• Faith
    ... [M]odels of God have no bearing on whether there is a God or not, only on what people claim about God. — Tom Storm
    :up: :up:

    (from 2022)
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/774731
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/774753
  • Strong Natural Theism: An Alternative to Mainstream Religion
    I've read his Ethics and it seems to me like he believed in a form of deism ... — Bob Ross
    The 'god of deism' is transcendent – ontologically separate – from the universe in contrast to Spinoza's immanent substance that is not ontologically separate from the universe. Read Spinoza more closely, Bob.

    ... but, crucially, I don't see how it is incompatible with historical classical theism (like Aristotle's).
    Well, actually, Spinoza's substance is incompatible with "classical theism (like Aristotle's)" because e.g.

    (A) it does not intend final causes (i.e. no telos, no moral laws),

    (B) it is not a volitional agent (i.e. not conscious) and

    (C) it is not ontologically separate from the universe or any other substance (i.e. not transcendent).

    Can you elaborate on what you mean by classical theism being outdated but Spinoza's Substance is not?
    I said deconstructed (i.e. shown to consist of inconsistent or contradictory predicates), not "outdated". Again, ...
    Read [Spinoza's] Ethics - Part 1 "Of God" pp. 1-31 (iirc) — 180 Proof
  • Strong Natural Theism: An Alternative to Mainstream Religion
    It seems that you are leaping ahead, identifying a being, rather than just an eternal permanence that 'IS' (has being), such as the quantum vacuum, that is absolutely simple, but never still, providing for change. — PoeticUniverse
    :smirk:
  • Why not AI?
    Would you say that those cognitive abilities have benefited from exposure to the intellectual stimulation and challenge provided by the ideas others offer on forums like this one? — Joshs
    No. My "cognitive abilities" (seem to) benefit mostly from exercising them unaided (as much as possible) here and elsewhere.
  • Why not AI?
    I don't use GPS while driving or LLMs for my TPF postings either. Call me a luddite ... I'm secure in my own cognitive abilities.
  • Strong Natural Theism: An Alternative to Mainstream Religion
    The idea of god intervening just is an idea of separation.

    ... the idea of an intervening god seem to place you [@Bob Ross] more in the context of scriptural theology than natural theology.     — Janus
    :up: :up:
  • Strong Natural Theism: An Alternative to Mainstream Religion
    Can you elaborate on Spinoza's critiques [deconstruction] of classical theism? — Bob Ross
    Read his Ethics - Part 1 "Of God" pp. 1-31 (iirc)

    I think God is Being itself; so perhaps Spinoza's "Substance" is another way of describing it: what do you think?
    I agree.
  • Strong Natural Theism: An Alternative to Mainstream Religion
    ↪Bob Ross
    Afaik, the "God" of Western "classical theism" (JCI & pagan) is a belated, unparsimonious, and in some ways conceptually incoherent form of – derivation from – pre-Hindu idea of Brahman. In modern philosophy, I think Spinoza was the first thinker to deconstruct "natural theism" (re: natural theology) and reconceive it as Substance (i.e. Natura Naturans aka 'laws of nature'): Deus, sive natura.

    ↪Bob Ross
    What you describe seems to express the view of Deism ...     — Paine
    :up:
  • To What Extent is Panpsychism an Illusion?
    Henry Bergson's idea of the mind as being a filter of 'mind at large' offers a fuller descriptive explanation. — Jack Cummins
    If so, what's the "explanation" for this "mind at large"? or evidence for each "mind being a filter"? or is Bergson's idea only a speculative analogy (rather than an "explanation") and not intended to be taken literally?
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    The case for survival is not fringe; it is courtroom-solid, and logically it's inductively solid. — Sam26
    You asked what would convince me and I've told you. In contrast to the above: laboratory-solid, hypothetico-deductively (i.e. experimentally)-solid. Otherwise, it's more plausible to accept that accounts of "NDEs" are confabulatory / hallucinatory rather than veridical. Believe whatever you like, Sam, but that doesn't change the fact that reliable, scientific evidence for "survival" is LACKING.
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    ↪sime
    :smirk: :up:
  • To What Extent is Panpsychism an Illusion?
    Are they [objects] as real as conscious beings; or more real, if one takes a materialist stance. — Jack Cummins
    Some (non-abstract) "objects" are also "conscious beings" and the vast majority are not. Neither type is "more real" than the other as far as I can tell.

    Btw, what does "more real" even mean?

    Klingons are from this galaxy. — Patterner
    LLAP \\//_
  • To What Extent is Panpsychism an Illusion?
    Which is more 'real' in descriptive understanding? — Jack Cummins
    I don't understand the question.

    Likewise, it could be questioned is panpsychism is a metaphorical analogy or an epistemological model of underlying processes of nature?
    Imo, it's a (poor) "analogy".

    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1006207
  • To What Extent is Panpsychism an Illusion?
    What I wonder about most in reading ideas of Spinoza, and others, including [Sc]hopenhauer; is to what extent ideas like reincarnation and resurrection are symbolic primarily. — Jack Cummins
    IIRC, neither thinker argues for "reincarnation and resurrection" symbolically or otherwise. And "consciousness" is not "fundamental" in either philosophy, so "panpsychism", like individual/personal survival after death, is excluded as a speculative possibility.
  • To What Extent is Panpsychism an Illusion?
    I would say that I I have some sympathy/ empathy with substance dualism. — Jack Cummins
    Well, as I've said elsewhere, I read Spinoza's conception of dual-property parallelism as a logical implication of 'non-transcendent (or monist), eternal, infinite substance' – acosmism.

    The idea of reincarnation (and resurrection) overcome this duality. — Jack Cummins
    "Reincarnation" presupposes the duality of souls and bodies insofar as it is the soul that is jumping (via death) from body to body. "Resurrection" is dualist too, though less explicitly, since the dead body regenerates itself and not the soul that's "eternal".
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    If you think that still isn’t enough, then do the intellectually honest thing and name a stopping rule ... — Sam26
    As I wrote in my previous post: at least objective corroboration – not just ad hoc circumstantial coincidences – testable-controlled, experimental evidence.

    While it is your prerogative (and evasive tactic) to reply anyway you wish, you never actually respond to my explicit criticisms. Believe whatever you like, your NDE "argument" (dogma), Sam, does not convince me for the reasons I've given many times. Anyway, good luck with the book. :smirk:
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    if you think testimony isn’t evidence, then you’re not just wrong— — Sam26
    It's not that "testimony isn't evidence", it's that "testimony" is mostly unreliable just like introspection. Such subjective accounts of extraordinary claims absent extraordinary evidence (or at least objective corroboration) are neither credible nor compelling to most nongullible, secular thinkers who have not had an alleged "NDE" themselves. In fact, it's dogmatic of you, Sam, to believe "testimony of NDE" is sufficient evidence for believing NDEs happen or that they prove "consciousness survives brain death" (re: afterlife).
  • Idealism in Context
    P naturalism? As in physicalist naturalism? — Manuel
    Philosophical naturalism (i.e. all testable explanations for nature, including the capabilities of natural beings (e.g. body, perception, reason), are completely constituted, constrained and enabled by (the) laws of nature) —> anti-supernaturalism, anti-antirealism. Re: Epicurus, Spinoza ... R. Brassier.
  • Idealism in Context
    Fwiw, if mind is mind-dependent, then 'transcendental idealism' is merely i-maginary (à la Spinoza's 'first type of knowledge'); however, if mind is mind-i]ndependent, then 'transcendental idealism' is only a solution in search of a problem (à la 'Cartesian doubt'). I find 'indirect/critical realism' (e.g. perspectivism, fallibilism, cognitivism/enactivism) to be much more self-consistent and parsimonious – begs fewer questions (i.e. leaves less room for woo-woo :sparkle:) – than any flavor of 'idealism' (... Berkeley, Kant/Schopenhauer, Hegel ... Lawson, Hoffman, Kastrup :eyes:) which underwrites my commitment to p-naturalism.
  • Faith
    ↪Paula Tozer
    :up:
  • Faith
    One might even argue that philosophy (if we include political ideologies) may have been been responsible for more deaths than any other pathway. — Tom Storm
    I don't think "philosophy" has been to blame for mass murders, etc so much as dogmas have (i.e. unthinking, or rationalized, obedience to authority / tradition / popularity / superstition ...)
  • To What Extent is Panpsychism an Illusion?
    For instance our senses largely point outwards, towards the world, so I am unable to see what is going on behind my eyes [ ... ] If that conscious periphery gave us enough information about the body [and brain] I’m sure consciousness wouldn’t be a such a mystery, and ideas like panpsychism wouldn’t even be entertained. — NOS4A2
    :up: :up:
  • Idealism in Context
    ↪Janus
    :100: :clap:
  • Idealism in Context
    I think [Berkeley] believed it to be a completely useless concept. — Metaphysician Undercover
    For him, perhaps it was; but nonetheless "matter" is very useful as a working assumption (like e.g. the uniformity of nature, mass, inertia, etc) for 'natural philosophers' then as it is now; certainly, as we know, not as "useless" of a "concept" for explaining the dynamics in and of the natural world as the good Bishop's "God" (pace Aquinas).

    ↪Apustimelogist
    ↪Apustimelogist
    :up: :up:
  • Idealism in Context
    I reject the idealism/realism dichotomy — Banno
    Yes, I agree, if only because it makes no sense to conceive of "mind" itself as merely "mind-dependent" (or in Berkeley's sense as "perceived"). Exception: "the mind of God"? – imo an unwarranted, even incoherent, assumption.

    The way I see it, the fact that we all experience the same world can be explained only by a collective mind we all participate in or an independently existing material world. We cannot know which alternative is true, the best we can do is decide which seems the more plausible. — Janus
    :up: :up:
  • Idealism in Context
    A lot of "quantum" gassing (as expected of an 'idealist/antirealist/supernaturalist' thread discussion).

    To paraphrase @Banno:

    bad philosophy –> bad science –> :sparkle: :sparkle: :eyes:
  • Idealism in Context
    ↪Wayfarer

    Not really sure what this is trying to convey. The[re] are several coherent realist perspectives on QM which don't invoke any form of collapse, such as Bohmian, Many Worlds, Stochastic mechanics and possibly others. Your response just seems to me like someone pretending that these theories, which all reproduce the correct quantum behavior, don't exist. You have clearly put yourself in an echo chamber where the only releva[nt] opinions on QM are those of subjectivists, wooists, relationalists.     — Apustimelogist
    :100:
  • To What Extent is Panpsychism an Illusion?
    To go back to fundamentals: I guess one thing you need to do is to define "consciousness", after which, you may find that the question is more easily answered. Until you do that, no answer is possible. — alan1000
    :up: :up:
  • Idealism in Context
    ↪Apustimelogist
    :up: :up:
  • To What Extent is Panpsychism an Illusion?
    The belief in objects having rudimentary consciousness goes back to animism. — Jack Cummins
    :up:

    from 2019 ...
    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/355107
  • Idealism in Context
    As d’Espagnat famously observed[assumed], quantum physics suggests that “reality is not wholly real” in the classical sense presupposed by scientific realism. — Wayfarer
    Perhaps, as "Schrödinger Cat" as well as e.g. Einstein, Popper, Hawking, Penrose, Deutsch et al suggest, "quantum physics" provides an extremely precise yet mathematically incomplete model of "reality" – how does quantum measurement happen? – that is (epistemically?) inconsistent with classical scale scientific realism (re: definite un/observables / locality). I suspect, 'absent solving 'the measurement problem', physicists like d’Espagnat make a metaphysical Mind-of-the-gaps faux pas.
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    Ya, right, "I'm projecting." — Sam26
    :up:

    ↪bert1
    Yes, I forgot ...
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    P1: Extensive Testimonial Database - Millions of individuals across documented medical settings report near-death experiences involving conscious awareness during verified clinical death (estimated 400-800 million cases globally, with over 4,000 detailed firsthand accounts in academic databases). — Sam26
    • Evidence of those "millions of individuals"?

    • "Estimated 400-800 million cases" how and by whom?

    • "Over 4,000" is a three-five orders of magnitude smaller sample than the alleged "millions" and consists of highly unreliable¹ "first hand accounts" instead of objective corroboration by controlled experiments – what about scientific evidence?

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eyewitness_testimony#Reliability [1]

    https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0065260108004012 [1]

    For me, until the questions above are satisfactorily addressed, the first premise (P1) is, at best, incoherent and, therefore, your inductive argument is not sound very weak (i.e. not credible).

    P4: Objective Verification Protocol - A substantial subset of cases includes independently corroborated details ...
    • Lacking controlled experiments?

    For me, the fourth premise (P4) is incoherent and, therefore, your inductive argument is not sound very weak (i.e. not credible).

    P5: Optimal Testimonial Conditions - Reports satisfy established criteria for reliable testimony: immediate temporal proximity to events, firsthand rather than hearsay accounts, credible sources without apparent ulterior motives, and systematic documentation by medical professionals and researchers.
    Nonsense ... (see both links below P1).

    @Philosophim Your critique of my work reflects a surprisingly limited and elitist perspective on philosophy, misrepresenting ... — Sam26
    You're projecting again, Sam.
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    the inductive argument. — Sam26
    Hume? Keynes? Popper? ...

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction#Formulation_of_the_problem
  • Language of philosophy. The problem of understanding being
    Philosophy deals not with an object, but with its concept. And since philosophy speaks about the world .. — Astorre
    This is confusing. Maybe you mean 'philosophy speaks about the concept of world'?
  • How do you think the soul works?
    I am not sure that the idea of spirit can be disregarded completely in thinking about the idea of soul. — Jack Cummins
    Like Spinoza, I "disregard" body-mind (i.e. matter-spirit) substance duality. Conatus is inherent in nature – this worldly – ontologically immanent (Deleuze).

    Hegel saw spirit as being imminent in history and in his understanding of 'mind'.
    By geist, Hegel means 'cultural and social development, or process, of humanity's self-consciousness' (e.g. weltgeist ... volkgeist ... zeitgeist).
  • How do you think the soul works?
    ↪Null Noir
    I think the primeval idea of "soul" is most rationally conceived of as conatus¹, even though the latter is, like life itself, impersonal and ontological-immanent (re: natura) whereas the former tends to be personal yet spiritual-transcendent (re: supernatura).

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conatus#In_Spinoza's_philosophy [1]
  • Evidence of Consciousness Surviving the Body
    ↪Philosophim
    :100:

    ↪Philosophim
    :up: :up:

    @Sam26
  • Artificial Intelligence and the Ground of Reason (P2)
    ↪MoK
    :up:

    Returning to the ideas of Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, AI is deprived of temporality and finitude, it is deprived of living experience. Today it is a complex algorithmic calculator. — Astorre
    :up: :up:

    the nonsensical idea of a theory of everything, which is the idea that the universe is infinitely compressible into finite syntax — sime
    :fire:

    Vincent J. Carchidi, “Rescuing Mind from the Machines”(link)

    This essay, published in Philosophy Now ...     — Wayfarer
    Thanks for this. :up:

    https://philosophynow.org/issues/168/Rescuing_Mind_from_the_Machines
  • The Problem of Affirmation of Life
    Life is one of the most complex and concentrated existences the universe contains. It is a set of chemical reactions that does not merely burn out, but seeks to renew itself for as long as possible. And as such we, life, make the world into something so much more existent than it would be had we all remained inert carbon. — Philosophim
    :up: :up:

    How can life be justified in spite of all the suffering it entails? — kirillov
    Only some statements "can be justified" (e.g. by how things happen to be) and not facts such as "suffering". As Epicurus points out: one's actions (i.e habits) can either increase or decrease (or both) one's own suffering and/or suffering of others. "The meaning of life"– its value or "justification" (if there is such a thing) – as Nietzsche says, belongs to the world, or nature as a whole, and not to any one of us who suffers. We are beings-in-question (from suffering), so how each being answers individually and communally (for suffering) is what matters first and foremost; thus, courage (contra hope (or despair)) is the 'foundation' of all other virtues (i.e. habits which decrease suffering). Amor fati. :death: :flower:
Home » 180 Proof