I would think no. Because the intention to do X didn’t affect whether or not you tried or succeeded at doing X, physically. — khaled
I would think to be morally responsible in that scenario you’d need some social definition of moral responsibility. — khaled
If so, then I think that bizarre and unmotivated thesis
— Bartricks
Why bizarre? It comes from splitting up the world into mental and physical stuff. Then noticing that the physical stuff seems to be self determining with no need of mental stuff. — khaled
So, just to be clear, your view is that if I attempt to kill Sarah, I am not morally responsible for forming that intention if it does not result in Sarah's death? — Bartricks
it is being claimed that material events cause mental events, but mental events can't cause material events. That's perverse. If there are material events, then we have good evidence that they cause mental events and vice versa. I just intended to raise my arm and it raised. There. — Bartricks
Oh, and physical stuff does not appear to be self-determining. When a physical thing does something we look for a cause of its doing it. — Bartricks
No that’s not my view. That you interpreted it that way is too bonkers for words.
If you decide to kill Sarah, your attempt to kill Sarah following that decision was not actually caused by that decision. So you did not even cause the physical attempt of killing Sarah. So how can you be blamed for something you didn’t cause? — khaled
Your intention to raise the arm and it rising isn’t evidence that the intention was causal. In the same way that a color change preceding a pH change in titration is not evidence that the color has anything to do with pH (it doesn’t). And the fact that the intention always precedes the action is consistent with epiphenomenalism. — khaled
I am morally responsible for my decisions regardless of whether they are effective in the world. — Bartricks
What in blue blazes are you on about? — Bartricks
Because whether I am morally responsible or not for my intentions and decisions and other mental activities has nothing to do with whether they are causally effective in the world. — Bartricks
then I am not morally responsible for being the mind that I am and so consequently I would not be morally responsible for any of my mental activity. — Bartricks
Sure. I would assume that being morally responsible would require you and your decisions to be able to.... you know.... do something. Guess not though. — khaled
Whether or not the thesis is bizarre and motivated. You would have known that had you simply read what I quoted. — khaled
Because whether I am morally responsible or not for my intentions and decisions and other mental activities has nothing to do with whether they are causally effective in the world.
— Bartricks
I think you're on your own there. — khaled
Morality applies to actions. Not mental activities. — khaled
And I'm curious how you think your mind originated. Not due to your birth or anything physical like that of course. So what? It was just sort of always there? An immortal soul of some sort? — khaled
kill Sarah your intention does not need to have resulted in Sarah's death, it is sufficient that you formed it. Obviously. — Bartricks
Not a great friend of Consistency are you? — Bartricks
This is a derailing move as whether epiphenomenalism is plausible or not is demonstrably irrelevant to the free will question. — Bartricks
It applies to more than actions, and some mental activities are actions and is essential to all actions. So, you know, well done. — Bartricks
1. If my mind is the product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for anything about my mind or anything it is caused to do. (If A, then B) — Bartricks
Remember: I agree with Strawson over 1. I agree that to be morally responsible, your decisions must not trace to external causes — Bartricks
↪Bartricks
kill Sarah your intention does not need to have resulted in Sarah's death, it is sufficient that you formed it. Obviously.
— Bartricks
Obviously not. In that example, you still attempted to kill Sarah. If you hadn't attempted you did nothing wrong. — khaled
You're just not a great friend of understanding. You sound so self assured I feel sorry for you because you always end up looking like an idiot when shown the obvious thing you've been missing. — khaled
It applies to more than actions, and some mental activities are actions and is essential to all actions. So, you know, well done.
— Bartricks
You know that I mean. Physical actions. I just don't understand what you gain by trying to make such a stupid very easily dismissible "objection". — khaled
1. If my mind is the product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for anything about my mind or anything it is caused to do. (If A, then B)
— Bartricks
This premise is just false. You don't know if your mind is material or immaterial at this junction correct? If your mind WAS immaterial, then it could be the product of external events you had no hand in, but still not be caused to do anything as a result (be undetermined). — khaled
Even if your mind was material, it could be that indeterminism is the case, in which case, again, you would be responsible for what it does, regardless of whether or not it was created by factors outside your control. — khaled
Remember your original argument for this? It was "In order to be morally responsible my actions must not fully trace to external causes". Well if your mind is undetermined (either by it being immaterial or by it being material and indeterminism being the case), then it could be a product of external events, yet still your actions would not all trace to external causes. — khaled
It isn't a difficult point to grasp and it is obviously true. — Bartricks
If a bedridden paralyzed patient who can't move any muscle in his body intends to donate to charity, but since he can't move he doesn't, has he done something moral? Similarly if he decides to kill someone, but since he can't move he doesn't, has he done something immoral? — khaled
And all actions have a mental element for actions are the exclusive preserve of agents, and agents are minds and an action is caused by certain kinds of mental event. — Bartricks
Why on earth would I be responsible for what my mind does if its activities are indeterministic? — Bartricks
False. Indeterministic causation is still causation. When an event is undetermined, it is not uncaused. It was caused, just indeterministically. — Bartricks
Literally no idea what your point is. On what grounds do you reject premise 1? Present a deductively valid argument that has the negation of 1 as a conclusion. — Bartricks
I just explained the point to my plate of fish fingers and I think one of them got it. — Bartricks
But just to be clear: to you "traces to external causes" is the case even if indeterminism is the case? Sure. Even though no combination of the external causes can ever decide the result, apparently the result still traces to external causes. Gotcha. — khaled
if indeterminism is true events still have causes. — Bartricks
All determinism can say in both cases is that they were determined to say this due to some prior cause. And to say that the cause was some enlightening rational argument is not understanding determinism. So the very arguments to support determinism are undermined by the very idea of determinism since it is an idea that is arational by nature. — Richard B
Well, that's fine if her view is that blame and praise come with the same control and origination requirements (I am not sure if that is her view - though it has also been a while since I read anything by her, and the last thing I read was her Freedom within Reason, which is quite old so perhaps her views have changed or perhaps the view I attributed to her was not her view). But from memory her view there was that someone born evil is not morally responsible for their subsequent evil acts, whereas someone born good is morally responsible for their subsequent good acts. And if that's right, well, it seems prima facie implausible. — Bartricks
That seems to be somewhat of a distortion of Wolf's view. — Pierre-Normand
A mind is a thing. An object. — Bartricks
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