As befits a perfect being, God prohibits some actions precisely because they are evil. — spirit-salamander

OK, but doesn't that run up against Moore's objection? If God prohibits actions because they are evil then we can work out we ought not to do those things regardless of any supposed divine prohibition. We can only presume an action is a prohibited by God by referring to its being evil. If we can make that reference successfully, then God (or any other supposed issuer of commands) drops out of the equation of moral reasoning.

Francisco Suárez (1548—1617) would argue "that for a law to be genuine law and not just law in name it must be grounded in the legislative act of a superior[.]" — spirit-salamander

I did not mean to object to Moore. Bartricks was meant. But you're right, even Suarez would eventually be subject to Moore's criticism that God might be superfluous. Suárez would, however, argue "that for a law to be genuine law and not just law in name it must be grounded in the legislative act of a superior[.]"

Moore would then reply:

And this is a very common mistake. — G E Moore, Chapter IV: Metaphysical Ethics.§ 76

In any case, the subject of the discussion is complicated and definitely not clear-cut as Bartricks believes it to be.

Personally, I find Gerold Prauss' theory the most convincing.

Pavlos Kontos sums it up in a review (Kant-Studien 2009). I hope the passages are somewhat understandable:

"The very case of an action that handles another person ‘only as an end in himself’ is [...] meant to exclusively define what morality is about; by contrast, the order of right emerges once we encounter other persons at the same time as means and as ends in themselves. These two real practical alternatives describe the difference between moral good and right (morally and rightly good), whence the negative alternative of handling someone ‘only as a means’ mirrors what is morally and rightly evil.

Prauss proceeds by dealing with the exclusively moral alternative, that is, with an action that handles other persons only as ends in themselves. It proves to be the case that this action, and hence the order of morality in general, is conditioned by a very peculiar situation: a claim to morality is grounded only “when the person handled is precisely not in a position to help himself and as long as he remains in this position” (711). “This self-help represents then the decisive criterion” in order for the realms of right and morality to be distinguished from one another and, consequently, this very distinction depends upon the emergence of such a particular case (711f., note). The rationale of the argument suggests that whoever cannot assure his own life cannot therefore represent a means for our subjective purposes (1117f.).

[...]

1. Morality emerges as a relation between an actor (able to help himself and others) and a
person in need or, according to the Samaritan example, a “verwundetes [wounded, injured] Subjekt” (1111f.).


Thus, Prauss is obliged to subscribe to two further claims: in addition to the claim that there is no morality possible between persons who are not in need, there is no morality possible between persons in need, since they have nothing to offer or, in the terms that the author will later introduce, they can give no life (not even to themselves). Hence, morality is conditioned by situations that are exclusively restricted to interpersonal relations between non-injured and injured persons.

[...]

[…] Prauss reconstructs the notion of ends in a long argument that we might reformulate as follows: Human will is not auto-referential but by essence directed to the success (and not to the failure) of the actions in which it is implicated. Due to this intentionality, good and evil are attributes we ascribe to actions, insofar as they respect the normativity (whatever its kind might be) that the agent has adopted and thereby freely ‘incorporated’ as his actual incentive (759). Every kind of normativity presupposes a claim raised by the Behandelte [patient, being treated, being acted upon] (that is, stemming from the objective side of action) and a kind of Befolgung [observance] (that is, the readiness of the agent to act according to the principles he has subscribed to).

[...]

Freedom bears practical relevance only insofar as it represents the object of conscience: normativity presupposes the knowledge of freedom, not just freedom itself (799). However, this factual knowledge is not sufficient to explain why human beings are regarded as ends in themselves. Thus, a second level of self-recognition is required, namely a level grounded upon a further fact: upon the fact that human beings, bestowed as they are with Vernunft [reason] and not simply with Verstand [understanding], achieve a thematization of their conscience of freedom (840). Hence, Vernunft makes possible a self-knowledge, i.e. a self-recognition, of human beings as free creators of ends, namely, as self-creators (817). It follows that the first kind of causality recognized by a human being bestowed with Vernunft is free causality as the vehicle of his selfrealization. It is only afterwards that a human being recognizes that other beings might also operate as causes, either as natural causes or even as free animals and human subjects. Prauss’ conclusion thus leaves no mystery: “free causality constitutes from the outset the necessary precondition of natural causality” (865). The synthesis of freedom (self-realizing will) and necessity (the claims raised by others), conditioned as it is by this mutual dependence of the two aforementioned facts upon one another, admits of three modalities: ‘to be only as a means’, ‘to be not only as a means but also as an end in itself’, and ‘to be not only also as an end, but only as an end in itself’. If one replaces being with will-to-live, he easily concludes that this synthesis allows for three modalities of action: “only life-to-take”, “not only life-to-take but also life-to-give”, and “only life-to-give” (1099).

[...]

Morality and right [...] represent a game that we are factually obliged to play, given the facts of self-knowledge and interpersonality; good and evil are attributes assigned to actions that directly or indirectly concern other human beings and are evaluated in light of their impact upon the lifetime of these human beings and, hence, morality and right do not dwell within our internal maxims or intentions."

"[W]hen we do not help someone in need, we do not solely prove to be non-meritorious but we commit an evil, whatever our maxims might be. From this point of view, Prauss’ proposal should be welcomed by those who acknowledge (without, however, supplying us with a convincing reformulation) that the duties of virtue should not be regarded as a kind of moral luxury we are allowed to neglect."

That is, in a nutshell, rational agents (can) issue imperatives all the time. But only in certain interpersonal contexts do these imperatives give rise to objectively binding moral obligations.

but to Banno and @T Clark I say: probably best to avoid this thread unless you're going to address the OP. — jamalrob

Agreed.

.

↪SwampMan I am a divine command theorist. I arrived at the view after reflecting on the following argument:

1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason
3. Only a mind issues imperatives
4. Therefore, moral imperatives are the imperatives of a single mind
5. The single mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God).

What mistake have I made? — Bartricks

As an idealist who believes that there is only one cosmic mind (and we are dissociated aspects of it- separateness is an illusion), I would argue there are no moral imperatives, there is only a single cosmic mind dreaming and experiencing. Some of the dreams are horrific, but are bad dreams immoral? Is there a moral imperative for God to dream nothing but good dreams?

But you are adding an additional premise, namely that there is only one mind. Adding that premise would not challenge the conclusion that divine command theory is true, it would just mean that you yourself are God.
Yet of course, you have good evidence that you are not God, for you do not appear to be omnipotent, omniscient or omnibenevolent. Moral norms, and the norms of Reason more generally, do not seem to be emanating from you. So the additional premise seems unjustified.

The solipsist version of idealism you refer to is not characteristic of idealism per se. Idealism doesn't imply solipsism.

"Had God commanded us to murder and steal, then doing so would have been obligatory and good."

So this is what B subscribes to. — spirit-salamander

This 'criticism' is one that can be made of any analysis of morality. For instance, let's say that you believe (insanely) that moral norms emanate from Platonic forms - a view that is quite popular at the moment and goes by the names 'non-naturalism' or 'intuitionism' or 'non-reductionism'. Well, on that view if the Form of the Good commanded us to kill and steal, then doing so would be obligatory and good.

So it is a rubbish criticism, popular though it is. Plus my view can deal with it in a way that no other view can.

But before I do that, note the difference between the conditional 'if p, then Hitler's acts would have been right' and 'Hitler's acts were right'. The first is, as it stands, utterly innocuous, for it all depends on what 'p' stands for. The second is plainly false and stupid. If you think - as you do - that morality is made of our own commands, then it is the second, not the first, claim that you must affirm. If you do not affirm it, that is only because you don't understand your own view.

You are just a lot of hot air. The original argument is patently obviously valid. Then, at tedious length, I outlined three syllogisms that get me to my conclusion (the only premises that can be disputed are the four of the original argument). So all I was doing was showing you how the original was valid, for it seemed you could not see it by direct rational intuition (which is a really bad sign). You could not see, directly as it were, that if moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, and that they all have a single source, and that minds and only minds issue imperatives, that Reason is therefore a mind. Like I say, I can 'see' - by intellection rather than sight - that this follows (as can most). But you need it spelt out as it is not immediately apparent to you. Like I say, a bad sign! Do you know that most people are able to recognize valid and invalid arguments 'before' taking courses in logic? All logic does is formalize what we can see by reason; it has no power in itself which is why one does not need to do any logic to be really good at philosophy. (It's like painting - some of us are just good at it, but others need to be taught how to look properly....and many of them never really learn and follow the rules rather than achieving the heightened awareness the rules were supposed to induce). Anyway, you have said precisely nothing to address the argument.

1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
3. Therefore moral imperatives have a single source: Reason

And you accept as well that this is valid:

1. If something is issuing imperatives, then it is a mind
2. Reason issues imperatives
3. Therefore Reason is a mind

And you accept as well that this is valid:

1. If Reason is a mind, then Reason is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God)
2. Reason is a mind
3. Therefore, Reason is God.

And you accept that this is valid:

1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they are imperatives of God
2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason
3. Therefore moral imperatives are imperatives of God

Or you don't as you don't know what you are talking about. Slink off, that's my advice. — Bartricks

Then you say this:

BTW since he is using quantifiers (e.g."single source", "single mind"), his argument may look even messier if you put it into a predicative logic form, instead of a propositional logic form. — neomac

Now, what you want everyone to know is that you've done an undergrad course in logic. But what it is plain to see is that, despite this, you can't actually follow an argument.

Do you actually have a criticism? I mean, do you think morality is not made of directives and values? Let's start there.

But you are adding an additional premise, namely that there is only one mind. — Bartricks

But that premise solves the question of where moral imperatives come from: there are no moral imperatives. If all that exists is one cosmic mind, how is there any morality? Does the one mind have moral imperatives as to how it treats itself?

Adding that premise would not challenge the conclusion that divine command theory is true, it would just mean that you yourself are God.

Right.

Yet of course, you have good evidence that you are not God, for you do not appear to be omnipotent, omniscient or omnibenevolent. Moral norms, and the norms of Reason more generally, do not seem to be emanating from you. So the additional premise seems unjustified.

It is very counter-intuitive. However, it doesn't seem impossible that a god could choose to experience things in a very limited way. If the goal is to experience as much as possible, then retaining the attributes of godhood would limit the experiences a god could have. I mean, a god can't very well experience things as a lowly human like me unless it becomes a lowly human like me (and bacteria, and virus, and aphid, and all the other limited things that are capable of having experiences).

The solipsist version of idealism you refer to is not characteristic of idealism per se. Idealism doesn't imply solipsism.

Right.

But that premise solves the question of where moral imperatives come from: t — RogueAI

There's no problem there - they come from a mind.

And they do exist - the reason (the faculty of resaon) of virtually everyone tells them that there are ways we ought to behave and ways we ought not to behave. Disagreement exists over exactly what we ought to do and ought not to do, but 'that' we ought to be doing some things and not others is beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we are talking about imperatives of Reason here (of which moral imperatives are simply a subset). You can't reasonably doubt that there are imperatives of Reason for a 'reasonable' doubt would itself appeal to some.

So, moral imperatives - which are imperatives of Reason - come from a mind. And as they exist, so too does the mind.

It is very counter-intuitive. However, it doesn't seem impossible that a god could choose to experience things in a very limited way. — RogueAI

It's 'God' rather than 'a god', but yes, they could. That's why I did not say that it is impossible that you could be God. It is metaphysically possible. But you have no evidence that it is the case and, it would seem, plenty that you are not. For you do not appear to be omnipotent. When you try and levitate, for example, or try to will the world into a different form, these attempts fail. Now, perhaps they didn't fail and you simply duped yourself into thinking you tried to do them and failed, rather than actually did them and failed. I do not deny this possibility. But possibilities are not good evidence. Appearances, by contrast, are. And as you do not appear to be all powerful, all knowing and all good, you would be unreasonable if you believed yourself to be God nevertheless. Plus God wouldn't believe he's God, so there's that too.

If we stick to respecting appearances, then there appear to be norms of Reason - indeed, nothing could really 'appear' to be the case unless there were norms of Reason, for an appearance incorporates a representation of Reason - and these norms appear to have a unified source, Reason. And that source does not appear to be me or you, for we are 'subject' to these norms and do not seem to be their author. And it also appears to be the case that minds and minds alone can issue imperatives. And thus, when we apply our reason to the appearances we are told that Reason is a mind and that we ourselves are not that mind.

The original argument is patently obviously valid. — Bartricks

Indeed the logical form of this argument (as it is) is something like:
If m then r
If r then s
If i then n
—————
p
q — neomac

If your original argument is "patently obviously valid," you should be able to formalize it, like neomac formalized it above. (Formalize means something like to put into symbolic form. It's useful for looking at the form of an argument without the distractions of content.)

Neomac asked you to formalize but you seemed to think he meant formulate. He mean formalize.

Here's an introduction to formalization in propositional logic. Enjoy.

https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Introduction_to_formalisation_in_propositional_logic

My opinion:

1. You don't know how to formalize your argument - that's why you think it's deductively valid when it "patently, obviously" isn't.

2. Once you take the time to learn how to formalize your argument, you will see it's "patently, obviously" invalid.

Show me how this syllogism is unsound:

1. A person who doesn't know how to formalize his argument can't possibly have a PhD in philosophy.
2. Bartricks doesn't know how to formalize his argument.
3. Bartricks can't possibly have a PhD in philosophy.

1. A person who doesn't know how to formalize an argument can't possibly have a PhD in philosophy.
2. Bartricks doesn't know how to formalize his argument.
3. Bartricks can't possibly have a PhD in philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm

1 is false.

You're mistaking being able to formalize an argument with being good at arguing. That's like mistaking being unable to speak Italian with being unable to argue well. If I have a PhD without ever having learnt the squiggle squoggle language, does that imply I am good at arguing or bad at it? What do you think?

Presumably you think Irving Berlin, Jimi Hendrix, the Beatles, Prince, Eric Clapton, and so on, were all shit at music because they couldn't read music? Yes? Someone should have told them and then we could have been spared all that noise they called tunes.

But anyway, this:

Indeed the logical form of this argument (as it is) is something like:
If m then r
If r then s
If i then n
—————
p
q
— neomac — ZzzoneiroCosm

is not the argument made in the OP.

I argued if moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, and if Reason is unitary, and if imperatives have to have a mind to issue them, then Reason is a single mind.

Formally, that's this: :<- [//****]. = <$@#***** ===$$//>

See?

Oh, sorry, made a slight error above - there should, of course, be 950 $ signs after the equals sign. Silly me.

You're mistaking being able to formalize an argument with being good at arguing. — Bartricks

Anyone can assert validity and that's all you're doing here: asserting validity. Validity is easy to assert. But you need to demonstrate validity. Otherwise, consider your argument dismissed.

Formalization is the best way to demonstrate validity.

I think neomac formalized your argument correctly and proved its invalidity. Show us where neomac's formalization is in error or be dismissed.

Anyone can make noise, but you have to be able to read music to make tunes. That's why the Beatles failed at it so spectacularly.

Anyone can make noise, but you have to be able to read music to make tunes. That's why the Beatles failed at it so spectacularly. — Bartricks

Every PhD in music can read music.

Dismissed.

But not every PhD in philosophy knows the squiggle squoggle languages. Me, for instance.

To get a PhD in philosophy from a top university you need to be really good at arguing. And in case you haven't noticed, that's what I is. I can tell a good argument from a bad one without having to squiggle squoggle them first.

Oh, and Paul McCartney does have a PhD in music. You lose.

And in case you haven't noticed, that's what I is. — Bartricks

You're actually horrible at arguing. You're deluded. Your ego has blinded you. Take care.


Confidence: the water of the wise man, the liquor of the fool.

Oh, and Paul McCartney does have a PhD in music. You lose. — Bartricks

To get into an undergrad program in music you have to know how to read music so your assertion is total nonsense.


You lose.

Good night.



(McCartney is also a knight: another honorary title.)

You're actually horrible at arguing. — ZzzoneiroCosm

No, I'm really good at it. I do it for a living.

You're deluded. Your ego has blinded you. Take care. — ZzzoneiroCosm

No, I think I am good at something I have documentary evidence I am good at.

Anyway, all you have to do to demonstrate to me that I am bad at arguing is show me that my argument is a bad one.

McCartney is also a knight: another honorary title — ZzzoneiroCosm

Paul McCartney has a PhD, but can't read music. Thus, not all PhDs in music can read music. It's an honorary PhD, but you didn't qualify your premise.

Get neomac to formalize that for you. No doubt it'd be this: if p then r, if i then t, therefore S. That's the above argument formalized neomac-style.

Anyway, take me to school daddio and show me my mistakes (in English please papa).

You're all ego and delusion and I hope you find a way through the fog. I won't be talking to you again. Take care.

You're all ego and delusion and I hope you find a way through the fog. — ZzzoneiroCosm

No, those are faults you have, not me. I've earned the right to consider myself good at arguing. You haven't and you've just decided - and this expresses the size of your ego - that because what I am saying doesn't make sense to you, it must be stupid. Yet you can say nothing specific in criticism of my case. So your objection is not rational and expresses a misguided confidence in your own superior ability, yes?

Do you think moral imperatives are not imperatives, for instance? Or not imperatives of Reason?
Or do you think that something other than a mind can issue an imperative?

Divine command theory is basically dumping the (hard) work of reasoning for yourself on to an authority figure, here God.

Appeal to authority is a fallacy if, for instance, said authority is defective in some way. God's perfect, He doesn't make mistakes and if, perchance, one has any misgivings regarding a divine command, it can only imply our inability to comprehend true/real goodness. Sounds to me like the emperor has no clothes tale: The emperor is naked I tell you! No, imbecile, your stupidity and lowly rank prevents you from seeing the emperor's splendid attire! :grin:

Conspiracy theory, oui?

Divine command theory is basically dumping the (hard) work of reasoning for yourself on to an authority figure, here God. — Agent Smith

It's a theory about what's needed for morality to exist. It is no different in this respect from a theory about what's needed for a mushroom soup to exist.

And morality demonstrably requires God. For moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason. And the imperatives of Reason have a single source: Reason (that's why we call them imperatives of Reason). And only a mind can issue an imperative. Thus Reason is a mind. And that mind would, by virtue of being the mind of Reason, be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. That is, the mind would be the mind of God.

So far no one has located an error in my reasoning. Note: I hold this view as a result of reasoning about the nature of morality. If an error is located, I will abandon it.

Have you noticed, perhaps it's just me, how the so-called laws of nature aren't really life-friendly or well-being oriented. If morality were actually woven into the fabric of reality, it should've been impossible to drive a dagger into someone's chest, or for a bullet to blow somebody's brains out.

God, as having created our universe, seems to have fashioned it in a way that evil is permissible. What does that tell you about divine command theory?

So far no one has located an error in my reasoning. — Bartricks

What's up, Smith. :smile:

Bartrick's statement here is demonstrably false. Many forum members have found many, many errors in Bartrick's reasoning. Read the thread and you will see. Have fun! :smile:

God, as having created our universe, seems to have fashioned it in a way that evil is permissible. What does that tell you about divine command theory? — Agent Smith

Nothing. It tells us something about us and our situation. But it does not challenge the idea that moral imperatives are imperatives, or that they are imperatives of Reason, or that Reason has a sole source, or that imperatives are only issued by minds.

Here:

1. If God exists, God would not suffer innocent people to live in ignorance in a dangerous world
2. God exists (for imperatives of Reason exist and they wouldn't unless God did).
3. Therefore, God does not suffer innocent people to live in ignorance in a dangerous world
4. We are living in ignorance in a dangerous world
5. Therefore, we are not innocent.

And if you're wondering why God created evil folk like us:

1. If God exists, he would not create ignorant evil folk
2. God exists
3. Therefore, God did not create ignorant evil folk
4. We are ignorant evil folk
5. Therefore we are not creations of God.

Therefore, we are not innocent. — Bartricks

Therefore we are not creations of God. — Bartricks

Deduction at its best.

Just wondering though, wouldn't it be easier (on our egos among other things) to simply give up the idea of God, come to terms with the Sky Father being merely a figment of our imagination, a sign of our desperation?

Have fun! — ZzzoneiroCosm

I hope I still remember how. The last time I had fun was when I was 12. :sad:

> But you need it spelt out as it is not immediately apparent to you. Like I say, a bad sign!

Ma’am can you intellect that is not a moral imperative of Reason to prove you anything in this forum nor to do the job of clarifying your views for you?

> All logic does is formalize what we can see by reason;

So what? Formalisation would still be useful, among others, b/c “others need to be taught how to look properly”. We are here to engage in philosophical debates in a public forum as anonymous users and no background knowledge about formal logic and related notions is required to participate to this forum. So it’s matter of intellectual honesty to be clear whenever possible, especially if this doesn’t require much effort, and we are uncertain about what relevant assumptions we actually share on a given subject.


> Anyway, you have said precisely nothing to address the argument.

Ma’am can you intellect that is not a moral imperative of Reason to entertain you in this forum?


> So all I was doing was showing you how the original was valid, for it seemed you could not see it by direct rational intuition (which is a really bad sign)

OK since by textual formalisation you are still not seeing that your original argument is not logically valid, despite you persistently claiming otherwise, do you see at least my middle finger to you with your rational intuition? Coz if you don’t, you better take your rational intuition to an optician.
In other words, since “you need it spelt out as it is not immediately apparent to you”, you made just the two most stupid claims in this thread. So suck it up and move on. You are fooling nobody, Bartrickster.


> Do you actually have a criticism?

Not yet, since your 4 deductions are so theoretically loaded that it’s even hard to understand how to unpack them. Additionally, no offense, but I don’t particularly enjoy exploring the extent of your intellectual dishonesty.

However, since you keep claiming that only 4 out your 8 premises are open to question and unless this claim of yours simply means that Bartricks is open to address doubts only against 4 out of 8 premises (which I don’t care, of course), then I will counter that indeed all 8 premises can be questioned (which is why it's important and more honest to spell them out from the start). And by that, I mean there are pertinent reasons to doubt the meaning or the truth of the given premises, either because they are not so strongly supported by our more general background knowledge or because they are not analytically evident (especially if no analysis of the relevant notions has been provided yet). If these reasons are compelling or not it’s entirely another matter and can be settled only by adequate arguments.
So here we go with your 8 premises and how one could question them (maybe there are other ways to question them, but my goal is exclusively to show that they can be pertinently questioned):

> 1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
> 2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason

What are the reasons to support the first claim? We have societies with different law systems, so with different sources for legal behavior, why can’t it be the same for moral imperatives? Why should there be only one source for moral imperatives?
What are the reasons to support the second claim? Why can’t we talk of imperatives of emotions (as Hume could suggest) or will (as in the DCT argument proposed in the main post)?

> 1. If something is issuing imperatives, then it is a mind
> 2. Reason issues imperatives

What are the reasons to support the first claim? If the notion of “mind” is contrasted to the notion of “matter”, does that mean that a materialist view is incompatible with issuing imperatives? How so?
What are the reasons to support the second claim? What is “issuing imperatives” by Reason supposed to mean? Why can’t Reason just produce or consist in possible state of affairs which are morally good (where morally good is an intrinsic property different from aesthetically good and instrumentally good) that then human reason can identify and take as a source for issuing moral imperatives b/c, say, humans are attracted to moral goods as much as to aesthetic goods?


> 1. If Reason is a mind, then Reason is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God)
> 2. Reason is a mind

What are the reasons to support the first claim? Why are omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent attributed to Reason as a consequence of Reason being a mind? Also humans have minds but they do not seem omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Besides Reason can be understood also in kantian terms, and not as a sort of divine entity.
What are the reasons to support the second claim? Why Reason is mind, and not mind and matter or just matter?


> 1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason, then they are imperatives of God
> 2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason

What are the reasons to support the first claim? Why are moral imperatives imperatives of God and not Gods? Why can’t Reason be shared between a plurality of divine entities as much as the divine nature is shared by 3 persons of the Holy Trinity?
What are the reasons to support the second claim? The preposition “of” in “imperatives of Reason” is ambiguous b/c it can express both a subjective and objective genitive (i.e. “Reason issues moral imperatives”, “moral imperatives are about Reason”), but depending on how we understand “moral imperatives” (see also the other previous questions) this notion can be compatible maybe with only one of the 2 senses and not the other. Besides should we take this claim as an identity or as an inclusion? Can't there be immoral imperatives of Reason (think of the case of Abraham & Isaac)?

There might be logic links between the 8 premises and the way we question them, but this depends on how these 8 premises are properly spelt out and how they are questioned. So nothing we can really decide a priori just from your 4 deductions.

Conclusion: unless the claim that only 4 out of 8 premises are open to question simply means that Bartricks is open to address doubts against only 4 out of 8 premises (which I don’t care, of course), then all 8 premises (not 4, not 5, not 6, not 7, but 8, exactly all 8 premises out of 8 premises!) can be pertinently questioned. Q.E.D.

This 'criticism' is one that can be made of any analysis of morality. — Bartricks

How can you be so sure? And if it were so, one would have to question every prescriptive moral theory. One must then not be afraid of doing so.

Plus my view can deal with it in a way that no other view can. — Bartricks

I have also presented a theory here that may be able to deal with it:

an original transcendental (meta-Kantian) moral theory

But before I do that — Bartricks

Then give an explanation of the following problem:

there is nothing in God or outside of Him (no reason, no principle whatsoever) that would prohibit murder per se except His total arbitrariness, which, however, from our point of view, is total randomness. I don't see why God should be in any respect better than Hitler. — spirit-salamander

Don't you think it

absurd to suggest that there are no actions such that they are too evil for God to command or even just to permit[?] — spirit-salamander

Paul McCartney has a PhD, but can't read music. — Bartricks

Paul has received honorary degrees from several universities, but he never attended college. But maybe I'm wrong - please provide some documentation for this claim.