There is NO more evidence for a non-intervening god than there is for an intervening one. — universeness

:up:

It's just as possible that an ASI might be very benevolent towards us. Much more so th[an] humans currently are towards other humans. — universeness

:fire:


"We shall take care of them."
"Eminently practical."
"And we shall serve them. And you will be happy. And controlled."

:nerd:

I think the wise passage you quote is better understood with more context ...

A truly good man is not aware of his goodness,
And is therefore good.
A foolish man tries to be good,
And is therefore not good.
A truly good man does nothing,
Yet leaves nothing undone.
A foolish man is always doing,
Yet much remains to be done.
When a truly kind man does something, he leaves nothing undone.
When a just man does something, he leaves a great deal to be done.
When a disciplinarian does something and no one responds,
He rolls up his sleeves in an attempt to enforce order.
Therefore when Tao is lost, there is goodness.
When goodness is lost, there is kindness.
When kindness is lost, there is justice.
When justice is lost, there ritual.
Now ritual is the husk of faith and loyalty, the beginning of confusion.
Knowledge of the future is only a flowery trapping of Tao.
It is the beginning of folly.
Therefore the truly great man dwells on what is real and not what is on the surface,
On the fruit and not the flower.
Therefore accept the one and reject the other. — Daodejing, Chapter 38, translated by Gia-fu Feng and Jane English, 1989

In ethics, I think 'X is less harmful than Y' (or 'X is least harmful of all') is much less vague or arbitrary, therefore more reliably actionable, than "X is good". It's pragmatic to address disvalue by preventing or reducing disvalue (e.g. harm to h. sapiens); however, we can only aspire to value because value tautologically transcends (in "platonic heaven") our condition such that "moral value" judgments / actions are arbitrary in practice (à la nihilism). Moore seems half-right but wholly for the wrong reasons. Rather than "good", less bad – minimize ill-being (re: disvalues) for its own sake (like medicine or ecology) rather than tilting at the windmill of "well-being" (re: value, ideal). Epicureans / Stoics rather than Bentham-Mill / Kant.

So how do you mean "modern" whereby Hobbes and Spinoza, Descartes and Leibniz are not modern philosophers?

:up:

:up:

IIRC, Zoroastrianism is the belief that two gods are eternally at war with one another (light vs darkness).

NB: "Pandeism" is my jam. :smirk:

Nor is Spinoza modern — schopenhauer1

Are Descartes, Hobbes & Leibniz modern?

Wait a minute. When did "speculation about the nature of existence and metaphysics" have great appeal? — BC

:fire:

:100:

Why are we able to understand reality at all? — Andrew4Handel

We are real beings inseparable from reality – the same reason fish are able to understand the sea.

Well, though I'm something of a Spinozist, I don't recommend Spinoza (who is actually an acosmist, not pantheist) for 'philosophy of mind' or contemporary neuroscience. This link to a recent post has a list of contemporary thinkers from whom I've learned much about 'mind':
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/755060

Out of interest, what do you make of Hegel?

Unfortunately, along with Kant, Hegel is the most influential (detrimental) modern philosopher for midwifing "p0m0" and "communism", respectively (as well as for also totally eclipsing Spinoza until about fifty years ago). For me, Hegel in two words: totalitarian teleology. :mask:

What do you think about the various concepts in the understanding of consciousness? — Jack Cummins

I think they are outmoded, folk notions.

Which of these concepts are more helpful or unhelpful in the twentieth first century climate of philosophical thought, especially in relation to the mind-body problem?

Committed to an embodied philosophy, my speculative bias is decidedly anti-supernatural / anti-idealist; therefore, I find both "soul" and "spirit" unhelpful.

"Mind" is (mostly) a property we ascribe to a (recognizable) phenomenally self-modeling, metacognitive body.

"Self" conceived as self-continuity (embodied) is more helpful than self-identity (disembodied).

And, as far as I'm concerned, "the mind-body problem" is dissolved by Spinozist property dualism contra Cartesian substance dualism.

Autopoiesis : "Enformy" :: 2001 : Star Wars, no? :nerd:

I prefer duotheism to monotheism — Agent Smith

So Wiccan / Zoroastrian mystagogy ... :sparkle:

Put differently, isnt the aim of philosophy to address within its practice such inclusive concepts as world, existence , reality and truth? — Joshs

Of course.

Can you unpack the quote? Also, can you cite its source? — ucarr

I can't "unpack" any more than I have already. You misread me out of context (or superficially) and thereby see "contradictions" where there aren't any. And I'm citing my own words from old posts (which I've linked), so why do you assume there's some other "source"? I suspect my problem, ucarr, with your responses is I don't see your point as I've not made any factual claims or proposed any arguments here with which it's reasonable to take issue.

ucarr considers philosophers as detectives — Agent Smith

I consider us escape artists (à la Witty's "flybottle" ... Epicurus' "tetrapharmakos" ... Plato's "cave" ... the Upanishad's "moksha" ...) :smirk:

We're only talking past each other. Let's not ... :confused:

:up:

instead of two entities, one with two mutually cancelling properties, — Agent Smith

Complementary properties are definitely not "mutually cancelling", Smith. Read the wiki article I linked. Are mind/body ... male/female (organisms) ... particle/wave (photons), ... "mutually cancelling"? :chin:

You've lost me.

I thought the Tao was a dualistic entity consisting of two opposites. — Agent Smith

I'm sure I've pointed out to you what's wrong with that interpretation. The dao is an analogue for what western philosophers term "dialectical monism". Like entropy (i.e. disorder-order) consisting of complementarities, not "opposites".

[deleted]

What does Planck say? ... not a metaphysical digital ontology. — noAxioms

So what's your point with respect to my question (and its context)?

IMO, dao = entropy. (YMMV)

As apokrisis once said, nothing is not nothing, but actually everything. Something can come from everything which to those who don't know of this equivalence is nothing. Creatio ex omnia (syn. nihilio). — Agent Smith

It's another way of saying

In sum: order (i.e. dissipative structure)
is a phase-state of disorder – disorder's way of generating more disorder. — 180 Proof

Philosophy, IMO, begins (again and again) wherever the question "How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real?" predominates like an itch that grows as we scratch it.
— 180 Proof

As I understand it, your above statement claims the question therein seeks a way, a manner or a means of knowing our acceptances-without-proof are real — ucarr

You're misreading what I wrote. My bad (I guess) for not being clearer. To unpack the statement, all I mean by it is that philosophy – reflective thinking – begins when we question our assumptions and givens (i.e. the ineluctable background (ontological) conditions for how we live and how we think). 'Topics in epistemology' (re: e.g. truth, knowledge vs opinion, etc) come later once philosophizing has begun in earnest and, IMO, themselves do not, cause us to philosophize.

What's your way of defining "real?"

Here's what I mean by real (from a recent thread on the topic) ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/749399

@ucarr

Its expansion does not encompass both truth content of particulars and precepts about general attributes of truth?
— ucarr

Those aporia (logically) come later ... — 180 Proof

... understanding (logically) comes first.

Apophatic ontology.

I'm aware [misinformed] that Materialists see no difference between Physical and Mental phenomena, because their (blind in one eye) worldview blocks-out Metaphysical features of the world — Gnomon

A much repeated slander that also makes no sense given that philosophical materialism itself is very much a metaphysical position (e.g. the Cārvāka (ancient India), Democritus, P. Gassendi, T. Hobbes, Baron d'Holbach, L. Feuerbach). "Materialists" merely differ from you (woo-of-the-gaps) immaterialists, Gnomon, with an alternative metaphysics, not a lack of one or "anti-metaphysics" as you claim (as if that too isn't a metaphysical position :roll:).

There's no shame, sir, in admitting you don't know what you're talking about; it's shameful, however, to keep on and on about things even you've confessed you've not studied as well as derivative sources you uncomprehendingly quote from repeatedly as if you're ... overcompensating. You're the biased dogmatist here, not I or any of your other skeptics / critics.

@Agent Smith

:up:

Yeah, fallibilism – "I could be wrong" about that too. :sweat:

(stick to appearances; those who promise ultimate truths are usually charlatans, oui 180 Proof?) — Agent Smith

As I recently wrote elsewhere, I

... realized that we only ever 'know reality' – orient ourselves – approximately, or superficially, via myths, metaphors, maps & models. — 180 Proof

I suspect fallibilism is more suitable for a contemporary kynic (unless you're a 'a deliberately homeless, p0m0 luddite') than (Hellenistic) skepticism.

I was a pyrrhonian back in my wayward youth and still have great regard for that form of skepsis (incorporating its praxis, along with fallibilism, in my epicurean-spinozist-absurdist 'framework' :cool:)

Is it incorrect to characterize the above question as a spark igniting epistemological inquiry? — ucarr

I think so

Its predomination as an itch that grows as we scratch is not an investigation of what distinguishes justified belief from opinion?

I don't think so.

Its expansion does not encompass both truth content of particulars and precepts about general attributes of truth?

Those aporia (logically) come later ...

:up:

Modern problems require Ancient solutions. — Agent Smith

:rofl: :up:

:smirk: You're a kynic, I'm an epicurean.

So the spark of philosophy is epistemological and philosophers are knowledge detectives? — ucarr

I don't think so.

:up: Gnomon admits to having trouble comprehending 'ontological immanence' à la Spinoza or e.g.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/629398

:up:

How often do you change or modify your views on philosophical questions? — Tom Storm

Less and less the older I get. (Old dog vs new tricks paradox?) IIRC, the last major change was over fifteen years ago – a radical shift in my thinking about and comprehension of metaphysics (thanks again, @Tobias) – and subsequently lots of minor tweaks and refinements, mostly of my conceptual vocabulary. I've also discovered many and developed a few new arguments which I'm always trying to improve. The path itself is the destination, right?

I never assumed reality is knowable — Tom Storm

I'd always assumed so because our minds seem – must be? – inseparable from reality (pace Kant, Descartes, Plato) but I'd also realized that we only ever 'know reality' – orient ourselves – approximately, or superficially, via myths, metaphors, maps & models.

:up:

:up:

Is atheism then a concern of theists only, and atheists concerned only with refuting the theist conception of God? — Ciceronianus

Yes.