It's just confused.

If I have a million dollars in the bank, and yet I also owe a million dollars, I do not have nothing. I have a million dollars in cash and a million dollars in debt.

If I use some of the million to buy a Ferrari, I have not bought it with 'nothing' have I?

If the meaning of indivisibility is identical, then banks and cornflakes are just synonymous names. Get it? — BrianW

Well, I get something from that, but what I get is about your intelligence, not about my argument. Have you been putting money in cornflake packets again?

No. I meant infer. I gave an example of my observation of certain phenomena and from it deduced that possibility. — BrianW

No, you meant 'imply', you just don't know that that's what you meant, because you don't know what a lot of words mean, such as 'bank', 'cornflake', 'indivisible', 'mind', 'imply' and 'infer'.

I addressed this in the OP. One view about sex is that it is wholly determined by your physical features (of which the genital view would be one).

My point is not that such views are true, but that sex would clearly be changeable if they were true. As it would be if any other view were true apart from the 'historical' one.

Why is Caitlyn Jenner celebrated and Rachel Dolezal excoriated? 'Splain me that. It's a puzzler. — fishfry

Having now looked up who those people are, I think the best explanation is that race clearly does have an essential historical component, whereas sex - it would seem - does not.

Not your fault at all. But you can take actions to improve the well being of others. Are you obligated to?
Isn't that exactly the type of moral questions that people will simply have subjective opinions about? — ZhouBoTong

I do not know what a subjective opinion is (aren't all opinions subjective, in that they are made of subjective states?).

Do you mean that opinions about moral matters are opinions about subjective matters? In that case I agree - morality is made of the commands and values of a subject, Reason, and so is therefore subjective - but that seems beside the point, for there remains a fact of the matter about what we have obligations to do, a fact that the kind of reasoning I am engaging in is supposed to give us some insight into.

I agree that by boycotting meat one could make a difference - but then by staying hooked-up to Mat I could make a difference, but I do not seem to be obliged to hook up to Mat, especially given that Mat's situation is not my responsibility. Likewise, if it isn't my fault the meat industry exists, and isn't my fault if others take my desire for meat as inspiration to go and kill an animal so as to sell its meat to me, then I think I probably don't have an obligation to forego buying it.

I mean, imagine my enemy makes Mat ill in a way that would require me to give up all sweet products for life else Mat will die. Am I obliged to forego all sweet products for life so as to avert Mat's death? Surely not. Something about me has inspired my enemy to place Mat in a position where he needs me to change my diet in order to live, but that does not make me 'morally' responsible for Mat's position and so doesn't seem to generate any obligation for me to forego sweet products for life.

Agreed. Those things are interconnected though. That's what I'm pointing out. You can't be indistinguishable from a woman/man visually without having the right chromosomal structure — khaled

No, there is no necessary connection between the two, as your subsequent comment acknowledges"

If a guy puts on enough makeup and crossdresses to be indistinguishable from a woman — khaled

My whole point is that the toilet issue is irrelevant. Whatever reason you give that could plausibly justify stopping that person from going into the female toilets, it won't make essential reference to the chromosomal structure of his cells.

So who should and should not be let into which toilet is an issue that isn't plausibly about chromosomes. So if one's sex is determined by chromosomes - either partly or entirely - then that debate isn't about sex, but something else.

Yes because this would have side effects such as: Making them very distinguishable from someone who was born female. If somehow you could fix the hormonal imbalances without changing the chromosomes, sure, but that sounds even harder to do. — khaled

You're not addressing the example, though. Someone who thinks that your sex is determined by the chromosomal structure of your cells doesn't think your visual properties determine your sex. Someone who looked exactly like a stereotypical woman but whose cells had the wrong chromosomal structure would be deemed a man and not permitted entry to that bathroom. Which, I am saying, is absurd.

I don't think many hold that position. I think most have a problem with people that vaguely somewhat resemble women asking to use women's bathrooms or vice versa. — khaled

I think many do hold that position. But anyway, the revised position hat you are proposing is that women's toilets are therefore not for women strictly speaking (on this definition of a woman, that is - a woman now being someone whose cells have a certain chromosomal structure), but for those who look a certain way. But then those who satisfy the visual criteria should be admitted, regardless of their actual sex, surely?

But they could be changed. So someone who thinks sex is determined at the chromosomal level does not think that sex can't be changed, just that it's really difficult to change it.

I'm sceptical they're right. But let's imagine they are and that being female is a bit like being water (you need to be made of H2o to qualify as water, and some substance that is otherwise indistinguishable from water yet does not possess that chemical composition is not, strictly speaking water - it is Twater - even though virtually everyone might mistake it for some and it can perform all the same roles etc).

Okay, well that too would be irrelevant to all the issues that divide people. Why, for instance, should someone who is otherwise indistinguishable from a woman be stopped from using a female toilet? Their cells don't have the right chromosomal structure? That seems absurd. That would be like insisting that tea shouldn't be made with Twater, only water, even though Twater tastes exactly the same as water and imparts exactly the same flavour as water to anything to which it is added.

You grow up.

Explain please.

Why would I get back to you when a) you don't know your stuff, b) you think you do know your stuff (thus providing another depressing example of the truth of the principle that 'the less they know, the less they know it') c) you don't let any of this prevent you from offering condescending advice.

Immateriality does not automatically infer indivisibility. — BrianW

You mean 'imply' not 'infer'.

And I did not claim that immateriality implies indivisibility. I argued that indivisibility entails immateriality.

If I say "banks are indivisible" and you reply "cornflakes are indivisible" then you are not addressing me. Sinking in yet?

If you mean by 'consciousness' what I mean by 'mind', then you should use 'mind' not 'consciousness' as I'm the one who's made the argument. This is especially so given that I use 'consciousness' to refer to 'the state of consciousness' (like, you know, everyone else does).

Now, the mind - which is an object - is indivisible. And from that we can conclude that it is therefore simple and immaterial and uncaused.

No, I am using the word 'mind' conventionally. It is conventionally used to denote the object that bears our conscious experiences.

The philosophical debate is over what kind of an object it is - material, or immaterial.

If you call 'concsiousness' 'mind' then a) you are using a well-known term in a misleading way and b) you are simply not talking about what I am talking about.

If I say "banks are financial institutions and they're corrupt" you are not even addressing me if you say "banks are the sides of rivers and they are wet".

I mean by 'mind' - the 'object that is bearing our conscious experiences'. If you mean something else, start up your own thread and use the word 'mind' there to mean 'butterscotch biscuits' or whatever. My arguments - the arguments here - do not apply to your meaning, but to mine.

Now, unless you think conscious states can exist absent any object that they are the state of - in which case you're very confused - you accept that there is an object that bears conscious states. Call it Rupert if you want. I call it 'the mind'. The debate - the philosophical debate - is over what kind of an object it is. IF you're not interested in that debate, go away.

ah, well as we're giving advice: don't be dishonest. Don't say you're familiar with the literature when you're not. Reading a Stanford Encyclopedia page does not make you familiar with the literature. It is 'about' the literature, but it is not the literature.

Also, don't assume you know more than your opponent (until it becomes apparent that you do, that is - so, you know, the opposite of what's happening between me and you).

Oh, and don't give advice, just argue.

What are you? 12? — Artemis

What are you? Dishonest, perhaps? I mean, you've said you're familiar with the literature. Yet you can't answer my simple question.

By 'familiar with the literature' did you mean that you've just read some stuff on the internet? Methinks you did.

Have you found the answer to the question yet?

You call that which is indivisible, mind. I call it consciousness. Science calls it energy. Etc. Etc.
Like I said, you were right. Do you have a problem with that, too? — BrianW

Er, yes, obviously I have a problem because it is false. Baby steps. Consciousness is a mental state. Mental 'state'. That means 'state of mind'. A 'state of mind' is a - ooo wait for it - a. state. of. a. mind. State of a mind, not a mind. State of a mind, not a mind. State of a mind. not a mind. State of a mind. Not a mind.

The mind is the thing. Consciousness is a state of it. Write that out a thousand times. Then tattoo 'mind' on your left hand and 'state of mind' on your right so that you remember that they're distinct.

I could easily rephrase your argument as follows:

1. If there are mental states, there is an object - a material thing, called a brain - that they are the states of
2. There are mental states
3. Therefore there is an object - a material thing, called a brain - that they are states of — TheMadFool

No you couldn't! That's a 'different' argument because it has different premises!!

All you can conclude from the fact there are states, is that there is 'some thing' that they are the states of. Whether it is a material or immaterial thing is what needs to be shown, not assumed.

So that is not - absolutely not - my argument, but a completely different argument with a flagrantly question begging first premise!

Like I say, you don't know how to argue responsibly.

Well, you are not very familiar with the literature are you?

I asked you a question that anyone familiar with the literature would know the answer to.

You didn't answer it. Owned.

Here, you're trying to blur the line between the conventional meaning of "appearance" and truth. — TheMadFool

No, I am describing a principle known as 'the principle of phenomenal conservatism'. Like I say, it underpins all inquiry.

You the one confusing the distinction between appearance and truth. Strictly speaking appearances are not 'true' or 'false', but 'accurate' or 'inaccurate'. Truth and falsehood are properties of 'beliefs', rather than appearances.

Appearances are deceptive and therefore we rely on rationality as you have. — TheMadFool

Now you're just stipulating - on the basis of no evidence whatsoever - that the principle of phenomenal conservatism is false.

No, appearances 'can' be deceptive. Not 'are'. 'Can be'. But the default is that they are accurate, not that they are inaccurate.

If you think otherwise, you won't be able to argue for your position.

Anyway, this is all by-the-by - if the only way you can attack my arguments is by trying to call into question the whole project of arguing - the whole project of reasoning about reality - then you are effectively admitting that my arguments are formidable.

What you need to do is attack a premise, not attack philosophy tout court.

Ha, 'complexity' indeed - no, I have pointed out repeatedly that buying meat in the supermarket is not equivalent to taking out a hit on a cow. That's obviously true and part of what explains why it is true is that, even if one foresees that a cow will die as a result, one is not acting with the intention that this occur.

Now, you've taken issue with that. But that's a clear case. The debate over the intention and foresight distinction is a debate over less clear cases - it is over how, more precisely, to draw the distinction, not because there isn't one there or because it isn't morally relevant (there are clear cases where it is), but because there are greyer cases.

but if you actually read the literature yourself — Artemis

Why do you think I have not read the literature? I think you haven't.

For instance, above I drew attention to a way of drawing the distinction - a consequence of an action is foreseen rather than intended when the agent could, in principle, hope that it not obtain. It's well known in the literature. Who came up with it?

Just to be clear - your position is that doing X knowing that Y will be a consequence is the same as intended Y? And that the distinction - the well known distinction between intention and foresight that is at the heart of the doctrine of double effect and discussed ad nauseam in philosophy journals - is confused and has no moral relevance?
That's ridiculous.

No, it is a well known distinction - it is embodied in the doctrine of double effect - and a foreseen consequence is 'not' intended. No amount of foreseeing and calculating in light of it makes it 'intended'. It was not the goal of the act and one could, in principle, hope that a foreseen consequence not obtain (whereas one cannot coherently hope that an intended consequence not obtain).
Buying meat to eat is not plausibly an act of commissioning a death. If you think it is, then you simply have a crude position.

I am focusing on one thing. You're the one trying to weasel it to fit your paradigm. It couldn't actually be more simple. Again, if you foresee that A->B and you do A on purpose, then you're causing B on purpose. — Artemis

No, what you're doing is declaring an act to be intentional, when it clearly isn't. As whether an act is intentional or not can often make a radical difference to its morality, we need to get this straight.

If you foresee that your act will have a certain consequence, X, that does NOT mean that you intended X to occur. It does NOT mean that you caused X 'on purpose'.

There are countless examples to show this. Foreseeing that your act will have benefits for others is not the same as intending that your act have those consequences. Someone who gives money to charity in order to benefit others is acting in a praiseworthy fashion, whereas someone who gives an identical sum to the same charity simply in order to acquire some tax benefits (merely foreseeing that others will benefit) is either not praiseworthy at all, or at least considerably less so. Someone who jumps from a burning building to avoid the smoke and heat, foreseeing that the fall will kill them, has not intentionally killed themselves.

Take trolley cases. In the first case you divert the trolley away from the five people into the path of one person, foreseeing that they'll be killed. In the second case you shove a fat man off a bridge onto the rails with the intention that his bulk will stop the trolley in its tracks, saving five.

Virtually everyone gets the rational impression that the first act - diversion - is right, whereas the second, 'fat man' - is wrong. The acts have the same consequences - one life down, five saved - but they seem different morally. Wherein lies the difference? Both were actions that had the death of one as their consequence. But in one - diversion - the impact with the trolley is foreseen, whereas in the other - fat man - the impact is intended.

Again and again and again our intuitions confirm that a) there is a difference between whether a consequence was foreseen or intended and b) that the difference is often of the first importance morally.

Buying meat foreseeing that in doing so others will be inspired to kill animals is not - not - the same as intentionally killing those animals, or taking out a hit on those animals.

But like I say, you're dug in.

The proof for premise 1, is according to you, "it appears to be" which, despite it being couched in a hedge, is easy to confirm through personal experience: I'm aware of my mental processes and also that I exist, distinct from others and actually consider myself to be quite like the driver of a vehicle, steering the body to do my bidding. Also, as you said, there's no sense in which I could talk of a half or a quarter of my mind. — TheMadFool

It is not a 'proof', but 'evidence'. Appearances, whether sensible or rational, are prima facie evidence of the reality of what they represent to be the case. That's a principle of intellectual inquiry without which you'd be unable to argue for anything at all. For instance, it is on the basis of rational appearances that we recognise this argument form:

1. P
2. If P then Q
3. Therefore Q

to be valid.

Our reason represents us to be indivisible, which is prima facie evidence that we are. That 'prima facie' means not that it is a proof - we could discover that we have more powerful prima facie reason to discount these particular rational appearances (not 'all' rational appearances - that'd be self-undermining - but 'these' rational appearances). But it means that the burden of proof is on the person who wishes to deny that premise - they have to provide apparent countervailing evidence, otherwise they're just being dogmatic.

However, notice something about your immaterial mind. It, based on being simple (indivisible), being immaterial AND being uncaused is exactly identical to nothing. So, now I present you an analogical argument: — TheMadFool

I have twice now explained why this is obviously not so.

First, it is a conceptual truth that 'nothing' is not a thing. By contrast my mind is a thing.

Here's an argument for that (if one were needed):

1. If there are mental states, there is an object - a thing, called 'a mind' - that they are the states of
2. There are mental states
3. Therefore there is an object - a thing, called 'a mind' - that they are the states of.

And minds think, whereas 'nothing' does not.

That's no. 3. Three times now I have explained why minds are not 'nothing'. 3 times!

You're clearly just dogmatically assuming that if something is not material, it does not exist.

The evidence is that this is not so. The thing you're thinking with - the thing your reason tells you both exists and is indivisible, and thus simple and immaterial - is 'not material' yet 'is' existent

And, mind is what we, humans, refer to our awareness-response mechanism. So I guess you were right all along, consciousness is indivisible. :wink: — BrianW

Er no. I never said "consciousness is indivisible". I said my 'mind' is indivisible. Mind. Not 'consciousness'. Consciousness is a 'state' of a thing, not a thing itself. I am conscious. I am not consciousness.

Oh, sorry, I forgot, you need to go check if 'science' confirms that.

First, no - if the steering mechanism fails 'I' lose the ability to steer the car. Second - congratulations on completely missing the point.

So if your speech center is damaged, you lose the ability to speak. Now, if one thinks the mind survives death then it must mean that the entire brain shutting down is of no consequence for the mind. — TheMadFool

How does that follow? If the steering mechanism in my car fails, then I lose the ability to steer the car. That doesn't mean I am the car, does it? I am not the car. Yet if the steering mechanism fails, that's hardly of no consequence to me - I can't steer the car, and I'm in the car!

Likewise, if a certain region of my brain gets damaged, then I may lose the ability to speak. That doesn't mean I am my brain. I am not my brain, but I am at the moment stuck in one and without it I am unable to interact with the sensible world. So, if bits of my brain are damanged that's often of the first importance to me, even though I am not my brain.

The mind is divisible by the fact that when you die it will disintegrate. — BrianW

No it won't. Disintegrate into what? You're assuming that the mind is the brain. But it isn't. The mind is indivisible, therefore simple, therefore immaterial.

Complex objects disintegrate. Simple ones do not.

Harris states that damage to certain parts of the brain results in a specific loss of function corresponding to that part. So if your speech center is damaged, you lose the ability to speak. Now, if one thinks the mind survives death then it must mean that the entire brain shutting down is of no consequence for the mind. — TheMadFool

I do not deny that doing things to the brain affects what goes on in the mind. That's not in dispute.

But it is fallacious to infer that from the fact X affects Y, X therefore 'is' Y. Yet that's exactly what you've done. If I stick a pin through my brain, that's likely to affect what goes on in my mind, yes? That does not mean that my brain 'is' my mind.

So what you're seeing as evidence that the brain is the mind is actually just evidence of fallacious thinking on Harris's part (which is understandable given that his only qualification in philosophy is a BA - yet he insists on writing about philosophical subjects as if he is an expert). And, of course, fallacious thinking on your part and on the part of all those who think that 'science' somehow proves the brain is the mind.

It doesn't.

Firstly, modern science has proved, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that it's the brain that thinks. We've even mapped out the regions of the brain concerned with specific mental activity. — TheMadFool

No it hasn't! All science has shown - and this is hardly recent - is that events in the brain affect what goes on in the mind. If one thing affects another, that does not show they're the same thing! For instance, your responses are making me cross. That is, they are causing in me a certain mental state. Now, that doesn't show that I am your responses, does it! Or that your responses are my mental states. Yet by your logic it would.

Ergo, you must realize that you will have to move your business into the immaterial and your arguments on the mind being immaterial rest on 1) indivisibility and that I've brought to your notice is insufficient to make a clear distinction between the mind, considered immaterial and nothing. That's why in my humble opinion, you're trying to make a thing of nothing. — TheMadFool

I don't know what you're talking about.

Er, no. I literally just told you the ways in which a mind - which is a thing - differs from nothing. And you then reply that I am making a thing out of nothing. Sheesh - can you read?

Nothing is not a thing. My mind is. Big difference. So, my mind is not nothing.

My mind thinks. Nothing doesn't. Big difference. So my mind is not nothing.

And on and on.

But don't let a proof get in the way of a conviction. Good job!

Still not sure I'm following you. Can you define 'exactly' for me? And that little dot that followed it - . - what does that mean? And "That's" - can you define what you mean by "That's". Need to know we're on the same page, you see. Oh, and "my" and "position" and "," and "too", as well please. And that dot at the end - what does that mean? The same as the earlier dot or something different this time?

Thanks Bre. Can I call you Bre?

What do you mean by 'how'?

And while you're at it, what do you mean by 'can'?

Oh, and 'we' - what do you mean by 'we'?

'Discuss' - I think we need to clarify that too, actually.

And 'death'. I am not sure what you mean by it when you use it.

'If' too, please.

'Don't' - please define that while we're at it.

And I supposed 'agree' would be helpful too.

And 'on'.

Oh, go on then - 'the' too please.

And 'term'.

And that squiggle at the end - ? - what does that mean?

Thanks.

No I don't.

Will you be dead in the future?

Are you dead now?

Is your answer to one of those different from the answer to the other?

Actually, don't bother - you're beyond help. I recommend Buddhism (if you're not a Buddhist already). They like to sit around and think nothing.

Depends.

Let's focus on one thing at a time. We're talking about commissioning something. That requires an intention.

If I buy some meat, I am not thereby commissioning a killing of a cow. I may have done something wrong, perhaps. But let's not abuse concepts: I have not commissioned the killing of a cow.

"Please go and kill me a cow" - that's a commissioning. Buying meat from someone who's killed a cow - even if I know full well it'll inspire them to go and kill another - is not, not, not a commissioning.

I may be partly to blame for the subsequent killing, I may not be. But it is not a commissioning. And you are quite wrong to conflate intention with foresight. Foreseeing something is not the same as intending it, as my example demonstrated.

It was true, wasn't it - if I jumped out of the building to avoid the heat and smoke, but foreseeing that in doing so I would die, I did not thereby intend to die, did I? My death was foreseen by me, but not intended by me.

But you're not addressing my argument if you change the meaning of the word 'mind' to your favoured interpretation.

For instance, let's say I say "banks are financial institutions; all financial institutions are corrupt; therefore banks are corrupt" and you reply "one meaning of the world 'bank' is 'turn'".

I reply "that's not what I meant by 'bank' - I mean by a 'bank' a 'financial institution').

You counter-reply "I still think my point stands. Banks are turnings. And understood as such, they are not corrupt"

It's to refuse to engage with my argument.

Now, call it whatever you want - call it a mind, call it a bank, call it a flibbertigibbet - but conscious experiences are borne by something. They are called 'mental states' - states are always 'states of something'.

That thing - the thing that mental states are the states of - is what I am calling 'the mind'. That's orthodox usage. But by all means use another term if you want.

For the simple fact is that that object -the mind, the flibbertigibbet, the bank, whatever label you want to put on it - is indivisible, and thus simple, and thus immaterial and uncaused.

"the mind is simple because I experience it to be so." — tomatohorse

You have put quote marks around that, yet that is not a quote from me. I did not say it. I said that my mind is represented to be indivisible by my reason. That's quite different. I don't know what it means to 'experience indivisibility'. It isn't, I think, an object of experience. No, my reason 'tells me' - that is, 'represents' my mind to be indivisible. And it is from its indivisibility that I infer its simplicity.

No - sigh - completely wrong. Foreseeing something is not the same as intending it.

If I jump out of a building to escape the heat and flames I foresee that I'll die, but I did not intend to die, did I?

Why would I explain any of that to someone who doesn't know the first thing about how to argue and just issues ignorant, arrogant pronouncements?

You - you - need to engage with one of my arguments. Until or unless you can provide reason to believe one of the premises of one of them is false, you're not doing that.

No, you seem to be totally ignorant about how intention is an essential ingredient in an act of commissioning and how it differs from foresight.