While I'm here, also in reference to what I previously quoted, namely, the duality between being and non-being:

My strong hunch is that there is equivocations galore in how the term "being" is applied by different philosophers of different cultures and at different times in history. From a Western philosophy vantage, being is not equivalent to existing - as you yourself are aware of. Some examples: The Good, The One, or else Eastern notions of Brahman and Nirvana (this without remainder). None of these exist but all are within their own frameworks taken to in fact be, this in manners that can be said to transcend existence and, thereby, existents - and, therefore, to hold being.

In which sense (from what framework) can there be a non-duality between being and non-being?

In Eastern frameworks, for example, the illusion/magic trick of Maya - wherein things occur and thereby are - is construed as separate from either the Brahman or Nirvana (without remainder) which as ultimate reality is. The first is possible to create and destroy, for example; the second is not. And, tmbk, only in complete absence of the first can one obtain the absolute pure nature of the second - as atman in Hinduism and as anatman in Buddhism. If this is so, then how can Brahman or Nirvana (without remainder) be considered to not be - this as would be implied by neither being nor not-being?

:up:

In contrast, Nishida, drawing on Zen, sees "absolute nothingness" not as mere absence but as the ground of reality itself, 'the nothing which is everything'. This nothingness is dynamic and relational, allowing for the dissolution of dualities such as self and other, being and non-being. — Wayfarer

Just happened upon this. In its English format, is this supposed to in fact be "absolute nothingness" or "absolute no thingness". The two are by no means equivalent.

↪javra
That's not germane here. You can see my opinion in other threads.

Not at all. It's based on sentiment. — Wayfarer

Yep. Scientism as a faith. — Banno

If you say so. Still, to make my former point a bit clearer, in the absence of an “is” which grounds our “oughts”, all systems of ethics can be decried as sentimental—this rather than rational. One could for example apply Hume’s guillotine even to virtue ethics: the difference between concrete instantiations of “what virtue is” (which, to be clear, can be as relative as anything else) versus “what virtue ought to be”, the latter so that one might for instance become more virtuous than one currently is. The first will not ground the second, except via sentiment—i.e., except via emotion rather than reason—not when there’s a complete absence of something like The Good being a globally existential “is” toward which one should aspire, in this case so as to gain greater virtue.

Why I brought this up: While the OP poster's arguments are full of gaps in what he has so far written, his general outlook appears to me to lean toward the virtuous, or else to aspire toward it. I want to cut @Seeker25 some slack, and am point out that the argument of Hume’s guillotine to too broad in that it applies to all ethical systems devoid of an ultimate objective Good that existentially is.

I don’t sponsor his arguments so far, but, to try to take his side, here is a trivial example of how evolution and ethics can converge:

Consider three possible types of ice-cream: a) ice-cream comprised of cyanide, b) ice-cream comprised of dirt, and c) ice-cream comprised of nutrients. Type (a), (b), and (c) otherwise all have the same delicious flavor to our tastebuds due to the latest innovations in chemistry. Save for death-yearning folk and their ilk, all will readily deem the consumption of (a) unethical—one would not be virtuous to give it to another so that they might trustingly eat of it, for example. As to those who knowingly choose to eat it, evolution selects against their being, leaving only non-cyanide consuming humans behind. Type (b) is not as bad, for it does not kill. But your and your friends’ indigestion upon eating it will in effect be a reduction of health, and hence of eudemonia (wellbeing). Whereas type (c) will not be unethical to consume whenever the cravings for a moderate amount of ice-cream emerge. All this by way of who we are due to the forces of natural selection which has shaped our current being.

There are certain human behaviors—say the gleeful perpetuation of genocides against the Other, gross misinformation that destroys all trust in what is real, the launching of nuclear weapons in today’s world, etc.—which in many ways parallel ice-cream type (a): they lead to the destruction of life. Other human behaviors, like the addiction to substances, will parallel ice-cream type (b): they will not kill but will reduce general wellbeing. And certain human behaviors can be likened to ice-cream type (c): they will improve wellbeing when acted out in their own proper contexts. Behaviors (a) will be unethical, behaviors (b) will be less than ethical, and behaviors (c) will in its proper contexts be ethical. And all this will be bound to the evolved forms of life that we are and to the very evolutionary constraints that has led to our current being as humans. Yes, there’s competition in nature, and the competition piques our interest generally, but there is far more cooperation in nature which is usually taken for granted in full: for starters, every multicellular organism is a cooperation between individual living beings we call somatic cells. (Place an individual somatic cell in a pastry dish with sufficient required stimulation and nutrients and it will live out its life just fine—I’ve at least been told this is the case for neurons.)

Ok, I thoroughly grant that to claim all this as some sort of definitive grounding for what ethics is and what ought to be would be fully sentimental, rather than rational. But behind this sentiment there is yet some inkling of convergence between evolution and ethics: the destruction of our species from within or else from without we deem not good and hence unethical (well, most sane people do), and there is little denying that natural selection has selected for this in us humans over eons. But natural selection is not an omnipotent god that determines all aspects of what we do. And if our species does become destroyed, natural selection will continue doing what it has always done: select for life that best conforms to its ever-changing contextual realities, which sapience tends to excel at (at least when its head isn’t buried in a donkey’s behind).

And evolution doesn’t operate on bodily physiology alone; it works on the behaviors of life galore.

Again, this isn’t an argument I will defend tooth and bone, but I do want to cut @Seeker25 some slack here. And preliminarily chopping down his arguments by evoking Hume’s guillotine and thereby decrying it as sentimental is overkill—in that Hume’s guillotine equally applies to all appraisals of ethics which do not incorporate an objective Good that is and that is to be aspired toward.

You entirely missed the point. Sure, science tells us how things are. It does not tell us how they ought be.

Even if "Science explains how things are and how events have unfolded over the past 4.6 billion years; these are facts" we cannot conclude from that alone how things ought to be. — Banno

Since your invoking Hume’s guillotine—short of the “is” of The Good, as per platonic or neoplatonic notions—what then might be rationally used to establish what one ought do or what ought be?

Grunts of “yay” and “boo”? But these too are things that are, rather than rational appraisals of what ought to be—and so this too succumbs to the same problem.

I'm not here intending to argue for The Good, just point out what I so far take to be obvious.

I am increasingly convinced that everything aligned with the trends of evolution is good, everything that opposes it is bad, and everything else is indifferent. It is precisely in this "indifferent" space that people must exercise their freedom.

What do you think? — Seeker25

Since I don’t know if you’re knowledgeable of this, it might be of interest to check out an overview of the Gaia Hypothesis, maybe especially when it comes to criticisms of it. There’s no conclusive evidence that it’s a farce but, Cartesian-ly skeptic as most are when it comes to things that don't suit our fancy – and I here include everyone from typical physicalists to typical monotheists - there is also no current conclusive evidence for this hypothesis that would convince the so called “skeptics”.

I’m also not familiar with your general philosophical background on metaphysics, but the general outlook you’ve outlined – this along with the Gaia hypothesis – can easily be found in keeping with notions such as that of an Anima Mundi. One in which a pre-Abrahamic notion of Logos pervades all that is – be it living or nonliving.

If this is so far not off-putting for you, then you might also be interested in C.S. Peirce’s notion of Agapism which can parallel Teilhard’s notion of cosmic evolution in general – both of which can be in general keeping to the former two concepts linked to.

Of one possible concern, all these views can easily be ridiculed as being in some ways teleological – which, as a metaphysical outlook, is grossly unpopular nowadays. (Then again, as the bumper sticker saying goes, Popularity is (or at least can be) a Socially Transmitted Disease.)

I don’t have much to comment on in terms of being pro- or contra- your generalized thesis in the terms you’ve presented. But if you happen to not be familiar with the concepts just specified, the links provided might be of benefit as a relatively easy to read springboard toward further thoughts and ideas.

As to entertaining the notion of "Nature being good” (its evolutionary process included), one here risks being labeled a Nature-worshiper if one did – a deplorable thing to be from the vantage of both physicalists and monotheists alike. Then, to maybe counterbalance this train of thought, there’s a partial lyric one can quote from a song by a former band called Nirvana: “Nature is a whore”. In overview of how I make sense of this quote, it will sustain and support (and in this manner take the side of) those filled with vice just as much as it will those filled with virtue … but this only up to a point, as per an ever increasing global warming that holds the potential to more or less wipe the slate clean of what we, maybe a bit too anthropocentrically, term “sapience”.

Whatever one presumes it to be - good, bad, or just plain ugly in its shear impartiality - I’m certain that Nature, and its evolution via natural selection in general, will persist in being long after we’re all dead and gone to this world. Just as it did long before we appeared.

The blind leading the blind, the blind judging the blind?

You don't see just how authoritarian you are. — baker

Hopefully I'm taking this well out of context, but it did hit a nerve. So I'm addressing this not to you in particular but as a general reply in respect to the overall thread:

That global warming is a hoax is steadily strengthening as our socially constructed truth. "Drill baby drill" being the general motto, with its great economic appeal.

Authoritarians will label those who value truth to be authoritarian. Tyrants will label those who value justice to be tyrannical. Evil/vice will label good/virtue as evil. Nothing new historically in any of this. Endless power games and mind fu*ks, to not mention worse. And our socially constructed truths rule the day in the short term.

But Nature, the bitch that she is, doesn’t give a shit about our socially constructed truths. Nor about our shortsighted will to conquer as much as we can for our egos’ benefit – everything from others' consent to Nature itself irrespective of means.

Nature is the ultimate authority. Call it authoritarian, tyrannical, evil. This will not change what Nature is and what it does. And our not being true to it - our not corresponding/conforming to its reality – might will just bite every last one of us in the ass rather painfully. Oh, and this irrespective of how one might want to philosophically justify the reality of Nature.

No doubt many will take this to be just one more idealistic and authoritarian opining in a world of relative realities wherein might makes right. Yes, and lemmings never do end up drowning themselves in mass droves on account of their shortsightedness. Not if we socially construct the truth that they don’t.

We have never been and never will existentially be in a post-truth world. And individual societies are aspects of it – "post truth" as individual societies might become – which makes the whole issue of people no longer valuing truth alarming; this, at least, to some. But there’s nothing new in those who value the benefits of dishonesty and corruption greatly tending to champion the dishonest and corrupt - this while disavowing those who don't so value.

Akin to asking, if you do not know how a word is spelled, then how might a dictionary be of any help?

I'll leave you to it. — Banno


Some other time maybe. — javra

I don't so far find justification for this claim. But groovy all the same. Then, please enlighten me as to what we all know "mind" to be in the ordinary sense. — javra


We know what we mean when we say such things as "I changed my mind", "I made up my mind", "I don't mind", " I did that task mindfully", "mind your step" and so on...there are countless examples. They suggest that what we understand as mind is really minding, a verb not a noun, an activity not an object. Of course this is not to say that reification of that activity does not often set in.

I'll start here: What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra


Everything in the so-called external world is not an aspect of our own minds. Of course our perception of those things is a form of minding, but it does not follow that the things are forms of minding. It seems impossible to make sense of the idea that they could be. If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent. — Janus

None of which provides a justifiably true belief of what demarcates mind from non-mind. This so as to address the question asked. For example, that mind is a process rather than a thing says nothing about this demarcation between mind and non-mind within any viable process theory. But I don't want to start playing devils advocate, irrespective of how much you or some others might, maybe, want me to. Repetition of unjustified affirmations such as that "we all know what 'mind' is in the ordinary sense" does not make the affirmation true - knowledge last I checked not being equivalent to a gut feeling - notwithstanding the emotive pleading that might hew the affirmations. As to these questions:

If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent. — Janus

By what means do you conclude that trees and insentient, as in not able to perceive things such as gravity and light in their own non-animal based ways? One would then uphold the reality of insentient life-forms, which would be a novelty for me. Otherwise, if they are deemed in some way sentient, then via what reasoning are they then concluded to necessarily be devoid of any form of mind? Not endowed with anything like our human mind clearly, but devoid of any type of mind whatsoever? Plant cognition is not an unjustified position.

As to how a tree, and ant, and human can all sense, act, and react in relation to the same rock, for example, this greatly parallels what I was entertaining in "The Mind-Created World" thread - which you hint at dispelling in preference of physicalism.

At any rate, yours still remains an unjustified claim that "we all know what a mind is in ordinary senses of the term". This would then entail that we all know - rather than having gut feelings regarding - what of what we are aware of is not an aspect of our own individual mind. Needless to add, no one would then need to deny the position of solipsism (only one self or mind exists) for we all would then have knowledge - justified true belief - that solipsism is false.

But since I, again, don't want to play devil's advocate, I'll do my best to leave you to it in turn.

The problem is that we all know what we mean by 'mind' in the ordinary context. — Janus

I don't so far find justification for this claim. But groovy all the same. Then, please enlighten me as to what we all know "mind" to be in the ordinary sense.

I'll start here: What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds?

I'll leave you to it. — Banno

Some other time maybe.

↪javra
I don't see as we need the mysticism. — Banno

Unlike this very statement, what I said was neither gibberish nor poetry – instead being a rational proposition.

Rather, delineating “mind-independence” with a lack of delineation for what “mind” is will be vague or else fuzzy reasoning. Mystical reasoning, if one’s so prefers to term such.

… then again, if minds are beetles in a box, then by what justification will the very notion of “mind-independence” not likewise be?

So as to not overly focus on Chistian beliefs, I should maybe add that the non-physicalist understanding of numbers as I’ve just outlined it pervades popular culture at large: from the notion that (non-physical) being is one (as in the statement, "we are all one," or the dictum of "e pluribus unum") to the notion that in a romantic relationship the two can become one. With all such beliefs being disparate from the stance that 1+1 can only equal 2 in all cases.

But none of this is to deny that in physical reality 1+1 can only equal 2 - and, by extension, that 2+2 thereby equals (and can only equal) 4 when it comes to physical entities.

There is more to truth than consistency, there is also the matter of correspondence with reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks for that, and I by this am not in any way disagreeing with your reply.

In the part I've just quoted: I find consistency and correspondence/conformity to reality to be deeply entwined. This in so far as reality, whatever it might in fact be, can only be devoid of logical contradictions (for emphasis, where an ontological logical contradiction is a state of affairs wherein both X and not-X both ontically occur simultaneously and in the exact same respect). For example, if reality is in part tychistic then truths will conform to this partly tychistic reality in consistent ways - thereby making some variant of indeterminism true and the strictly hard determinism which is currently fashionable among many false.

It's a whopper of a metaphysical claim that realty is devoid of logical contradictions - although I so far find that everyone at least implicitly lives by this conviction. But, in granting this explicitly, then for any belief to be true, in its then needing to conform to reality to so be, the belief will then necessarily be devoid of logical contradictions in its justifications (which, after all, are justifications for the belief being conformant to reality, or else that which is real). So if a) reality is consistent (devoid of logical contradictions) and b) truth is conformity to reality then c) any belief which is inconsistent will not be true.

As to the truth of numbers, their relations, and what they represent:

If physicalism, maths can only represent physical entities and their possible physical relations (otherwise it wouldn't be physicalism). If non-physicalism, then the numbers made use by maths could in certain situations represent incorporeal entities, such as individual souls or psyches. In the here very broad umbrella of the latter, one could then obtain the proposition that "one incorporeal psyche added to another incorporeal psyche added to another incorporeal psyche can via assimilation converge into one possibly grander incorporeal psyche" - thereby holding the potential of producing the 1+1+1=1 proposition, which will contradict the 2+2=4 proposition IFF the numbers of both equations are taken to represent the same corporeal and hence physical objects. Otherwise, within at least some non-physicalist worldviews, the question which is so easily ridiculed from physical vantages can emerge: how many individual incorporeal beings, such as angels, can fit onto the tip of a pin? With the answer being indeterminable due to the very incorporeal nature of individual beings addressed - creating a deep equivocation of sorts.

The basic general point to all this tmk being in general agreement with your post

I disagree with you, but I acknowledge that no logical argument can prove you wrong. — Relativist

I understand. Although don't we here then embark into areas of faith, rather then those of belief which can be justified.

It also seems to me that our difference on this point is vanishing small- as small as the possibility that "2+2=4" is false. — Relativist

Yes, I can agree, hence why I consider my belief that 2+2=4 to be categorical - despite it yet being, technically when philosophically appraised, fallible rather than infallible.

Aye, I don’t want to turn this thread into one of epistemology. But to answer …

I’m sorry but I’m one of those stodgy old-fashioned types who believe that 2+2=4 is true in all possible worlds. I can’t see how a world would hold together if it were not. — Wayfarer

And yet we live in a world where some people, some more fervently than others, believe that a certain 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 (often termed the Trinity) and that it is only due to this state of affairs that the proposition of 2 + 2 = 4 can possibly hold true. Put a philosopher’s or a mathematician’s hat on and one might see a blatant logical contradiction here. At any rate, I take this world where the Trinity is taken to be factual (and hence were a certain 1 + 1 + 1 does equate to 1, rather than to 3) to be one such possible world.

How could 2+2=4 be wrong ? Our mathematical knowledge is more certain than any philosophical argument you can bring against it. If a philosophical view requires us to doubt 2+2=4, then I would rather abandon that philosophical view, than allow uncertainty into mathematics. — Sirius

I've already given reasoning for 2 + 2 = 4 not being an infallible proposition. What you're here addressing is not the reasoning but the conclusion and how you'd react to it. But, as to the conclusion, that there is a possibility - irrespective of how minuscule - of X being wrong in no way entails that X is in fact wrong. Furthermore, just because X can be rationally evidenced fallible rather than infallible does not in any way warrant that one then doubts X. What reason is there to doubt X when X exhibits no inconsistencies - this despite X being fallible nevertheless?

This I believe is the key phrase toward understanding javra's position on this matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it certainly is pivotal to what my argument for global fallibilism consists of.

But, again, I find no reason to doubt the truth of 2+2=4 in the absence of inconsistencies. And 2+2=4 is certainly consistent.

What I find to be an important issue in all this is how "mind" is defined or else understood.

For one example, in C.S. Peirce's philosophy of objective idealism, physicality is a grand, global, and in many ways ubiquitous, effete mind - does this effete mind belong to me and my individual (non-effete) mind, to you, to anyone? But if it did would this not then logically contradict the very premise of there being an effete mind thus defined and understood?

Hence, as this one of many examples tries to illustrate, the very notion of "mind-independence" is thoroughly contingent on what one understands by the term "mind". Via at least certain interpretations, there is no reason to deny a reality independent of each and every individual non-effete mind (yours, mine, etc.) to which we all conform that is nevertheless of itself an effete mind and, hence, mind-dependent.

As to the overall gist of the thread as expressed by the title, for my part, I can only answer "yes": the often used dichotomy between metaphysical realism and anti-realism is - or at least can be - useless and/or wrong. I however say this as one who believes in Peirce's appraisal of physicality being effete mind.

Do you not consider 2+2=4 a categorical belief? Is it a fallible beliefs? Are you "aware that it might be wrong?" — Relativist

To answer your questions: Yes, I consider 2 + 2 = 4 a categorical belief (for the degree of reality I endow it with is extreme). Yes, it is a fallible belief. Yes, I am aware that it might be wrong.

My reasoning for the last two answers:

I cannot find any way of demonstrating that for all time yet to come in what remains of this cosmos no sentient being (one possibly unimaginably more intelligent than any human is, was, or will ever be) will ever find a justifiable alternative to the proposition of "2 + 2 = 4" which, being a justifiable alternative, might in fact be the right interpretation of the proposition - this while I am simultaneously unable to find any infallible justification for this very same proposition. Thus, this proposition is not infallible and could in principle potentially be wrong, if not in full then at least in part.

More importantly to me, I hold the very same reasoning for the affirmation that that me (more properly, that "I") which is aware of this proposition of "2 + 2 = 4" in fact occurs while simultaneously so being aware of said proposition. That said, this affirmation that "I as a first-person point-of-view am while in any way aware of anything whatsoever" is nevertheless the strongest fallible certainty I am currently aware of.

If you or anyone else can evidence the aforementioned reasoning erroneous, more power to you. I'm however hedging my bets that no one can.

Thus, a position of global, else radical or absolute, falliblism - one which duly grants various degrees of certainty, as pertains to both psychological certainty and to epistemic certianty, and which is in no way contingent on the occurrence of doubt. I, for example, do not currently doubt anything which I've just expressed.

Thanks for trying anyway. — Janus

You're welcome.

I'm running out of steam and getting short on time. I still don't get why you defend physicalism against the possibility of non-physicalism when you so clearly expressed that:

There is no guarantee that physicalism is false. Nor is there a guarantee that it is true. The real issue as I see it is what does it matter? Why should we mind whether physicalism is true or false? — Janus

I've provided this explanation, if not in full then in part: there can be no objective good - and hence no objective morality - within any system of physicalism.

You can, of course, evidence me wrong by pointing out any physicalist system wherein there can be coherently maintained an objective good.

But I'd like to know: why does all of this matter to you?

Maybe if you didn't promote the worship of a nihilistic death as ultimate salvation, and this ad nauseam, I'd then find some reason to take you seriously ... I get it, to you friendship is an evil. OK.

You're telling us to withdraw while not withdrawing. I again call this out as hypocrisy.

Is there some coherent reasoning for why this is not the case?

If not, and the facts of the matter are such, then why should I entertain your hypocritical reasoning?

(Apropos, if the facts of the matter are such, then this is not an "attack of the person" but an attack of the very reasoning addressing what we ought to do.)

Irrelevant to the point I was making about the terminology, and the problems of using any colloquial definition of belief. — Relativist

Maybe I jumped the gun a bit. Do you take a categorical belief to be absolute? Granting no such thing as infallible beliefs, what would an absolute belief then entail? So far, it seems to me that if a belief is not infallible, then one is aware that the belief might be wrong - and this irrespective of how well justified it might be so far. Which in turn seems to me to necessitate that all fallible beliefs are graded beliefs upon analysis, even when staunchly addressed in terms of yes/no.

The hallucinated cat is not a cat at all. The perceived cat is a cat. — Janus

On what grounds if both percepts are physical in the same way via the functioning of the brain. (To better drive the point home, I'll specify that the observer of the cat is not surrounded by others - and that he observes a cat which he has no reason to presume is a hallucination even though it is.)

I'm wondering how non-physicalism could support morality in any way that physicalism cannot, since that seemed to be your contention. You haven't attempted to address that question. — Janus

Via examples, the Platonic / Neoplatonic notion of the Good can only be a non-physical ideal - one that is nevertheless the ultimate reality. But please note: no law-giver created or else decreed the Good in either system of understanding. And such objective good requires an non-physicalist metaphysics. Wtih the occurrence of such an objective good then also is entailed an objective morality.

Because they are generally important to people, and because a society with moral principles that promoted general disharmony and suffering could not last long. It would necessarily be despotic. — Janus

I acknowledge the sentiment, but none of this is a rational grounding for what is good. Slavery was once generally important to people, for example. Would that make slavery morally good? And on what grounds would an Orwellian 1984 not last long? Besides, why is lasting long a good to be aspired toward within physicalism?

The philosophical analysis I was referring to was epistemology, so not directly related to "the real world or manufactured bubbles" - which is metaphysics. — Relativist

Epistemology is not directly related to the real world? I disagree.

Do we? It sounded like you were just defending the use of a definition of belief . — Relativist

I really dislike the idea of "absolute/infallible certainty" being something that anyone can hold. You affirmed that:

implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty. — Relativist

Which to me is not a position that a fallibililist can hold.

You sound pissed off, like when you (falsely) accused me of making a confrontational statement. I've simply tried to address things you've brought up, as honestly as I can. If my views piss you off, there's no point continuing. — Relativist

No, not pissed off, just in a rush. I appreciate your replies, but I've learned that there are certain impasses do discussions/debates. The discussion of what fallibilism is and entails can present itself as one such. To put it differently, unequivocal fallibilism devoid of exceptions is modernized terminology for Ancient Skepticism - which is contrary to Cartesian Skepticism. A long story that doesn't seen to belong on this thread. But, in this vein, I can well affirm that, "I fallibly know that in infallibly know nothing." If that makes sense to you, great.

The hallucination is a neural process and hence physical. Of course it is not a physical (real) cat. I see no inconsistency there but rather a conflation between the hallucination and what is hallucinated. — Janus

How is a distinction between the perceived physical cat and the perceived non-physical cat to be made when both are equally "neural process and hence physical" as perceptions?

I read it attentively the first time and I can't see what in a non-physicalist model the objective support for morality could be other than a lawgiver or else some kind of karmic threat of having to pay for transgressions. And again, I don't see how any of that could work absent the assumption of an afterlife. — Janus

There is here a warrantless conflation between lawgiver and afterlife. See, for example, Buddhism. I said "no" to your assumption of there being a deity (a law-giver) which ordains an objective good.

It would be grounded on human flourishing and social harmony. — Janus

And, within physicalism, why are these to be deemed "good"?

By "inconsistencies" I take it you mean that physicalism is not consistent with our "normal' intuitions about the nature of mind and consciousness and the subject? — Janus

No. I mean that phisicalism has internal inconsistencies of logical reasoning - mostly having to do with awareness.

The last unaddressed example I made in this thread was:

The question again was "are hallucinations physical?". So if a person hallucinates a stray cat running along their path, is the hallucinated cat physical?

As to perceptions being this and that in the brain, this will include all veridical perceptions just as much as it will include all non-veridical perceptions. So claiming that the hallucinated cat was caused by the brain does not resolve whether or not the hallucinated cat was physical as a hallucination per se. — javra

Anyway you've left those aside so are you saying that because (many or most?) people need to believe that moral laws are given by a higher (necessarily non-physical) power, physicalism in denying the existence of such a law-giver will lead to moral nihilism? — Janus

No. Reread what I've stated more attentively before replying and you might see how this assumption is unwarranted. All the same, thank you for putting it in the form of a question.

I don't think the idea of an objective moral good depends on a law-giver. — Janus

Yea, ditto.

What about the idea of living a good life. improving the lives of others. Do you believe that it's all pointless if there is no afterlife? It may be for you but I'm sure there are many people who don't think this way. Thinking this way is after all only a particular attitude or disposition not an objective truth. — Janus

And on what is this notion of what a "good life" is itself grounded, philosophically speaking within systems of physicalism? I'm not here addressing dispositions. I'm addressing logical reasoning.

I think your point is that you can believe X, but not be fully committed to it or completely certain of it. This is the way the word "belief" tends to be used in common conversation, but why force this vague concept into a philosophical analysis? — Relativist

There a rather long enough post in which I explained, to which you did not directly reply. What does philosophical analysis address? The real world or manufactured bubbles?

We commonly hear people expressing certainty as "I don't just believe it, I know it", implying that "belief" means something less than certain, and "knowing" = absolute certainty. — Relativist

Um, no, not "absolute - hence infallible - certainty". But it does mean that the belief can be justified without inconsistencies, thereby evidencing both its truth and that the knower can thereby confirm the truth of the belief.

Hell, we disagree galore on epistemology then. As I've previously stated, I'm a fallibilist. And since it's now evident that you are not, I now take it that you will uphold the possibility if not actuality of infallibility.

We differ significantly in this regard. I'll leave it at that.

Why would you want this?? — schopenhauer1

Given your shpiel, I can only assume this is an honest question. To answer honestly: because friendship reduces suffering. I'm pretty sure this is supported by the empirical sciences as well, something to do with dopamine and other neurotransmitters, improved longevity and quality of life, and some other such things. There's also the having help in times of need, to boot.

As to the risks, a news-flash: you risk your health by living. I already know your general conclusion, life is therefore bad. To be nice and polite, most life, humans included, disagree, with me included.

BTW, isn't this thread a bit hypocritical? You're doing the opposite of withdrawal by posting it.

I guess that answers that. Thanks

Withdrawal is preventative, but also a statement about not allowing oneself to inflict harms upon others. The key is to ensure that any contact is purely transactional- just enough to meet the basic requirements of existence, without letting it spiral into further emotional entanglements. — schopenhauer1

Is this to say that Agape, Philia, and the like are wrongs to be avoided and shunned? After all, if there for example is no "emotional entanglements" of friendship, then there is no possibility of undergoing the suffering of being betrayed by those you trusted as friends - nor is there the possibility of inflicting such wrongs upon others.

Not my cup of tea, this general outlook. But it does appear entailed by your conclusion: friendship is a vice rather than a virtue. Am I wrong in this inference?

Fuzzy logic involves reasoning with imprecise/vague statements. Alternatively, one can cast beliefs in terms of probabilities, and utilize Bayes' Theorem.

IMO, the best thing to do is to transform one's informal statements of belief into something precise, so the formalism can be applied. — Relativist

Out of curiosity, how do you deem any of these generalities you mention to touch upon the philosophical analysis of what beliefs are and are not - this in manners that don't make use of the No True Scotsman fallacy?

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Here, in parallel to your anticipated answer, my own philosophical appraisal of what belief in general is as presented in more precise terms:

- To believe X = via conscious, unconscious, or both means simultaneously, to impart or else endow the attribute of reality to X; i.e., to trust that X is actual and thereby real (where trust is itself understood as confidence in or dependence on)

- A belief = an instantiation of the process of believing just specified.

To my current comprehension, this definition of belief encompasses all possible instantiation of what can be referenced by the term "belief" without overgeneralizing. For one example, in the believe-that / believe-in divide this denotation will apply to all cases: e.g., To believe that extraterrestrials have visited Earth is to endow reality to (and thereby uphold the reality of) extraterrestrials having visited Earth, whereas to not believe that extraterrestrials have visited Earth is to not endow reality to this very same claim. In contrast, to believe in, for example, John's ability to pass the test is to endow reality to the future even of John's having passed the test via his efforts. It accounts for tacit beliefs just as much as it does for explicit beliefs. And so forth.

Hence, if (any degree of) reality is imparted to X by a psyche A, then X is believed (in due measure to the degree of reality one endows it with) by A. If no (degree of) reality is imparted to X, then X is not believed by A.

As such, beliefs need not be complete or absolute but can well be partial.

Does you precise definition of belief in general fair any better?

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@Wayfarer, my bad for this diversion from the thread's theme, but I don't have the time to create a new thread with this subject matter in manners where I could significantly participate.

However, for the sake of this thread's topic, I'll further tweak the above so as to emphasize that all beliefs - and hence anything that we can in any way take to be real - will be dependent on the occurrence of psyche. The physicality of our brains included, for one example.

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Edit: For improved clarity: by "degree of reality" I in the above strictly meant a shorthand form of "degree of likelihood and, hence, of probability that something is actual and thereby real". I'll leave this correction here rather than apply it to the body of this post.

I suppose it all depends on how one qualifies belief. Still, in ordinary life, when a guy is asked, "do you believe your team will win?" or, as a different example, "do you believe she'll say 'yes'?", the guy might well honestly answer with a categorical, "Hell yea!" (rather than with a, "well, it depends") ... yet without being foolish enough to presume that this honestly held belief is in a full blown correlation to a not yet actualized future reality. But I get it, this to you would not be a "strictly true belief". — javra

Philosophical analysis requires more precision than ordinary language often delivers. — Relativist

This is starting to overly deviate from the thread’s theme, but since you here invoke what philosophical analysis ought to consist of with a broad stroke … in a manner that could insinuate my own deviation from this ideal:

Sure, good philosophical analysis should strive for more precision than ordinary language provides, but to what effect?: When you say “a strictly true belief”, via the correspondence theory of truth, what you are technically specifying is “some given, some X, that strictly conforms to the reality of what a belief is” and which, thereby, is a genuine belief.

If you meant something other by the term “true” then please let me know.

So, then, ought a “strictly true belief” conform to a) the reality of a human concocted understanding of what beliefs are or b) the reality of belief as it occurs in the real world, fully including as it is expressed in ordinary language?

Seems to me that option (a) is a lousy way of doing philosophy, for it here can easily become thoroughly biased to certain human’s convictions rather than being as impartial (i.e., as objective) as possible - whereas philosophy ought to properly address in as impartial a manner as possible that which the real world consists of and, hence, in this particular case, that which was given as option (b).

In sum, what actuality/reality ought a “strictly true” belief conform to? To that actuality of certain humans’ abstractions regarding what beliefs are which exclude certain real-world applications (which can thereby be in keeping the No True Scotsman fallacy) or, otherwise, to that actuality of its various occurrences in the real world which encompasses all its applications, fully including the term's use in ordinary language? This, again, as regards proper philosophical analysis.

The approach I myself aspire toward is the latter rather then the former.

[...] This is why Bergson believed that clock time presupposes lived time.

This highlights how understanding “what exists” inevitably involves interpreting it through something that only a perspective can provide. In both Kant and Bergson’s views, the subjective experience of time is foundational, suggesting that any scientific or philosophical statement about existence must, knowingly or not, rely on this element of lived experience. — Wayfarer

:up:

So it is not strictly true that the guy believes his team will win. Rather, he believes it more likely than not that they will win, or that it is a near certainty, or some other probabilistic qualification. — Relativist

Using the same reasoning, then you'd claim that "it is not strictly true that I believe the sun will rise again tomorrow", this because I believe it more likely than not that it will, or that it is a near certainty, or some other probabilistic qualification. Being a fallibilist, then, I do not hold any "strictly true" beliefs. Yet, despite all this, the fact remains that I do believe the sun will once again rise tomorrow, as can be evidenced by my behaviors and preparations in relation to this belief - despite my not holding this belief to be certainty, but to instead hold a probabilistic qualification, such that it is, in technical jargon, more likely then not.

I suppose it all depends on how one qualifies belief. Still, in ordinary life, when a guy is asked, "do you believe your team will win?" or, as a different example, "do you believe she'll say 'yes'?", the guy might well honestly answer with a categorical, "Hell yea!" (rather than with a, "well, it depends") ... yet without being foolish enough to presume that this honestly held belief is in a full blown correlation to a not yet actualized future reality. But I get it, this to you would not be a "strictly true belief".

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win. — Relativist

I'm not big on that distinction. For starters, as a falliblist, upon analysis all my beliefs are graded (probabilistic or else comparable) - this even though I will typically address them in the categorical "yes/no" format. Do I believe the sun will rise again tomorrow? My answer is "Yes," this barring the odd improbable occurrence, such as of a large meteorite hitting the Earth before then in a manner that makes the Earth shatter, or some such (this such that I will hold this one graded belief with a probability assignment - say of 99.999% or thereabouts). All this then makes the distinction between categorical beliefs and graded beliefs artificial, to my own ears at least.

All the same, the initial point you made was:

If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true. — Relativist

My point was that this is not always the necessary case. Graded beliefs, when so dichotomized from categorical, being beliefs all the same.

I hope you understand why it's relevant. I absolutely believe there is an external world that exists independently of minds. I can't possibly accept idealism unless I drop this belief, and that would require a defeater (not just the mere possibility it is false). — Relativist

Are you then in search for infallible proof. I've none to give ... regarding anything whatsoever.

That's not what it means. A verdical belief is one that is actually true, i.e. it corresponds to an aspect of reality. — Relativist

Yes, I know what it means.

If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true. — Relativist

This is not always the case in real life applications, most especially when it comes to beliefs regarding future facts. If John believes his team will win the game then he might bet accordingly while nevertheless having a great deal of doubt regarding this same belief. Here, a person believes X without necessarily believing X is true. To claim otherwise is to try to force-feed all real life instantiations of belief into a somewhat limited understanding of the term's denotation.

If the protagonist in the movie had hallucinations that he believed were false because his psychiatrists convinced him they were false, then the belief in their falsehood was an undercutting defeater of the (seemingly true) hallucination. — Relativist

The movie was based on real events. And he wasn't convinced by psychiatrists but by inconsistencies in the hallucinatory people he was observing and interacting with (namely, they were not ageing over time as they ought to have).

The point made seems to however not have been grasped: Until inconsistencies appear, no one has reason to believe that what they observe as an aspect of the physical world is in fact a hallucination - say, for example, a cat that one sees running across one's path. Which however does not entail the necessity that the last stray cat one saw was therefore not a hallucination (... hence being a non-veridical experience and belief regarding what is real). The only means we hold for discerning what is and is not veridical is justifications, which tend to not hold when inconsistencies are present.

The question again was "are hallucinations physical?". So if a person hallucinates a stray cat running along their path, is the hallucinated cat physical?

As to perceptions being this and that in the brain, this will include all veridical perceptions just as much as it will include all non-veridical perceptions. So claiming that the hallucinated cat was caused by the brain does not resolve whether or not the hallucinated cat was physical as a hallucination per se.

You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world. — Relativist

That's a bit confrontational to me. And, as I previously expressed, I'm not interested in so doing.

As to your other replies, they sidestep the questions asked without providing answers. E.g. are non-veridical beliefs of themselves physical? BTW, to the person hallucinating X, the physical reality of X will be a veridical belief ... this up until the time reasoning might intervene (it doesn't always). The movie "A Beautiful Mind" makes a good point of that, for one example.

But I'll leave it at that.

There is no guarantee that physicalism is false. Nor is there a guarantee that it is true. The real issue as I see it is what does it matter? Why should we mind whether physicalism is true or false? — Janus

Hmm, because of its implications.

There a bunch of other reasons, but as one significant gripe I have with it (here placing its inconsistencies aside), if physicalism is true, then this will easily lead to - if it does not directly entail - moral nihilism. And it certainly does away with any possibility of an objective good.

... For example: Given phisicalism, everything sentient then necessarily ends in nonbeing wherein all suffering permanently ends upon their own corporeal death (we're atheists so this for us is a good thing to uphold - lest we suffer the encroachment of that diabolical theism crowd with their concepts of an anima mundi and such). Ergo, enduring the suffering of life with as much grace as possible when things get rough is stupid - and there is no ultimate good to aspire toward, well, other than one's personal death when life gets a bit too much. The abused, the tortured, etc? They too obtain this same salvation from all suffering via their own physical death to this world ... so when one places a bullet through a child's head under the cover of war one in essence is blessing the child with eternal peace and an absolute lack of suffering. Is so murdering a child right or wrong? Within systems of physicalism, there is no one right answer - either due to moral nihilism or to moral relativism.

... Kind of thing. And I say this as one who sometimes longs for the days when I used to believe that my corporeal death to this world meant my absolute nonbeing.

There's concrete shitty stuff happening in the world right now that bothers me, at times galore. And so the issues addressed tend to matter to me, in large enough part for this very reason regarding a proper grounding for ethics. ("God does everything" also not being anywhere near any such proper grounding.)

All this written a bit tongue in cheek, but I hope it might still get the general point across.

BTW, if it doesn't matter to you (as you sort of insinuate), then why bother replying to my post to begin with?

My pleasure. And yea, I myself like the concept of constructive empiricism as just outlined.