You don't have an argument, do you? I say that it is possible for the law of non contradiction to be false, and all you can do is insist that means I think it is actually false.
No, it is 'possibly' false. That doesn't mean 'false'.
And now you say that necessity is there because 'possibly false' means 'not necessarily true'. Er 'not necessarily true' is a denial of necessity's presence. That's what 'not' means.

You see, I don't know what the symbols mean, but I can reason well. You can't. That's the difference between knowing your stuff and not. I can see that there is no contradiction involved in saying that it is metaphysically possible for the law of non contradiction to be false. You don't need to know the symbol language to be able to see that. You just need to be clever (and tbh, not very).

So, once more, prove me wrong - using English words, not symbols (so no little wiggly lines Banno - I know you like them, but they just make you look silly - and no saying you already have. You haven't. No wiggles. Just words.

Do you understand the task? I am claiming that the law of non contradiction - according to which if a proposition is true, it is not also false - is true, but contingently true. You are claiming that I am contradicting myself by saying that. But so far all you keep doing is saying that again and again without showing it. And everytime you attempt to show it you just assume that it is true of necessity and not contingently. Which isn't a demonstration that I have contradicted myself, but a demonstration of poor reasoning skills on your part.

I will take any squiggle use to be an admission of defeat. And likewise for the claim that you have already done so. No squiggles. No fibs. Just English. Do it.

So you are arguing that there is no contradiction involved in holding the view that non-contradiction is false. — Banno

Oh dear Banno. Don't you read English, Banno? I think the law of non-contradiction is true. Remember?

If I thought the law of non-contradiction was false, then of course I'd be affirming a contradiction, for I would be saying that some true propositions are also false in the actual world.

But that's not what I am saying. I am saying that the law of non-contradiction is true. It is just not necessarily true, that's all.

When is the penny going to drop? I wonder....

Well, here's the odd thing; those symbols are pretty standard, and anyone who has taken the trouble to study logic will be familiar with them. But also, there is an audience to these proceedings,a nd I am writing for the as well as for you. — Banno

Well, I have told you several times that I don't understand them. If you just expressed yourself in english rather than symbols it'd be clearer to us all that your arguments don't stack up.

I've presented the argument three - or is it four - times. Its just applying the so-called principle of explosion to modality. — Banno

Yes, and I keep asking you to remove the symbols - they come in at the crucial point and I think that's no accident. I think you can't show me to be committing a contradiction, because I claim not that the law of non-contradiction is false, but that it is contingently true. And to get from 'there is a possible world in which it is false' to 'it is actually false' you'd need to help yourself to the notion of necessity, as I keep saying. Perhaps you think that if there is a symbol for necessity, then you're off the hook. No. I will just keep pressing you to express yourself in English until it becomes clear. You are arguing in a circle. As ever.

You are very fond of demanding that folk address your argument. I have presented an argument showing that it does. Please address it. — Banno

You presented it in German, as far as I am concerned. Express it in English.

Because he knows his stuff. For example, he can read the Squiggles and squoggles. — Banno

That's not what 'knowing your stuff' involves. Plato wouldn't have had a clue about the squiggles and squoggles. I think you don't know your stuff and you are hiding behind squiggles and squoggles. Come out from behind the squiggles and squoggles, Banno, if you dare.

I'm sure he would make an excellent argument for dialetheism. That's what's missing here — Banno

Why do you think that? That is, why do you think he'd make an excellent argument for it?

And of course it is missing here - I am not arguing that the law of non-contradiction is actually false, but that it is true, just contingently. Or rather, that there is no contradiction involved in holding that view. (I can argue for it too - excellently - but that would be off topic).

Squiggles and squoggles. Let's get rid of them, shall we.
— Bartricks

Well, no, since they are part and parcel of the logic you claim to understand, and they permit us to see the structure of the arguments more clearly. — Banno

No, they make it less clear for I don't know what they mean. YOu might as well express yourself in German. If you genuinely wanted to be clear, you wouldn't use the symbols. Now, once more: I don't know what they mean. Use English.

No, I have demonstrated that the view that for some proposition A, A is both true and false, is a consequence of your view that the law of noncontradiction does not apply in some possible worlds. Reject noncontradiction in any possible world, and you reject it for every possible world. — Banno

No, how does that follow? That's no different from saying that if I think unicorns can exist, they do. That is, that if I accept there is a possible world in which they exist, then I must accept they exist in all possible worlds. Er, no.

I think there is a possible world (whatever one of those is) in which the law of non-contradiction is false. It doesn't follow that it is false in all possible worlds. How does that follow?? It just plain doesn't.

Oh, what an opportunity that would be. Yes, I'd love to discuss dialethism with him. — Banno

So, just to be clear: you think it pointless to engage in philosophical discussion with a philosopher who thinks the law of non-contradiction is true, but you'd love to engage in philosophical discussion with a philosopher who thinks it is false? Peculiar.

Yes, I understand that you are claiming that the laws of logic hold in the actual world but not in other possible worlds. — Banno

Good. But....

Bartricks claims that there are contradictions in some possible word. Hence he claims that for some proposition A, both A and ~A are true. — Banno

Squiggles and squoggles. Let's get rid of them, shall we. So, you have attributed to me the view that I think that for some proposition A, A is both true and false. Yes? That's not my view.

My view is that any proposition that is true in the actual world, is not also false.

Look, you might as well give up - you need a bridge from what I say about possible worlds to this world. But you don't have one. Necessity is what'd give you it. But necessity is what's at issue.

You're not going to be able to get from contradictions being true in a possible world, to contradictions being true here. Not without necessity's help. And necessity isn't there to help you. The instant you try and get necessity to help you, the game is up - you've begged the question.

Again, you need to show that I've contradicted myself and you're just not going to be able to do that. All you're doing is showing that I am contradicting you. But, thank God, I am not you.

What? More squiggles and squoggles. You love your latin and your squoggles, don't you?

Bartricks claims that there are contradictions in the word. Hence he claims that for some proposition A, both A and ~A are true. — Banno

No, I claim that there are no true contradictions in the actual world. I mean, I've said that now about a 100 times. Maybe you should learn English 'before' you start squiggling and squoggling.

Now, again, Bartricks claims that if a proposition is true, it is not also false. I think that's true. True. True . True. True. Is there a squiggle or a squoggle for true? Maybe it'll sink in if I squoggle it. How about this - $. Let $ mean 'true'. Now let % mean a proposition. Now let ! mean not. And let ? mean false. And * can mean Bartricks.

* thinks that it is $ that if a % is $, then it is ! also ?

There - has that helped?

And if you like, we can call that claim a Bartrikium Tartidium, as I know you like Latin and that sounds a bit Latin to me.

You are in the actual world claiming there is an instance contradictions are true. game set match — Cheshire

Er, no. I am in the actual world claiming that in the actual world no true proposition is also false.

Just as I am in the actual world claiming that there are no unicorns in the actual world

I claim that it is 'possible' - metaphysically possible, not epistemically possible - for true propositions also to be false. That does not mean that I am asserting that any actually true proposition is also false.

It is also metaphysically possible for unicorns to exist. That doesn't mean I think unicorns exist or that I ride to work on one.

So, not 'match', rather you've tried to return my serve using your face as a racket and now you are wondering why all your teeth are on the grass and not in your mouth.

t's in the nature of reductio arguments to assume what is in contention and then derive a contradiction from that assumption. that's what I have done here. Assume Bart is right, and noncontradiction is not necessary. Then in some possible word, contradictions ensue. Hence, the assumption is false. — Banno

I don't deny that there is a possible world in which contradictions are true (whatever a 'possible world' is - I have no idea). I claim that in the actual world contradictions are not true.

Show me how I am contradicting myself.

If what's at issue is whether the law of non-contradiction is necessary or contingent, then you beg the question if you assume it is a necessary truth for the purposes of demonstrating it to be.
What you need to do, to avoid begging the question, is assume it is a contingent truth and show that 'that' leads to an actual contradiction. Then you'll have shown me to be contradicting myself. But if you have to assume it is a necessary truth, then all you've shown is that I am contradicting you. Which isn't in dispute - I know I am contradicting you. You need to show me to be contradicting myself. So, for the purposes of a reductio, assume the law of non-contradiction is contingent and derive from it a contradiction.

If not(any proposition and not that proposition) is not necessarily true, then in some possible world, it is false. In that world, any proposition and not that proposition. — Banno

Oops. You put that word 'necessary' in there. That's question begging. Without - without - assuming that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth - for that's what's at issue - show me that I am contradicting myself when I say that in reality no proposition that is true is also false. But that it is metaphysically possible for there to be propositions that are true and also false. Show how I am actually contradicting myself. You haven't done that. As suspected, the symbols disguised an assumption of necessity (or at least, the argument would need to make one to get to the conclusion that I have contradicted myself).

Really? But you claim to be familiar - even expert - at logic. — Banno

No, I've never claimed expertise in that area. It's an embarrassing lacuna in my knowledge, though it is one that has in no way hampered me. So, despite not knowing what the symbols mean, I'm very good at spotting a valid argument.

Oh shut up. I have addressed the topic of this thread and I am answering questions someone is putting to me. If you don't like it, use that thing called 'your will' and stop reading me. Christ.

Bartricks has contradicted himself if he makes an assertion that implies a contradiction.

Bartricks asserts that the law of noncontradiction is not necessarily true. — Banno

Yes, certainly those claims are true. Although I can actually demonstrate that it is not necessarily true. But here I am asserting it.

The law of noncontradiction is ~(A & ~A).

If ~(A & ~A) is not necessarily true, then in some possible world, it is false. In that world, (A & ~A)

(A & ~A) is a contradiction. — Banno

Squiggle squoggle squiggle squoggle - Bartricks has contradicted himself. Nah, having trouble with that.

No more squiggling and squoggling please: explain how I have contradicted myself.

Replace the symbols with words. I don't know what they mean.

I see you put what you consider to be the relevant part in bold, as if that will somehow affect things.

SO if the law of noncontradiction is not necessary, then a contradiction ensues. You assert that the law of noncontradiction is not necessary; hence, you assert a contradiction. You have contradicted yourself. — Banno

How? I don't follow you. Don't use symbols, I don't know what they mean. Explain in words (if you can't, you shouldn't be using symbols).

I know - I'll explain myself in bold.

If a proposition is true, it is not also false. That's the law of non-contradiction, right? It tells us how things are in actuality - in actuality, no true proposition is also false. Now I believe that's true. And thus not also false. Just true. Now, I also think that it is possible - metaphysically possible - for this proposition "If a proposition is true, it is not also false" to be false. Which is another way of saying that I think the law of non-contradiction is contingent, not necessary. But I don't think it is false. I think it is true. Where - where - have I contradicted myself? Don't just tell me that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth. That's precisely what is in dispute. Show me where I contradict myself. Again: "no true proposition is also false" I think that's true. I don't think it is necessarily true. I think it is true. Now show me how my thinking it is true rather than necessarily true involves me in a contradiction.

Yeah, asserting a contradiction is not a very strong argument, even if you assert it three times — Banno

Where do I assert a contradiction, Banno? Highlight it.

No, I, along with almost everyone else I have met except you, think is a necessary truth. — Banno

So? Get out more. I think it isn't a necessary truth. But I think it is true. You think I think it is false, yes? Can you just confirm that for me - are you saying that I think the law of non-contradiction is false? Because that's false. I think it is true.

SO if the law of noncontradiction is not necessary, then a contradiction ensues. You assert that the law of noncontradiction is not necessary; hence, you assert a contradiction. You have contradicted yourself. — Banno

How does an actual contradiction ensue? I think it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false. I think it is actually true. How is there a contradiction there? I don't think it is true and false. I think it is true. Capable of being false. But actually true.

Again: I think that if a proposition is actually true, then it is not also actually false.

But I think it is possible for a proposition to be true and also false.

I just don't think any are.

I think all actually true propositions are not also actually false.

Where is the contradiction?

No, you claimed it's circular. You did not point out a circularity. Now you engage in the rhetorical strategy of claiming to have presented an argument previously, an argument which is not there. YOu've done this on several occasions before, in previous discussions we have had. — Banno

No, I argued it. Here:

Now for your next line: There is a possible world in which god does not exist. That's no different from saying that God does not exist with necessity. That is, you are not inferring from it that God does not exist with necessity. You are just stating it in other words. To say that God does not exist in a possible world is one and the same as saying that God does not exist with necessity. And that's also your conclusion. Thus your argument is circular. You've said "God does not exist with necessity.....therefore God does not exist with necessity'. — Bartricks

And above, here:

To say that a person exists in all possible worlds 'just is' to say that they exist of necessity. Possible worlds talk is just a way of trying to talk about necessity and contingency. That's what it was designed to do.

So, if you assert that God does not exist in some possible worlds, then all you have done is say "God does not exist of necessity". Yet that is what you are seeking to conclude. So it is really no different from this argument:

1. Fromage exists
2. Fromage means Cheese
3. Therefore Cheese exists

1. God does not exist in some possible worlds
2. If something does not exist in some possible worlds that means it does not exist of necessity
3. Therefore God does not exist of necessity.

True, but just pointless.

To be non-circular you'd need to extract your conclusion - that God does not exist in some possible worlds a.k.a. God does not exist of necessity - from some premises that do not assert it. — Bartricks

Now, address that argument.

And I will ignore your reply to this post. Just not interested. — Banno

Then why did you make it? Just goading, yes? You're not remotely interested in addressing anything of substance that I have said. I assume because you can't.

Now, once more: your argument is circular. You can put a latin name on it if you want. But I am accusing it of being circular, and I explained its circularity.

Your argument is also attacking a straw man, as the credibility of theism in no way depends upon God being a necessary existent. (Theism is true if God exists; he doesn't have to exist of necessity - just plain old vanilla existence will be enough).

I am a theist, and I think God exists contingently. I think that any theist who thinks God exists of necessity, believes a contradiction. That is, they believe there exists a being who can do anything, but also cannot do some things. That's an actual contradiction. And I don't think contradictions are true, because I believe the law of non-contradiction - which says just that - is true. True, not false.

God exists contingently because God can do anything and thus God can destroy himself. Thus God exists contingently. And so does everything else. And every true proposition is true contingently as well, as God can do anything and thus can make any true proposition false if he so wishes.

Thus, there is no such thing as necessity. Which is good, as philosophers don't know what it is anyway.

Thus, the law of non contradiction, though true, is not necessarily true.

And here we go.
You ARE an amateur. That's not an insult, it is accurate.
The others were addressed to your argument, not you. Your argument IS shit. You are not your argument.
This is the problem: if I tear your arguments into bits, you think I am attacking YOU - yes? I am not. I am attacking your position.

Now, take a breath and address my criticisms and stop trying to goad. Address the argument. Call it shit if you want, but at least have the decency to explain its shitness as I did yours. Good luck.

I did mean to come back to this, even though it will probably, on experience, meet with a mouthful of abuse rather than anything useful. — Banno

Yes, but only once you start trying to abuse me rather than addressing my arguments, then I will abuse you back and abuse you better. I'm almost certain that'll happen....but let's see, it's entirely up to you.

No, it's a modus tollens reductio. That god is necessary is inconsistent with that we can specify a possible world without god. It shows we can have a necessary being or we are able to specify a possible world without some given individual, but not both. — Banno

I explained why it is circular and you have said nothing at all to address my point. So I will just say it again and you can put whatever Latin label you want on it, just so long as you address it. How about that?

To say that a person exists in all possible worlds 'just is' to say that they exist of necessity. Possible worlds talk is just a way of trying to talk about necessity and contingency. That's what it was designed to do.

So, if you assert that God does not exist in some possible worlds, then all you have done is say "God does not exist of necessity". Yet that is what you are seeking to conclude. So it is really no different from this argument:

1. Fromage exists
2. Fromage means Cheese
3. Therefore Cheese exists

1. God does not exist in some possible worlds
2. If something does not exist in some possible worlds that means it does not exist of necessity
3. Therefore God does not exist of necessity.

True, but just pointless.

To be non-circular you'd need to extract your conclusion - that God does not exist in some possible worlds a.k.a. God does not exist of necessity - from some premises that do not assert it.

I then kindly suggested a way - it is conceivable that God does not exist.

If something is conceivable, it is metaphysically possible (that is, there is a possible world in which it is the case).

Thus, there is a possible world in which God does not exist. That is, God's existence is not necessary.

That's not an especially strong argument, as its second premise is dubious. But it is at least not circular.

Note - I am a theist who thinks God exists contingently. And I have a good, non question begging argument for that conclusion. God can do anything, including destroy himself. This he exists contingently. That's a good argument for your conclusion. It also shows it to be a straw man.

As for the law of non contradiction and its contingent status - I do not understand what your problem is. Genuinely. It is true. That is, I think it is true. Not false. True. I just don't think it is necessarily true. I don't even know what it means to say something is 'necessarily' true. I am a sceptic about necessity.

But anyway, I believe the law of non contradiction is true. You think I think it is false, yes? I don't. I think it is true. Show me how I have contradicted myself 'without' helping yourself to the notion of necessity. (For note, I do not believe the law of non contradiction is necessarily true because and only because I don't think there are any necessary truths - I think necessity doesn't exist).

Incidentally, if Graham Priest was on this site, I assume you wouldn't debate him either? He's worse than me. He thinks the law of non contradiction is actually false. At least I think it is actually true (although I am open to persuasion - I wouldn't dismiss what priest says, not at all)

Oh, I see that you did attempt to do this above. It failed abysmally.

There was more sky-daddying and cod psychology of the sort that suggests you have some sort of inferiority complex. And I assume that by 'word salad' you mean to express that you could not follow the relevant section?

Anyway, ignoring all that, what do we find? Well, not exactly high brow stuff.

why do you keep humping this concept that knowledge has to have justified true belief? you keep bringing up justified true belief. — MAYAEL

Er, it's just what knowledge involves. It was first articulated by Plato. There's dispute over whether knowledge involves more than this - whether there is another ingredient - but there isn't serious dispute over whether it involves possessing a justified true belief. There's a debate over whether you need to be aware of the justification in question and there are debates over the mechanics of how you need to have arrived at a belief in order for it to count as justified in the right kind of way - debates prompted by Gettier's famous article. But that it involves true belief and justification is not in dispute. And that's all my argument requires.

obviously I'm not sure what the confusion there was. perhaps people misunderstood you in thinking you said you owned all Rembrandt's and nothing else? — MAYAEL

Yes. That is, they were being stupid (well, if they'd dared to answer - they didn't, presumably because they were foxed by it). If I say "if I own all the world's Rembrandt paintings, do I own any fake Rembrandts? Yes, no, or maybe?" and someone doesn't know the answer or thinks it is something other than 'maybe', then they are, well, just dumb, at least on that occasion (everyone has bad days, of course).

For instance, that same person would no doubt think this argument valid:

1. If P, then Q
2. Q
3. Therefore P.

Whereas it is not. This is:

1. If and only if P, then Q
2. Q
3. Therefore P

Someone who cannot distinguish between 'if P then Q' and 'if and only if P, then Q' is just not that good at philosophy becuase they're impatient and sloppy and don't care about important distinctions.

Now, obviously I am pleasantly surprised that you recognize that if I own all the world's Rembrandts, that leaves open the possibility that I may also own some fake Rembrandts. Well done! Give yourself a big macho pat on the back. Hang on, I'll try and talk bloke: "Alwight mate!! Nice one!" No, that's all I've got.

Now apply that to knowledge: if I am in possession of all the world's justified-true-beliefs (Rembrandt paintings), do I have any false beliefs (fakes)? Yes, no, or maybe?

The answer is maybe.

A clever person might object that this may not be the case - that the answer could be a decisive 'no' - because if you have a false belief, then there's a true belief you lack. And they may think that if you are in possession of all items of knowledge, then you are eo ipso in possession of all true beliefs. And thus your possession of all true beliefs precludes you having any false ones.

But that's why I started by demonstrating how possessing all the world's knowledge is compatible with not being in possession of all the world's true beliefs. (I think my fictional critic's claim is dubious anyway, but rather than bother exploring it I can just sidestep it with the move I made).

So, step one: show that having all-knowledge does not necessarily involve having all the world's true beliefs. That's what the pizza example showed. Knowledge has at least two components, and thus having all knowledge is akin to having all the world's pizzas. But if one has all the world's pizzas one does not necessarily have all the world's pizza bases, for a pizza base without a topping is not a pizza and thus not necessarily something one owns.

Thus, having all knowledge is compatible with not having all the world's true beliefs.

With that in the bank, the way is now clear to show that having all knoweldge is compatible with having some positively false beliefs. That was step two.

And then I showed that God positively would have some false beliefs, such as believing that he is not God.

Stop squawking other people's slogans, farmyard cockerel. Engage with the OP. That is, try and argue something. I argued something. Try and argue back.

Hmm, well I agree that the belief that an omniscient being can and will have some false beliefs is justified and thus an item of knowledge. And I agree that means God will believe it too, as God is in possession of all knowledge. But I don't yet see a problem.

For instance, I don't think God knows he's God. That is, one of the false beliefs God has, is that he is not God. Someone who thinks they are not God - and thus thinks they are not omniscient - can surely believe that an omniscient person can and will have some false beliefs? I mean, I believe I am not God, and I also believe that an omniscient being can have false beliefs. So I see no problem with someone who mistakenly thinks that are not God believing that God will have some false beliefs.

But even if God does know he's God, I don't see a problem, for he would just believe that he himself is capable of having, and does have, some false beliefs. I think I am capable of having, and no doubt do have, some false beliefs. So I don't see why God could not believe the same about himself.

So I am not yet seeing a problem as such....

That's just bad psychology. If someone expends a lot of effort defending a view it is more likely due to the fact they sincerely think it worth defending - and are finding the objections misguided and incompetent and are hungry for some good ones - than that they think the view is false.
For instance, why are you not answering my simple question about Rembrandt ownership? Because you know that if you do you'll either confirm a double digit iq or you'll have to accept the validity of my argument, yes?

You possess knowledge do you? I don't think you do. I think there's ample evidence from the content of your posts here that your wisdom comes from the back of a cereal packet and that nothing you think stands up to any real rational scrutiny.
But let's not take your word for it - why not demonstrate your reasoning skills by answering this simple question:
If I own all the world's Rembrandt paintings, do I own any fake Rembrandts? Tmyes, no, or maybe?

Yes. It is just an ad hominem point anyway. It doesn't matter how any particular theist arrives at their belief, what matters is whether it is true and the quality of the evidence that can be provided for it.
But yes, I am a theist who started out as an atheist and became a theist on the basis of the evidence. It may be relatively rare, but that's because most people determine what's true on other grounds.

You say that lacking knowledge of a proposition's truth is evidence of lack of omniscience. But that's question begging because whether it constitutes a lack of knowledge, as opposed to a lack of true belief, is precisely what's at issue.
An omniscient being does not lack knowledge, for all items of knowledge are in their possession. But they can lack - and I think will lack - some true beliefs. True beliefs by themselves are not items of knowledge though, as you acknowledge. So we cannot validly conclude from that person's failure to believe them that they lack knowledge.

You say that it doesn't follow that an omniscient being will have any false beliefs. Yes, I agree. But it is compatible with having some. That is, one can be omniscient and have any number of false beliefs. Just as one can own all the world's pizzas and in addition own any number of pizza bases.
Plus I argued on independent grounds that God probably does have some positively false beliefs. He probably doesn't believe he is God, for instance.

You sound like you're snorting and frothing at the mouth. And all this status talk and henpecking anxiety - it all sounds very farmyardy. I take it that in this farmyard you see yourself as an alpha-male cock? That certainly sounds partly right.
But back to the topic- do you have anything coherent to say about the argument in the OP? So far all you have said is that it is impossible to make mistakes - so presumably that means I have made none - and that if most people think I am an idiot that's good evidence I am an idiot. That seems false - I mean, what if they're all idiots? Take my argument. You think it is the argument of an idiot. Ok. Explain. Is there a fault in my reasoning or is there a false premise?
If I own all the world's pizzas, do I own all the world's pizza bases?

And you seem to think you have important information to give and that I have misunderstood something. I see no evidence in support of either claim.

I wrote an OP. Read it and make a philosophical criticism of something in it, or query something in it. YOu haven't done that. You've just said something out of left-field that made no sense and then accused my OP of being 'retarded' - without providing any evidence of retardation whatever.

So get down off your high horse and say something philosophically worthwhile that engages with the OP.

If you can't understand a basic concept like what I stated and see how it applies in your life then we can't have a conversation so until the shields are down have a good day — MAYAEL

Oh nooo, please impart to me your wisdom oh great one. I will lay down my shield and take off my breast plate so that you may run me through with your spear of knowledge. Impale me!!!

As ever, you fail to focus on the relevant issue. I considerately answered your off-topic questions, and told you - several times now - that they were off topic and what the relevant issues were, but you simply won't be told.

Now, Reason is a person, not a faculty. 'Our reason' is a faculty. 'Reasoning' is what you are doing when you use it (I recommend it - try it). And normative reasons and imperatives and other such rational impedimenta are what our faculty allows us to detect. Pointless me saying that because it is all just so much noise in your head, yes? Lalalala, loolooloo, traalalalala. I could have said that to the same effect. So, you know, whatever. If you want to know why Reason will be omnipotent, search through my discussions and find the answer.

This thread is about whether God can make mistakes. I have argued that he can and my argument depends on the credibility of two claims. First, that omniscience involves being in possession of all knowledge. Second, that knowledge has at least two components, true belief and justification.

Now off you trot and go and be confused all over someone else's thread.

Oh, I see you've mentioned me. And gotten it all wrong, as ever. Do move aside, amateur!

First, let's crucify your opening argument:

God is supposed to be a necessary being. Something is necessary if it is true in every possible world.

There is a possible world in which god does not exist.

Hence, god is not a necessary being. — Banno

Well, the conclusion is true, but the argument is shit (it is circular). God is not a necessary being. I believe in God, but I'm not stupid. So I recognize that God, being all powerful, can destroy himself if he wishes. Thus he does not exist of necessity.

Some idiots - you know, the kind of people who confuse the metaphysical possibility of the law of non-contradiction being false with it actually being false - confuse existing with necessity with existing. God exists. But God does not exist of necessity as reflection on the concept reveals.

Your opening line - God is supposed to be a necessary being - is also false. God is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. Some theists - idiot ones - think he exists of necessity and some - clever ones - think he doesn't. To make existing with necessity a defining feature is just to attack a straw man.

Now for your next line: There is a possible world in which god does not exist. That's no different from saying that God does not exist with necessity. That is, you are not inferring from it that God does not exist with necessity. You are just stating it in other words. To say that God does not exist in a possible world is one and the same as saying that God does not exist with necessity. And that's also your conclusion. Thus your argument is circular. You've said "God does not exist with necessity.....therefore God does not exist with necessity'.

To remedy matters you need to conclude that there is a possible world in which God does not exist. Presumably you'd have to go via some kind of conceivability claim - that it is conceivable that God does not exist, and as what's conceivable is a fairly reliable guide to what's metaphysically possible, there is a possible world in which God does not exist.

But that argument is relatively weak as the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility is contested somewhat. Plus you'd no doubt reject similar arguments offered for, say, the immateriality of the mind (I can conceive of my mind existing apart from my body, thus it is metaphysically possible for it to....that would not be metaphysically possible if my mind was part of my body, thus my mind is not part of my body). (Note, I don't reject such arguments, I just don't think they're all that powerful, precisely because of the dubious nature of the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility).

Anyway, your argument is circular as it stands.

But its conclusion is correct. Here's my much better argument, that is simple and decisive: God can do anything. Thus God can destroy himself. Thus God does not exist of necessity. Indeed, nothing does. If God exists, nothing exists of necessity. For God can destroy anything and everything at any time. Thus all things exist contingently.

And that also means that......the law of non-contradiction is contingently true (look - 'true'....it's 'true', not false), not necessarily true. It's 'true'. But it is not 'necessarily' true. True, but not necessarily true.

That's one you have difficulty with, isn't it. Ironically, if you think God exists and the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true, then you're involved in a contradiction (for you would be committed to affirming that God can do anything and not some things). To avoid a contradiction, one needs to conclude that if God exists, then all truths are contingent and thus the law of non-contradiction is contingently true.

Anyway, consider yourself lessoned.

Its just the persons opinion that it's a mistake but fundamentally there's no such thing. — MAYAEL

If there are no mistakes, how do we explain you?

Well That sounds about as retarded as any of the other retarded beliefs stated here today — MAYAEL

Did i make a mistake somewhere then? I thought mistakes don't exist.

And regardless, you haven't answered the critique that even if God changes the normative reasons, he can't do anything to those who ignore them. Your God cannot affect a single person, animal, plant or object reliably. Yet he/she is omnipotent somehow. — khaled

This is really off topic, as I've already explained that my case does not depend upon identifying God with Reason. God is by definition able to do anything. By identifying Reason and God I am giving an explanation of how it is that God is omnipotent. But 'that' he is, is not in dispute.

But once more, just for good measure. To be omnipotent - and remember, it is not in dispute that God is omnipotent - one cannot be 'bound' by the laws of logic. How could there be a being who is not bound by them? The being in question would need to be the author of them. That is, the being would need to be Reason.

What you're doing is focussing on normative reasons - which Reason will also be the source of and by dint of which she has colossal power - and not on the rational landscape more generally, all of which is a creature of her will (I too am focussing on normative reasons becuase it is from a subset of those - namely, epistemic reasons - that justifications are made and justifications are an essential component of knowledge). So, basically you're not focussing on the relevant issue. I can explain the mechanics of omnipotence, but here is not the place. Focus on the relevant issue.

1- Reason is a faculty (your words)
2- God is a person (your words)
3- Persons aren't faculties (obviously)
4- Therefore God is not Reason — khaled

Er, no, I did not say 'Reason is a faculty'. I said 'our reason' is a faculty. Christ, you people are soooo sloppy.

Shall I say the same bloody thing again and again and again and again until some penny drops somehwere??

Reason is a person. Got it? A person. God. A person. Not a faculty. A person. A mind. A subject. A thinking thing.

'Our reason', or 'your reason' is a 'faculty'. I said this explicitly. There was no room for misinterpretation. Reason with a capital R is the name we of the source of reasons. Reasons, plural, are normative reasons - favouring relations. 'Our reason' is a faculty.

YOu seem to be able to comprehend this with sight, so what's your problem? Is it, perhaps, that you're determined I'm wrong and think I don't know my stuff?

Anyway, learn to focus on the relevant issue. My case here - in this thread - depends crucially on two claims: that being omniscient involves possessing all knowledge and that knowledge has at least two components - justification and truth.

Explaining the omnipotence of God is 'not' the issue. Can't you see this? The omnipotence is taken for granted. The only - only - reason I am talking about normative reasons is that they are what justifications are made of.

Yeah, I don't know whether it's the lapsed academic in me, but most of my OPs are there to invite criticism, look for holes, find the weakest points and, if possible, help me fix them. — Kenosha Kid

Finished polishing your halo? And don't thank me for finding the gaping rents in everything you've said and thereby helping you to fix them.

Now I think that throughout this thread your reasoning has been malfunctioning badly and I can fix it. To do that, first tell me what's the answer to this simple question:

If I own all the world's Rembrandt paintings, do I own any fake Rembrandts? Yes, no or maybe?

Get over it, and escape from your Rembrandt's self assembled maze. — Corvus

One of the stranger things I've been told to do.

I do have reason to believe it.

But regardless of whether or not I do believe it, or whether or not I have reason to believe it, the rock will still fall. In any case, whether or not the rock falls, my belief and the reasons for my belief don't affect the rock. — khaled

And do you have reason to believe that, or no reason to believe it?

Plus truth itself seems essentially to involve Reason.

I don't think you begin to appreciate the power being Reason gives to that person. Like I say, they can do anything. And nothing you believe will be justified unless or until she favours you believing it; and nothing you do will be rational unless or until she favours you doing it. And arguably - I would argue - no proposition would even be true unless she made it so.

As for this:

In short:

1- God can move a rock
2- If the mind that issues normative reasons is God, then the mind that issues normative reasons can move a rock.
3- The mind that issues the laws of reason cannot affect a rock in any way (since rocks aren't affected by normative reasons).
4- Therefore the mind that issues normative reasons is not God.

Which premise do you disagree with? — khaled

3 is clearly false. Even if rocks are not affected by normative reasons, it doesn't follow that the mind whose attitudes constitute such reasons is unable to affect rocks. For instance, rocks are not affected by my hopes. But it doesn't follow that I cannot affect a rock.

So that argument is clearly unsound. But note too that my main case does not depend upon identifying Reason and God. Identifying Reason and God serves to explain what would otherwise seem inexplicable. But it is not essential to my case. My case requires only that we acknowledge that being omniscient involves possessing all items of knowledge, and that knowledge has at least two components: justification and true belief.

I will deal with you noobs above shortly when I am at my computer and not stabbing away at a phone.
But it has occurred to me that there are some positively mistaken beliefs that God will have (or can reasonably be expected to have). And those would be the belief that he is not omniscient and the belief that he is not omnibenevolent and the belief that he is not omnipotent. For a good person is humble. So God is humble, or so we can reasonably infer. But one is not humble if one believes oneself to be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Thus, God will not believe such things. God, in other words, will not believe he is God. Which is a false belief. God mistakenly believes he is not God. Which is, as I have argued, entirely consistent with God being God. God is not only capable of making mistakes - and capable of making them and remaining God - he positively does make some. God is mistaken about who he is. Which is, when you think about it, quite a whopper of a mistake.

Anything philosophical to contribute or just cod psychology?

Engage with the OP. Rest assured that I will be delighted if someone raises a good objection to what I have argued. I love - love - a good objection.

Clement? You think reading Clement Freud will help me uncover my motives in drawing attention to your double digit IQ? I don't think so. It might help me cook salmon in an interesting way. But do I want to cook salmon like a pervert, that's the question I'd be asking myself.

Anyway, if I have read all of Clement's cook books have I read any of Nigelka Lawson's?