory serves me right)

With that general background in mind, apropos the allegiance to Western Civilization by westerners, or something to the like, which this thread in part seems to be about:

Has anyone so far brought up the following issue?

The religious fundamental-extremist drive, yearning, and often undulated lust for the coming of the Messiah asap (the first time the Christ arrives for fundamentalist Jews; the second coming for fundamentalist Christians)—which is supposed by fundamentalist-extremists to only occur once the nation of Israel is fully inhabited by only Judaic people is, to the best of my knowledge, a staple part of the Western Judaeo-Cristian civilization. Some such extremist Christians at least seem to exhibit some degree of blood-lust in this craving; cf. the whole “Armageddon days” that is desired to arrive by some, and as was supposedly prophesied in Revelations (for only then will Christ’s second coming occur, according to this common interpretation of scripture). Some current fundamentalist-extremist Jews seem to not be lagging too far behind in this same lust for blood (from human lesser-animals, apparently).

Christ’s coming for the first time for Jews can be, for fundamentalist-extremist Jews (btw, a group to which, tmk, many Orthodox Jews are sharply antithetical, the latter being very peace-loving and such), interpreted to signify the exaltation of the chosen people and, by certain inferences, thereby the subjugation of all non-chosen-people, i.e. Gentiles—or something to this effect (heck, one can even see the case for the existential disappearance of Gentiles world over for not being “sufficiently close to G-d” as understood by self-labeled “true Jews”). Whereas Christ’s second coming for fundamentalist extremist Christians will basically signify that all non-believers get sent to eternal Hell right away, Jews most typically included.

But, despite this, till then, there is all indication of a strong, unassailable allegiance between fundamental-extremist Christians and fundamental-extremist Jews, for both seek the same given aforementioned goal of fulfilling the prophecy of the Messiah’s coming.

One could bicker among the details of the just expressed (and I wrote them down from best recollections, mistaken as these sometimes are, without going through the trouble of finding references where appropriate, and most certainly with the hew of my own current biases as a human)—but the overall gist to me seems to remain. Oddly, I haven’t heard of this commonly known reality of fundamental-extremist religious belief structure among the Judaeo-Christian civilization/populace often spoken about publicly, such as in media or in houses of worship with publicly accessible sermons. And those brights/atheists in the populace haven’t managed to make the slightest dent in this situation; if anything, only adding fuel to the fire. In democracies, politics is determined by the population’ intentions. How much of the western populace is fundamentalist-extremist is hard, if at all possible, to accurately judge. But there’s plenty of evidence that fundamentalist thought and practice has not diminished, and has likely increased, in the West at large over the decades. If nowhere else, then at least in the USA.

So—this just mentioned issue of the Messiah’s coming sure seems to me to be a purely Western Civilization thing. Many might even say that the West as we know it required, and still requires, Judaeo-Christian ideology in order to work.

The pinnacle issue all this is intended to ask about: Ought this policy-influencing yearning in our Western culture for the Messiah's coming to not be mentioned, questioned, and disapproved of by us westerners … this on the grounds that it has been a staple aspect of Western Civilization for the past two millennia?

--

Ps. Not only am I very pro all peace-loving and justice-loving Jews of the world, I’m also for all Christians that—in the paraphrased words of Bill Maher in the documentary “Religulous”—are “Christ-within-ers” or some such (to my reckoning: hold the ethical teachings of JC as that which ought to be lived and practiced via works). Well, since I also mentioned atheists, also very much pro all humanitarians as well. All the same, the issue I posted is still of interest to me.