If only there was some kind of instrument that one could use quickly to find out about these matters - a kind of 'searching engine'.
Do your own research grandpa. Paul McCartney has a PhD in music. It's an honorary PhD. Go look at the argument I was addressing and see if the premises were qualified so as to rule out honorary PhDs.

And then try and engage with something relevant to the OP. You people - total lack of focus. I hope none of you are air traffic controllers.

This 'criticism' is one that can be made of any analysis of morality.
— Bartricks

How can you be so sure? And if it were so, one would have to question every prescriptive moral theory. One must then not be afraid of doing so. — spirit-salamander

Well, I showed you how it would apply to non-naturalism. Nothing stops 'the Form of the Good' from issuing a prescription to kill others for fun, does it? So, it applies to non-naturalism.

What about naturalism? Well, if natural features can issue prescriptions - and obviously they cannot, but the naturalist thinks otherwise (or else isn't talking about morality at all) - then what stops the natural world or some relevant part of it (the trees, perhaps) from issuing a prescription to kill others for fun? Nothing. Yet were it to do so, then killing others for fun would be right. So it applies to naturalism.

I take it that you now reject those two kinds of view?

Right, moving on....well, it clearly applies to individual and collectivist subjectivist views, for nothing stops me from issuing a command to others to kill others for fun, and nothing stops a collective from doing the same (apart from the incoherence of thinking that collectives are themselves minds capable of issuing imperatives, of course).

So, I take it that you now reject individual subjectivist views - such as your own - and collectivist subjectivist views?

What about nihilism? Well, most nihilists think that morality is at least capable of existing, they just think it does not. So they think that there is a 'possible world' in which some acts are right and some wrong. But if they admit that there is a possible world in which some acts are right and some wrong, then they should accept that there are other possible worlds in which very different acts are right and wrong, such as killing others for fun. For in these possible worlds one of the above theories about morality will be true, and we've just seen that they can't rule out such possibilities.

So, I take it that you now reject this kind of nihilism as well.

The only view to which the criticism could not be made, would be the view that morality is incoherent and thus is incapable of existing. However, a proponent of that view thinks Hitler actually did nothing wrong. And if one is fine with that view, then it would be somewhat ridiculous to reject views that allow that it is metaphysically possible for Hitler's acts not to be wrong, but that they were in fact very wrong indeed, wouldn't it?!? So I take it that you reject that view too.

So, the criticism can be made of all alternatives worth considering. And it is my view and mine alone that can deal with it.

Note, you are now in the incoherent position of having rejected all possible views about the nature of morality. So, if you are logical, you will now realize that something must be wrong with the criticism, for they can't all be false.

Just wondering though, wouldn't it be easier (on our egos among other things) to simply give up the idea of God, come to terms with the Sky Father being merely a figment of our imagination, a sign of our desperation? — Agent Smith

I am trying to figure out what's true, not what it is easiest to believe. God exists, as my argument demonstrates. And the 'problem' of evil is no problem at all, just evidence that we are not God's creations and that we are in a penal colony as just punishment for previous immoral behaviour.

Are you a hand-dryer? So much hot air.

Do you actually have a criticism?

Not yet, — neomac

Try harder.

> 1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
> 2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason reason — neomac

Why are you crossing out 'Reason' and replacing it with 'reason'? It's 'Reason' not 'reason'. The source of normative reasons is traditionally called 'Reason' with a capital 'R' (because 'reason' is ambiguous).

What are the reasons to support the first claim? — neomac

Do you mean what reason do we have to think it is true? Why do you think we call them imperatives of Reason? My imperatives are called imperatives of Bartricks. Yours are called the imperatives of a hand-dryer. The mark of a rational imperative - an imperative of Reason - is that it comes from Reason. Now, there are lots more arguments for the unity of Reason - and relatedly, for the unity of morality - but that will do and is sufficient to place the burden of proof on you (and note, you don't discharge a burden of proof by pointing to brute possibilities - so stop asking questions and make an actual argument in support of your arbitrary belief that imperatives of Reason do not have a singular source in Reason - good luck with that).

Why are moral imperatives imperatives of God and not Gods? Why can’t Reason be shared between a plurality of divine entities as much as the divine nature is shared by 3 persons of the Holy Trinity? — neomac

Like I say, you clearly don't really understand how arguments work. They are imperatives of Reason, and Reason is a mind, and the mind in question would have the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

Why can't they be imperatives of multiple minds? Because a group of minds is not itself a mind and it is only minds that can issue imperatives. If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason? Furthermore, it is a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done: one mind is sufficient. So, positing several would be a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future). Note as well, that even if one can coherently posit several minds (and one can't) - and it is not ontologically extravagant to do so (and it is) - you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!

Why are omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent attributed to Reason as a consequence of Reason being a mind? Also humans have minds but they do not seem omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Besides Reason can be understood also in kantian terms, and not as a sort of divine entity. — neomac

Kant is never clear about what Reason is. He talks about imperatives of Reason and faculties of reason, but seems confused about what or who Reason itself is. So you'll get no help from Kant on that front.

If Reason is a mind then that mind would be omnipotent because she'd get to determine what is and isn't possible. And she'd be omniscient because she'd get to determine what is and isn't known. And she'd be omnibenevolent because she'd fully approve of how she is. That's why.

The preposition “of” in “imperatives of Reason” is ambiguous b/c it can express both a subjective and objective genitive (i.e. “Reason issues moral imperatives”, “moral imperatives are about Reason”), but depending on how we understand “moral imperatives” (see also the other previous questions) this notion can be compatible maybe with only one of the 2 senses and not the other. — neomac

If I said "let's go to the bank and withdraw some money" would you respond "the word 'bank' is ambiguous as it all depends on whether it has subjective or objective preposterous genitals - do you mean a financial institution, or the side of a valley, or 'turn'?" Yes you would, wouldn't you. You're clearly one of those Dyson hand-dryers that insist you put your hands in a narrow slot and then blow them to the side so that they flap into the dried piss of the previous user's hands - very tedious and annoying.

Imperatives of Reason are imperatives that are emanating from Reason. As is obvious from the argument.

There might be logic links between the 8 premises and the way we question them, but this depends on how these 8 premises are properly spelt out and how they are questioned. So nothing we can really decide a priori just from your 4 deductions. — neomac

What? Gibberish. Only 4 premises can be questioned for all of the others follow logically from them. But you can't see that, can you? Here: $$$<<< =X///$$$$$$$$$$$ There, see now? Or should I put a few boxes and rhomboids in there?

Conclusion: unless the claim that only 4 out of 8 premises are open to question simply means that Bartricks is open to address doubts against only 4 out of 8 premises (which I don’t care, of course), then all 8 premises (not 4, not 5, not 6, not 7, but 8, exactly all 8 premises out of 8 premises!) can be pertinently questioned. Q.E.D. — neomac

Not 'Q.E.D. but 'W.T.F'. I have literally no idea what you are on about at this point.

Now, do you have an actual argument to make that calls into question the truth of any of the four premises of my argument?

Where have I said that life cannot be a blessing? I have not. The point, however, is that we have no obligation to bring into being lives that would be blessings, yes? But we do have an obligation not to bring into existence lives that would be a burden. And hypothetical consent - the fact that the person whose life would be a blessing if we created it would have consented to our doing so retrospectively - counts for nothng.

Thus, we have an obligation to prevent harms when there would be someone who'd be harmed if we did not do so, but we have no obligation to promote benefits unless there would be someone who'd be deprived of them if we did not do so.

I am merely advocating for consistency. The reason it appears ad hoc is likely due to the double standards in your own position regarding happiness and suffering — DA671

Locate an inconsistency in what I am saying! I am the one being consistent. You are being ad hoc.

We are justified in performing an act, at least in principle, when failure to perform the act would either result in someone being harmed or someone being deprived of a benefit.

That's why it's wrong to bring into existence someone whose life would be characterized by intense suffering. There's someone who is harmed by that act.

And that's also, incidentally, why we do not have an obligation to bring into existence happy lives. If we do not do so there is no one who is deprived of the benefit of them.

The fact that they would have consented to what we did to them if we had created them is irrelevant, as I have shown in my OP (with which you agreed).

God, as having created our universe, seems to have fashioned it in a way that evil is permissible. What does that tell you about divine command theory? — Agent Smith

Nothing. It tells us something about us and our situation. But it does not challenge the idea that moral imperatives are imperatives, or that they are imperatives of Reason, or that Reason has a sole source, or that imperatives are only issued by minds.

Here:

1. If God exists, God would not suffer innocent people to live in ignorance in a dangerous world
2. God exists (for imperatives of Reason exist and they wouldn't unless God did).
3. Therefore, God does not suffer innocent people to live in ignorance in a dangerous world
4. We are living in ignorance in a dangerous world
5. Therefore, we are not innocent.

And if you're wondering why God created evil folk like us:

1. If God exists, he would not create ignorant evil folk
2. God exists
3. Therefore, God did not create ignorant evil folk
4. We are ignorant evil folk
5. Therefore we are not creations of God.

Your view seems ad hoc. You think that a person can be harmed by an act even though they did not exist prior to it, but you think that a person cannot be imposed upon by an act unless they existed prior to it. That, I think, makes no real sense. The person whose life will be characterized by utter agony has been imposed upon if we create them - the imposition in question is the life of agony.

My view is consistent: in order to be harmed or disrespected or imposed upon or whatever, one needs to exist. That is, there needs to be someone who is harmed or disrespected or imposed upon.

That person does not need to exist 'prior' to the act. It is enough that they exist at some point.

And this applies to hypothetical consent as well: it only counts for something in respect of acts that, if not performed, would harm someone or deprive someone of a benefit.

So, to be clear, you think that one can be harmed by an act even if one does not exist prior to it, but one can't be 'imposed' upon unless one exists prior to the act?

Procreation creates a person, but it doesn't impose anything upon a person, since there is no person to begin with prior to their existence. — DA671

So you think that in order for something to be an imposition it is not enough that we locate someone who is imposed upon, they must exist prior to the act as well?

So, if I know that were I to have a child, the child's existence would be characterized by utter agony from beginning to end, I would not be harming the child by bringing it into existence?

The act itself is not an imposition because it in and of itself doesn't go against the interests of a person. Whether or not the person experiences future harms/benefits is another matter and not germane to the matter at hand. — DA671

I don't see how you're responding to my point. In order for something to be an imposition, there needs to be someone who is imposed upon.

There is in the case of procreative acts: the person who is brought into being here. That person is imposed upon. There is no conceptual problem here.

Sometimes we are justified in making impositions on others without their consent. That is where hypothetical consent comes in. But hypothetical consent does not apply to procreative acts.

Divine command theory is basically dumping the (hard) work of reasoning for yourself on to an authority figure, here God. — Agent Smith

It's a theory about what's needed for morality to exist. It is no different in this respect from a theory about what's needed for a mushroom soup to exist.

And morality demonstrably requires God. For moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason. And the imperatives of Reason have a single source: Reason (that's why we call them imperatives of Reason). And only a mind can issue an imperative. Thus Reason is a mind. And that mind would, by virtue of being the mind of Reason, be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. That is, the mind would be the mind of God.

So far no one has located an error in my reasoning. Note: I hold this view as a result of reasoning about the nature of morality. If an error is located, I will abandon it.

Well, there is someone who is imposed upon if you procreate - the person you created! There isn't if you don't. There is if you do.

I said that when it comes to hypothetical consent, we are sometimes justified in appealing to it when the act we are considering performing would be one that, were we not to perform it, would either harm someone or deprive someone of a benefit.

That doesn't apply in the procreation case, for if we do not perform the procreative act there is no one who is harmed or deprived of a benefit.

Well, doesn't that apply to impositions too? Something is an imposition on another if, were you to perform the act in question, there would be someone who is imposed upon?

For something to be an imposition, there needs to be someone who has been imposed upon, yes?

Again, one cannot violate someone's consent when they don't exist to have any interests (prior or present) in the first place. — DA671

So you agree that hypothetical consent counts for nothing when it comes to the morality of procreation? The fact that if we create Tony, Tony will be pleased at us for having done so, is morally irrelevant, yes?

You're all ego and delusion and I hope you find a way through the fog. — ZzzoneiroCosm

No, those are faults you have, not me. I've earned the right to consider myself good at arguing. You haven't and you've just decided - and this expresses the size of your ego - that because what I am saying doesn't make sense to you, it must be stupid. Yet you can say nothing specific in criticism of my case. So your objection is not rational and expresses a misguided confidence in your own superior ability, yes?

Do you think moral imperatives are not imperatives, for instance? Or not imperatives of Reason?
Or do you think that something other than a mind can issue an imperative?

You're actually horrible at arguing. — ZzzoneiroCosm

No, I'm really good at it. I do it for a living.

You're deluded. Your ego has blinded you. Take care. — ZzzoneiroCosm

No, I think I am good at something I have documentary evidence I am good at.

Anyway, all you have to do to demonstrate to me that I am bad at arguing is show me that my argument is a bad one.

McCartney is also a knight: another honorary title — ZzzoneiroCosm

Paul McCartney has a PhD, but can't read music. Thus, not all PhDs in music can read music. It's an honorary PhD, but you didn't qualify your premise.

Get neomac to formalize that for you. No doubt it'd be this: if p then r, if i then t, therefore S. That's the above argument formalized neomac-style.

Anyway, take me to school daddio and show me my mistakes (in English please papa).

So you agree that the fact most people would give their retrospective consent to be born, does not in itself do anything at all to imply that procreative acts are morally permissible? For that would clearly be a violation of both c and d.

So to my question in the OP your answer is 'yes'?

Eh? Look, I can't do your working for you - what are you saying?

But not every PhD in philosophy knows the squiggle squoggle languages. Me, for instance.

To get a PhD in philosophy from a top university you need to be really good at arguing. And in case you haven't noticed, that's what I is. I can tell a good argument from a bad one without having to squiggle squoggle them first.

Oh, and Paul McCartney does have a PhD in music. You lose.

I hope Nozick would also agree that it's problematic to not save someone/provide a genuine gift just because one cannot ask for it themselves. — DA671

What was your point in respect of gifts? Do gifts constitute a counterexample to one of my conditions?

Anyone can make noise, but you have to be able to read music to make tunes. That's why the Beatles failed at it so spectacularly.

Well that's 1.5 seconds I won't be getting back. Oh, now you've added more.

1. A person who doesn't know how to formalize an argument can't possibly have a PhD in philosophy.
2. Bartricks doesn't know how to formalize his argument.
3. Bartricks can't possibly have a PhD in philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm

1 is false.

You're mistaking being able to formalize an argument with being good at arguing. That's like mistaking being unable to speak Italian with being unable to argue well. If I have a PhD without ever having learnt the squiggle squoggle language, does that imply I am good at arguing or bad at it? What do you think?

Presumably you think Irving Berlin, Jimi Hendrix, the Beatles, Prince, Eric Clapton, and so on, were all shit at music because they couldn't read music? Yes? Someone should have told them and then we could have been spared all that noise they called tunes.

But anyway, this:

Indeed the logical form of this argument (as it is) is something like:
If m then r
If r then s
If i then n
—————
p
q
— neomac — ZzzoneiroCosm

is not the argument made in the OP.

I argued if moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, and if Reason is unitary, and if imperatives have to have a mind to issue them, then Reason is a single mind.

Formally, that's this: :<- [//****]. = <$@#***** ===$$//>

See?

Oh, sorry, made a slight error above - there should, of course, be 950 $ signs after the equals sign. Silly me.

But that premise solves the question of where moral imperatives come from: t — RogueAI

There's no problem there - they come from a mind.

And they do exist - the reason (the faculty of resaon) of virtually everyone tells them that there are ways we ought to behave and ways we ought not to behave. Disagreement exists over exactly what we ought to do and ought not to do, but 'that' we ought to be doing some things and not others is beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we are talking about imperatives of Reason here (of which moral imperatives are simply a subset). You can't reasonably doubt that there are imperatives of Reason for a 'reasonable' doubt would itself appeal to some.

So, moral imperatives - which are imperatives of Reason - come from a mind. And as they exist, so too does the mind.

It is very counter-intuitive. However, it doesn't seem impossible that a god could choose to experience things in a very limited way. — RogueAI

It's 'God' rather than 'a god', but yes, they could. That's why I did not say that it is impossible that you could be God. It is metaphysically possible. But you have no evidence that it is the case and, it would seem, plenty that you are not. For you do not appear to be omnipotent. When you try and levitate, for example, or try to will the world into a different form, these attempts fail. Now, perhaps they didn't fail and you simply duped yourself into thinking you tried to do them and failed, rather than actually did them and failed. I do not deny this possibility. But possibilities are not good evidence. Appearances, by contrast, are. And as you do not appear to be all powerful, all knowing and all good, you would be unreasonable if you believed yourself to be God nevertheless. Plus God wouldn't believe he's God, so there's that too.

If we stick to respecting appearances, then there appear to be norms of Reason - indeed, nothing could really 'appear' to be the case unless there were norms of Reason, for an appearance incorporates a representation of Reason - and these norms appear to have a unified source, Reason. And that source does not appear to be me or you, for we are 'subject' to these norms and do not seem to be their author. And it also appears to be the case that minds and minds alone can issue imperatives. And thus, when we apply our reason to the appearances we are told that Reason is a mind and that we ourselves are not that mind.

You are just a lot of hot air. The original argument is patently obviously valid. Then, at tedious length, I outlined three syllogisms that get me to my conclusion (the only premises that can be disputed are the four of the original argument). So all I was doing was showing you how the original was valid, for it seemed you could not see it by direct rational intuition (which is a really bad sign). You could not see, directly as it were, that if moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, and that they all have a single source, and that minds and only minds issue imperatives, that Reason is therefore a mind. Like I say, I can 'see' - by intellection rather than sight - that this follows (as can most). But you need it spelt out as it is not immediately apparent to you. Like I say, a bad sign! Do you know that most people are able to recognize valid and invalid arguments 'before' taking courses in logic? All logic does is formalize what we can see by reason; it has no power in itself which is why one does not need to do any logic to be really good at philosophy. (It's like painting - some of us are just good at it, but others need to be taught how to look properly....and many of them never really learn and follow the rules rather than achieving the heightened awareness the rules were supposed to induce). Anyway, you have said precisely nothing to address the argument.

1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
3. Therefore moral imperatives have a single source: Reason

And you accept as well that this is valid:

1. If something is issuing imperatives, then it is a mind
2. Reason issues imperatives
3. Therefore Reason is a mind

And you accept as well that this is valid:

1. If Reason is a mind, then Reason is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God)
2. Reason is a mind
3. Therefore, Reason is God.

And you accept that this is valid:

1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they are imperatives of God
2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
3. Therefore moral imperatives are imperatives of God

Or you don't as you don't know what you are talking about. Slink off, that's my advice. — Bartricks

Then you say this:

BTW since he is using quantifiers (e.g."single source", "single mind"), his argument may look even messier if you put it into a predicative logic form, instead of a propositional logic form. — neomac

Now, what you want everyone to know is that you've done an undergrad course in logic. But what it is plain to see is that, despite this, you can't actually follow an argument.

Do you actually have a criticism? I mean, do you think morality is not made of directives and values? Let's start there.

"Had God commanded us to murder and steal, then doing so would have been obligatory and good."

So this is what B subscribes to. — spirit-salamander

This 'criticism' is one that can be made of any analysis of morality. For instance, let's say that you believe (insanely) that moral norms emanate from Platonic forms - a view that is quite popular at the moment and goes by the names 'non-naturalism' or 'intuitionism' or 'non-reductionism'. Well, on that view if the Form of the Good commanded us to kill and steal, then doing so would be obligatory and good.

So it is a rubbish criticism, popular though it is. Plus my view can deal with it in a way that no other view can.

But before I do that, note the difference between the conditional 'if p, then Hitler's acts would have been right' and 'Hitler's acts were right'. The first is, as it stands, utterly innocuous, for it all depends on what 'p' stands for. The second is plainly false and stupid. If you think - as you do - that morality is made of our own commands, then it is the second, not the first, claim that you must affirm. If you do not affirm it, that is only because you don't understand your own view.

But you are adding an additional premise, namely that there is only one mind. Adding that premise would not challenge the conclusion that divine command theory is true, it would just mean that you yourself are God.
Yet of course, you have good evidence that you are not God, for you do not appear to be omnipotent, omniscient or omnibenevolent. Moral norms, and the norms of Reason more generally, do not seem to be emanating from you. So the additional premise seems unjustified.

The solipsist version of idealism you refer to is not characteristic of idealism per se. Idealism doesn't imply solipsism.

I just made an argument directly relevant to the topic of the thread. Which is more than the rest of you have done. All you've done is made it about me. Just address the argument or show me that it is irrelevant to the topic - you know, try and do some philosophy and stop making things personal.

You are just a Bartricks baiter - you have contributed nothing - nothing - philosphical to this thread. All you do is goad. It's a little pet project of yours - go to any thread to which I am contributing and tell others how mean I am and not to participate in a debate. It's pathetic.

It is evident that you do not have a PhD in philosophy. — Fooloso4

How so?

Do you have anything philosophical to contribute or are you too just interested in Bartricks baiting?

Stop Bartricks baiting and argue something. You don't have to read this thread. You can start your own or contribute to another and regurgitate half understood Stanford pages to each other. And other people, Banno, can make their own decisions about whether to reply to me or not - they don't need your help. It's not my fault you lack a position of authority in real life - go away.

No, that's extremely controversial. But it follows from my premises.

It is uncontroversial that the argument I made is deductively valid, as anyone who understands arguments would know.

And each premise, taken individually, is uncontroversial.

It is uncontroversial that moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason.
It is uncontroversial that all imperatives of Reason have a unified source: Reason (that's why we call them imperatives of Reason, as opposed to just 'imperatives').
It is uncontroversial minds and only minds can issue imperatives.

So, put together, we get the conclusion that Reason is a mind. That's controversial. But it uncontroversially follows from uncontroversial premises. That's called a discovery.

That people here will dispute it - or will dispute it when I assert it - is not evidence of controversy. Among philosophers there is none. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason. The controversy is over their content and over exactly what an imperative of reason is.

Ironically this is precisely why most philosophers reject divine command theory - they reject it because it makes moral imperatives imperatives of God, rather than imperatives of Reason. Needless to say, they do not realize that Reason is God.

PhD in philosophy are you? From where? what was your dissertation on? — Fooloso4

Skeptical are we? How would my telling you those things do anything to reduce your skepticism? Anyone could just make up such answers.

Here's a more reliable test: try and refute my argument.

No, the word 'reason' is ambiguous and can refer to a) normative reasons (you have reason to eat healthily) b) causes or explanations of things (explanatory reasons), c)motivations, d) a faculty, e) the source of normative reasons.

Now, when we talk about imperatives of Reason, the 'of' bit refers to the source of the imperatives - to Reason in the 'e' sense of the term. It does not refer to the faculty of reason. The faculty of reason is the means by which we are aware of the imperatives and other issuances of Reason. That's why it is called a 'faculty' of reason and not a 'source' of reasons. Note, if there's a faculty - and you admit that there is a faculty of reason - then there's that of which the faculty gives us some awareness or impression. Those impressions or awarenesses are 'of' the imperatives of Reason. And among them are the imperatives of morality. That's why we use our reason to gain insight into what's right and wrong. And those imperatives are imperatives of Reason. They're not imperatives the faculty is issuing. That's bonkers. Faculties do not issue imperatives. Plus that would mean that whatever your faculty told you you had reason to do, you'd have reason to do - it'd be impossible for the faculty to give you a false impression. Yet it does so all the time. Yours, for instance, is telling you I am not very good at arguing, yes? That's a false impression.

One at a time.

1. Arguable. Emotions and irrationality may also play a role. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That doesn't make sense as a response to "Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason". Do you mean that moral imperatives are imperatives of emotion? What does that mean? How does an emotion - a feeling - issue an imperative?

It is uncontroversial that moral norms are norms of Reason. Moral reasons are called moral reasons precisely because they are just among the different sorts of reason that Reason issues. Aesthetic reasons, instrumental reasons, epistemic reasons and moral reasons.

So 1 is uncontroversial and you've said nothing to challenge it - indeed, nothing that even manages coherently to address it.

Argue something Banno, SEE. That stands for Stanford Encyclopedia Educated.

No, it is valid. As you would know if you knew how to argue properly and hadn't just done a little undergrad course on logic. And no, you can only question 4 of the premises. The others follow from those premises. Didn't you notice? It's called a sorites. I and 2 of the first argument are open to question, as are the first premises of the next two. That's all. And those, a better reasoner would have noticed, are equivalent to the premises in the original deductively valid argument the validity if which you were unable to recognize. Now, you've got nothing philosophical to contribute, have you? Like a poorly house trained dog I have rubbed your nose in it. Now it is time for you to go outside in shame. Unless, that is, you have some kind of argument to make. Thus far you have made none at all, just Barticks baited - which didn't go so well, did it? Now, argue something or go. And note, bolding false assertions does not an argument make.