Thank you for the relatively in-depth reply.

But when one believes in the existence of past life, and afterlife, then the existence could be named as non-being. One has lived in the past or existed as some other being in the past before birth, but there were changes of the being via change of time, or some event, the being in the past has gone through transformation to non-being. Then the current being has come to existence. — Corvus

The semantics the two of us use for being and non-being are significantly different. Because of this, I think we would be talking past each other in using these terms, and, by extension, the notion of nothingness. For one example, to me, iff ghosts were to be real and not merely constructs of some humans’ imaginations, then I would label ghosts as spirits or souls that hold actual being in the cosmos. This rather than labeling ghosts as non-beings (noun) or else expressing that they do not hold actual being (in verb form) in the cosmos. I’d hold the same for past lives and afterlives. So, in my use of words, neither ghosts, nor past lives, nor afterlives would pertain to nothingness or else nonbeing. And I would instead affirm that all these are different forms of being.

But again, this is more an issue of how we express ourselves rather than the content which we intend to express. Its just that without uniformity in the former, it is difficult toward impossible to find agreement on the latter.

I am not very knowledgeable on QM, and QM is not my first interest in my readings, but I feel that for the whole universe to exist, there must have been absolute space first. Without absolute space as absolute nothingness, no physical objects, motions or changes are possible. Time itself is from changes of the objects, hence without space there are no motions, no changes hence no time would be possible either. — Corvus

As a technical detail of the theory of relativity via which any linear model of the universe can be established (a linear model here being one in which the universe had an absolute beginning that progresses toward an absolute end), neither time nor space occurred prior to the Big Bang. The here assumed gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang is stated to have occurred is affirmed to be spaceless—this because space, just as much as time, becomes meaningless in a gravitational singularity. In the linear model just described, then, both space and time are stated to have started only upon this cosmically singular, initial gravitational singularity’s explosion, this being the Big Bang. As reference:

A gravitational singularity, spacetime singularity or simply singularity is a condition in which gravity is predicted to be so intense that spacetime itself would break down catastrophically. As such, a singularity is by definition no longer part of the regular spacetime and cannot be determined by "where" or "when". Gravitational singularities exist at a junction between general relativity and quantum mechanics; therefore, the properties of the singularity cannot be described without an established theory of quantum gravity. Trying to find a complete and precise definition of singularities in the theory of general relativity, the current best theory of gravity, remains a difficult problem.[1][2]

[…]

Modern theory asserts that the initial state of the universe, at the beginning of the Big Bang, was a singularity.[7] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_singularity

But again, I myself would label this initial singularity as something rather than as nothing(ness).

So that its known, rather than a linear model of the cosmos, I instead favor what could in summation be termed a cyclical model of the cosmos, a Big Bounce rather than a Big Bang as the labels go, which can also be established via the theory of relativity.

A handy concept in your pocket to explain the possible state of the universe before and after its existence. — Corvus

I can very much see this application for any linear model of the universe (as previously described). But again, I'm one to favor a more cyclical model of the universe and, because of this, I personally don't find use for this notion of before and after the universe's being.

As long as you have arguments with possibly some evidence, we are interested in looking into the ideas. — Corvus

This "we" which you here reference, they'd be "interested in looking into the ideas were arguments with possibly some evidence" to be provided by me for the way that the term nothingness gets interpreted by you in your arguments? I don't get it.

I made it clear what my background presumption in this respect was. To be clearer: Do you or do you not interpret nothingness as equivalent to non-being in you're arguments, this as I've explicitly stated I so far assume you do (with emphasis on this being an assumption)? Else do you take non-existence to be something other than non-being? If so, how are the two concepts different to you?

There is no one correct answer here. But the answer you provide will have significant baring on how the issue of nothingness is commonly addressed.

Then why couldn't you call an isolated empty space as absolute nothingness? Because they share the common qualities for the concepts and existence. Absolute space is also a physical entity demonstrated by Newton in his bucket experiment. — Corvus

Because an isolated empty space occurs relative to givens, such as its surroundings, and is thereby not absolute nothingness. (absolute does mean complete without exceptions).

As to the video you've linked to, it seems to me to pose a trick question from the get-go. By the very concept initially specified in the video, an "absolute empty space" (whose very cogency my addressed contention questions) cannot contain a bucket of water, never mind distant galaxies and starts, for the occurrence of any of these things would make it other than an absolute, i.e. a literally complete, empty space. Besides, Newtonian conceptions of absolute space have been debunked some time ago by the theory of relativity, no?

I will think about this point, and get back here for update, if I can come up with any idea either for agreeing or disagreeing. But here is a good article on the topic in SEP. — Corvus

That's perfectly fine, but I want to point out that my post, or else contention, was in the form of a question, and not in the form of an argument one then can agree with or disagree with: Again, in what sense can space occur, and thereby be, in the complete absence of distance(s) between givens?

When you say Absolute Nothingness, it would be the space with absolutely nothing in it, not even a particle of air. The total vacuum state of the space can be called Absolute Nothingness. — Corvus

I take it that by "absolute nothingness" one means absolute non-being rather than being which is devoid of things and hence thingness. Nirvana, as one example, is reputed to be devoid of any thingness while yet being, hence not being nothingness.

If so, in which sense can space occur, i.e. be, in the absence of any and all distances?:

Distance is always relative to things - even if they're construed to not be material (e.g., the distance between two psyches: two psyches might be very far apart, this being a distance, strictly due to their differing views ... if, that is, one were to not take this example as being purely metaphorical). At any rate, here is my contention:

If there are no things between which there is distance, then there is no occurring distance period. And if there is no occurring distance, I so far fail to see how there can occur any sensible understanding of space. Again, what does distance-less space signify?

(The quantum vacuum state yet has distances between particles that appear out of it and disappear into it, for instance.)

This sounds a bit like "consciousness is consciousness of" which is Sartre. I always liked that. I am conscious of a cat, so the cat in a consciousness can also be called me being conscious of a cat, or just summed up as a particular moment of me, of self. — Fire Ologist

There is a logical equivocation in what consciousness is when implicitly stipulating that one’s (consciousness’s) being conscious of the cat is equivalent to the (percept of) the cat being an aspect of one’s consciousness. The first is consciousness in the sense of “that which is conscious of”; the second is consciousness in the sense of “all of which a conscious being, aka consciousness, is conscious of”.

For example, when affirming, “a memory brought into consciousness,” or else, “a conscious memory (rather than an unconscious memory),” one will implicitly stipulate the just mentioned second sense of “consciousness”. But when affirming, “I am conscious of memory X,” one will be implicitly stipulating the first just mentioned sense of “consciousness”. A conscious memory will hence never be a memory which in and of itself as memory holds awareness of other (the first sense of “consciousness”) but will instead always be a memory which one as conscious being is conscious of (the second sense of consciousness).

If interested, I clarify this distinction in the following chapter of my ongoing work: Chapter 12: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part I—Intentions (specifically, section 12.2). But, so its known, I do make use of several newly coined terms—many of which were introduced in previous chapters—so as to be able to adequately demarcate that which is being addressed.

My main point being, the “I” (or else "self" when thus interpreted) addressed in the thread cannot (or at least should not) then be consciousness in the second sense of “all that a conscious being is conscious of”. It can (or should) only be consciousness in the first sense of “that which is of itself aware”—be this an awareness of its very own self as that which is aware (e.g., I am (aware/conscious of being) content and intrigued as that first-person point of view which is aware/conscious and is thereby aware/conscious of other, such as of a memory) or else be this an awareness of other than itself (e.g., I am aware/conscious of a memory regarding what happened to me a week past—this memory being other relative to me as that which is aware/conscious of the memory).

↪javra
Nice icon. — Banno

:grin: Just saw this. A sincere thanks!

Btw, if you're still interested, can you offer any references in philosophical literature to the notion of change occurring sans time, i.e. in the absence of before and after?

I so far still can't wrap my mind around "change that occurs in the absence of any 'before the stated change' and 'after the stated change'" ... but I know enough to know that I should never say never when it comes to philosophical proposals.

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Sorry @Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though.

The main problem with your argument there is that it introduces elements that does not follow out of the science. — Christoffer

The occurrence of consciousness doesn't follow out of the science either. Unless one here wants to deny the reality of consciousness on these very same grounds, then this problem you here express is in no way an impediment to the logically valid supposition of a deity-inclusive physicalism, one accordant to laws of nature both currently known and unknown.

It should also be mentioned that - while the scientific method is contingent on the occurrence of a singular, universally existent, physical reality - the scientific method is in no way contingent upon physicalism. As previously noted, one can logically maintain the same singular, universally existent, physical reality within the objective idealism of C. S. Peirce - for one example of an idealism that supports the physical, replete with its natural laws.

Emergence doesn't mean "anything goes", we don't see a pool of bacteria spontaneously conduct magic because such emergent property "just happened", we still see it as a causal line of events, but engaging in extreme complexity. The emerging property is still dependent on the composition of the underlying systems and parts and limited by their physical composition. Such limitations may also play into the emergent properties. — Christoffer

In respect to emergence, one cannot via current knowledge predict novel cases of emergence. The stipulation of emergence is in no way predictive - but, instead, is always an ad hoc (to the purpose (of accounting for)) explanation for that which is observed or else postulated to be real, and this always after the fact of said observations and/or postulates (hence always also being post hoc).

If emergence is accepted, there is then nothing about the intrinsic properties of emergence that preclude realms of emergent reality wherein deities dwell resulting from supervenience on the consciousness of humans and lesser life forms. (As one can claim that science shall one day figure out consciousness, one here can just as validly claim that science shall in the further future still some day figure out the workings and operations of such corporeal-consciousness-emergent incorporeal deities.)

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As I initially wanted to illustrate, physicalism endeavors to rationally conclude tacitly maintained convictions - but the proposal of emergence as a physical account of (some aspects of) reality does not of itself successful confine physiclaism to that which is tacitly maintained. With the case in point being a logically valid metaphysical possibility of a deity-inclusive physicalism.

For all the reasons just mentioned, emergence is then a red herring in the attempts to validate physicalism as it's commonly understood.

Yet I think the real question is how fruitful is the assumption of reductionism itself? I view physicalism as one general answer to reductionism. The physicalist is happy to stop somewhere and waive off else in philosophy as near nonsense. Brush everything else off with accusing others of talking about spirits. Or at least something that isn't so important. Has this consequences?

Basically naive reductionism leaves us to ask about the foundations of everything from physicists, as if they somehow would have the cradle of knowledge about everything. Yet the fact is that even if a complex system is a sum of it parts, just looking at those parts individually don't answer much about the operations of the complex system itself. A metallurgist just looking at scraps of metal cannot answer how a jet aircraft flies, just as a microbiologist looking at cells has a hard time to explain our current societies. — ssu

:up:

As I tangentially alluded to in another post, were reductionism to be a valid means of explaining - and thereby gaining knowledge of - all that is, we then ought to be able to explain all that is via strict analysis of the omnipresent quantum vacuum state in and of itself. As in, I'm currently motivated to write this post because the quantum vacuum did this and that. One then could even neatly replace the "God did it" answer to everything that explains nothing with a "the quantum vacuum did it" answer to everything that explains nothing.

Just want to second your observations with this. And of course there's other means of approaching the issue of reductionism.

I've decided that ontologies are a lot like impressionist paintings. They look better from far way. :rofl: — Count Timothy von Icarus

For my part, I applaud this sentiment. :grin:

Emergence of individual minds from, and their supervenience on, the physical can be in principle explained just five via certain versions of idealism, such as that of Peirce’s objective idealism.

But I here want to mainly illustrate that this emergence and supervenience route of argumentation is a red herring avoiding the very issues concerned in respect to what physicalism is:

There is no logical reason why spiritual realms—replete with forest and house fairies, ghosts, angels, and less than omnipotent deities that can thereby conflict with each other—cannot all be hypothesized to exist via emergence from, and supervenience upon, that realm of reality consisting of corporeal consciousness, awareness, and mind applicable to life in general—with the latter itself being affirmed to emerge from and supervene on physical particles, fields, and the like … ultimately from and upon the omnipresent quantum vacuum state.

Yet, point being, this supposition would be antithetical to physicalism for tacitly maintained reasons—something to do with an aversion to spirituality as expressed. Physicalism though it would yet technically be given the premise of emergence and supervenience.

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As to rejecting these here hypothesized apparitions on grounds that they are not empirically verifiable, neither are consciousnesses (the philosophical problem of other minds attests to this), whose reality no one here is debating. So lack of empirical proof isn't much of a rational argument against the deity-inclusive physicalism just expressed.

On the other hand, asking me "how" and "why" questions regarding this hypothetical is akin to me asking any physicalist "how" and "why" questions regarding gas atoms (two hydrogen and one oxygen) comprising a liquid when a grouping of H2O molecules are at room temperature. I have no good answer to give, no more than the physicalist does.

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No psychobabble here included or intended, but if by this presented argument one would want to project upon me some laughable fear of annihilation upon death or of some such other physicalist proposition, I’ll then duly project upon the stated physicalist the phobia of an afterlife … together with psychologizations of the deeds in their life which might make this fear so potent.

I'm hoping replies to this post, if any, don’t lower themselves to such speculative and ad hominem rebuttals. If replied to, I'd much rather be rationally evidenced wrong in the argument just made.

You've misinterpreted what I meant by "physicality in total". In the context used, I intended that physicality of which we are a) directly acquainted with via direct experience (this being concrete physical reality of which we know via our immediate physiological senses) and b) that physicality which we infer to have been, to currently be, and to be in the future - with an example of the latter being physicality before life emerged from nonlife within the cosmos.

Is there a way we could distinguish between laws of thought being laws of nature, and 'laws of thought' being incorrigible intuitions related to language and regularities in nature, that have developed in us from a young age? — wonderer1

I will answer yes: rationally. If laws of thought develop from physicality, then, prior to their development, physicality would not be in any conceivable way bound by them. I'm here primarily thinking evolutionarily. This would then differentiate them from laws of nature.

Yet, in favor of the point I intended to initially make regarding some form of idealism, we nevertheless require that physicality in total be intelligible via laws of thought in order to infer that laws of thought in any way develop from physicality.

The arguments for physicalism as the OP asked are best when we simply limit the definition of existence to only something material. Concepts, language, ideas, mathematics, logic, all of that can then simply be said to be something else. Perhaps true and logical, but not something that exists.

Of course some can argue that this just is circular reasoning and isn't very useful as we do need all those concepts, models etc. to say anything relevant about what does exist materially in our universe. — ssu

I view things to go deeper than that.

Question: In what way can the basic laws of thought either rationally or empirically be evidenced to not in and of themselves be basic laws of nature writ large—such that that which is logically impossible is then deemed to be part and parcel of physical reality?

If laws of thought govern all that is physical, then it is irrational to hold that these very laws of thought emerged (via supervenience or otherwise) out of that which is physical. Instead entailing that the physical itself is contingent on the occurrence of laws of thought—with laws of thought being commonly taken to not be in and of themselves physical unless they were to emerge from the physical.

This then directly points to some form of idealism (an omni-this-and-that deity not being in any way required for its occurrence).

(Quantum weirdness—such as the delayed-choice quantum eraser—is no man’s land in terms of proper interpretations. And these interpretations commonly regard what is metaphysically possible rather than logically so. So quantum weirdness in itself will not evidence what I’m here asking for.)

I get the sense there is an assumption at play that has not been articulated with physicalism that you are concerned is problematic? — NotAristotle

I'm not sure it's worth debating, merely provided you with an answer to your initial request. But as to this second question, I have addressed it here:

It’s worse than circular reasoning: it’s reasoning that the cart pulls the horse forward. — javra

... where the cart is the ill-defined "the physical" and the horse is the very laws of thought and value-structures previously addressed which are prerequisites for any conclusion.

Can someone spell out to me what is being reduced and why this is a bad thing? (Because if the answer is subjective experience, I don't see in what sense physicalism is a "reduction"). — NotAristotle

Off the top of my head, all things pertaining to laws of thought and to all aspects of value theory (including the metaethics of what “good” is) is in physicalism reduced to the physical—this when laws of thought and value per se (such as one’s valuing of truths or of correct reasoning or of objectivity—or else not) are prerequisites of arriving at any conclusion whatsoever, including that of physicalism wherein everything is reduced to the physical. Moreover, a clear definition/demarcation of “the physical” is wanting to begin with. It’s worse than circular reasoning: it’s reasoning that the cart pulls the horse forward. I’m a great supporter of the scientific method, but science (when thus understood) cannot address these issues in principle.

Let's assume for the sake of the argument that 'finite' is not included in the definition of 'person' (henceforth also called 'subject', so that it may also imply supernatural beings), so it does not figure a logical contradiction. If an infinite subject is that which encompasses the whole universe, it is metaphysically possible that this subject exists. If by infinite however we mean something that spans not only its world but all worlds, then it is not metaphysically possible because we know at least one world which he does not span: ours. However, I would say that by then, the definition of infinite is twisted to mean something that actually reflects "necessary (in all possible worlds)", after all. — Lionino

Infinity itself is a tricky concept. I once started a thread on the topic and got brutally pummeled by less than charitable mathematical folk for the terminology I employed. So I’ll here employ different terminology for it.

We often enough think of infinity in terms of quantity. Even Cantor’s Absolute Infinity, for example, is postulated to a number bigger than any other quantity. Going back to its roots, though, infinity signifies that which is devoid of limits and boundaries. In this sense then, to be bound, for example, to any aspect of space (distance), time (duration), or number (quantity) is to be finite, this rather than infinite. The Ancient Greek notion of Anaximander’s Apeiron gives one example of this latter notion of the infinite.

Most infinities we can think of are thereby in some respects bounded and only in some others unbounded. For example, Cantor’s Absolute Infinity is yet bounded to, and hence limited by, quantity. For the sake of convenience, I’ll here label these bounded infinities, or else the boundedly infinite—and contrast these to unbounded infinity, or else the boundlessly infinite. A line, a geometric plane in Euclidian space, and Cantor’s Absolute Infinity are all then bounded infinities; whereas the Apeiron is one example of that which is boundlessly infinite.

Given all that, what then does the phrasing of an “infinite subject” intend to imply?

I presume that “a subject” entails being a subject of awareness, which I further take to entail being aware of other. If so, all subjects are boundedly infinite in some regard—for one example, their/our awareness can, I think, be safely deemed infinitely divisible in principle. For instance, I see a rock + background: the rock has infinitely many aspects I could address in principle (variations in color, texture, curvature, etc.; relations between these; similarities and dissimilarities to other things I could be aware of; etc.)—given that I don’t get bored in so doing and that I would so address for all eternity. And this is not to yet get into the rock’s background.

We might by the just stated then affirm—in a rather bizarre formulation—that all subjects (of awareness) are thereby infinite at all times for as long as they occur. This on grounds that their awareness of other, by which they are principally defined, can only so be. (I might add, I can’t yet fathom of anything spatiotemporal that can’t be deemed to be boundedly infinite in at least one respect; as one example previously mentioned for an “infinite dog”, the mapping of anything physically spatial via geometric points leads to an infinite quantity of geometric points constituting whatever it is that is being addressed, thereby making the thing boundedly infinite. But if all items in a set of items are infinite in the same respect, this characteristic ceases to be any difference between them: an infinite apple then equals a plain old apple, so there then is no reason for the adjective of “infinite”.)

So no, when thus understood, an infinite subject would not be a logical contradiction—thereby allowing for metaphysical postulates wherein infinite subjects of awareness are interpreted to hold an awareness that encompass this world or that. (Don’t we as subjects of awareness in at least some ways encompass the very possible worlds we are aware of?)

But so construing all subjects of awareness to be infinite is intuitively odd. We typically by “infinite” want to convey something more. I venture that oftentimes (if not always) this something more will turn out to be logically contradictory: as I find to be the case with an omniscient, else omnipresent, else omnipotent subject (of awareness).

At any rate, the notion of “a boundlessly infinite subject” can only be a logical contradiction: at the same time and in the same respect that addressed is a) bounded to being a subject of awareness (entailed by being a subject) and b) is in no way bounded to being a subject of awareness (entailed by being boundlessly infinite). To use the same example I previously mentioned, the Apeiron cannot logically be a subject of awareness which thereby is cognizant of things which are other than itself—for, if for no other reason, this would then limit the Apeiron to so being a subject of awareness, which contradicts the Apeiron being perfectly limitless in all respects. (While I question Anaximander's notion of the Apeiron on logical grounds, another possible to conceive of boundless infinity is that of Nirvana without remainder, this among yet others, such as the Ein Sof; none of which are subjects of awareness that thereby dwell in a duality between self and other)

(In a bit of hurry at present so I’m not double checking the just written. If there’s glaring mistakes in it I’m sure someone will let me know.)

Got it. Just wanted to reply to with a :grin:

I'm saying that 'substance' is a poor choice of words, for the reasons I gave. — Wayfarer

Aristotle himself made use of the term ὑποκείμενον (hypokeimenon) and demarcated it in the following way:

Aristotle defined a hypokeimenon in narrowly and purely grammatical terms, as something which cannot be a predicate of other things, but which can carry other things as its predicates.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypokeimenon#Overview

The term "hypokeimenon" can well translate into fundamental, or else metaphysical, “substrate” - which could be interpreted to be synonymous to “substance” as it's now commonly used but avoids the issues which you’ve addressed in regard to the latter term’s technical philosophical meanings.

Of additional note: the Wikipedia page specifies "material substrate" but, going by Aristotle's definition alone, one could also conceive of a mental substrate - or else some other type of metaphysical substrate as might be the case with neutral monism.

As to usage (this as most will commonly interpret things nowadays): Mind - or else, maybe, something mental, such as consciousness - is the metaphysical substrate in idealism; matter is the metaphysical substrate in materialism; and both are metaphysical substrates of equal importance in Cartesian dualism.

Do you see any flaw with the term “metaphysical substrate” as it’s just been made use of?

Edit: in my haste, I replaced "substratum" with "substrate". But they are synonymous, and the second does sound better to my ears (so far at least).

Does a causation chain have being? It does if there is a dog at its end. — jgill

Yup, philosophical issues 101. Which some will doubtlessly want to be spelled backwards, no less.

Because contemplation is passive. — Banno

We inhabit two very different minds. I'm always active in what I contemplate. You claim not to be. OK.

You know, Einstein and the moon. — jgill

Ah shoot, gonna turn this thread into one about best understandings regarding an objective idealism ontology?

I'll pass on that for now. All the same, the piece of wood or metal can well occur were all humans to somehow disappear this very instant, as would the moon - as would also persist the signs we humans would leave behind, as in both a) lines representing the idealization of a perfect inch and b) the word "money". These physical things would yet occur but - in granting no other equally or more advanced intelligence in the cosmos - these physically occurrent things would be utterly devoid of the meaning we deem them to hold. They would be utterly meaningless to dogs, bacteria, etc. But again, I don't want to turn this thread into one regarding ontologies.

They still lurk, but haven't posted in months. — Banno

One again wrong in your presumptions. Tis me (formerly "evolog" on the old website, don't you know).

It might be better to think of inches and dollars as something we do rather than something we contemplate. — Banno

Because contemplation is not something we do?

Does an inch exist on a ruler without someone looking at it? — jgill

An inch no more exists without anyone contemplating it than does any word (such as the word “money”) exist without anyone contemplating it. In other words, it doesn’t. It is 100% a socially constructed and established unit of measurement - whose actuality as such is fully contingent on that cohort of minds (and their individual process of thought) which accept it as commonly established construct. Same is true of a centimeter, and so forth.

Long ago, one of the regulars here insisted that Mount Everest did not have a height until it was measured. — Banno

And I bet they still maintain this bit of advanced philosophical thought.

At some point it becomes worthless to continue such discussion. — Banno

agreed in full

The example I gave was the height of a hill with regard to distance from the peak. The height changes over distance, not over time.

I don't know how to make this any clearer. — Banno

You're gonna have to be inventive and/or cogent.

Is the hill itself changing (say due to some volcanic eruption)? I presume not. Does the hill's measurement require processes of mind? I presume it does.

There is no such thing as "change over distance" when the temporarily of mental processes that start at the hill's peak (an event) and move toward the hill's base (another event) are removed from the analysis.

There is no change over distance period, but always change over time.

Yes, the sign does not change. But the value of y may well change with a change in x, yet without t.

I don't think you have followed this, but perhaps we'd best leave it there. — Banno

For my part, no, I see you not having followed the very points I just made.

In what way can "y may well change with a change in x" in which there does not occur a before and after the addressed change?

If you agree there is no conceivable way, then in what way can there be a differentiation between "before and after" without time occurring?

There is a difference between the two, the former being mere stipulation, and the latter being supported by empirical evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

:100: I would only add: "supported by experience, of which empirical evidence is one form of" (this in the modern sense of "empirical").

Such folk are introducing ad hoc excuses not to see that their metaphysical view is false.

But anyway, may I ask again, if there is no change apart from time, how do you understand δxδy? You must, I presume, claim that it is not a change? — Banno

Your former expressed, very slanted (if not utterly incorrect) biases should be addressed by this answer:

In short, you are (most likely unconsciously) reifying the sign "δx/δy" into the meaning it conveys for you and everyone here that can comprehend it in like manners:

There is no change whatsoever in "δx/δy" as sign, just as there is no change whatsoever that occurs in a static image for as long as it remains static. And both will require certain processes of mind to be interpreted in any meaningful way. (If not interpreted in any meaningful way, the argument can well be presented that they might not even be cognized as objects of awareness to begin with. But I won't here argue for this tangential.)

Processes of mind are processes (to state a triviality). Hence, time is requisite to them.

Any possible changes that the sign "δx/δy" can evoke - in one's mind, if this needs to be added - will then occur in processes of mind that, for instance, use the abstraction of variables (in this case, "x" and "y") to abstractly understand that when one variable changes (which requires time in before and after the given change) the other variable will also change (requiring the same abstracted frame of time) in manners established by the given sign as equation. This (mental) understanding of change is not itself static but dynamic; it is not a state of mind but a process of mind.

In what conceivable metaphysics is the sign "δx/δy" changing as one looks at it without in any way shifting one's focus of vision? Else, in what conceivable metaphysics can processes of mind occur in the absence of duration (which is always a temporal extension, or else temporal length, between two events)?

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To be blunt, your quoted biased conclusions so far look to me to amount to a pile of BS, to put it kindly - to not get into the psychobabble of "projections". As a recommendation that you are of course free to not take: it might be better to engage in discussions and debates on a philosophy form without insulting your interlocutors' intelligence or character by presupposing them to be far more idiotic than you yourself happen to be. Hey, no one here or anywhere is omniscient and hence perfectly intelligent, so I say this as one relative idiot among other non-omniscient beings that are thereby fallible.

Funny reply, but OK.

It's true that the colour changes over distance, whether you discern it or not. — Banno

To be taken seriously, show your reasoning. For instance, in what theory or truth that you wish to uphold is truth not partly dependent on one or more observer’s discernment of what is real (i.e., actual or else ontically occurrent).

And here we are off into realism against antirealism, and the thread goes on... — Banno

Are you now labeling yourself an “antirealist”? If not, that ought to address this issue.

May I ask, Javra, where the insistence that change requires time comes from? Why is it important to preserve this idea? this by way of trying to understand why folk seem so adamant about something that to me seems obviously wrong. Thanks. — Banno

It’s a matter of semantics: To me, the term “change” can only denote and connote “to become something else”, “to replace one thing for another”, “to make into something else” and related phrasings and synonyms. All these entail the occurrence of one or more processes. With “a process” being understood as a series or else sequence of events, hence entailing that some event occurs before some other event that occurs after the previous one. And this, thereby, entails time.

Since this to you "seems obviously wrong", what semantic for the term "change" do you hold in mind wherein change is, or else can be, fully independent of process(es)?

(To answer this by pointing to static images or to mathematics is fully counterproductive due to the very disagreement between us.)

And this is exactly the point. There is a change over distance. — Banno

That, again, requires an observer's changing/moving mind to discern.

May I ask, Javra, where the insistence that change requires time comes from? Why is it important to preserve this idea? this by way of trying to understand why folk seem so adamant about something that to me seems obviously wrong. Thanks. — Banno

I'll get back to you on this early next year my time. :smile:

This is not a proof for God argument. — Philosophim

For my part, the issue is that existence can only be rationally concluded absurd in so far as its being is, and can only be, a-rational (beyond any form of reasoning). If infinite causality, then the entire thing in total cannot itself have a cause, but is instead, for lack of a better word, magical in its so occurring - this with all the natural laws, etc., it encapsulates. If, however, one assumes a causal determinism with an initial starting point, then the same issue applies to existence in total: its occurrence is absurd (for the reasons just specified).

This can be an unnerving existential reality/realization for some but, all the same, I see no other rational conclusion to be had.

The OP assumes "a first cause to existence" instead of concluding in the position of absurdism - this as pertains to existence's being as a whole. This, to me, is the pivotal aspect of the disagreement - either with or without the notion of a first cause as God. (And yes, for the record, I deem myself a philosophical absurdist in this specific regard.)

One sees the image as a whole, not only by scanning it — Banno

As a whole, nothing of the image changes. It is only within it that changes occur form one part of it to another.

and Hook's law does not assume a block universe. — Banno

I'll look into it.

2024 must be almost everywhere by now...? — Banno

Not on the pacific side of the Americas ... still procrastinating in preparing for the folks that will show up :grin:

Almost forgot:

The absence of an icon next to your name makes it difficult for old folk such as I to spot your posts, as I scroll up and down on my laptop. — Banno

I'll try to work on it after the new year comes around in my neck of the woods. :wink: :razz:

It changes from yellow to white over distance, not time, you see. — Banno

This, however, fully ignores the reality of the observer's gaze moving in time from one spot of the image to another so as to discern the change addressed - without such a temporal motion of gaze, no change occurs.

And then Jgill pointed out that

A derivative can describe a rate of change with regard to a non-time variable: dy/dx — jgill

That should have been an end to it. — Banno

It so far seems to me this will only hold if one upholds the ontology of a block universe, i.e. the eternalism take on time. If so, here, all perceptions that involve time are fully illusional - and these encompass all that can be empirical, rendering all that is empirical to be strict illusion.

Otherwise, it again appears to me that the non-time variable which changes will again require an temporally-changing observer's mind (where time is, for example, minimally defined as a series of befores and afters - here, regarding givens such as ideas) to discern there being any change whatsoever.

If I have understood your post, you would like to define a sub-class of causes, which after Aristotle are to be called efficient causes, and which require change over time. That's fine, but it does not follow that all causes occur over time. — Banno

You've understood my post, yes. And I'm in agreement with your conclusion. In Aristotelian terms, formal and material causations are themselves change/motion-independent and hence not directly dependent on time. This as one example of causation-types not requiring change over time. But the pertinent question for philosophical clarity, if not rigor, will then remain: what is it that one then refers to when using the term "causation"?

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BTW, from what I recall, Aristotle species efficient causation to necessitate not merely change, but a change in motion, including those of its commencing and of it stopping. Unlike the notion of change of itself, motion (movement of anything in his terms, which can well be of psychological process, and not merely physical motions) will then appear to entail duration between befores and afters and, hence, the occurrence of time when so generally understood.

I can get that, and I did jump into the discussion without reading most of the previous posts.

Make of my reply what you will. To me it does evidence the occurrence of moral realism.

Yes, correct. — Leontiskos

:up:

Is it a moral fact? We're discussing moral obligations, not non-moral obligations. — Michael

It directly concerns what the alcoholic ought to do despite what anyone might want, or like, the alcoholic to do. I fail to understand how this specific "ought" wouldn't be a moral - or, better yet, ethical - fact: one that thereby regards the notion of the good.

As to obligations, I'm not involving myself with them. The question can always be placed: why ought one honor one's former promise ... and with an innumerable quantity of possible scenarios, some can be found wherein it is morally good for one to not honor one's former promise.

I'm explaining that if ethical non-naturalism is true then being moral has no practical benefit. — Michael

I starkly disagree, here granting that this ethical non-naturalism concerns moral realism. But I'm not here to present a thesis on the subject. I'm here only addressing your quoted proposition and my reply to it.

That they should become sober is not an objectively binding moral obligation. It is a pragmatic suggestion, like telling someone that they should brush their teeth. — Michael

It not a statement of suggestion that one gives to another - for in the example all who know the alcoholic want him to continue drinking. The example I gave was given as a statement of fact. That aside:

1) Does your reply then make the statement untrue? If so, how?

2) Why presume that morality is independent of pragmatics?

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. — Michael

A) The alcoholic (who thereby self-destroys themselves via alcohol consumption) should become sober, this despite B) the alcoholic and all which surround him wanting the alcoholic to continue drinking alcohol (for whatever reasons, with these possibly ranging from that of wanting the alcoholic to continue being their merry self in the company of others when drunk to that of wanting the alcoholic to die).

What’s missing here for a satisfactory account of moral realism is the reason for why (A) is valid despite (B). Notwithstanding, to me this scenario presents an intuitive truth that I presume is universally shared. If so, then the proposition you’ve offered is not true - this, as you claim, just as the moral realist affirms.

WW2 history must turn you into a quivering wreck. — RogueAI

Well, unlike some others, there indeed is something about concentration camps that I deem wrong. This especially when they turn into extermination camps. No quivering on my part, but sorrow, yes - this mixed with some anger at those who don't give a fuck.

In now long-gone history, this concentration camp turned extermination camp thing was once done by the Nazis toward the Jews - in case some have not heard. But this is only meaningful to those who care, of course.

In the present moment, this concentration camp turning into extermination camp is being directly done by the Israelis with the Palestinians - if not strictly via direct killings then via intentional starvation and disease. But this is also strictly meaningful to those who have a heart and thereby care.

The past is unalterable. The present, however, is. But I somehow already know your reply: almost 10,000 children killed in a few months time, to not mention those maimed both physically and psychologically ... boo-fuckin-hoo you privately reply, because you just don't give a fuck.

And no, I don't shed tears for people that hate children.

The genocide — oh, sorry, I mean that very just “war” on innocent children — continues. Eight thousand dead and counting.
— Mikie

Boo hoo — Merkwurdichliebe


What a truly repugnant response. — Mikie

@Merkwurdichliebe's “boo hoo” reply makes me envision someone eating popcorn with a brewsky in their hand in front of their TV set while joyfully laughing out loud at every instance of a child being maimed or dying, and always drooling at the mouth for more children’s blood being shed.

There's a chance this might not be Merkwurdichliebe, but such is the image his comment produces.

In my experience, such individuals have no guilt and can do no wrong, irrespective of what their actions might be. They’re in their own eyes pure angels - angels that want for others to be ruthlessly obliterated with as much bloodlust and spin of reality as is required to do so.

Honest observations from someone who knows himself to be no angel - of the type just addressed or any other. :naughty:

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The numbers you talk about alone sometime bring me close to crying rather authentic tears. But then, this turns into anger - which can in principle be put to good use.

Basically wanted to second your comment.

The idea of 'causation' presupposes time, because a cause is defined as prior to its effect, and causation is a temporal process. — unenlightened


The bowling ball causes the depression in the cushion.

Cause is not always prior to effect. Indeed sometimes it is impossible to decide which event is the cause and which the result. — Banno

This will be fully dependent on what is interpreted by the term “causation”. That causation expressed in the phrase, “my aim of expressing the ideas of this post was the cause of me writing the words in this sentence,” is not today taken by most philosophers and scientists to be a valid instantiation of causation—even though it is a valid form of Aristotle’s final causation in his framing of causal pluralism. And even though the expressed sentence makes cogent sense (just as much as does the statement of a ball causing a cushion’s depression).

I'll argue that Kant’s rebuttal to Hume in claiming that simultaneous causation occurs in many instances of efficient causation—which the ball and cushion example epitomizes—misses the entire point of what efficient causation is supposed to be. Here’s one reputable source’s definition:

The efficient cause or that which is given in reply to the question: “Where does change (or motion) come from?”. What is singled out in the answer is the whence of change (or motion). — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/#FourCaus

There is no motion or change taking place in a bowling ball’s state of rest atop a depressed cushion. Hence, here, there can be no efficient cause to an effect (of change or motion), for no such effect occurs.

Then again, the ball’s being in a state of rest on the cushion causes the cushion’s given curvature just as much as the cushion’s given curvature causes the ball to be in a state of rest. Both are equally viable from their different, respective vantages of interest. Here, then, the ball's state of rest on the cushion is a simultaneous cause and effect in relation to the cushion's given curvature, which is also a simultaneous effect of and cause to the former. This relationship, then, produces so much havoc in our understandings of (efficient) causation as to render the term useless and, thereby, meaningless.

Here is one possible alternative understanding of how the resting ball causes the cushion’s depression: teleologically, rather than efficiently. In short, the ball’s set of teloi (including that end of being optimally proximate to Earth’s center) interacts with the far more malleable cushions’ set of teloi so as to result in an equilibrium wherein the ball is at rest and the cushion is depressed. This equilibrium (which, of itself, is changeless) is thereby teleologically caused by the ball just as much as it is by the cushion—this since it results from an interaction between both teloi-driven things. Utterly foreign to our modern ears, but in no way illogical.

As @unenlightened specified, for efficient causation to hold, the occurrence of the cause will then need extend prior to the occurrence of the effect—which does not happen in the ball and cushion example. With this traditional understanding of efficient causation, however, one can then validly affirm that, “the person letting the bowling ball slip from their hands (efficiently) caused the change in the form of the cushion that lied just underneath,” for the first occurrence as (efficient) cause extends prior to the time-span of the second occurrence as effect (despite the teleology previously mentioned remaining intact—to here not address the formal and material causes which could also be argued to occur). And, from a different vantage, one can then also validly affirm that “the cushion’s placement caused the falling bowling ball to come to its specific state of rest” for, here again, the cushion’s placement, as cause, necessarily extends prior to the bowling ball’s state of rest as effect.

But, again, a ball resting atop of cushion does not efficiently cause the cushion’s depression. This for the same reasons that change in temperature does not efficiently cause change in barometric pressure.

Since this issue of causality is of interest to me, I’m curious to see what disagreements there might be with the just expressed.

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To contribute to the OP: where there to be no disagreements, this would then make the argument expressed in ’s post quite valid.