A reason to believe something is not under evolutionary constraint directly, I think. If I understand correctly, these reasons you mention are complex traits, meaning they are the result of many things working together. A reason is not a single entity, but a collection of things. The fear of fire is your experience of the shape of fire, your experience of the colour of fire, your experience of heat, your experience of pain cause by hot stuff, etc. Fear of fire is not shaped by evolution. The molecular machinery that allows you to see, feel, smell fire is. — Daniel

You are confusing intuitions and beliefs with what they're intuitions of and/or beliefs about.

What we can provide an evolutionary explanation of are the intuitions and beliefs.

An evolutionary explanation of the intuition that we have reason to believe things is not an explanation of why we have reason to believe things.

That would be akin to thinking that an evolutionary explanation of why people believe in God is an explanation of God.

A reason to believe something is known as a 'normative' reason or 'justifying' reason. You want examples? Well, you have reason to believe you exist, don't you? That is, you don't just believe it, you think there's reason to believe it, yes? Well, that's what I am talking about. Those: reasons to believe things.

Consider these two statements: a) there are trees; b) there is reason to believe there are trees.

Those aren't equivalent, are they? One is about trees, the other is about what I am talking about: reasons to believe things.

Note, the entire of philosophy is concerned with them. Philosophy is the enterprise of trying to figure out what we have reason to believe (including what we have reason to believe about reasons to believe things)

Oh! So, you mean to say that just because we have the
faculty of reason it doesn't necessarily follow that there are any real reasons (to believe anything). — Agent Smith

Yes. That you have the impression or belief that there is a reason to do something does not entail that there is. The reason and the impression of the reason are distinct, just as an impression of a tree and a tree are different.

which drives the point home viz. our proclivity to believe in god(s) doesn't imply the actual existence of god(s) — Agent Smith

That's not what I said. I said that if we can provide an explanation of the development of a disposition to believe in God without having to posit God himself, then that explanation debunks the belief. That is, it gives us grounds for thinking that the belief is false, or at least that we have no reason to think it true.

Another example: I jab a pencil in my ear and I start hearing a ringing sound. Now, what's the best explanation of why I am hearing a ringing sound? That something is ringing out there in the world? No. The best explanation is that I am hearing a ringing sound because I jabbed a pencil in my ear. That explanation makes no mention of any actual ringing out there in the world. And thus it debunks the impression. I am getting the auditory impression that there's a loud ringing in the room I am in, but because this impression is a product of me pushing a pencil into my ear I now have grounds to think the impression is false: there is no ringing in the room, there is just a pencil in ear.

Now, does that mean that I am saying that if one gets an auditory impression of a ringing sound that this does not imply that there is any ringing going on?

No. On the contrary, if one gets the auditory impression of a ringing sound the default is that this is excellent evidence that there is some ringing going on.

And likewise, if one finds that one has an intuition that God exists, that is default excellent evidence that God exists.

But if - if - we can provide an evolutionary account of that intuition that makes no mention of God himself, then we would have debunked the credibility of the intuition.

So, you get a ringing impression. That gives you default reason to believe that there is some ringing going on out there in the world. You then remember that you just jabbed a pencil in your ear. That information provides you with reason to believe that there is no actual ringing going on corresponding to your impression, but that your impression is false as it is the product of a pencil stabbing and not the product of any sound 'out there'.

The puzzle arises becasue we can give an evolutionary account of the development of our faculty of reason without having to posit any actual reasons. And thus such an account debunks our impressions and beliefs that we have reasons to do and believe things. Yet we have to presuppose that there really are reasons to believe things. So the atheist who believes they have reason to believe in evolution by natural selection has an incoherent set of beliefs. They believe there is reason to believe in evolution by natural selection, yet if evolution by natural selection alone (unassisted by God, that is) is true, then there are no reasons to believe anything.

But such intuitions are rooted in sensory faculties which tell about something external. A sensory faculty, by definition, senses something outside itself; they tell us of the external world. An intuition is about something sensed and therefore about an external world. — Daniel

First, our senses are impotent to 'tell' us anything about anything. It is our reason that tells us to suppose our sensations are 'of' things. That is, the 'representing' is done by our reason. It is our reason that tells us to suppose that colour sensations are of something out there that is coloured and shaped, and so on.

Second, our faculty of reason or intuition represents us to have reasons to do and believe things. And it is those - those reasons - that I am talking about. One must not confuse an intuition with what it is an intuition of. One can give purely evolutionary accounts of the development of the intuitions. The problem is that one can do so without having to posit any reasons themselves. And thus the explanation will debunk those intuitions.

The result: one will have to conclude that there are no reasons to do or believe anything in reality. There are just impressions of such things. But the things themselves - the reasons - do not exist.

And that's incoherent. For concluding something is to do as one thinks Reason bids. Someone who thinks they have reason to believe there are no reasons seems confused.

There is a reason to believe things, and it is that sensory faculties tell us exclusively about something external to the sensory faculty. No matter the nature of the external, the sensory faculty necessarily tells us about something external. — Daniel

You are confusing the basis upon which we have a reason to believe something with the reason itself.

We do indeed have reason to believe what our senses are telling us (though note, they tell us nothing in themselves, it is our reason that tells us what to make of them). I have not denied this. My point is that if one gives a purely evolutionary account of how we have come to believe we have reason to believe things one will not have to posit any actual reasons.

I gave an example: if you can explain why people are disposed to believe in God without having to posit God, then that explanation debunks those beliefs, doesn't it? (it doesn't debunk belief in God, just beliefs in God formed by that disposition). It doesn't vindicate them. It gives one reason to think there's no God, for we can explain the belief in God without having to posit God.

Now, the same applies to reasons to believe things - indeed, all reasons to do and believe things - if one gives a purely evolutionary explanation of why we are disposed to believe there are reasons to do and believe things.

Yes, I think those others are talking about the reliability of our faculty of reason in telling us about the non-rational world. So our reason tells us what to believe (and what to do). And their point - or the gist of their point - is that the faculty would need to be designed in order to reliably do that (or that the world would need to be designed to answer to it, or some such).

But their points seem fundamentally different to mine. I hope so anyway, for I think their cases are undermined by evolutionary accounts. There seems no problem in explaining how a faculty that reliably generated accurate - or fairly accurate - beliefs about any external reality there may be would be selected for. There does not need to be a designer, evolution by natural selection alone will explain what needs to be explained on that front. I think their cases are quite weak, then.

My case is quite different. My focus is on reasons themselves, rather than the reliability of the faculty that tells us about them. The evolutionary account of the development of our faculty leaves us with no need to posit any actual reasons corresponding to the intuitions that the faculty generates. Thus, an evolutionary account of our faculty of reason - even if it succeeds in explaining how such a faculty would generate accurate beliefs about the material world - would leave us not having to posit any actual reasons. And thus we should not posit them. Which then means that we have a self-refuting case. We can't really explain why such a faculty would be selected for if we end up having to conclude that there's no reason to believe anything.

What this tells us, I think, is that evolutionary accounts presuppose not just an external world, but also presuppose the reality of reasons. And thus an evolutionary account must not challenge the reality of what it presupposes, else it will be incoherent.

It's not actually clear to me what a naturalist analysis of reasons would amount to (to the discredit of the naturalist, of course). If the naturalist is someone who believes that among the natural features of the world are reasons, then their account will certainly fall foul of the evolutionary explanation, for there would be no need to posit such strange things. The naturalist will therefore find themselves with an incoherent position.

The same would apply to the non-naturalist about reasons. Again, there would be no need to posit such things.

The only exception is my kind of divine command theory of reasons. For if reasons are the attitudes of God, then we have independent reason to think that God would provide us with a faculty of reason that would tell us fairly reliably about the superficial nature of the world we are living in.

Yes, anyone who, in the context of an argument over the morality of a particular type of act, raises the whole 'but how do we know anything?' question has lost the argument.

I'm off-topic aren't I? Oh well! — Agent Smith

Yes. What I am doing is raising a well-known puzzle and then suggesting how to solve it.

What's the puzzle? The puzzle is that an evolutionary explanation of our rational intuitions seems to debunk them. Why? Because we seem able to provide an explanation of why we are disposed to get such intuitions without having to suppose that what they're intuitions 'of' actually exist.

Compare this to sight. Does an evolutionary explanation of the development of our faculties of sight debunk that faculty? No, because our evolutionary explanation will mention what our sight gives us apparent awareness of. Humans who saw the lions in the field would not picnic in that field. Thus those humans would be the ones more likely to survive long enough to procreate. We actually have to posit what the sight gives us an awareness of in order to explain its adaptive value. So, that's a vindicatory explanation. The evolutionary explanation of how sight developed does not give us grounds to think it is not telling us about anything real. On the contrary, it provides us with reason to think it does tell us about something real.

Compare sight to a disposition to believe in gods and afterlives. Well, a plausible evolutionary explanation can be provided of such a disposition. Those who believe in gods and afterlives are likely to be happier than those who do not and are better motivated to behave morally, which in turn will increase their likelihood of creating trusting relationships and so on, all of which is likely to enhance one's chances of successfully reproducing people who will in turn successfully reproduce.

Is that a vindicatory explanation of the disposition to believe in gods and afterlives? No, for we have not had to posit any actual gods or afterlives. Thus the disposition's adaptive value does not turn crucially on the existence of what it is a disposition to believe in. And this means that the evolutionary explanation debunks the beliefs that were formed in this way. We can explain why humans are disposed to believe in gods and afterlives without having to suppose there are actually any gods or afterlives.

Those are just standard examples of vindicatory evolutionary explanations and debunking evolutionary explanations. When it comes to the development of faculties of awareness or faculties of belief formation, a 'vindicatory' explanation is one where we need to posit what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of (or belief in) in order to explain its development. A 'debunking' explanation is one where we do not have to posit what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of (or belief in) in order to explain its development.

Now for the puzzle: when it comes to our faculty of reason the evolutionary explanation seems to be a debunking one, not a vindicatory one. We seem able to explain why we developed a faculty that produces in us the belief that we have reason to believe things without having to suppose that there are actually any reasons to believe things in reality. So we can explain the development of the faculty without having to suppose the reality of what the faculty gives us an apparent awareness of.

Yet that now means that we've undermined our own case, as any case for anything depends on there being actual reasons to believe things (not the mere belief in such things).

The fact a person deserves something will, standardly, give rise to an obligation to provide it.
— Bartricks

Right. So when I said...

For someone to deserve something means (in the context it's used here) there is a duty of moral agents to provide them it.
— Isaac

...the correct response was just "yes". — Isaac

Er, no. Christ. Comprehension skills: D. To deserve something does not - NOT - mean the same as 'there's an obligation to give the person it". Clear? They don't mean the same thing. If two statements have the same meaning - that is, have the same propositional content - then you can use them interchangeably. You cannot substitute talk of desert with talk of moral obligations.

Again: to deserve something is quite different from there being an obligation to provide it.

The former can give rise to the latter. That does not mean they're the same. If one thing gives rise to another thing, that doesn't mean that the first thing is the second. It looks stormy outside and so a lot of people are carrying umbrellas. That does not mean that 'it looks stormy' means ' a lot of people are carrying umbrellas', even though the fact it looks stormy is often what's responsible for people carrying umbrellas.

Nope. I said...

For someone to deserve something means (in the context it's used here) there is a duty of moral agents to provide them it.
— Isaac

'Means', not 'equivalent to'. If you're going to try and quibble over semantics then you at least need to use the bloody words I used. Quibbling semantics by using words I didn't even use seems a little one-sided — Isaac

You're the one who is misusing terms and then attributing the resulting views to me!!!

If two statements mean the same thing, then that means they have the same propositional content. Now, to deserve something does NOT mean the same as 'there is aduty of moral agents to provide them it". Those are quite different concepts. That is, the concept of desert is completely different to the concept of a moral obligation.

Write this out a thousand times until it sinks in: to deserve something does not mean the same as 'there is a duy of moral agents to provide it".

Again: a rapist deserves to be raped. That does not mean that we are obliged to rape the rapist.

But sometimes - sometimes - that a person deserves something can give rise to there being an obligation to provide it.

If the two meant the same thing......then there would be a 'necessary' connection. It would impossible for a person to deserve something and there be no obligation to provide it.

Yet often a person can deserve something and no one be under any obligation to provide it.

Well then you're lacking any evidence at all that this is indeed a moral intuition since the examples you've given all relate to obligation (such as to avoid harm to others). You've not provided any other example where we consider the creation of deserts, in this way, without the ability to provide them to be immoral. — Isaac

More sloppiness. A moral intuition is a kind of mental state (it's a mental state with representative contents). I am appealing to moral intuiitions in support of my claims. But the claims are not themselves about moral intuitions.

My claim was that it is immoral - other things being equal - to create injustices. And if one has created someone who deserves something they're not going to receive, then one has created an injustice. Which of those claims do you dispute? Do not challenge the probative force of intuitions - all arguments for anything appeal to intuitions. Just try and challenge a premise. Do that by trying to come up with a counter-example to the premise in question. So, for instasnce, I have claimed that if a person has done nothing, then they do not deserve to come to harm. You challenge that premise by coming up with a case in which a person has done nothing at all yet seems to deserve to come to harm. Good luck coming up with such a case. But that's what it would take to challenge that premise. I have claimed that it is an injustice when a person who does not deserve to come to harm comes to harm. TO challenge that claim you would need to come up with a case where a person clearly does not deserve to come to harm yet comes to harm and it is no injustice (there are cases of this - I have mentioned one, namely freely self-inflicted harm....but they do not seem to undermine my case). And I have claimed that it is wrong, other things being equal, to create injustices. To challenge that claim you would need not just to provide examples where we are obliged to create injustices - for I do not deny that we are sometimes obliged to create injustices - but you would need to show that other things are not equal in the procreation case. Do one of those things.

Shall I help you? I have already provided you with one example of a case where a person does not deserve to come to harm, comes to harm, and the harm is not undeserved - freely self-inflicted harm.

That's not going to undermine my argument, however.

Here's another potential counterexample to something I have claimed: freely going beyond the call of duty. I have claimed that it is wrong, other things being equal, to create a desert of something that can't be provided. But one counterexample to that claim is the case of a person who freely goes beyond the call of duty. That person makes themselves even more deserving of good things than someone who has not gone beyond the call. Yet it is even more unlikely that they will get what they deserve than if they had not gone beyond the call. But clearly it is not wrong to go beyond the call.

See? That's how to challenge me in a sophisticated way. Now, up your game.

Western culture is "just the practice of using reason to find out what's true"?? — baker

It's up to you to tell me what on earth you mean by 'western culture' or why it's relevant to anything I have argued.

But philosophy is the practice of using reason to find out what's true, yes? That's what I'm doing in this OP.

And then there's just making stuff up or believing something because there's a tradition of believing it. That's not philosophy. It is what it is. Now, I assume that when someone starts talking about 'other traditions of thought' or 'other cultural traditions' what they mean is "but what about those who do not use reason to figure out what's true and instead just make stuff up or insist that certain views are true because that's just what people believe in this or that neck of the woods". Well, my answer is those folk are not doing philosophy. It's like giving me your recipe for banana cake. It's not relevant to anything I have argued.

The implicit one, "People are born innocent". — baker

That wasn't an implicit premise. It was explicit. Do you dispute it? On what basis?

My question was, does innocence/guilt exist outside of the human species or our like? — universeness

I don't understand the question. Innocence or guilt is always someone's. And it always belongs to a person, a mind.

I do challenge your argument. I asked you if the purpose of the universe is linked to the existence of humans. If antinatalism were realised it would damage that purpose, would it not? — universeness

And I answered. Our purpose is to do what's right and avoid what's wrong. And I have argued that it is wrong to procreate. So you are simply begging the question by insisting that purpose is something else. You need to argue for that claim by refuting my argument.

Extinction is permanent so if you don't know, perhaps it is unwise to advocate for antinatalism, if it would not achieve your goal as humans would just be eventually replaced by another conscious/sentient species who face the same dilemmas as we do. — universeness

Again, I addressed this point. Imagine all women decide they do not wish to procreate. Is it ok to rape them? Obviously not. Why? Because that would violate their rights, which is an injustice. So, it is more important to prevent injustices than it is to keep the species in existence.

I have argued that procreation itself creates an injustice.

You make an intriguing distinction here. Are you saying that if human beings can be created by harvesting sperm and eggs and producing humans completely outside of the human body then your antinatalism, would be ok with that? — universeness

Er, no. Of course not. Why would you think I was? It's wrong to lie, isn't it? Default wrong, anyway. Does that mean I have an obligation to stop you lying? Should I kill everyone in order to stop lying occurring? No, that's dumb. If it's wrong to lie, that means I ought not to lie (and you ought not to lie). It does not follow that I ought to prevent you lying or you me.

Now, it is immoral to procreate. That means you ought not procreate and I ought not procreate. It does not mean that I am obliged to stop procreation from occurring.

Well, the case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that there are reasons to believe things. — Bartricks

Do you understand why this bit is true?

Read the OP then.

Do you understand what a self-refuting argument is?

But I think you don't even know what it is. I think you just saw the word God and then decided to say some stuff. You didn't take the time to understand the puzzle, did you? Now that's naughty.

And it isn't irrelevant. It's what this thread is about. The thread you're happily derailing.

Describe the puzzle

So who do you think is the better qualified of the two of us on this subject? Me or you?

For example, how familiar are you with the literature on evolutionary debunking arguments?

No, I was simply pointing out that God is mentioned in the solution to the puzzle, not the setting-up of the puzzle.
But you don't even understand the puzzle. So we're really not off to a good start, are we? You just saw the word God and thought "God is bad. I no like God. I no understand argument. But I no like God. I will say my thoughts"

I use word i no understand. I think it mean being in France. But I not sure. I use anyway. I am be clever. I using wordings I not know meaning of. That clever.

So you understand, then, that an exclusively evolutionary story about our development isn't correct?

I dun not understand OP, but I dun don't like it cos he mentioned god and I don't like god so I will say some stuff.

So? You think philosophy is a democracy?

Do you actually understand the OP? Do you understand how an unassisted evolutionary account of our development presents a problem?

Vague and ambiguous mean different things. And it's not a fallacy to employ an ambiguous term. Christ almighty - who the hell educated you people?

I don't think you know what 'bald assertion' means. I did not baldly assert that purely evolutionary accounts of our development leave us having to conclude - incoherently - that there are no reasons to believe anything. I carefully explained the matter. Now, if you think my explanation was faulty - and note, I didn't mention God once during that explanation - say where and why. Don't just express your ignorant attitudes towards me and an OP that mentions God. I get that you hate religions and are all cross and stuff, but this is a philosophy forum and the OP contains a case that you need to address. If you are convinced it doesn't, that's fine - go away then.

It really doesn't matter because God in the OP has nothing to do with it other than a rabbit which you pull put of a hat as a literal deus ex machina. I don't need to follow your argument because there isn't one. — Streetlight

Once more, address the OP. Start by trying to understand the puzzle I was raising. Like I say, there's no doubt an SEP page on it. I know you people love fancy labels as you think it makes you sound clever, so what I am doing above is raising what's known as the 'ontological' version of the evolutionary debunking argument.

"Reasons" =/= "directives" as you point out below with "directives OF reason", so your premise is false and invalidates your "argument".

[ ... ] because all of the directives of reason are her directives.
Oops. :snicker: — 180 Proof

Read what I say carefully. Reasons-to-believe things are directives. Directives need a director. The director needs to be a person.

The word 'reason' is ambiguous (that means it has several distinct meanings). Sometimes we use it to denote reasons-to-believe things.

Sometimes it is used to denote the faculty of intuition that gives us some awareness of the reasons-to-believe things.

And sometimes it is used to denote the 'source' of the directives.

Reasons-to-believe things are directives.

They need a director.

The director needs to be a person.

That person will be 'Reason' because - do you remember from above? - that's one of the uses of the word 'reason'.

That person will be God.

That's called an argument.

Note too that it is not essential to my case. Everyone must admit that reasons-to-believe things exist. The job of work is to reconcile their existence with an evolutionary account of our development. That, I am arguing, cannot be done without God.

Clearly you don't even understand the puzzle I was attempting to resolve.

Do you understand what a self-undermining case is?

This is the only line worth anything in the OP, and it is worth nothing. — Streetlight

But you're not very good at arguing or at understanding what another person has argued. I mean, you somehow thought that I had argued that your faculty of intuition is infallible, yes? But that's not in the OP. So you just have really poor comprehension skills.

Show your working. Address the OP.

Note, you have yet to do this. You simply told me your 'intuitions' about certain matters. I then asked you in what way that was relevant to the OP. You then asked me whether I trust your intuitions. Well, no of course I don't - why would I trust the intuitions of a person whose reason is so poor they can't understand the OP? I mean, did I at any point assert in the OP that our faculties of intuition are infallible or that yours in particular is?

More attitude expression. Show your working. Address the OP.

You addressed precisely nothing in it. Address it.

Again, more attitude expression. Address the OP.

Go away. This is a philosophy forum and so far all you've done is express ignorant attitudes. It's pathetic.

Yes. I presented a case. It's not my fault you can't understand it. There's a big literature on evolutionary debunking arguments. There's no doubt an SEP page you can read on it. Why don't you do that, and then read the OP again. Now run along.
And as someone has already noted above, there's a similar argument to mine that's very well known, made by Alvin Plantinga. No doubt you've read it.

No you're not. Address it or go away.

Address the OP or go away.

So much for your comprehension skills. Why would I trust the intuition of a person who is unable to understand the OP or address it?

No.

Relevance to the OP?

First, reasons to believe things are directives to believe things. Directives require a director and only a person can occupy that role. Thus, the directives of reason are the directives of a person. And that person will qualify as God precisely because all of the directives of reason are her directives.

And then there's the indirect argument provided by my argument in the OP. It can't reasonably be denied that our faculty of reason tells us about something real (see the OP for details). Yet unless we posit God - or at least a person who is concerned, at least to some extent, about our welfare in this dangerous world - who has provided us a faculty of intuition to inform us of what we have reason to do and believe, we will be forced to conclude that our faculty of intuition tells us about nothing real. But that's a self-undermining conclusion and thus we have to suppose our faculty of intuition has been implanted in us by a person, rather than developed by blind forces of evolution alone.

I suggest you now post a crying with laughter emoticon.

You're the troll matey. I made an argument and all you did was insult me (and a very wet and feeble insult it was too). Anyway, get back to your fairground, Jacko.

I didn't deny it. Now, once again, is there any reason to think it true?

Read the OP again. Engage with the argument I made.