Is it incorrect to characterize the above question as a spark igniting epistemological inquiry? — ucarr

No, ex mea sententia, no! However, though the objective is knowledge (theoretical and practical, re sophia), philosophy is also the realization that the epsitemological project it has undertaken is futile, bound to fail). A dilemma presents itself: raise the bar and it's impossible, lower it and it's dukkha (unsatisfactory). @180 Proof subscribes to fallibilism; I myself adopt what I call an ad interim weltanschauung/philosophy (stick to appearances; those who promise ultimate truths are usually charlatans, oui 180 Proof?) Like @unenlightened once remarked, a brilliant observation, "I treat dreams as real until I wake up." :fire:

(stick to appearances; those who promise ultimate truths are usually charlatans, oui 180 Proof?) — Agent Smith

As I recently wrote elsewhere, I

... realized that we only ever 'know reality' – orient ourselves – approximately, or superficially, via myths, metaphors, maps & models. — 180 Proof

Like $\pi$, an irrational - only an approximation is possible. Reduce error and, in more general terms, recognize one's mistakes, awareness of where one could be/go wrong.

:up:

How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real? — 180 Proof

Is it incorrect to characterize the above question as a spark igniting epistemological inquiry? — ucarr

No, ex mea sententia, no! — Agent Smith

I take you to mean (because of the double-negative) it is correct to understand:

How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real? — 180 Proof

as a question that sparks the epistemological project of philosophy.

There is, however, a caveat:

However, though the objective is knowledge (theoretical and practical, re sophia), philosophy is also the realization that the epsitemological [sic] project it has undertaken is futile, bound to fail). — Agent Smith

A general truth about the epistemological project, then, has it bound by the mathematical concept of the limit. The philosopher-as-knowledge-detective makes an ever-progressing approach to the goal of certain knowledge without arrival.

I myself adopt what I call an ad interim weltanschauung/philosophy (stick to appearances; those who promise ultimate truths are usually charlatans... — Agent Smith

Per your view, Agent Smith, philosophy vis-a-vis knowledge stays confined within the bounds of an insuperable skepticism. Moreover, your skepticism is coupled with a sardonic jeering at claims to penetrate the world of appearances with counter-intuitive insights. Like a savvy gumshoe, you regulate your beliefs with a worldview that, in parallel with a floatation device, keeps you in hover mode around promising candidates for truth claims yet non-committal.

Like @unenlightened once remarked, a brilliant observation, "I treat dreams as real until I wake up." :fire: — Agent Smith

With his clever approach to self-mockery, wittily characterizing himself as a would-be adept, @unenlightened puts the steamed milk into your latte.

@ucarr

Its expansion does not encompass both truth content of particulars and precepts about general attributes of truth?
— ucarr

Those aporia (logically) come later ... — 180 Proof

... understanding (logically) comes first.

Philosophy, IMO, begins (again and again) wherever the question "How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real?" predominates like an itch that grows as we scratch it. — 180 Proof

As I understand it, your above statement claims the question therein seeks a way, a manner or a means of knowing our acceptances-without-proof are real.

Objectivist is one way of defining "real."

objectivism (noun) philosophy - the belief that the things of the natural world, especially moral truths, exist independently of human knowledge or perception of them.



What's your way of defining "real?"

I like Tallis' response best.

"In the beginning was astonishment."

Philosophy, IMO, begins (again and again) wherever the question "How do we know our assumptions are true or our givens are real?" predominates like an itch that grows as we scratch it.
— 180 Proof

As I understand it, your above statement claims the question therein seeks a way, a manner or a means of knowing our acceptances-without-proof are real — ucarr

You're misreading what I wrote. My bad (I guess) for not being clearer. To unpack the statement, all I mean by it is that philosophy – reflective thinking – begins when we question our assumptions and givens (i.e. the ineluctable background (ontological) conditions for how we live and how we think). 'Topics in epistemology' (re: e.g. truth, knowledge vs opinion, etc) come later once philosophizing has begun in earnest and, IMO, themselves do not, cause us to philosophize.

What's your way of defining "real?"

Here's what I mean by real (from a recent thread on the topic) ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/749399

:lol:

The Pyrrhonist argument is quite simple and as powerful. For every thesis an equal and opposite antithesis (adiaphora). The scale of truth is perfectly balanced at the center. Hence epoché, post-aporia.

...philosophy... begins when we question our assumptions and givens. — 180 Proof

The above quote is how I boil down your statement to its essentials.

philosophy – reflective thinking – begins when... — 180 Proof

The above quote I understand to be synonymous with: Philosophy = reflective thinking. This can be restated as: Philosophy = deep thought.

'Topics in epistemology' (re: e.g. truth, know vs opinion, etc) comes later once philosophizing has begun in earnest and, IMO, themselves do not, cause us to philosophize. — 180 Proof

I read the syntax of the above quote as having 'Topics in epistemology' as the antecedent of themselves and thus I get: 'Topics in epistemology...' themselves do not, cause us to philosophize.

There might be a problem of contradiction because the sentence first claims topics in epistemology come later once philosophizing has begun in earnest, and then it says topics in epistemology themselves do not cause us to philosophize.

If topics in epistemology don't get underway until philosophizing has begun in earnest, and if topics in epistemology exemplify philosophizing (I think they do), then to follow that by saying topics in epistemology themselves do not cause us to philosophize appears to be contradiction.

However, this appearance of contradiction might be dispelled if you can say what precludes topics in epistemology from causing philosophizing after it has begun in earnest.

Reality is ineluctable and, therefore, discourse/cognition–invariant. — 180 Proof

The encompassing of reason that necessarily cannot itself be encompassed by reasoning, — 180 Proof

The real encompasses reason (Jaspers) and itself cannot be encompassed (Spinoza / Cantor) ... like 'the void within & by which all atoms swirl' (Epicurus). — 180 Proof

Reality is that which does not require "faith" and is the case regardless of what we believe. — 180 Proof

I read your definitions of "real" as follows:

Reality is inescapable because it subsumes the total being of sentients within its larger-than-sentience domain.

Reality is the acid test of the scope of sentient knowledge and understanding because the former is totally super-ordinate to the latter.

Reality is ontically independent of sentience. Humans, for example, cannot create themselves because self-creation would entail creation of a context for self, which is to say, self-creation would entail the concomitant of creation of reality, an impossibility given its permanent super-ordination of sentience.

Reality is totally stifling WRT to individuality of perception and WRT to self-determination of identity because there is one and one only nature of reality, and thus reasoned discussion and its understanding are confined to an absolute determinism thereof.

You've lost me.

I like Tallis' response best.

"In the beginning was astonishment." — Manuel

In Egyptian math the glyph for 1,000,000 is a sitting man with his arms raised above his head (in astonishnment), I can picture Jeff Bezos :yawn:

The idea is to go beyond what is often said to be the beginning of a philosophical journey or adventure, which is that philosophy begins in wonder.

I think it goes beyond that, all the way to utter astonishment, at existence, and life and the universe and objects and perception and unity and diversity and knowledge and so on and on.

Of course, the association one has with any particular word may render any definition bland or trivial. Jeff Bezos having billions may be astonishing to some, and in a way it is. But not in a good way.

That's not how I experience astonishment, nor do I expect others to have the same experience as I do.

The Pyrrhonist argument is quite simple and as powerful. For every thesis an equal and opposite antithesis (adiaphora). The scale of truth is perfectly balanced at the center. Hence epoché, post-aporia. — Agent Smith

Appears to me skepticism has a mathematical structure akin to the cancellation of opposite charges resulting in zero. Since zero in isolation is impractical, philosophy with practical content must be irrational.

Appears to me skepticism has a mathematical structure akin to the cancellation of opposite charges resulting in zero. Since zero in isolation is impractical, philosophy with practical content must be irrational. — ucarr

Exactamundo!

You've lost me. — 180 Proof

Let's revisit a couple of my communications.

'Topics in epistemology' (re: e.g. truth, know vs opinion, etc) comes later once philosophizing has begun in earnest and, IMO, themselves do not, cause us to philosophize. — 180 Proof

When a philosopher is working in topics in epistemology, s/he is doing philosophy. That you believe this you make clear by declaring topics in epistemology come later once philosophizing has begun in earnest. When you follow this by declaring, IMO, topics in epistemology themselves do not cause us to philosophize, you appear to contradict your prior statement that working in topics in epistemology occurs once philosophizing has begun in earnest.

If, when a philosopher does work in topics in epistemology, this work, once it's underway, exemplifies philosophizing in earnest, as you claim, but then you next claim that, IMO, topics in epistemology themselves do not cause a philosopher to philosophize, then you need to further unpack this statement with a clarifying explanation. Without a clarifying explanation, I claim your statement is a self-contradiction.

Since what I say here, like what I said previously, is easy to understand, if you continue to plead non-comprehension, I will conclude your plea is a pretense that enables you to avoid acknowledging self-contradiction.

Reality is ineluctable and, therefore, discourse/cognition–invariant. — 180 Proof

My response to this claim, in short, says it's nature viewed through the lens of rigid determinism, thus giving the claimant power to deny varieties of perception of nature. This leads straight into viewing topics in metaphysics with the same rigid determinism.

Can you unpack the quote? Also, can you cite its source?

Can you unpack the quote? Also, can you cite its source? — ucarr

I can't "unpack" any more than I have already. You misread me out of context (or superficially) and thereby see "contradictions" where there aren't any. And I'm citing my own words from old posts (which I've linked), so why do you assume there's some other "source"? I suspect my problem, ucarr, with your responses is I don't see your point as I've not made any factual claims or proposed any arguments here with which it's reasonable to take issue.