A world with no existence is metaphysically impossible because metaphysics deals with existence. — Corvus

Isn't the idea of nothingness a purely metaphysical construct? Hence, a world of nothingness would then be a possible metaphysical construct - about which the only thing to be said is that nothing exists in the possible world. Akin to an empty set.

I think you might underestimate the inner monologue. After all, I am guessing that animals can think visually as well. Our ability to manipulate glyphs which represent arbitrary concepts, both aloud and internally, is part of what sets our cognitive ability apart. — hypericin

I mentioned something about how animals think without words in that thread. So I felt like commenting on this aspect here.

Although animals will have wordless thoughts in one way or another, the argument can well be made that thinking via words will set limitations on what can be thought by humans, this in manners that wordless thinking will not. This limiting of thought via words that grants thought relatively stringent structure would then be a hindrance in activities ranging from novel artistic expressions to novel ideas in both the sciences and in philosophies.

For humans, wordless thought can think outside of the box in which word-driven thought resides, so to speak. Sometimes in very abstract (and logically consistent) manners.

But as I said, I think this is only the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their [physical] referent(s). I don’t think this is the case if we consider the meaning of “morning star” and “evening star” in terms of their sense(s). — Michael

While I still find the notion of a posteriori necessity suspect for reasons aforementioned - for example, such as the issue of a term's sense(s) being precisely that which the term references - I do agree with what you here state.

In the context of this discussion the terms refer to an object in the solar system. — Michael

I get that, but then how does one obtain the necessity of equivalency between terms when they each in large part specify different things, such as in different contexts?

Rephrased, that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet speaks to the necessity of the physical item's identity being unitary irrespective of how it might be termed and, hence, referenced - but not to the necessarily equivalency of terms that can be used to address said item.

Back to a posteriori necessity, then, it is not necessary (logically, metaphysically, or physically) that the term "Venus" equates to the term "Lucifer". It is only necessary that were each separate term (each laden with its own many connotations and denotations) to happen to be used to address the same physical referent, that then and only then both terms be usable as means of referencing the same physical given. But that's a tautology: if it is true that both X and Y can be used to reference Z, then it is true that X and Y are interchangeable - and in this sense alone equivalent - only in so far as both can be used to reference Z. This tautology doesn't seem to me to then support any a posteriori necessity.

What am I not comprehending here?

The sense/reference distinction. By sense it’s metaphysically possible that they’re different but by reference it’s metaphysically necessary that they’re the same. — Michael

Can you clarify the attempted distinction. Venus references love as well as a planet X. Lucifer references lucidity as well as the same planet X. The sense of each term is then obtained from the totality of what each term references - or so it so far seems to me.

It currently feels like materialism is creeping in: as though only physical referents can be deemed the actual referents of terms. This in contrast to senses being immaterial, which, in then possibly referencing immaterial attributes (such as that of love or of lucidity), aren't deemed to reference any actual givens.

180 Proof is right in a way. When formalised, "an infinite person" does not entail a contradiction. There is an X that is both i and p. No problem logically.

However if we think of the concept of a person, and then the concept of infinity, can they both be properties of the same subject? Well, inevitably it depends on what our concepts are. If we start with a concept of a person as a a thing with spatial limits, and infinity as without spatial limits, then an infinite person would be a conceptual impossibility. Is this what is meant by metaphysical possibility? — bert1

The issue is what that X innately entails. Here, X = person. That X is both A (infinite) and not-A (finite) at the same time and in the same respect will be what the very definition of what a logical contradiction is.

The only conceivable exception I can think of would be that of the Trinity consisting of the Father, the Son, and the Holly Ghost as three different persons in one omni-this-and-that-being. Some of us strongly deem this to be logically contradictory (even if some subset of such might revere Jesus Christ's being/character/etc):

Jesus Christ's body was limited to a human body, as all accounts of him attest to, for example. Jesus Christ's mind was limited to, for example, what he as a subject of awareness perceived - rather than him perceiving what all subjects of awareness perceive in a simultaneously manner, for example - this, again, as all accounts of him attest to.

The Father in Genesis II onward was limited to his walking the garden of Eden, hence was bodily limited. He was also limited in in his forethought of what the serpent, Eve, and Adam would choose to do, hence was not omniscient.

As to the holy ghost being a person, I challenge anyone to cogently explain what this could possibly mean.

All that aside, a person is commonly understood to be a human being, no?

Without warrant ou ascribe the property of being "finite" to "person" which is not intrinsic to the concept. — 180 Proof

Please justify this so far unsupported affirmation to someone who can't comprehend it. Is any person, for one example, omnipresent bodily or omniscient mentally?

Also, circles (or spheres) are both infinite and finite simultaneously ... — 180 Proof

Sure, but in different respects. Hence, they are not logically contradictory.

Yes, metaphysiically, not logically. — 180 Proof

How do you figure not logically? To rephrase: an infinite person is at the same time and in the same sense both a) a person that does not have end or limit to mind and body (this on account of being infinite) and b) a person that does have end or limit to mind and body (this on account of being a person). This is a logical contradiction: A and not-A at the same time and in the same respect.

"Infinite person" is one person that is infinite in extent, — 180 Proof

Try it this way: "infinite" in all cases means "not finite", where "finite" means "having an end or limit". A person in all cases is finite in both mind and body. Hence, "infinite person" is contradictory.

The leading example I've seen of a posteriori necessity is that of "Venus = Lucifer". I so far find this fishy. Any bloke on the street will tell you that "Venus" does not equal "Lucifer". That they both in part reference the same physical planet is not the whole of the story.

Then again, who knows, maybe love does equal lucidity after all. :grin:

But I kept the doubt in mind: is it not a matter of semantics even then? Because in epiphenomenalism, the mental changing the material is impossible within that metaphysics. But in epiphenomenalism, isn't the inability to change the material part of the definition of what is mental? And thus the mental changing the material becomes a logical contradiction within that metaphysics? — Lionino

For what it’s worth, my current thought process on the matter is along these lines:

Logical possibility—all of it pivoting on laws of thought—pivots on what is (taken to be) ubiquitous to all subjects of awareness. This irrespective of whether subjects of awareness might hold a comprehension of what these laws of thought might be; e.g., a preadolescent child will think via the laws of thought (however imperfectly and, hence, at times, illogically) although not holding a comprehension of them.

Physical possibility—when divorced from any metaphysics regarding what the physical entails, e.g. materialism, idealism, or substance dualism, etc.—also pivots on what is (taken to be) ubiquitously applicable to all subjects of awareness. Here, though, without a metaphysics there cannot occur a comprehension by which to make sense of physicality.

So both the logically possible and the physically possible will at root address ubiquitous actualities, actualities that are thereby universal and, in this sense, singular.

Metaphysics, on the other hand, will always make use of the logical and of the physical—at least in part, to which experiences, i.e. subjective actualities, can be added as well—to arrive at understandings regarding that which is in any way actual (including, for example, that which is actually possible). There are multiple ways metaphysics could be derived via physicality-bound (as well as, at times, experience-bound) logic. Thus resulting in multiple, often enough contradicting, metaphysical models of what is.

Each metaphysical system will then galvanize its own semantics; most of the time the validity of these metaphysics-specific semantics will be evaluated by their individual explanatory power—this in explaining what is actual (be it laws of thought, be it the physical, or be it our sometimes discordant and sometimes commonly held experiences, which could then extend into things such as cultures, languages, etc.). And, by extension, these individual explanatory-power-endowed semantics that together form the given metaphysics then grants the given metaphysics as a whole its explanatory power.

So the individual understandings, or semantics, imbedded within a metaphysical system (such as that of epiphenomenalism’s impossibility of mind affecting matter) is tied into, and is justified via, a webbing of ideally fully self-consistent semantics—all minimally conforming to what is known of logic and of physicality—that work together to explain all that is actual. To deprive epiphenomenalism of the impossibility of mind affecting matter is to then nullify the entirety of the metaphysical webbing of understandings which epiphenomenalism is. This, were it to occur, would then leave a vacuum of explanatory power and, hence, of general understanding, for all those that previously upheld the metaphysics of epiphenomenalism.

This being a longer path toward saying that I fully agree metaphysical differences can be said to boil down to semantics. I’d only add that, for one example, the particular semantic of “mind” in the case of epiphenomenalism appears to me inextricably bound into the entire webbing of semantics—of logic- and physicality-bound understandings—which this one metaphysics in fact is, if not merely being a webbing of understandings from which this metaphysics is constituted.

[This, to my mind, could get deep into epistemological issues of justification: which, as per the above, I currently perceive to involve some variation of foundherentism. This being a crossbreed of foundationalism (in conforming to the laws of thought and to physicality, if not also to some aspects of experience) and coherentism (in relation to a particular metaphysics' ideal lack of self-contradiction in the understandings it holds). Likely a different issue, though.]

At any rate, this is only a rough sketch of a general idea. Still, while its likely incomplete, I nevertheless so far find it to, well … to hold a fair share of explanatory power—this in terms of the different types of modalities addressed in this thread.

Glad to hear it was of benefit. :up:

However, what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino

How do you understand “metaphysical possibility”? As 1) possible iff it is true in at least one logically possible world, as 2) possible iff it is logically consisted to the laws of some particular metaphysics, or 3) as a possibility not addressed by either (1) or (2) as just described?

If (1), and if all logical possibilities pivot on the laws of thought as I believe they do, then it so far seems to me that any possibility one can think of which conforms to the laws of thought will also be metaphysically possible. If so, then one cannot have a metaphysical impossibility that is however logically possible.

If (2), then this will depend on the laws of the particular metaphysics in question. For instance, in the metaphysics of epiphenomenalism it is impossible that consciousness could alter its constituency of brain via the choices consciousness makes, this despite such top-down process being logically possible all the same.

I'm quite open to learning about possibilities that would be encompassed by alternative (3), however.

Good is measured in deontology by intentions towards one’s duties and not the consequences they bring about. — Bob Ross

You asked for potential problems with deontology. Don't get me wrong. I've read up on deontology a bit. It's just that I so far find it lacking. Rephrasing my question in terms of your quoted appraisal: Of what ethical good is intending to keep one's established duties if so doing produces unethical results? The maintaining of duties within a community of slave-holders and slaves resulting in the lynching of those slaves that don't uphold said duties, for one example. Going hand in hand with this, Harriet Tubman then being decried as immoral for not honoring the established duties of her slave-owning community but, instead, escaping slavery. All the same, if this avenue of reasoning doesn't matter, then never mind.

Interesting. What problems can you construct for deontology? I lean much more towards that than consequentialism. — Bob Ross

Consequentialism comes in a very wide variety of forms: from “the proof is in the pudding” type mentality that can be used as evidence that might makes right (with its associated potential atrocities) to notions such as that of karma (which at base is about cause and consequence).

Having touched upon that:

Of what good is deontology if it doesn’t produce good results, i.e. good consequences? If no satisfactory answer can be given to this question other than that of affirming it to be good on account of its good consequences, then deontology (as can then be likewise said of virtue ethics and so forth) will itself be a form of consequentialism broadly defined.

Of course, this is not to confuse all forms of consequentialism as being forms of utilitarianism (which can itself be understood in different ways).

BTW, the OP gives a nifty thought experiment. At this juncture, I’ll simply object to its supposition of necessity. I can’t yet fathom any logical scenario – irrespective of possible worlds - wherein it is necessary that an innocent being A be perpetually tortured so as to grant all other beings the opportunity to live, and this in a utopian state no less (other than it being so ordained by a not so nice omnipotent deity, kind of thing; but then I don't deem omnipotent deities to be logically possible to begin with ... different topic though).

(Edit: made some typos, now corrected.)

Would you say these are like specific experiences? With phenomena? Its strange because I don't think I can express meanings without words so it is not clear to me what active cognizance of wordless meaning could be like in the moment. — Apustimelogist

Well, they're most definitely experienced. "Phenomena" technically translates into appearances perceivable through the physiological senses. In this sense, then, they are devoid of phenomena. Also, the meanings are not expressed to oneself but, instead, directly dealt with.

A different way of expressing it, this via words of course, is that it deals with appraising, manipulating, and deciding upon understandings.

I imagine that most can discern two dots on a blank page without needing to count them. Here, then, one understands the quantity involved without the need to use words. Then, were there to be two circles, one with two dots and one with three dots, a person could discern that the circle with three dots contains a greater quantity of dots simply via the faculty of understanding. This without a need to use words in the thought process. One can of course use words to count the dots ("one", "two", "three") but this in a sense slows down the process of discerning - as I was previously saying, being a kind of cognitive crutch in the process of thought.

Differently exemplified, the word "animal" evokes a fairly complex abstraction which is understood. Mammals, insects, lizards, fish, birds, these are all types of animals, while trees, and mushrooms, and rocks are not. The understanding of what "animal" conveys is grasped without the use of words by adults - else a thorough verbal listing of all concrete types of this abstraction would be required in addition to a verbalized categorization of what concrete types fit into what subcategories (cat is a type of feline which is a type of mammal which is a type of animal). As with discerning and contrasting quantities, a person could then discern the meaning/abstraction/understanding of what via words is expressed as "animal" - as well as the various types this category contains - without the use of words. So doing being wordless thoughts. As with counting by use of words being a kind of crutch in discerning quantities, so too can be said of using one's inner voice to now express the word "animal" to oneself so as to address the concept which the word is understood to convey.

Don't know if I could express it much better than this, but I find that words are only the very tip of an otherwise massive iceberg. Words (or, maybe better yet, what in this thread has been termed "word-forms") are appearances and, in this sense, phenomenal, whereas the iceberg beneath the waters consists of meaning which cannot be perceived, neither via the physiological senses nor via imaginings of one's mind. Even when one thinks via one's inner voice, one is still using word-forms to appraise, manipulate, and decide upon the icebergs beneath the waters - so to speak via a limited analogy.

The ontological reality of suffering differs in certain ways from the ontological reality of mathematics, but I think both propositions are objectively true. — Leontiskos

I'm in full agreement with what you've replied.

Here I would like to add a point about making distinction between 'subjectivity' and 'subjecthood'. It's an awkward distinction to make, but it attempts to distinguish between 'subjective' as in 'pertaining only to an individual' and 'subjective' as in 'pertaining to the state of being a subject', and to facts which can only be truly understood in the first person.

"If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable." — Leontiskos — Wayfarer

I see the distinction you are trying to make, but I am not convinced that your second category does not collapse back into your first category. Presumably your second category is something along the lines of qualia. But the difficulty is that qualia can be understood through language. I can speak about the perception of red, and you will know what I am talking about given your experiences. — Leontiskos

Consider the distinction between "an object of awareness" and "a subject of awareness". At least some specific objects of awareness can then be classified as subjective in the sense of "pertaining only to an individual". But would one then also classify the actuality of a subject of awareness's being (subjectivity in the sense of "pertaining to the state of being a subject") as a) strictly only an object of awareness sans any subject of awareness or, else, as b) strictly pertaining only to one individual (such that it is not an actuality equally applicable to all co-existent individual beings; i.e., such that solipsism is concluded)?

If yes, I so far fail to understand the reasoning to this. But if not, then one obtains a category of subjecthood - which, if absolutely nothing else, will include the attribute of being a subject of awareness - that is not deemed to be subjective in the first sense addressed. This such that the proposition of "all individual beings are subjects of awareness" can be deemed equally objective to the proposition "rocks exist in the world".

Were morality to have anything to do with suffering and its absence, for example, and were this to itself be included in the objective category of subjectood as just mentioned, then the truth of morality could be appraised as grounded in subjectood - and this such that it could be universally knowable in principle.

How would you characterize what happens in your head when you think? Like whenn trying to solve a problen? — Apustimelogist

Since people are different, I’m here speaking only for myself. I’ve been this way (without an inner voice) in periods of my adult life. One appraises, judges, compares, and decides upon (etc.) concepts with an active cognizance of what the concept(s) at issue are—this in manners fully devoid of what maybe could be expressed as the phenomenal aspects of words, aka word-forms—i.e., devoid of the imaginary sounds that are not apprehended via physiological senses—but strictly consisting of meanings, or else the content of concepts (rather than their labels).

To emphasize, not to in any way equate any human to lesser animals, but lesser animals do not hold any language (in the sense of grammatically ordered words) and can yet arrive at Eureka moments of great ingenuity after being presented with puzzles. Needless to add, all of this thinking/cogitating about and discovering of solutions for them always occurs sans language and, hence, sans any internal voice. Included is one video to this effect after a quick scan on youtube (great apes can also do some astounding things requiring puzzle solving and hence abstract thought, thought which is again languageless).

All humans have far greater abilities of abstraction that any lesser animal. So to me it’s in no way bizarre that some humans can engage in very complex, abstract thought without in any way making use of an internal voice. From this vantage, the internal voice of thought could be viewed as a type of cognitive crutch that assists in going from one state of mind to another—such that the crutch is not necessary, at least not in principle. In many ways akin to discerning quantities without counting via use of words.

Don’t want to be overly vulgar in this, but think of the act of sex; some have a hard time with it unless they talk throughout; others might deem the sensual intensity of the experience to be unpleasantly diminished via constant verbalizations of the emotions and thoughts experienced (or were their inner voice to be active during the activity). Same rough parallel, I think, could be made to the variety of ways in which people think.

[...] and we agree on most. Word-forms are meaningless until people associate them with meaning. But this, to me, means that people are meaningful, not the word-forms. People convey the meaning, and stand ready to supply it should they come across word-forms they understand. — NOS4A2

By my appraisal, we so far seem to agree in full. If you care to further this:

As with ideas universal to a populace - such as that of a circle - words (by which I mean word-forms + their associated meaning) embedded within a particular language exist independently of individual minds, although being simultaneously dependent on all minds which hold understanding for the given word(s). They are not intra-subjective realities/actualities - such that they perish together with the individual mind that apprehends them (as would personal memories of, for example, some sentiment experienced during a certain time in childhood). They are instead fully intersubjective, pertaining to all within a certain populace while not being dependent on the individual mind of any within said populace.

So, any particular word is such due to the meaning all people in a community deem it to have - a meaning which children learn to assimilate into their own mind/being via trial and error. But the word will continue to persist unaltered with the passing away of any one individual mind within the populous which speaks the particular language in which the word is understood. Given enough time wherein babes assimilate the words of their born-to language and in which mature minds of the language community pass way, the words will themselves often enough change - in both word-form and in meaning. This can be exemplified by the reading of Beowulf in its original form (preferably, maybe, with an adjacent modern English translation).

Hence, like the reality of a circle as idea, words will all be mind-dependent but not dependent on individual minds. Unlike the idea of a circle, however, given enough time, words can change - again in both word-form and meaning - with the passing of generations; whereas the idea of a circle gives all indications of being unchangeable regardless of time-span and number of generations.

Summarizing this via different terminology, each word will then present itself as a far more plastic (or else dynamic) and as a far less ubiquitous universal than the universal of, for example, the idea of a circle, the latter giving all indication of being perfectly static across time as well as perfectly ubiquitous to all beings across the cosmos which are able to engage in sufficient abstractions. Notwithstanding, each word would thereby yet be a type of universal strictly relative to the language speakers concerned: dependent on all of their/our minds while being dependent on no one particular mind in question.

Then, going back to ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs, once we deciphered them via the Rosetta Stone, we then grasped the words - else expressed, the language-specific universals of that culture - which hieroglyphs as word-forms likely conveyed by comparing, assimilating, and translating them with the language-specific universals of our own language(s) - which we convey via our modern word-forms.

Hey, throwing this out there for debate and critique, what else.

Awfully narrow view of divinity as concept.

BTW, what exactly is metaphysical about the bible? Does it present any logical arguments anywhere regarding existence ... or merely tell you what is on grounds of these tellings being His word? "God did it" isn't much of a metaphysical argument for anything, after all.

My problem is that if the word-forms conveyed meaning, we’d know what they meant by reading them. It is precisely because they do not convey meaning that we do not understand them, not unless some Rosetta Stone or human being is able to supply them with meaning. The drift of meaning over time suggests much the same. — NOS4A2

I'm not yet understanding how this conflicts with words being more than their word-forms. For example via analogy, red is just a color. But cultures will associate certain psychological states of being to the color red: passion (be it love or anger) in most of the West and, for example, luck and happiness in China, or else peace and/or justice in Japan. It's via these associations that the color red can then symbolize particular psychological states of being - this, for example, in paintings or on actor's faces or clothes. Same I find holds for word-forms: they're meaningless until a group of people associate the word-form to a meaning (or to a set of such).

Apropos, by "word-form" I so far understand the strictly perceptual aspect of words, be this via sound, or via sight, or via touch. Am I mistaking what you mean by the term?

The basic question is this: are words more than their word-form? — NOS4A2

Before the meaning of hieroglyphs was deciphered, hieroglyphs were to us word-forms devoid of known meaning and, therefore, could not be used by us to convey meaning. But we presumed them to be words all the same on account of their seeming to hold some sort of grammar. Hence, before their decipherment, they were not words to us - but merely word-forms, this, again, on the presumption that they had been words to ancient Egyptians.

Words in any language we (or anyone else, such as the ancient Egyptians) make use of convey meaning - otherwise they’d be visual, sonic, or tactile gibberish, and not words.

I thereby conclude: words = word-forms + associated meanings(s). Making words more than mere word-forms.

Otherwise expressed, how can one control the world without in any way subjugating it? — javra

In religion, by imploring and bribing (with sacrifice) the deity to fix your weather, grow your crops, keep the floods off your land, smite your enemies and win your football games.
(I never said this part worked!) — Vera Mont

Hey, more for my own reasons than anything associated with topics in this thread: Ambiguous dictionary definitions aside, do you find no semantic difference between

1) X controls what Y does.

and

2) X influences what Y does.

To me - while the two can overlap in extreme cases - (1) always conveys that Y is in one way or another puppeteered by X (e.g. the TV's remote control puppeteers what the television set does from a distance) which to me is another way of saying that Y is (at least metaphorically) subjugated to X's whims, whereas (2) does not so necessarily convey (for example, it is an intrinsic aspect of any (non-coercive) conversation imaginable: what one says will always influence what the other says back - this without controlling what the other person says back - thereby producing the inter-course of dialogue).

In short, for me, control is one relatively minor subset of influence, but influence does not equate to control.

I get your reply above, but with the understanding of terms I've presented, I take it that prayers and such are generally about influencing situations rather than controlling them (even if it might not work all the same). Still, I'm far more interested in whether you find semantic differences between (1) and (2).

Forgot to mention, I'm in general agreement otherwise. Also:

And it's true that one can go to war for liberty... but only if another attempts to subjugate him. — Vera Mont

:100:

I never said the objective was "control over the subjugated other". I said the objective was control of the world by inventing a more powerful projection of themselves and putting Him in charge, on the understanding that if we do his bidding, He will do ours. — Vera Mont

First, this is an exceedingly limited view of what metaphysics entails. More to the point of this one reply, doesn't this then mean that we are subjugated to Him? Otherwise expressed, how can one control the world without in any way subjugating it?

If ideas were to all be fiction, wouldn't all true propositions then be fictitious?

As to being just names, names of what - other than the archetypes, thoughts, or else conceptualized states of being which they name?

Besides, not all ideas have ready names. These often enough get expressed via art, to includes poetry, music, and painting.

Asking these two questions as someone who upholds ideas to be real existents.

-------

I'll argue that the two categories of real existents in the poll present a false dichotomy. I didn't vote for either option since I deem them both mistaken.

Some ideas, such as that of a circle, could be mind-dependent in terms of all coexistent minds able to so experience while simultaneously being independent of any one individual mind able to so experience. One implication will be that if this one individual mind no longer is, the mind-dependent idea - in this example, of a circle - will nevertheless continue existing unaltered.

Which was my contention. Cultural indoctrination is a direct result of the prevailing philosophy. — Vera Mont

Well, of-bloody-course!! Their gods are bullies who approve of subjugation and submission. That's what makes empires great. — Vera Mont

I might have misinterpreted you before. Sounds like underneath all the superficial bickering, you just might be into this "control over the subjugated other" thing yourself.

Of note, one can engage in conflict, war, or maybe worse so as to not be subjugated just fine without any intention of subjugating the other. This can in part be expressed via that whole, "give me liberty, or give me death" motif - a bit of philosophizing in and of itself.

I'm not sure I could classify the findings of metaphysics as "knowledge of what is", but OK. — Vera Mont

Smilingly asked, would one otherwise classify the findings of metaphysics - such as the nature of time, space, and causality - as "bullshit regarding what is not" (such that neither time, space, nor causality are)?

By what is the quest for this kind of knowledge primarily motivated? — Vera Mont

I thought I'd already addressed this. I take it to be primarily motivated by the predispositions of one's character. Some want to subjugate. Others want to understand. Here, alone, are two different motivations.

A few pagans in Europe; Lots of unorganized Native Americans - not the Great Civilizations which conquered them. — Vera Mont

A bit underplayed. It's worth mentioning that these "Great Civilizations which conquered" were all slave-owning. Differences of taste in terms of what is valued, I suspect.

I didn't say it worked, only that control is the aim. — Vera Mont

As in "control over other (to distinguish this from self-control) is the good to be obtained for its own sake"? Aye to that, for far too many. Agreed. But this won't define the motives of all humans. Compassion, wonder, eudemonia, to list a few commonly found attributes of many a human, male and female, are not driven by the aim of gaining control over other (this such that the other is subjugated to the whims of one's own self).

The same I find applies to metaphysics: one's predispositions will greatly determine what one seeks out of it. For instance, to better gain control over all other or, otherwise, to gain a better understanding of what in fact is, this both physically and psychically. (The same, btw, can be said of any form of knowledge, including that which is scientific.) The latter can be appraised as a "love of wisdom" or else "of truth" wherein these are held to be good for their intrinsic worth, maybe here even good for their own sake. The former, however, will view knowledge and understanding as tools to be used for greater ascendancy toward a superlative superiority of one's own self wherein all other is subjugated.

Consider these two different metaphysics for example: nature as evil that needs to be subjugated and conquered vs. nature as sacredness that needs to be honored and conformed to (an example from a song: nature as that which tames the beast within). The first metaphysics is about control-over; the second isn't.

In short, tmk, control is not the aim of all by any means.

Note: I also didn't say 'exclusively' - but if you can prove that organized religions and metaphysics are not predominantly masculine in origin, I'll eat a crow. (But you'll have to kill it.) — Vera Mont

:grin: :razz: Hard to "prove" what was well over two millennia past, but a good deal of evidence points to societies being far more egalitarian in terms of sexes and their interests when addressing at least western culture prior to Abrahamic religion/metaphysics. Everything from women pharaohs supported and admired by the people (we often forget that ancient Egypt is so far the most long-surviving civilization in history by far), to female Druids of cultural and religious importance on a par to male Druids, to many a revered goddess in ancient days (to not address the legend of the ancient Amozons, or of Lesbos, and so forth), to tribal societies and their own spiritual/metaphysical beliefs (such as that of animism and its resulting nature worship - which, btw, I personally can't much distinguish from the basic tenets of today's panpsychism, despite the latter often claiming to be physicalist).

So, if this was the case before, there's no reason other than the status quo of culture that this can't be the case again.

Then there's also such a thing as "feminist metaphysics", this on top of a good enough sum of female philosophers. Outnumbered by males, true, but maybe this in large part has to do with cultural indoctrination and resulting education - on par to what one finds in the sciences and in mathematics. If so, than in parallel to how female authors were once greatly outnumbered by males but no longer are, the same could someday hold for women metaphysicans and philsophers in general.

And, for instance, just because Hypatia of Alexandria was mascaraed by males who'd rather forget all about her does not make her a less worthy philosophical figure in our history.

But hey, in the unlikely case this might eventually come to convince you that religions and metaphysics are not under the primary jurisdiction of males in principle, please let that poor crow be!

You 'mansplain' that much much better than I ever could, lady! :clap: :cool::flower: — 180 Proof

I can't help but have a good laugh at this. So, you've never encountered a controlling woman then?

It is also the reason for the entire body of Metaphysics: If only we could reduce live, the universe and everything to basic principles, we could wrestle into submission. — Vera Mont

Not all. Understanding of X does not necessarily equate to control of X. No?

A more interesting question might be: Why do you need to look for a meaning? — Vera Mont

That is an interesting question. There is no real need to have meaning. — George Fisher

Maybe the boldfaced answer provided could be further elaborated upon but, so far, I can only see this answer as utter hypocrisy. Being sapient, we seek meaning so as to make sense of, and we seek to make sense of so as to improve our own condition of being - if nothing else, so as to better allow us to live, rather than, say, to indifferently perish via rot.

Lesser animals may be sentient but, not being sapient, the quality of their lives is nowhere near as contingent on abstract understanding as our own is.

Absurdism, existentialism, nihilism, all these posit having pinpointed the true nature of reality, or of existence, or of the life which we are (else, are endowed with) - and in all this there is entailed meaning; specifically, meaning regarding reality, existence, life; meaning which endows those who uphold any of these just mentioned positions to better live within the context of the cosmos we find ourselves. Otherwise none of these positions would be in any way sensible to, much less upheld by, anyone.

One will note how none of these three positions just mentioned affirm either "I don't know" or "I don't care".

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From a somewhat vulgar sci-fi novel I still greatly like, Venus on the Half-Shell, there is the protagonist's leading question to which he tries to obtain an answer for from various beings within the galaxy:

"Why are we born only to suffer and die?"

The novel ultimately answers this question with:

"Why not?" (which I find might be a more important question to answer for oneself than the first, this were one to care about such issues)

To me, your post addresses a very worthwhile perspective.

To reaffirm what I was previously expressing, value's ontological standing - with the perspective you've mentioned being one outlook of such - is not something that can be tested via the scientific method and, hence, by the empirical sciences. This, for yet one more example, no more than the empirical sciences can test for whether teleology occurs within the cosmos - despite all of us experiencing intentions and, hence, actively held teloi, with each of us being an aspect of the cosmos.

But again, nice post.

I am not sure what your claim that value is experiential means. — Fooloso4

I simply mean that value (i.e., worth, or importance) is experienced by us and that we can only know of it via our experiences - although not through any experience we obtain due to our physiological senses (such as those of sight, sound, smell, touch, and physiological taste).

Are you making a distinction between what value is and what is value? — Fooloso4

not in the context you've quoted

What empirically falsifiable hypothesis can be produced to determine if “value” is a fallacious reification of a process? — javra


If I understand the question, [...] — Fooloso4

no. The statement was indirectly addressing this post's question, to which I've already replied:

Suppose "value" is a fallacious reification, and instead there is only valuing as a process that occurs. Could science study human valuing? — wonderer1

The value of what? — Fooloso4

The value of anything. Say, the value of any post in this thread. Take your pick. As to whose attribution of value, for the time being address your own.

Value - aka importance or worth - is neither a sight, nor a sound, nor a smell, nor a tactile feeling, nor a gustatory taste (nor a proprioception of one's own body; etc.). Again, it is not something we experience via any particular physiological sense.

science cannot address even in principle [what value is] — javra


Can the question of what value is be addressed without regard to what it is that people value? Whatever answer we might give to the question "what is value?" wouldn't it be rejected if it is something that no one values? Is there a tipping point? Would it be an adequate answer if one person values it or only a few people? Does it matter who it is that values it? — Fooloso4

Your questions do not address my contention. Value is experiential, but in no way empirical (in the modern sense of the term); therefore, the empirical sciences can only presuppose its reality via non-scientific means, and cannot discern what value is via the scientific method. And, as to "what is value" a dictionary will provide commonly upheld definitions.

Maybe more concrete examples might help out:

What empirically falsifiable hypothesis can be produced to determine if “value” is a fallacious reification of a process? Moreover, by what empirical means could this hypothesis then be tested?

Whether value is a process cannot be determined by the empirical sciences, this in principle, because - be it in fact process or not - it is not something that can be directly perceived via the physiological senses, but can only be inferred from empirical observations that presuppose its reality. For the same reason, neither can the empirical sciences determine whether “extrinsic value” is an accurate conception of what can in fact occur. Nor can it (needless to add, via the scientific method) better delineate what intrinsic value might be, or if it is real. And so forth. While these are all experience-based issues, none of them are empirical (again, in the modern sense of the term).

And whether value is a process or not, to claim that it is unimportant is to directly engage in hypocrisy, for this would be an affirmation of value.

Etc.

How we might distinguish between what people say they value and what they actually value is something that experiments can help determine. — Fooloso4

Sure, but this, again, presupposes the reality of what value is. It, however, does not, and cannot, establish its reality through the scientific method of the empirical sciences.

Suppose "value" is a fallacious reification, and instead there is only valuing as a process that occurs. Could science study human valuing? — wonderer1

Suppositions can get rather arbitrary. Value is a standard English noun, and value was only one of the examples I've provided. It is fully synonymous to "worth". That said, as someone who upholds process philosophy, of course I take it to be a process - just as much as all other nouns in language are. But my only point remains, empirical science cannot be used to give us better understanding or knowledge of what value/worth is - even if it is rephrased as "valuing"/"worthing".

There are some who are critical of the notion of a political or social science, but many in academic political science departments, wanting to mark and defend their territory, regard what they are doing as science. — Fooloso4

They're worthy academic fields of study, but the vast majority of social sciences, and of political science more narrowly, do not make use of the scientific method which pertains to the empirical sciences. In rough parallel, many deem theoretical mathematics to be a science, which it is in the now largely archaic sense of "knowledge obtained via study" - but it in no way utilizes the scientific method as I've outlined it in my previous post. But then, in this archaic sense, in which social and political science are sciences, so too can be philosophy, here granting that knowledge can be obtained via its study.

With regard to value, a social or political scientist might study what it is that people value, putting aside or rejecting the question of what value is essentially. Does philosophy or any other discipline do any better? — Fooloso4

This can enter into an utterly different direction. My sole contention has been that the empirical sciences - again, which utilize the scientific method - cannot address what value is, this even in principle. Philosophy, on the other hand, can - in both principle and practice - with value theory as a primary example of this. That the field of philosophy arguably hasn't been so far very successful at pinpointing what value is will however be entirely unrelated to the stance I'm taking regarding empirical science's innate limitations.

Science is a process of selective limitation. — Pantagruel

Please clarify. Examples would be helpful. — 180 Proof

In relation to the scientific method of the empirical sciences—by which I mean falsifiable hypothesis, test with no or with restricted confounding variables, results, and the replicability of the later, all of which is verified via peer-review methodologies—here’s a partial listing of generally important things which science cannot address even in principle, this due to its intrinsic limitations of what it can address:

• What value is
• What meaning/significance is
• What justice is
• What goodness is
• What knowledge is
• The verity of the upheld epistemological tenets (e.g., fallibilism) and ontological tenets (e.g., the nature of time, space, and causality) upon which all empirical science is founded; otherwise expressed, the philosophical tenets encompassed by the philosophy of science which all empirical sciences make use of in their endeavors.

These, among others, cannot be addressed even in principle by science because scientific knowledge can only pertain to those aspects of reality which are in principle perceivable via the physiological senses by any and all people. This were one to have the inclination, and in some cases the technical requirements, to so look.

This isn’t to in any way detract from the importance of science, but it is to illustrate that science is quite limited in what it can address. And this because it has no choice but to select for understanding/knowledge in those topics which can be empirically verified and/or falsified.

In order to find harmony, religious belief needs to be excluded. But in doing so we lose the parts of religion that is of tremendous importance to our mental health and social bonding. The practices we have in rituals, mythological storytelling and exploration needs to somehow be reworked into a context of non-religious belief, which requires a new paradigm of how to live life. — Christoffer

as well as:

Where, more generally, do the ideas of 'harmony' and the 'collective' derive from, and why can't there be equal dialogue about them between the religious and irreligious? — mcdoodle

Apropos the interplay between religious and irreligious beliefs and praxis: Back in my early twenties when I basically was an atheist in all implied senses of the word (no gods, no spirituality, etc.) a friend once asked me: “If you don’t believe in anything spiritually sacred, then why not choose to piss on a gravesite rather than, say, near an adjacent tree when you’re in a cemetery and there is no one else around?”

It’s a male-centric question, I grant, but, its non-gratuitous vulgarity aside, I still find it to be a good question in regards to beliefs and praxis.

I had my psychological answers back then—basically affirming that respecting the spiritual beliefs of others grants me psychological warrant to then expect that my own atheistic beliefs be respected by them in turn. Other people’s potential answer to the question might well be different. But I think the question can go fairly deep in terms of distinguishing the sacred (to each spiritual person and group of such their own) from the profane; as well as in addressing how the atheist relates to this sacred/profane distinction made by theists.

Not much of an argument for anything. So there’s no real need to address this post. But I’m mentioning this viewing it to directly address the connection between spiritual beliefs and praxis—be the praxis on the part of the theist or the atheist. (Here presuming most atheists to have respect for the gravesites of the dead, despite not interpreting the gravesite as anything spiritually sacred.)