Can rules of law be immoral?
Yes.
Therefore rules of law are not moral laws.

No, they trace fully to the causes. If indeterminism is true events are not thereby 'less' caused (as even my fish finger recognizes).

But just to be clear: to you "traces to external causes" is the case even if indeterminism is the case? Sure. Even though no combination of the external causes can ever decide the result, apparently the result still traces to external causes. Gotcha. — khaled

Yes, Finger, that's right. Although causes do not 'decide' a result as decisions are mental events and causes aren't minds. But apart from that misuse of language (and the conceptual confusion it expressed) yes, indeterministic causation is still causation and if indeterminism is true events still have causes. And thus if it was indeterministic what kind of mind my mind would be, that does precisely nothing to make me morally responsible for it. Obviously.

↪Bartricks
kill Sarah your intention does not need to have resulted in Sarah's death, it is sufficient that you formed it. Obviously.
— Bartricks

Obviously not. In that example, you still attempted to kill Sarah. If you hadn't attempted you did nothing wrong. — khaled

To be morally responsible for forming an intention to do X does not depend on whether X itself occurs. It isn't a difficult point to grasp and it is obviously true. I just explained the point to my plate of fish fingers and I think even one of them got it. So, you know, up your game.

You're just not a great friend of understanding. You sound so self assured I feel sorry for you because you always end up looking like an idiot when shown the obvious thing you've been missing. — khaled

Dunning and Kruger.

It applies to more than actions, and some mental activities are actions and is essential to all actions. So, you know, well done.
— Bartricks

You know that I mean. Physical actions. I just don't understand what you gain by trying to make such a stupid very easily dismissible "objection". — khaled

No, what you said was just plain false. Morality applies to more than actions. It applies to states of affairs and character traits as well, neither of which are actions (the moral properties of rightness and wrongness apply exclusively to actions, but those are not all the moral properties that there are). And all actions have a mental element, for actions are the exclusive preserve of agents, and agents are minds and an action is caused by certain kinds of mental event. So you were totally and utterly wrong. I mean, it's actually quite impressive to have packed so many mistakes into so few words. I'm impressed.

1. If my mind is the product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for anything about my mind or anything it is caused to do. (If A, then B)
— Bartricks

This premise is just false. You don't know if your mind is material or immaterial at this junction correct? If your mind WAS immaterial, then it could be the product of external events you had no hand in, but still not be caused to do anything as a result (be undetermined). — khaled

On what grounds do you reject premise 1? Present a deductively valid argument that has the negation of 1 as a conclusion. I cannot understand from what you've said on what grounds you are rejecting it. You seem to be thinking that as my mind could be immaterial and still the product of external causes, this somehow shows premise 1 to be false. Er, how? What the argument shows is that being immaterial is 'necessary' for being morally responsible (and thus having free will). It does not show that it is sufficient.

Even if your mind was material, it could be that indeterminism is the case, in which case, again, you would be responsible for what it does, regardless of whether or not it was created by factors outside your control. — khaled

Why on earth would I be responsible for what my mind does if its activities are indeterministic? If it was indeterministic what height I would achieve, or what eye colour I would have, would that make me morally responsible for those matters? Obviously not. The same is true when the indeterminism infects my mind. You can't plausibly go from not being morally responsible for something to being morally responsible for it just by the addition of indeterministic causation.

Remember your original argument for this? It was "In order to be morally responsible my actions must not fully trace to external causes". Well if your mind is undetermined (either by it being immaterial or by it being material and indeterminism being the case), then it could be a product of external events, yet still your actions would not all trace to external causes. — khaled

False. Indeterministic causation is still causation. When an event is undetermined, it is not uncaused. It was caused, just indeterministically. Imagine that it was indeterministic whether the bullet would hit me or not. It hits me and blows my arm off. Well, what was the cause of my arm blowing off? The bullet, yes?

Sure. I would assume that being morally responsible would require you and your decisions to be able to.... you know.... do something. Guess not though. — khaled

No, that's the bonkers view you expressed earlier and then disavowed when its bonkerishness became apparent. To be morally responsible for intending to kill Sarah your intention does not need to have resulted in Sarah's death, it is sufficient that you formed it. Obviously.

Whether or not the thesis is bizarre and motivated. You would have known that had you simply read what I quoted. — khaled

This is a derailing move as whether epiphenomenalism is plausible or not is demonstrably irrelevant to the free will question. But it 'is' a bizarre and unmotivated view. For the same evidence that implies material events cause mental ones exists for the reverse. What's the evidence that material events cause mental ones? Well, I just bashed my toe - material event - and it caused me to be in pain - mental event. What's the evidence that mental events cause material ones? The pain - mental event - caused me to shout out "ouch", which was a material event. But anyway, whether or not epiphenomenalism is a really stupid view or a sensible interpretation of the data is neither here nor there, as it doesn't bear on the issue under debate.

Because whether I am morally responsible or not for my intentions and decisions and other mental activities has nothing to do with whether they are causally effective in the world.
— Bartricks

I think you're on your own there. — khaled

Oh, so now you 'do' think that whether you're morally responsible for intending to do X depends on whether X actually occurs? Not a great friend of Consistency are you? Until you and consistency start getting on a bit better I'm not sure this is going to be at all productive.

Morality applies to actions. Not mental activities. — khaled

It applies to more than actions, and some mental activities are actions and some mental activity is essential to all actions. So, you know, well done for being so wrong about so much.

And I'm curious how you think your mind originated. Not due to your birth or anything physical like that of course. So what? It was just sort of always there? An immortal soul of some sort? — khaled

It didn't originate, for if it did then it would be the product of external causes. And yes, a soul. That's the point. Free will requires a soul.

Here's the argument again, clearly laid out:

1. If my mind is the product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for anything about my mind or anything it is caused to do. (If A, then B)
2. I am morally responsible for being the mind that I am and am morally responsible for what it is caused to do. (Not B)
3. Therefore, my mind is not the product of external events I had no hand in. (Therefore, not A)
4. If my mind is a material thing, then it is the product of external events I had no hand in (if C, then A)
5. Therefore, my mind is not a material thing (Therefore, not C).
6. If my mind is not a material thing, then it is an immaterial thing (if not C, then D)
7. Therefore, my mind is an immaterial thing (therefore D)

Free will requires a soul then. And a soul I am. And a soul you are. Which means you're morally responsible for the way you have been thinking above.

Your intention to raise the arm and it rising isn’t evidence that the intention was causal. In the same way that a color change preceding a pH change in titration is not evidence that the color has anything to do with pH (it doesn’t). And the fact that the intention always precedes the action is consistent with epiphenomenalism. — khaled

What in blue blazes are you on about?

The question you asked me - and that I am patiently answering - is whether we would still be morally responsible if epiphenomenalism is true, yes?

Focus.

The answer to that question is 'yes'. Why?

Because whether I am morally responsible or not for my intentions and decisions and other mental activities has nothing to do with whether they are causally effective in the world.

Simples.

What matters where my moral responsibility for such activities is concerned, is their causal history. If I myself am simply a product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for being the mind that I am and so consequently I would not be morally responsible for any of my mental activity. Holding me so would be as unfair as holding me morally responsible for my eye colour or height or some other feature of my material body that I had no hand in it having.

If my mind is a material thing, then it would be the product of external events that I had no hand in, as this is the case with all material things.

So, in order for me to be morally responsible for the activities my mind engages in, I need 'not' to be a material thing. And as my reason and the reason of virtually all other careful reasoners (an important qualification - we're not including total spanners), represents us to be morally responsible for our mental activities, we can and should conclude that we - we minds, that is - are not material objects. Of course, few are willing to follow reason where she leads, but decide in advance how far they are willing to go.

Again, whether epiphenomenalism is true or not has no bearing on this whatsoever.

No that’s not my view. That you interpreted it that way is too bonkers for words.

If you decide to kill Sarah, your attempt to kill Sarah following that decision was not actually caused by that decision. So you did not even cause the physical attempt of killing Sarah. So how can you be blamed for something you didn’t cause? — khaled

In that case you simply didn't understand the original point and you used entirely the wrong words to express yourself. I am morally responsible for my decisions regardless of whether they are effective in the world.

And because of that epiphenomenalism, if true - and it isn't - would not preclude my being morally responsible for my mental activities.

I would think no. Because the intention to do X didn’t affect whether or not you tried or succeeded at doing X, physically. — khaled

Well, I think you're going to be on your own there. So, just to be clear, your view is that if I attempt to kill Sarah, I am not morally responsible for forming that intention if it does not result in Sarah's death? That's too bonkers for words.

I would think to be morally responsible in that scenario you’d need some social definition of moral responsibility. — khaled

I don't have a clue what you're on about. You can't define someone into being morally responsible. Writers of dictionaries are not Gods.

If so, then I think that bizarre and unmotivated thesis
— Bartricks

Why bizarre? It comes from splitting up the world into mental and physical stuff. Then noticing that the physical stuff seems to be self determining with no need of mental stuff. — khaled

Well, that too is extraordinarily confused. It's bizarre and unmotivated because it is asymmetrical - it is being claimed that material events cause mental events, but mental events can't cause material events. That's perverse. If there are material events, then we have good evidence that they cause mental events and vice versa. I just intended to raise my arm and it raised. There.

Oh, and physical stuff does not appear to be self-determining. When a physical thing does something we look for a cause of its doing it.

Physical stuff causing minds which do nothing — khaled

I do not understand what you mean. Seems confused.

A mind is a thing. An object.

Minds do things, such as think, desire, decide, hope and so on.

Thinking, desiring, hoping, intending - these are activities of mind (exclusively so).

So do you mean by epiphenomenalism the thesis that the activities our minds engage in are the causal product of material events, but that those mental activities are impotent to cause any material events?

If so, then I think that bizarre and unmotivated thesis is nevertheless entirely consistent with us being morally responsible for the activities our minds engage in, so long as we are morally responsible for being the minds that we are.

For instance, if I form the intention to do X and try to do X, and X occurs but entirely coincidentally and not as a product of my trying to do X, I remain fully morally responsible for trying to do X. Yes?

Right. But these “decisions” are mental things. — khaled

They are states of mind, not really 'things' as such (a state of mind is a state of a thing - minds being things - but it is not itself a thing).

Are they supposed to have physical effects? — khaled

I do not really know what you mean.

Or in other words, do you think free will exists if epiphenomenalism is true? — khaled

Those aren't other words for what you previously said.

What do you understand epiphenomenalism to be?

No, I don't see why you'd think it did.

Moral responsibility requires being the originator of one's decisions, I think. And that requires being an immaterial soul, as all material entities - if any exist - have come into being.

No, they don't define it, not in any substantial way, for the definition is the end-point of analysis, not the beginning.

Again: they are talking about what's needed to be morally responsible for one's decisions. That's what compatibilists and incompatibilists are disagreeing over.

If you define 'free will' as 'a type of jam' then you are simply not talking about what they are talking about.

They are talking about what's needed for moral responsibility. And they're disagreeing over what's needed. But 'what's needed' is the issue. And 'free will' is what they agree is needed. And once the disagreement is resolved, we will know what having free will involves.

It is not a good idea to ask average members of the public questions about complex metaphysical issues, as most of them are complete berks.

But among philosophers - so among those who have undertaken to reflect on this matter in a highly disciplined way - there is broad agreement on the basic concept, despite disagreement reigning over exactly what it takes for our wills to answer to that concept.

Free will is 'that which is needed to make one morally responsible for one's actions'. There's near universal consensus on this, which is why you'll find 'moral responsibility' and 'free will' used pretty much interchangeably in the debate. So, for instance, when Harry Frankfurt argued that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities, that was taken to be a powerful source of support for compatibilist positions on free will, as defenders of such views would - if Frankfurt's argument works - now no longer have to argue that their conditional analysis of alternative possibilities was more plausible than the incompatibilist unconditional analysis and could instead sidestep the whole issue.

Anyway, among those who think carefully about the matter, the majority agree that we have free will of the moral responsibility-grounding kind. And they think this despite disagreeing over whether that kind of free will requires indeterminism.

What does this tell us? Well, it tells us that it is more clear and distinct to the reason of careful reasoners that we have free will - or, if one prefers, that we are morally responsible - than it is that free will requires indeterminism, or whatever. (That is, it is clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that moral responsibility requires free will; and it is clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that we are morally responsible for what we decide to do; and clear and distinct to the reason of virtually all careful reasoners that it follows from this that we have free will, whatever it may involve).

There are exceptions - there are hard incompatibilists (such as Derk Pereboom) and there are impossibilists (such as Saul Smilansky and Galen Strawson) - but they are all guily of being unduly conservative about the nature of reality and how much our reason can tell us about it (which is somewhat ironic given that they are nevertheless willing to conclude that something that so patently exists - free will - doesn't).

Well, that's fine if her view is that blame and praise come with the same control and origination requirements (I am not sure if that is her view - though it has also been a while since I read anything by her, and the last thing I read was her Freedom within Reason, which is quite old so perhaps her views have changed or perhaps the view I attributed to her was not her view). But from memory her view there was that someone born evil is not morally responsible for their subsequent evil acts, whereas someone born good is morally responsible for their subsequent good acts. And if that's right, well, it seems prima facie implausible.

Anyway, as you know I find it hard to understand how anyone in their right mind can consider someone blameworthy or praiseworthy for something - a decision, a desire, whatever - that was the causal product of external factors that the agent had no hand in. That seems no less unfair than blaming someone for their height or the age in which they were born.

I wouldn't give them the same weight - some appearances appear stronger than others, and other things being equal that translates into them giving us greater reason to believe in the accuracy of their representative contents.

I am not sure I follow. If right-doing requires the ability to do the right thing, then right-doing does not require the ability to do otherwise. But if wrongdoing does require the ability to do otherwise, then wrongdoing is plausibly incompatible with determinism in a way that right doing does not appear to be. Which seems to me to motivate the idea that, in fact, right doing also requires the ability to do otherwise (or that neither do). My point being that it is no good removing the asymmetry at a deeper level if we still end up with wrongdoing requiring something incompatible with determinism while right doing does not.

Re rational abilities to do wrong. There seems an ambiguity here. I agree that we never have overall reason to do wrong, and thus someone who does wrong is defying reason. But it can - and is - rational to want to have the ability to defy reason. So the ability to do wrong is one it is rational to have, eventhough it is not rational actually to do wrong.

Yes, because the answer to my question is that no, it would not be wise to think such a thing. I can and do know that "where the hell is my iphone" is not something Socrates said, even though he was perfectly able to say such a thing. And it would not be wise to think one could not know this.
The same is true in respect of "The only true wisdom is knowing that you know nothing". It's not something Socrates said. It's something people who have not read the Apology think he said because that's what youtube and wikipedia have told them. It's an incredibly stupid saying - it doesn't make sense - and that's sufficient to make it incredibly unreasonable to think Socrates said it. That and the fact it was just made up.

Yes, I do not deny that her view is coherent. Ought implies can, and ought not implies can not. Which seems sufficient to explain how it is that right-doing and wrong-doing might require different abilities (one to do, the other to do otherwise).

But it nevertheless seems prima facie implausible. For instance, it seems implausible that if determinism is true, then we are praiseworthy for all our right deeds, but blameless for our immoral ones. Intuitively if one is one, one is the other - it's a package deal.

I wouldn't get into a conversation with someone to whom the law of non contradiction did not appear to be true. Read your original post and then read my reply.

If it appears to me that x is true, but it appears to you that x is false, then both my view and yours conflicts with some appearances, yes?

So we now both have the burden of proof if we want to insist our view is the true one.

If, however, I form the view that as there is an appearance that x is true, and an equally strong appearance that x is false, therefore x is as likely true as false given this evidence, then I do not have the burden of proof, for now my view is in line with the appearances.

Some people prefer questions to answers. You are one of those, I think.

In dismissing appearances you do not just dismiss me, but Aristotle. Do you think that's wise?

hmmm....No.

I wouldn't get into a conversation with such a person.

The principle of phenomenal conservatism marks the beginning of intellectual inquiry. That the law of non contradiction appears to be true followed by the subsequent appearance of conflicting appearances is what generates questions about what is really the case. And that's the beginning of philosophy.

Appearances can be defeated or undercut and it is the on-going business of philosophical inquiry to defeat and undercut conflicting appearances in the most appearance respecting manner.

Still no.

You are not understanding the principle.
First, a proof will consist of appearances. It was a point Descartes made. I can prove I exist. How? I appear to exist. And that appearance is so strong there is nothing I can think of that will raise a doubt about its accuracy.
Second, when appearances appear to conflict - that is, when their representative contents appear contradictory - we are default justified in believing that one or other or both are inaccurate. Why? Because the law of non-contradiction says so and it appears to be true to virtually everyone (and we cannot notice conflicts between appearances until we notice that the law of non-contradiction appears to be true).

I do not find what you are saying to be coherent.

You are asking, I think, for a justification for the laws of logic. Well, I have provided one: they appear to be true and it is a basic principle of intellectual inquiry that if something appears to be the case we are justified in believing it to be. And if you want a justification for that principle, you are asking to be shown reason to believe it, yes? Well, does it not appear to you that you have reason to believe it?
Perhaps you want to be shown that you have reason to believe what you have apparent reason to believe. But now your desire is confused or at least has no bearing on anything's being justified. For if you recognize that you have apparent reason to believe it, then you are already aware of a reason to believe it and you are simply wanting to be shown more of the same.

If it appears to you that it appears to Helen that the burglar had a red hat on, and it appears to you that it appears to Sam that the burglar had a blue hat on, then other things being equal you have as much reason to believe the burglar had a red hat on as a blue one.

The law of non-contradiction appears to be true. That is, the reason of most people represents it to be true. That's an appearance: a rational appearance.

It is precisely because of this that we understand that conflicting appearances cannot all be accurate. Indeed, to take some appearances to be conflicting is of a piece with taking their representative contents to be contradictory.

In this way we learn that one or other or both appearances are inaccurate.

No.

A devil's advocate is still trying to show that there is reason to believe the view they are advocating for.

I still do not understand what your point is in respect of the law of non contradiction or any other law of logic for that matter. Our evidence they are true is that they appear to be. That isn't a problem.

What about this 'quote' from Socrates: "Where the hell is my iPhone?!"
Am I wise if I think I do not know whether he said that or not?

Question begging. And like so many others you confuse Socrates' position with that of a radical sceptic.
Again, "to disbelieve something under circumstances where believing it would give you knowledge is the opposite of wise" (Bartricks).

No, you don't know what you're talking about or what I'm talking about. But thanks for your input.

No, the proposition 'it is raining and no one believes it is raining' is self-refuting, but not inconsistent with truth. For it is possible for it to be true. It itself contains no contradiction.

Here is another view that is possibly true, but self-refuting: there is no reason to believe anything.

Again, possibly true. But any attempt to defend it would undermine itself as to defend a view is to attempt to show that there is reason to believe it.

As to what you say about the principle of phenomenal conservatism - well, I do not follow you. What reason do we have to think the law of non-contradiction is true save it appearing to be?
And if that is true, howdoes that not demonstrate that its truth is even more basic?

I mean, a first storey is more basic than a second as you can't have the latter without the former. Well likewise the principle of phenomenal conservatism is more basic than the law of non-contradiction for we are not justified in believing the latter unless the former is true.

No, it is a fact that that 'quote' is not a quote from Socrates. It's just made up.
I believe Socrates never uttered those words. I am very well justified in that belief. And if - as it is - it is also true that he never said them, then I know that he never said them. If I thought I knew that I didn't know whether he said them or not I would be unwise, not wise. It is not wise to disbelieve something under circumstances where believing it would give you knowledge.

Well, for one thing he does not claim to know nothing. His point is that knowing that you do not know a particular thing makes one wiser than someone who does not realize that they do not know it. Why? Well, because that view is true.
By contrast someone who believes they know they know nothing has a false view. For if they 'know' that they know nothing then they know something, not nothing.
So only someone lacking in wisdom but loving of maxims would say "the only true wisdom is knowing one knows nothing". And that's not Socrates.

As I understand it, Pereboom coined the term 'hard incompatibilist' to describe his own view, which is not that free will is impossible but rather that what free will requires we highly unlikely possess, even if determinism is false. This is because in his view it requires not just indeterminism, but agent-causation. And he thinks it unlikely that we have agent-causal powers.
Needless to say, he is just another naturalist who thinks that if you can't naturalize something it doesn't- or likely doesn't- exist.

I also believe that Frankfurt has never officially declared a side. He is widely assumed to be a compatibilist simply because he has argued that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (a claim which, if true, would seem to help the compatibilist cause more.....though many incompatibilists, including Pereboom, agree with Frankfurt on this). But, like I say, he himself has never explicitly endorsed compatibilism and everything he has argued is consistent with incompatibilism (I suspect that like me he is actually an agnostic on the issue).

Wolf, I think, holds a bizarre asymmetrical view according to which right-doing and praisewothiness are compatible with determinism whereas wrongdoing and blame worthiness are not (or at least require alternative possibilities). An unstable view.

But what Socrates says there is not at all equivalent to "the only true wisdom is knowing you know nothing". The simple fact is that Socrates never said it.

↪Nikolas
"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing." Socrates
— Nikolas — Bartricks

Have you found a reference for that quote yet?

No, self-refutation doesn't require inconsistency, at least not in the content of what has been asserted. If I sincerely say "it is raining, but nobody believes it is" then my statement is self-refuting, but it is not inconsistent. There is no contradiction contained in it. Yet I have refuted myself for in saying it I demonstrate its falsity.

Similarly, the claim that nothing can be shown is like this: any attempt to show it to be true assumes its falsity.
Anyway:

It would seem the "principle of phenomenal conservatism" or the "principle of credulity, or what "appears to be true", while not self-refuting, are certainly no more authoritative than the even more fundamental and credible principles of identity or non-contradiction. — James Riley

Yes it is, because our evidence that the principle of non-contradiction is true is that it appears to be. That is, our reason represents it to be. How would the principle of non-contradiction possibly have more rational authority than the principle of phenomenal conservatism?

I *think* that a principle of logical argument is that the burden of proof is upon the proponent. — James Riley

That is false. It is self-refuting. Note, that claim - that the burden of proof is upon the proponent - is itself something you (or someone) is proposing. And thus they have the burden of proof. And any attempt they make to discharge it, will involve making proposals. And thus it will never be discharged. That claim is therefore equivalent to claiming that nothing can be shown, including that nothing can be shown. Which is self-refuting. (I assume you have heard of this 'principle' from the internet - from a youtube video, or wikipedia or some such? That is, you've heard of it from wholly unreliable sources).

The basic principle of intellectual inquiry is that the burden of proof is on the one whose claim conflicts with appearances. It's known as the principle of phenomenal conservatism or sometimes the principle of credulity.

Note, it is not self-refuting, for it itself appears to be true. And thus we have reason to believe it is true and the burden of proof is on the person who thinks that principle is false.

But it means that when you say this:

When I hear "logic" assert the Principle of Identity, I say "prove it." Logic's response seems to be, it's "self-evident". That response reminds me of a frustrated parent saying "because I said so." — James Riley

You are mistaken. The best and only evidence you can ever have that a proposition is true, is that it is either itself self-evident to our reason, or it is implied by something that is. Your parents, of course, are not Reason and thus when they say "because I say so" this does not constitute evidence in support of what they have said. (For an analogy: if I simply write an extra zero on my bank statement, that does not make me ten times richer. However, if the bank writes an extra zero on my balance, then I really am ten times richer).

Yes.

I am personally agnostic on whether compatibilism or incompatibilism is true, as I think the more important ingredient is possession of an immaterial soul.

I follow Descartes in thinking that we should first get clear about what is clearest and not dismiss the more clear on the basis of the less.

As it is more clear that I have free will than that free will either requires, or does not require, indeterminism, I conclude that I have free will (and conclude that it would be irrational to revise that conclusion in light of the discovery that determinism is true, should that discovery ever be made).

But my reason - which is my only guide to what's what - says that if everything about me is a product of external factors that I had no hand in, then I would not have free will. Contrary to what Sam Harris says, a puppet is 'not' free if it loves its strings.

So, I conclude that my decisions are not wholly the product of external factors that I had no hand in. There are, of course, external factors that play a causal role in me deciding as I do. But there's another ingredient as well: me. I make my decisions, and even if I have been caused to do so by external factors, as long as I am responsible for being the me that I am, then I will still be responsible for those decisions as they will still be 'mine'.

However, if I am a physical object - such as my brain or whatever - then everything about me will be a product of external factors, as I clearly did not create my own body. So if I am a physical thing, then I am not responsible for being the me that I am.

Thus, if I have free will - and my reason assures me I do - then I am not a physical object. My physical body is simply my temporary accommodation, but is no more 'me' than my house is.

Thus, I must be an immaterial soul. Free will requires it.