And I counter-replied.

You made the inane observation that the theory of evolution is just a description of a processs.

That didn't address anything I'd argued in my OP, and so in a vain attempt to get you to engage with the argument I asked you whether you thought there was any reason to think it true.

You then insulted me. And I then insulted you back much better. It's the way of things.

Bit literal aren't we. I imagine you get stuck at stop signs a lot. Now: address the OP.

You have the knowledge of an average college freshman. — Jackson

Show me how by addressing the argument in the OP. Dad.

So, you think there's no reason to think it's true? Read the OP again and try and understand what I'm arguing.

I am familiar with his argument. It is different to mine (though this is from memory). All he does is argue that we have no more reason to think our faculties reliable than not. He doesn't say anything about the status of reasons themselves.

My argument is different. My point is that any case for evolution by natural selection presupposes that there are reasons to believe things. And those, in turn, presuppose God. And it is the combination of God and a dangerous world that explains why we have developed fairly reliable faculties of rational intuition.

For you, is innocence/guilt a creation of human conscience or does it have any significance outside of humans or they're like? — universeness

Innocence is not our creation. It's a status that someone has, not something we bestow by our attitudes. If I believe you're guilty of something, that doesn't mean you are - even if I manage to convince everyone else that you're guilty of it.

Is antinatalism a pointless viewpoint because the universe has no inherent significance/meaning without the existence of lifeforms such as humans, even antinatalist ones. — universeness

No. Antinatalism is the view that it is immoral to procreate (other things being equal).

If, by the 'meaning' of our lives, you mean their purpose, well clearly the purpose of our lives is to do what is right. By procreating then, one goes against the purpose of one's being here. If you disagree, you need to challenge my argument.

If lifeforms such as humans went extinct, do you think evolution/natural selection would simply continue and another lifeform like humans would emerge? — universeness

I don't know. But evolutionary forces do not have moral obligations. We do. And among them is an obligation not to procreate. Note, I have not argued that we have an obligation to stop the production of persons. I have argued that we, as individuals, are obliged not to procreate.

This was not a proposition of mine, it was a corollary of what Bartricks said about deserts not creating obligations in this context.

If what children deserve doesn't create an obligation to provide it, then procreation is not made immoral by that fact since no one is morally obliged to see to it that those deserts are brought about. — Isaac

First, I did not say that deserts do not create obligations, I said that they're different concepts - the concept of moral desert is not equivalent to the concept of moral obligation (which is what you had asserted - you'd asserted that to deserve something is equivalent to someone being obliged to give you it; which is nonsense).

The fact a person deserves something will, standardly, give rise to an obligation to provide it. It won't necessarily do so. But it often will. That a person deserves respect is precisely why we standardly are obliged to give it. But that a rapist deserves to be raped does not mean we are obliged to rape them. So, 'sometimes' the fact a person deserves something is the basis of an obligation to provide it; sometimes it is not. 'Sometimes' doesn't mean 'always'.

Second, my argument was that it is immoral - other things being equal - to create a desert of something that cannot be provided (there are exceptions, but whether they apply to the procreation case is something that you'd need to argue). No premise of my argument asserted that if someone deserves something then we ought to give it to them. But you seem incapable of focussing on the actual argument.

I see that now what you're doing is questioning the probative value of intuitions. Good one! All knowledge of anything is based on them. So thanks - my argument is so good all you can do in response to it is question whether we know anything at all. Do you realize how incompetent that is as an argumentative strategy?

Aw, is Isaac unable to make an argument?

So, tell me, Issac, how does one argue for something without appealing to intuition? I'm dying to know....

I did read the OP and I explained why it does not raise a problem.

I have asked you umpteen times now to raise a problem. You haven't.

Here are some more problems for us to discuss: the cat/shape problem. My cat has a shape. But some shapes aren't cats. Puzzling.

The hair head problem. My head has hair. But there is some hair that is not on my head. Puzzling.

The language/speak problem. I speak a language. But no language speaks me. Puzzling.

The addition problem. Adding 2 to 2 makes 4. But adding 2 to 3 makes 5. Puzzling.

You have provided no argument. All you've done is assert that we are not souls but matter and then expressed your disapproval of the eternal soul thesis.

What's your case?

My point is that you don't know whether those statements are true or not; — Luke

I know! That's the point!

The thesis that every truth is in principle knowable is not, note, the thesis that every truth is actually known. It is that every truth can - in principle - be known.

And it's demonstrably false. There are all manner of propositions that, if true, could not be known. I keep giving you examples. There are LOADS. "No one knows anything" for example.

Now don't reply 'how do you know it's true" - that's the point!! I don't and can't - no one can (save God, of course).

So what problem are you trying to raise? Do you think the knowability thesis has some prima facie plausiblity? It doesn't. It has nothing to be said for it. It's just a false thesis. It may not be obviously false, but it's false upon a bit of reflection.

So what's the problem? Why on earth would one ever think that all truths could be known? It's like thinking all flour is in cakes. No it isn't. There's flour in cakes. But there's no reason to think all flour is cake bound.

The knowability thesis is that all truths (i.e. all true statements) are, in principle, knowable. — Luke

That thesis is demonstrably false. I am demonstrating its falsity by providing you with examples of truths that, if true - and it's metaphysically possible that they are - could not be known.

Note, the existence of such truths is not controversial. They've got a name! They're known as 'blindspot propositions'.

Now, again, what is the problem you're trying to raise?

Yes, that's why they're not knowable! Sheesh.

There are no justifications.

There. That proposition might be true. Assume it is. Now, we don't know it to be true, do we? We can't. Because if it is true - and assume it is - then no belief is justified.

Yes. I gave you some examples of such unknowable truths.

But you said that it was true. You both know and don't know that it's true? — Luke

No. Here are tonight's lottery numbers: 1,2, 3,4,5,6.

Imagine they are. Do I know that those are tonight's lottery numbers? No, for my belief was wholly unjustifed.

So, there's a case of a true proposition that I believe to be true and that is not known.

Anyway, as I keep saying, there are countless examples of propositions that are true and not known, and propositions that do not seem capable of being known.

You've yet to explain to me what the problem is supposed to be. You just keep conflating truth and knowledge.

But you said that it was true? — Luke

Yes. So? That a proposition is true does not entail that it is known to be.

Look, this is very simple: this proposition "X is true and no one believes it" can be true. But when or if it is true, it could not be known. Why? Because to know a proposition is to believe it. And if you believe that in that proposition's truth, then it is false. So, when it is true, no one believes it. And thus it is never known to be true.

You're just confusing truth and knowledge, it seems to me. There's no puzzle here.

Then how do you know that "there are x number of blades of grass in the world and nobody believes it" is true? — Luke

I don't. No one can. That's the point.

'True' does not mean 'known'.

So there's no problem with there being true propositions that are unknown. I mean, there is a number of blades of grass in the world. And no one knows it. So we already know that there are truths that no one knows.

And it would seem that there are some true propositions that, by their nature, cannot be known.

What's the problem?

Like I say, there's no contradiction involved for 'knowledge' involves truth, but truth does not involve knowledge.

So I don't see any puzzle.

You've missed the point. There are lots of propositions that can be true - and may well be true as we speak - but which can't be known to be true when or if they are. They're known as 'blindspot' propositions.

There's a number of blades of grass in the world. So make that X. Now I am fairly certain that nobody currently believes that there are that number of blades of grass in the world. So this proposition: "there are x number of blades of grass in the world and nobody believes it" is true. Yet it can't be known to be true.

And I gave you another example. It is entirely possible that no justifications exist. Well, if that's true - if, right now, there are no justifications for any beliefs at all - then it is true that there are no justifications, yet nobody can know it as knowledge requires justification.

So again, what's the problem?

No, animals are not innocent in the proper sense. — spirit-salamander

Yes they are. To be innocent is to be a person who has not freely done anything wrong. Animals are persons - there's something it is like to be an animal, they have a mind. And they have not freely done anything wrong as they lack free will. So they're innocent. As are newly created human persons.

I brought animals into the equation because babies resemble them in terms of beyond guilt and innocence. — spirit-salamander

Why not just stick to babies? They're the less controversial case. Babies are persons and they have not freely done wrong. So they're innocent.

There is only one way in which a person can come positively to deserve harm. And that is by freely doing wrong.

Thus, newly created persons do not deserve to come to harm. And that means that any harm they come to - with one exception - is undeserved. The one exception is harm that a person freely subjects themselves to.

Procreative acts create a person who does not deserve harm, but who will come to harm. That's to create an injustice. And we are obliged not to create such situations, other things being equal.

But as far as I know, God represents for you an ultimate axiom in all questions of morality and values. If God's existence or being is the absolute good, then any form of being, including suffering, is always better than non-being. — spirit-salamander

That does not represent my view. God is not an 'axiom' - that's incoherent. God's a person. And my view that morality requires God is not a view asserted in any of the premises of my argument, so you're just changing the topic.

I do not see any paradox described in your OP.

Wikipedia is written by people who typically do not fully understand what they're confidently pronouncing on.

Suppose p is a sentence that is an unknown truth; that is, the sentence p is true, but it is not known that p is true. In such a case, the sentence "the sentence p is an unknown truth" is true; and, if all truths are knowable, it should be possible to know that "p is an unknown truth". But this isn't possible, because as soon as we know "p is an unknown truth", we know that p is true, rendering p no longer an unknown truth, so the statement "p is an unknown truth" becomes a falsity. Hence, the statement "p is an unknown truth" cannot be both known and true at the same time. Therefore, if all truths are knowable, the set of "all truths" must not include any of the form "something is an unknown truth"; thus there must be no unknown truths, and thus all truths must be known. — Fitch's paradox of knowability

It is just asserted above that all truths are knowable.

Well, no they're not. Demonstrably. For instance, take the proposition 'X is the case and nobody believes X'. Well, that can be true. But it can't be known to be true.

Or take the view that there are no justifications. It's possibly true. But it could never be known to be, for to know something is to have a 'justified' true belief.

So it would appear demonstrable that not all truths are knowable.

Where's the problem? Is the idea that all truths are knowable supposed to be self-evident or something? It isn't.

This is the basic error in Bartricks's appalling bad argument. — Isaac

That's fighting talk. So come on, boyo, arguments are appallingly bad in two ways; they can be invalid or they can have false premises. Which one is it?

It ain't invalid. So which premise do you dispute? Say. And then I'll take you outside and show you how it is.

Oh, and incidentally this:

For someone to deserve something means (in the context it's used here) there is a duty of moral agents to provide them it. — Isaac

Is total crap. One can deserve something and no one be under any obligation to give you it. They're completely different notions. You are simply confused because often the fact a person deserves something can give rise to an obligation to provide them with it. But there's no necessary connection. To 'deserve' something is not equivalent to someone having an obligation to give it to you. Someone can deserve something and no one be under an obligation to provide it. And the reverse is true: we can be under an obligation to give someone something they do not deserve. For instance, you don't deserve my time. But I may be obliged to correct such confused thinking whenever I come across it, and thus I may be obliged to reply to your poorly thought through comments even though you do not deserve it.

So the argument that we have a duty to avoid harm befalling innocents cannot be derived from the intuition that innocents do not deserve harm. They don't deserve harm, but they don't deserve non-harm either. — Isaac

And what on earth do you mean by 'they don't deserve non-harm either'? Unpack it. What are you trying to say with those words? Do you mean that if a baby is in agony, that the suffering in question is not undeserved? There's no injustice in it, right? It's just a burning baby. Nothing to worry about. It isn't bad. It isn't an injustice. The suffering isn't undeserved. It's 'non-deserved'. Yes? What an unbelievably implausible view.

A thought experiment for you: imagine Tony has lived a perfectly decent life of his own free will. So, he doesn't deserve to suffer, yes? And now he's on fire. Presumably your view is that his suffering really is undeserved. But the baby who is also on fire - well, that baby's suffering is non-deserved. So, there's an important moral difference, in your view, between Tony's suffering and the baby's suffering such that Tony's suffering constitutes an injustice whereas the baby's does not - yes? That's absurd.

Now, again, dispute a premise.

This view is limited strictly to some particular Western worldviews, namely, mainstream Abrahamic religions and secularism. — baker

What are you on about? The 'west' is not a worldview, it's just the practice of using reason to find out what's true, as opposed to making shit up or believing something because one's ancestors believed it. And it's not geographical. And arguments don't go from being sound to unsound from region to region. I mean, you can't seriously think that if you get on a plane arguments that were sound when you took off will be unsound depending on where you land?

Now, which premise in my deductively valid argument do you dispute? Or are you a Buddhist?

↪Bartricks
It seems absurd to say that the idea that innocents do not deserve to come to harm tout court comes from God, when it is God as creator who purportedly created this world wherein innocents may indeed, due to misfortune, be harmed.
— Janus

Above not addressed by you. — Janus

Because it's not relevant to my argument.

My argument's conclusion is normative. The claim that morality requires God is a metaethical claim.

Look, Hugh, try and focus on the actual argument I made.

Here's how you do that. You first assess whether the argument is valid. That is, you assess whether the conclusion follows from the premises.

Then - and only then - you move on to assess the premises. And to do that you need to focus on the actual premises of the argument, not unrelated claims.

And you assess the premises by considering whether they are self-evident to reason or follow from self-evident truths of reason.

Here's a tip: consider the negation of the premises and see if they seem self-evident to reason.

So, one of my premises is that a person who has been created is innocent. The opposite of that - the negation - is that a person who has been created is guilty. Now, that's not self-evident to reason, is it? Indeed, it's stupid.

And if a person is innocent then they do not deserve to come to harm. That's also self-evident to reason - indeed, it's a conceptual truth (that's technical for 'you don't know what you're talking about if you deny it").

The negation of that claim is that innocent people deserve to come to harm. Is that self-evident to reason or really bloody stupid? That latter, yes?

And what follows from my two premises: that people who are created don't deserve to come to any harm.

Now, don't fanny about asking unrelated questions about the nature of morality. Focus. To deny that conclusion you need to deny a premise, and neither is reasonably deniable. That doesn't mean you won't deny one. It just means that if you do, you're unreasonable.

And then there's my additional claim: that a life here will be full of harms, including the harm of death. That is, no life here can reasonably be expected to be entirely harm free.

Now, is that reasonable? Yes. Obviously.

What follows? This: that procreative acts create people who deserve to come to no harm, but who will come to harm. That is, procreative acts create an injustice.

Deal with it.

You're not taking account of the point that several have now made that innocents don't in any absolute sense deserve to be harmed or protected from all harm. Another point is that maybe we all need to experience some pain in order to grow and mature. — Janus

It is self-evident that those who have done nothing do not deserve to come to harm. You don't challenge that claim by confirming it. You have just said that innocent people do not deserve to be harmed. That's my claim. Sheesh!

In any case as compassionate beings, we have a natural tendency to want to protect innocents from deliberate or even random 'bad luck' harm; we don't need to invoke the idea of deserving or not deserving to feel that. — Janus

Relevance? Which premise are you trying to challenge?

Thinking in terms of deserving or not deserving is a category error when it is taken out of the context of what is earned and of reward and punishment. — Janus

What?

Quite.

Taking if further now, what should we do with the rest of the people already and still existing? I assume you would think that many or all of these people will continue to harm themselves and others. According to your morality should we kill or eliminate those people, since it may not be moral to allow human suffering to exist in any way? Should the whole planet commit mass suicide? — punos

Again, how on earth is any of that implied by my argument? I have said that innocent persons deserve respect, good will, the promotion of their happiness and no harm whatsoever. So, in a world full of innocent persons that's what we ought to give each other. See? What perverted reasoning gets you to the conclusion that my view is that we should kill each other?!?

And no, of course we shouldn't commit mass suicide. Again, pay attention to my claims. If we're innocent then we don't deserve to die, do we? Write that down. Bartricks claims that we do not deserve to die. Then tell me how you get from that to "therefore we ought to kill ourselves". Go on. Fill in the missing premise.

I have also emphasized that death is itself an incredible harm. So why the hell do you think it's a good idea to visit on ourselves?

We're innocent. That means we're entitled to a happy harm free life. And we're entitled - up to a point - to do what's necessary to secure it for ourselves. We deserve a lot more than we're going to get. But we deserve all the happiness we can secure for ourselves. We do not deserve to die, and thus we are entitled to do what we can to delay its occurrence.

The problem is that there is a deeper premise on which your premise is contingent. I didn't want to bring it up if i didn't have too, but it's the issue of free will. I just don't assume that people have that freedom no matter how much they FEEL they do. If we don't see eye to eye on that issue then any discussion beyond that is pointless and fruitless. For me it's not even a question, because of the biological imperative (survival and reproduction). — punos

My argument does not assume free will. Free will is something a person needs if they're to be able to affect what they deserve. And free will enables a person to make themselves deserve to come to harm. But the newly created have done nothing. So, if they have free will, then they do not deserve to come to harm for they have yet to do anything that could incur a desert of harm. And if they do not have free will, then they do not deserve to come to harm either. Either way they do not deserve to come to harm.

I would only be assuming free will if my argument asserted that some people deserve to come to harm. But no premise in my argument makes any such assertion.

Your only criteria that i can gather is that according to your personal notions of morality we should preemptively "kill" or stop babies from being born because they will suffer. — punos

How the hell do you get that from what I argued?!? I don't think we should kill babies! That's absurd. They don't deserve to die. Christ! Have you not been following this at all? They do not deserve to die. No one innocent does. So, one does wrong in creating them....for they are going to die, aren't they? But once created, you don't kill them! That would be to make a bad situation a thousand times worse! Think. It. Through.

An analogy to show you just how appallingly you're reasoning. Let's say there's an island with dangerous lions and tigers on it. I argue that you shouldn't send an innocent child to that island, as it's incredibly dangerous there and it's inevitable that the child will eventually be eaten by a lion or tiger. You respond "Oh, so you're saying that we should feed children to lions? That if there's a child on the island, we should feed it to a lion?" Unbelievable.

So your argument is that we shouldn't live cause we will die? That's Antinatalist final argument? Then tell that from the beginning as to know not to take you seriousl — dimosthenis9

THe argument is in the OP. You people seem to have all the intellectual focus of a sparrow. The argument is that people are created innocent and thus deserve no harm at all. Death is one of the many harms that a life here subjects a person to. But any and all harms are undeserved if an innocent person suffers them. Christ, this really isn't difficult.

Now, which premise do you dispute? Do you think we are not created innocent? Or do you think we are and simply do not grasp the concept of innocence and thus do not understand that an innocent person does not deserve to come to any harm? Or are you incapable of seeing what follows from what?

Except if falling from the bike and scratching your shoulder counts as "serious harm" for you. — dimosthenis9

Life is full of harms and the risk of harm. Some are certain - such as death - and some not. But that a person will be subject to a great many harms in a lifetime is true beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, recognizing that requires that one be reasonable, which you clearly aren't.

They are vacuous. Your op says nothing. — Wayfarer

How are they vacuous?

It's not vacuous to say that a person who has done nothing is innocent and thus does not deserve to come to any harm. Such claims are basic.

And it is beyond a reasonable doubt that this world does not offer such a life to anyone. Thus, procreating creates an injustice. That just follows.

And we shouldn't create injustices, should we? You shouldn't create an undeserved harm, should you? And 'all' the harms that come from living here are undeserved because no one who is created is born deserving to suffer them.

There's nothing vacuous in the argument. You're just not addressing it, perhaps because its premises are beyond dispute.

It is incumbent on you to make a case. — Wayfarer

I did. See the OP.

You said:

To procreate is to create a huge injustice. It is to create a debt that you know you can't pay.
— Bartricks

Which I paraphrased as

why should anyone be born in the first place, given that life often sucks.
— Wayfarer

And it is a direct paraphrase, it simply re-states the sentiment in different words. — Wayfarer

No, you clearly don't understand what words mean. Don't try and paraphrase me. You don't have the comprehension skills necessary.

Very cunning. If I don't agree with you, then I'm culpable, I believe the innocent ought to suffer. — Wayfarer

No. I am simply asking you to acknowledge that your reason confirms that innocent people deserve good will, respect, and happiness.

And they do not deserve to come to harm either, do they?

So, my premises are rock solid. They are extremely well confirmed by reason. You can deny them. Hell, you can claim that babies deserve to suffer. But you'd just be saying things that fly in the face of what our reason says. It'd be like insisting 3 + 4 = 78. It's just silly.

So, again, do babies deserve to suffer?

Answer: no.

Will they?

Answer: yes.

Do they deserve happiness?

Answer: yes

Will they live a happy harm-free life?

Answer: no.

Do you dispute it? Do you think that others do not deserve respect, good will and happiness? Consult your reason.

Says who? From whom? On what basis? — Wayfarer

God. I just told you that. Pay attention and stop asking questions you don't care to hear the answer to.

Because your arguments rely on broader issues to do with the nature of morality — Wayfarer

That's dumb. You'd raise the same questions no matter what moral position I was defending.

Learn to distinguish between normative claims and metaethical claims. My claim that antinatalism is true is a 'normative' claim. It is a claim about how we ought to behave. And the premises I appealed to are normative and can be assessed by whether or not they answer to what our reason tells us about these matters.

THe claim that morality is made of God's attitudes is a metaethical claim.

Now, FOCUS on the argument I made and stop trying to change the subject.

Look at the premises of my argument. DO any of them mention God? No. So you don't need to either.

So, you're not a Christian, but you believe there's a natural moral law. What is the justification for that? Why do you think it's a matter of what is or isn't deserved, as distinct from something that simply happens through no agency? — Wayfarer

You're not focusing on my argument but raising broader questions to do with the nature of morality.

Moral desert is a feature of morality. Any plausible analysis of morality would need to accommodate it.

Now, my own view about the nature of morality is that it is made of the attitudes of God (by which I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person). But that's not a premise of my argument, is it? So you don't need to worry about my metaethical views. All you need to worry about are the premises of my argument.

The notion of desert I am appealing to is retributive. A retributivist believes that sometimes a person can come to deserve to come to harm.

One does not have to do anything to deserve things. A person who has done nothing deserves respect, good will, happiness and so on.

But in order to deserve to come to harm, one needs to do things (and one needs free will).

And in order to void one's deservingness of respect, good will, happiness one also needs to do things.

There are some who, for no good reason, deny that anyone can ever deserve to come to harm. This will not affect my argument, however. For if no-one deserves to come to harm, then all harm is undeserved, And thus an innocent person will not deserve to come to harm.

So, believers in retribution should agree with me, for any plausible view on when a person comes to deserve to come to harm is going to make mention of freely performed actions, and a newly created person has not performed any free actions and so does not deserve to come to any harm.

And someone who (irrationally) disbelieves in retribution should also agree with me, for if no one is ever deserving of harm, then newly created persons do not deserve to come to harm.

To object to my claim that people are born innocent and thus do not deserve to come to any harm at all, the objector would need to argue that we are not created by procreative acts, but pre-exist and, furthermore, have previously done evil things of our own free will, such that we are born deserving to come to harm.

But that view is one few would defend and furthermore it would still not really work to overcome my argument, for we seem obliged to operate on the assumption that others are innocent, even if they are not. And thus we would still be obliged to assume that those whom procreative acts create are innocent for deliberative processes.

You're confusing legal innocence with the natural condition of humans. T — Wayfarer

No I'm not. I'm talking about MORAL desert. Christ. Do pay attention.

Your argument really is more like, why should anyone be born in the first place, given that life often sucks. — Wayfarer

Er, what? No it isn't. Read. The. OP.

To be innocent 'just is' to be undeserving of harm. As I keep saying. It's not an argument, but a premise in an argument.

If you think that the claim is incorrect, say and provide evidence that it is. That is, provide an example of a person who is beyond dispute innocent, yet deserves to come to harm. Good luck.

Have you considered the fact that about half or 50% of pregnancies are accidental? No one is making any decision to have children in those cases. What should be done about that? — punos

What's that got to do with my argument? Which premise are you trying to dispute with it?

Note, there's a general point about when a person is morally responsible for their action - do they have to know that what they are doing is wrong, etc? But that applies to any immoral act whatsoever.

That most parents procreated without directly intending to just shows that most parents are incredibly dumb and culpably reckless irresponsible self-indulgent people. How wonderful that those are the ones who create more of themselves.

When someone outlines a deductively valid argument for an interesting conclusion, what you need to do is address the premises, not just say general stuff that may or may not be relevant.

So, say which premise you are disputing and then explain how what you're saying raises a reasonable doubt about the premise in question.

Again, you're not making any sense. Address the argument in the OP. You're just saying stuff.

No we don't know this. At all. — dimosthenis9

Yes we do. So, you're seriously claiming that it's reasonable to believe that a person here will lead an entirely harm-free life? That's insane. Note too that death is a harm, so your example is terrible. First, it is grotesquely implausible to suppose that someone will live without suffering any harm whatsoever until 14. It's metaphysically possible, but not a remotely reasonable thing to beleive. It's metaphysically possible, for instance, that I will win every lottery that draws tonight. But it's not at all reasonable to believe it. Only a total idiot would take such a possibility seriously. It's possible that if you take a loaded gun and fire it at a baby that it'll jam. But it's not remotely reasonable to assume that will happen.

And then there's death, which you seem to think doesn't constitute a harm even though it is probably the biggest harm of all. Innocent people deserve to die, do they?

You have failed.