Again, that's a fact about you and isn't relevant to the topic.

Not a problem, but surely if you're genuinely interested in what's true then you have to listen to reason? Otherwise all you're doing is listening to yourself - that is, you'll just be trying to find a story about reality that you like, or a community of believers that you'd like to join. But none of that is evidence.
Berkeley listens intently to reason and reports what he hears. And you can check whether your reason confirms what his says. And his says that the world our sensations tell us about must resemble our sensations in some way, otherwise they would not be telling us about it.
That's true, yes? It's truth becomes apparent on reflection.
And sensations can only resemble other sensations - that's true too, isn't it?
And sensations can only exist as the sensational activity of a mind - that's true as well, yes?
What follows? That the external sensible world is made of the sensational activity of another mind.

No drugs, no meditation, just cold hard reasoning.

t

As I said, ignoring non human suffering, you cannot deny that the average person is a positive influence. And so not having them risks becoming more harmful than having them. — khaled

But that's trivial. Yes, if we ignore all the ways in which we have a negative impact and focus only on the ways in which we have a positive impact, then yes, I would say that we have a positive impact. But that's to do no more than say "a positive consequence is a positive consequence". It tells us nothing about the morality of procreation.

In fact procreating is clearly an activity that creates both suffering and pleasure. Even putting aside the quantities involved, what I am noting is that most of the suffering that such acts create is undeserved - which is the worst kind of suffering, morally speaking. That is, of all the kinds of suffering we have moral reason to prevent, the kind we have weightiest reason to prevent is undeserved suffering. By contrast, most of the pleasures procreative acts create are non-deserved. (Indeed, many are positively undeserved, for if procreative acts are immoral, then the pleasures that those who commit such acts derive from having done so will typically be positively undeserved).
Non-deserved pleasures are still good or can be. But their being non-deserved typically means that we do not have any weighty moral reason to create them.
And undeserved pleasures are positively bad and we typically have moral reason to prevent them.

Why would such lives contain far more undeserved suffering than pleasure? Can you explain? — baker

Because most people don't want to live such monkish lives of self deprivation. So they will suffer considerably if they live such lives. And that suffering is unjust, for by hypothesis they are subjecting themselves to such deprivations becasue and only because they live in a world in which not doing so would visit even greater sufferings on others. None of that was their doing, so their suffering is undeserved.

This would be true even if it were the case that they were morally required to live lives of deprivation.

What other pains and pleasures are there other than those in a life of one who has been subjected to life? — Isaac

The pains and pleasures caused to others, obviously.

Why 'implausibly'? You've admitted the being subject to unjust suffering puts someone in a position of deserving happiness. You've said that to that be born is to experience unjust suffering. — Isaac

No, I said that's one way in which one might come to deserve pleasure, I did not say that it was inevitable that it would.

But yes, subjecting someone to a life here creates lots of undeserved suffering. Not, note, just the suffering the liver of the life endures, but the suffering imposed on others. Now, most - most - of that is going to be undeserved. Most doesn't mean 'all'.

Some of the undeserved suffering a person who has been subjected to a life here will endure may well make them deserving of subsequent pleasures. That is not being denied.

But I then gave an example to show that even if 'all' of the pleasures in a life come to be deserved in that way, it would probably still be immoral to create that life, because it is generally wrong to do bad that good may come of it. The example I gave was of an innocent person, Tim, whom we imprison. That was an unjust thing to do even if Tim subsequently murders someone in prison and thereby comes to deserve to be there.

I do not understand your reply. It didn't engage with the arguments I presented.

Another argument against materialism, this time by George Berkeley.

Let's start by just clarifying what we mean by 'material world'. We mean a world that exists 'objectively'. That is, a world that is not made of mental states - a world that exists outside all minds, then.

What evidence do we have of the existence of such a place? Well, most people are going to appeal to their sensations. That is, they take the 'material world' to be the place that their senses are telling them about.

However, argues Berkeley, the 'sensible world' and the 'material world' cannot be the same place. For the sensible world - the world of shapes, colours, smells, tastes, textures and so on - must resemble our sensations, for otherwise in what sense would they be telling us about it? (they do not have to resemble it perfectly, of course; but they do need to resemble it in some sense)

Yet sensations can only resemble sensations. Smells are like smells and not another thing; tastes are like tastes and not another thing; and so on. So, the sensible world that our sensations give us some insight into must itself be made of sensations.

But sensations are essentially sensed. That is, they exist 'as' states of mind. And so the sensible world - the world that our sensations give us some awareness of - must exist as the states of a mind. Not my mind or your mind - for the world is clearly not a creature of our wills - but the mind whose sensations they are.

Thus, our sensations give us evidence for the existence of a sensible world, but a sensible world is not a material world.

It seems, then, that we have no empirical evidence that the material world exists. That doesn't entail its non existence. However, now that we can see that the material world is not the world our sensations tell us about, it is hard to attach any meaning to the term 'material world'. That is, it looks as if it is an empty idea.

I don't think the material world exists. Here's an argument for that:

1. Material objects are, by their very nature, infinitely divisible
2. Nothing that exists is infinitely divisible
3. Therefore material objects do not exist

1 is obviously true. Any material object occupies some space, and any region of space can be divided.

2 is self-evident to reason, at least upon reflection. For if something is divisible then it has parts - those into which it can be divided. And so an infinitely divisible thing will have infinite parts. But there cannot exist any actual infinities. That's precisely why we reject views that generate infinite regresses.

3 just follows as a matter of logic.

We don't rate him.

That would have to be determined by some impossible hedonic calculator. As I recall, Bentham did insist that some pleasures were superior in their cash value than others. I lean toward the romantic: Living a life of deep, Wordsworthian experiences or, as Mill would have it, the philosopher's, exceeds that of the brute mentality. — Constance

No it wouldn't. There's nothing 'impossible' about a hedonic calculator incidentally. But like I say, I stipulated that, for the sake of argument, the average human life creates as much pleasure as pain. My focus was on desert and how deservingness can make a radical difference to how much such pleasure or pain counts, morally speaking.

And it wasn't Bentham but Mill who distinguished between higher and lower pleasures. But like I say, that's not the issue. For there can be deserved higher pleasures, undeserved higher pleasures and non-deserved higher pleasures.

You then say that desert makes no sense in this world. Well, I think that's demonstrably false. Certainly the burden of proof is on the desert denier, not me. But note too that if someone can only resist my argument by rejecting moral desert wholesale, then it must be a very strong argument. It's a bit like rejecting my argument by saying "but we can't know anything!"

Yes, but that's beside the point. Most people aren't going to live such lives, nor are they morally required to, and if they did then - for most people - such lives would contain far more undeserved suffering than pleasure.

Well none of that made any sense to me at all. Sorry.

I think this is demonstrably false. If this were true then humans would be each better off living as hermits. — khaled

How does that follow? It's not better 'for me' to live as a hermit. It is better for me to live as I am - which is in a manner that causes a great deal of undeserved suffering to other creatures (for I live a comfortable western lifestyle).

But let's say I decide to live as a hermit. Okay, well now my life would contain a great deal of undeserved suffering, for living such a life would be extremely unpleasant.

Of course, it is entirely unreasonable to expect anyone to live such a life, and unreasonable to expect that any offspring one creates will adopt it. Most of us live our lives in ways that cause considerable undeserved suffering to other creatures. Our lives also contain much undeserved suffering - but if we went out of our way to prevent causing undeserved suffering to other creatures, then our lives would contain even more.

Like more traditional arguments for antinatalism, this looks circular. The asymmetry detected is in fact entered by hand. A person treats people with kindness and as a result, on her birthday, is thrown a lovely surprise birthday party which she takes pleasure in. But we define this pleasure to be undeserved without reason, making it qualitatively the same as a bully who steals a winning lottery ticket. — Kenosha Kid

It doesn't look circular, and nor is it. But perhaps you do not know what a circular argument is or maybe you are using the term in an unorthodox way.

I have no idea what your example was supposed to illustrate. The person you mention probably deserves the pleasure she receives. Why do you think I would think it "qualitatively the same asa bully who steals a winning lottery ticket"? I can't fathom how you could think anything I said implied such things.

My case above assumes that the amount of pleasure and pain created by the average human life are equal, but that they differ only in terms of their deservingness.

In reality I think that things are not equal at all, and that the average human life creates considerably more pain and suffering than pleasure (we just have a myopic tendency to focus only on human pains and pleasures). But once one factors in all the suffering we cause to animals, I think it's clear that we record a negative balance, and quite a big one at that. (Not that I'm blaming us too much for that - most of the blame lies with our parents)

If I understand you correctly, you are suggesting that the average human can be expected to prevent a great deal of undeserved pain. I don't think that's true. Most humans are not justice warriors (and nor, I think, are they obliged to be). I think we create far more undeserved pain than we prevent. I mean, most of us are not dedicating our lives to preventing undeserved pain from occurring. And, as I say, I don't think we are under any obligation to either, as that would be beyond the call of duty.

I don't see what's problematic in that assertion. You say that suffering is a personal experience. Yes, nothing I've said supposes otherwise. You say it is not a physical property. Again yes, but nothing I've said assumes otherwise.

Pain is essentially experienced. That is, it exists 'as' an experience. ("I'm experiencing some pain, but am I actually in pain?" makes no sense).

But this is all by the by. What's relevant to my case is that a) pain often matters morally (that is, the fact an act will create some pain is often a fact about an act that has great moral significance), and b) that whether pain/pleasure is deserved or undeserved also makes a great difference to whether an act that promotes it is right or wrong.

I don't think you're saying anything particularly interesting here other than we should not hurt others to where there's no utility in doing so. — Cobra

But that's not what I'm saying. I am unclear how you got that from anything I said. I have not expressed a commitment to utilitarianism. indeed, far from it - I draw a distinction between deserved and undeserved pleasure/pain, which is a distinction that no classic utilitarian would recognize (to the discredit of the theory). Desert is typically said to be a 'deontological' notion, precisely because whether or not you deserve something is not a function of the consequences of giving it to you. So, the fact that giving me X would maximise happiness does not entail that I deserve X.

Nevertheless, I agree that the premises of my argument are uninteresting in that they are quite uncontroversial. Most recognise that moral desert exists and that whether a pleasure or a pain is deserved or not makes - or can make - a radical difference to the moral justifiability of an act that creates it.

But my conclusion - that antinatalism is true or at least lent weight by what I have argued - is, of course, extremely controversial. And I suppose I'd say that the interest lies both in this - that is, that some very uncontroversial and highly plausible premises imply a controversial and widely disbelieved conclusion - and the fact that the argument in question is a novel one.

No, not necessarily or likely. You're mistakenly assuming that I am talking exclusively about the pains and pleasures contained in the life of the one who has been subjected to a life. They're in the mix, but I am talking about all the pleasures and pains that a life here can reasonably be taken to create.

But even ignoring that, it won't make much of a difference. Assume, very implausibly and just for the sake of argument, that every experience of pleasure in your life is deserved due to a prior experience of an undeserved pain. I don't think that's going to make it ok to have created those pains and pleasures.

Imagine, for instance, that we can reasonably expect that if Tim is unjustly imprisoned for murder, he will commit a murder in prison that will subsequently justify us keeping him there. Is it right and good for us to imprison Tim? Surely not. The fact that 'if' we imprisoned him he would subsequently become deserving of that imprisonment doesn't seem to cut it. What seems important is that Tim is innocent and doesn't deserve to be imprisoned. Pace Shakespeare, all is not well that ends well.

It seems to me that you are conflating 'deserved' suffering with 'justified' suffering.

Sure, it can sometimes be morally justified to make one person suffer for the sake of the welfare of others. But that doesn't mean that the person who suffers 'deserved' to suffer.

Whether some suffering is deserved or not can make a big difference to whether we are justified in bringing it about. For instance, the suffering we cause to criminals when we incarcerate them is suffering that we are justified in subjecting them too in part, at least, because they deserve it.

And the major reason why we insist on a presumption of innocence in a trial is precisely because if we incarcerate someone innocent, then we will be subjecting someone to undeserved suffering.

So the moral significance of some suffering is radically affected by whether or not it is deserved. And as the presumption of innocence shows, we typically consider it extremely important not to be the agents of undeserved suffering.

Applied to procreation: procreating undeniably creates a large amount of undeserved suffering. Even in the unlikely event that procreating creates an equally large amount of pleasure, most of that pleasure is going to be non-deserved. And that, I think, is going to operate to make procreative acts immoral, other things being equal.

Not relevant. This thread is about whether an act that creates equal quantities of undeserved pain and non-deserved pleasure is good or right.

You didn't distinguish what a "deserved", "non-deserved" and "undeserved" pleasure is. Maybe an example from each? — khaled

Imagine someone who is living a kind, generous and honest life. That person, I'd say, deserves to be happy.

Or imagine someone who, through no fault of their own, has suffered considerably up to now. That person deserves to be happy.

So, one way of coming to deserve pleasure is through one's deeds, and one way is through being a victim of undeserved suffering. No doubt there are other ways too, those are just the ones that occur to me.

When it comes to undeserved pleasure - well, the case that comes to mind is that of Dr Mengele. Dr Mengele performed many horrific experiments on concentration camp victims. But he escaped after the war and lived the rest of his life in, it would seem, happy retirement in south america. His happiness was positively undeserved. That is, the fact Dr Mengele had a happy life is not a fact that makes the world a better place, but a worse one. Why? Because he did not deserve to be happy. His pleasure, then, is positively undeserved.

And as for non-deserved pleasure - well that's just pleasure that sits in the middle of the 'deserved pleasure/undeserved pleasure' spectrum. So if I'm just walking down the street and I find some money or am given a nice compliment or something - well, it's not that I positively deserve the pleasures those things give me (it doesn't seem 'unjust' if I go for a walk and no one gives me a nice compliment, for example, or I don't find any money). So those pleasures - which I think will be the vast bulk - are non-deserved. They're good - I'm not saying anything against them. But they're not positively deserved, at least not typically.

Contrary to what you assert, it is not relevant. The soundness of an argument is unaffected by the motives of the arguer.

A utilitarian measure, and not sure about the premise that a person's life realizes more pain over suffering is sound. But then, the entire argument ignores the qualitative distinctions between pleasures and pains, as well as in the grounding these have in ways unseen. The dismissal of undeservedness or deservedness antecedent to being thrown into an existence is an assumption that needs to be argued. — Constance

Although I think it is almost certainly the case that an average human life will cause much more suffering than pleasure overall, I was very clear in saying that I would not assume this and would instead assume that the quantities are equal. That is, I will assume - for the sake of argument alone - that the average human life creates as much pleasure as pain.

I do not ignore qualitative distinctions, they're simply not relevant to the argument I am making and so I didn't mention them (for the point is about our deservingness of the pains and pleasures involved, a point that cuts across qualitative distinctions).

As to this: "The dismissal of undeservedness or deservedness antecedent to being thrown into an existence is an assumption that needs to be argued". That too is both incorrect and irrelevant. It is incorrect because the burden, surely, is on you, not me. That is, the default is not that we are born positively deserving to suffer, or born positively deserving pleasure; the default is that we are born 'innocent' - that is, we do not positively deserve to suffer, nor do we positively deserve pleasure. If you think we are born deserving to suffer, or born deserving pleasure, then you need to provide us with some justification for that belief.

But anyway, it's beside the point. For whether we are born deserving to suffer or not, my question was a 'what if'. So, 'if' people are born innocent, and 'if' the quantities of pleasure and pain a life creates are equal, then does the fact that most of the pains will be positively undeserved whereas most of the pleasures will be non-deserved imply that such acts are morally bad, other things being equal?

Just clarifying. That being the case, if I were to rephrase the statement in a clearer way, as in "the best explanation of why reason would disapprove of us approving of or creating bad art is that reason disaproves of bad art", would you not call that circular? — Noble Dust

That isn't what I said - I said that bad art is art that we have reason (lower case r) not to adopt certain attitudes towards. The kind of reason in question is an 'aesthetic' reason (a kind of normative reason).

The best explanation of 'that' is that Reason herself disapproves of the art in question, for typically if we disapprove of something we disapprove of others approving of it.

Question begging. What's BS about it?

You conflated an idea with the thing it is an idea of. A classic mistake.

I said Reason is a person and persons 'can' adopt attitudes towards things (for instance, you're a person and 'contempt' is the attitude you're adopting towards me).

Perhaps you think philosophers know already what Reason is. Well, that's a mistake as a cursory knowledge of the literature would tell you.

Back at you. I never said 'concepts adopt attitudes' did I? I said Reason adopts attitudes towards things. And I said that Reason is a person. Persons - and persons alone - adopt attitudes towards things.

Reason is not a concept. A concept is an idea. Reason is not an idea, it is something we have ideas 'of'.

Yes. Reason with a capital 'R' that is. She's a person. Our 'reason' is a faculty that gives us some awareness of her attitudes. And 'reasons' are her attitudes.

All of which can be demonstrated by means rational. Though you, no doubt, would consider that circular.

No it isn't. Inferences to the best explanation are not circular arguments. And, to my knowledge, you are not my friend.

No you don't, for I am not exhibiting any misunderstanding. So I don't know what you're astonished at, but it isn't that.

Well I hope you're laughing out loud in astonishment at the brevity with which I accurately answered the question.

If art is bad, then - other things being equal - we have some reason to adopt certain attitudes towards it. Someone who, for instance, looked at it approvingly, would be adopting an attitude towards it that they have reason not to adopt towards it (which is just another way of saying that they would be adopting an attitude towards it that Reason does not approve of them adopting).

So bad art is art that Reason disapproves of, for that is the best explanation of why - strange circumstances aside - she would disapprove of us approving of it or creating it, or whatever.

Your question seems to run distinct things together.

For instance, you ask us to imagine several events happening simultaneously. So the first thought experiment involves simultaneity. To imagine it we do not need to imagine the events happening 'now', it is sufficient that we simply imagine them all happening 'at the same time' (whether past, present, or future).

And we can do it. That is, we can imagine numerous events occurring simultaneously. By hypothesis, doing that requires imagining that all the events have something in common. And what we imagine them having in common is the same temporal property.

Clearly, then, we can imagine temporal properties, else how could we pull off the imaginative feat described above?

And it is possession of one kind of temporal property rather than another that disguishes the 'now' from the past and the future. What we take to be 'now' is that which we take to have the property of presentness.

You ask 'when is now?'. The question answers itself. For now is now and not another time.

Or, what is it that defines bad art? — Invisibilis

Bad art is art that Reason disapproves of.

You CAN imagine a world in which the collection of molecules known as your body doesn’t exist correct? Therefore your body existing is a contingent truth. You’re trying to imagine the “experience of not existing” which is not a coherent concept so of course you’d fail. — khaled

No, that's question begging. Yes, of course I can imagine my body not existing. And most would agree that my body's existence is contingent. But that isn't what the notion of 'contingency' means (it does not mean 'is conceivably false'. For I find myself unable to imagine myself not existing, yet clearly my self's existence, no less than my body's existence, is considered by most to be contingent too.

So you're persisting with the idea that necessity and contingency has something to do with conceivability, despite the fact there is damning evidence that this is not the case, plus just taken at face value it seems absurd to think that our imaginations place limits on reality and vice versa.

Really? You cannot imagine a world in which your parents never met? — khaled

Er, we're going in tedious circles here - my parents created my body, not my self. So yes, I can obviously imagine that, but it's beside the point.

Maybe actually read what I’m saying. — khaled

Maybe YOU should do that - you don't seem to understand your own view, or why it seems to be two quite different views that you vacillate between.

However you swap around the terms and definitions “a married unmarried man cannot exist” will remain true. When someone says “true by definition” It usually means “if you substitute the definition in it will be clear that the statement is true” which is exactly what I mean. — khaled

No, first "a married unmarried man cannot exist" is not true if the 'cannot' means 'necessarily cannot', for it is by convention - and thus not necessary - that 'unmarried' means 'not married'.

And if you agree that 'necessarily true' adds nothing to 'true' (and that this is also true of contingently true') then you agree with me.

Under what conditions do propositions deserve our convictions or our doubts? — TheMadFool

When Reason herself seems either to express a conviction that they are true, or a doubt about the matter, or seems to favour 'us' being doubtful about the truth of the proposition in question (given how we have acquired it).

So, it seems clear and distinct to our reason that 2 + 2 = 4 - indeed, our reason represents 2 + 2 necessarily to = 4, which is our reason's way of conveying Reason's conviction that this is so.

Thus, we are justified in believing very firmly that 2 + 2 = 4.

If you are asking what I think 'metaphysically' impossible, or 'metaphysically' possible mean, then I do not know. That's my whole point. I think they do not describe real features of the world. And I think we can dispense with them and still do fine in terms of reasoning about things, for we can dispense with them and not find ourselves having to affirm contradictions.

We can still say a proposition is 'necessarily' true, but now the term will be functioning expressively - it will express our conviction that it is actually true, rather than saying something special about the proposition itself. That is how the word typically functions in everyday life.

But the idea that necessity and contingency are real features of the world, as opposed to expressions of conviction or doubt (and such like) is, I think, false.

So you’re trying to imagine the experience of not existing? That’s an incoherent concept. Of course you would not be able to imagine that, that’s like trying to imagine a square circle. If your body doesn’t exist the “I” (probably) won’t exist but it pointless to try to imagine what that would “feel like” — khaled

Yes, er, that's MY point - I cannot conceive of not existing. I cannot imagine it. But clearly that does not mean that I exist of necessity. So 'inconceivable' does not capture what philosophers mean when they say that a proposition is true of necessity. For the proposition "Bartricks exists" is one that I cannot conceive of being false, yet it is not a proposition that any philosopher I know of would say is of a kind that is 'necessarily' true (as opposed to just 'true').

So, I give you an example of something I - and anyone else who is clear about what is involved - cannot conceive of being the case, and you first say that you can conceive of it, and now you say that it is impossible to conceive of it. Okay, so again, "Bartricks exists" is a proposition whose falsity I cannot conceive of, yet that is not necessarily true. Thus, when we wonder what necessity is, conceivability is not a good guide.

I can’t think of an example of something that is inconceivably false that is not true by definition or vice versa. Though that could just be a lack of imagination. Care to provide an example? — khaled

To quote you, "I literally just did!" This proposition "Khaled exists" is, for you, a proposition you cannot conceive to be false, yes? But it is not true by definition. And it is not necessarily true.

Yes it does, because you can substitute the meanings of the words in. For example: a married bachelor cannot exist can be translated to: A married unmarried man cannot exist. Which is obviously true and will remain true regardless of whatever word you use to encapsulate “unmarried man”. — khaled

But you said that 'necessarily' true should be understood to mean 'true by definition'. But the definition of a term - and thus what you can substitute one word for - are not necessary truths. So, although it is true that bachelors are unmarried men, it is not necessarily true because the definitions of those terms are not necessary truths. It is not 'necessarily' true that 'bachelor' means 'unmarried man'. It just does.

So I don't see how what you've said addresses the point. In effect all you've said is that so long as bachelor means unmarried man, a bachelor will be an unmarried man and vice versa. Well, yes. But that's no different to saying that so long as there is some cheese in my fridge it will be true that there is some cheese in my fridge. Yet clearly it is just 'true' that there is some cheese in my fridge - it is not necessarily true.

So 'true by definition' doesn't capture what 'necessarily true' means either.

See my responses to you.

I do not know what you mean. I am talking at a conceptual level. Goodness and 'getting what you want' are not equivalent. Sometimes it is good to get what you want, sometimes it isn't. So 'good' and 'getting what I want' are not the same notion. And thus a maximally good world can also be one in which lots of wants are frustrated.

You must admit this too, for you think this is the best world and yet clearly many wants go frustrated in it.

I was not 'trying' to say something, I 'did' say that this world is maximally good.

I was then trying to figure out what 'you' might have meant by 'best possible world'. And it seems you have to mean that it is the best world imaginable.
But then that seems obviously false unless one adds to it that it is the best world imaginable once one understands that it is maximally good.

And that's equivalent just to saying that this world is maximally good.

But then you decided that this is equivalent to saying that everyone gets what they want, which is not something I said or believe.

That isn't what I said at all.

The world is maximally good. That doesn't mean everyone gets what they want. It depends what you want. Some things one ought not to want - some wants are bad to have. And some people - lots, no doubt - don't deserve to get what they want.