No you didn't. Identify a premise you believe to be false and then provide actual evidence it is false by constructing a deductively valid argument that has its negation as a conclusion and premises that seem self evident to reason.

Oh, and you clearly didn't understand the clay example. Your view is that the clay was divided when it went from a six sided shape to a five sided one. Presumably you think a pizza gets bigger the slices it is cut into.

So on Brandom's view, what is a normative reason? I do not mean what sort of consideration generates one. I mean what is one, in itself?
For instance, it seems to me - that is, I get the impression that - I have reason to reject a view that contains a contradiction. What is that an impression of?
I can give a very clear answer: it is to have the impression I am directed to reject a view that contains a contradiction.

The argument i gave you is a good one. It is deductively valid and appears sound too.

You ask why we cannot have an infinity of actual causes. It generates contradictions, that's why. You can't have an actual infinity of anything, because half of infinity is infinity

Anyway, if you think you can have an actual infinity of something, then the burden of proof is on you to explain how.

But anyway, I’ve already argued that casualty acts in the opposite way. It acts to constrain possibilities, to stabilise instability. — apokrisis

Yeah, I don't know what you're talking about. You need to refute the argument I gave you.

I don't understand the terms being employed and those quotes make no sense to me at all. That is, I don't know what Brandom is talking about.

A normative reason is a reason to do something.

We have faculties of reason. A faculty of reason gives its possessor the impression that there are reasons to do things. That's why it is called a faculty of reason.

If the faculty is a good one, then it will be reliably tracking the actual reasons that there are.

Being rational is a about how responsive one is to the rational impressions one's faculty of reason generates in oneself.

So a 'perfectly' rational person is someone who always does what they get the impression they have reason to do, and they do it because they get the impression they have reason to do it.

And an ideally perfectly rational person would be someone whose faculty of reason reliably tracks the reasons that there actually are, such that they always do what they in fact have reason to do.

So again, how does your lump of clay change itself from a cube to a pyramid? Does it have a change of mind or sumthink? — apokrisis

The question is whether something can cause a change in itself, yes?

The answer is 'yes'.

We can demonstrate this, in the manner that I just did. I'll do it again and you can tell me which premise is false.

1. If there are changes in things, the changes have causes
2. There are changes in things
3. Therefore, the changes in things have causes
5. If the changes in things have causes, they do not have an infinity of causes
6. Therefore, the changes in things do not have an infinity of causes
7. If all the changes in things are caused by changes, they will have an infinity of causes
8. Therefore, not all changes in things are caused by changes
9. If a change is caused, it is caused either by another change or by a substance
10. Therefore, some changes in things are caused by a substance.

Now, substance causation is causation by a thing. Not by an event. So, not by a change. But by a thing.

To the question, then, whether a thing can change itself, the answer is demonstrably 'yes'.

What you are now wondering is 'how'. That's a different question.

The answer is 'by doing so'.

That too is the answer to a similar question about how a change causes a change.

Not everything requires explanation (if it did, nothing could be explained).

Note too that one does not have to be able to answer the 'how' question in order to answer the 'does it happen' question.

I do not know how the tapping of my fingers on my keyboard produces these words on the screen, much less how you're able to see them too. Yet that does occur and I have good evidence it occurs. That evidence is not undercut by my inability to explain 'how' it is occuring.

So, again: can a thing cause a change in itself. Demonstrably yes. How? I don't know. I don't even know what you'd want by way of explanation there. I assume you want a question begging one in which I explain how the thing caused the change by undergoing a change.

This sounds correct to me. It was Plato who defined philosophy as using reason to search for truth and he founded the discipline (by founding the first university in which to teach it).

I would not distinguish between the empirical sciences and the rational sciences, however. For insofar as empirical inquiry is taken to be telling us something about reality, it must be thought that we have normative reason - justifying reason - to believe that our sensations are 'of' a world.

So there is no way of avoiding having to make an appeal to reason. The view, held by so many these days, that empirical investigation is our ultimate source of insight into reality, is not a view that is empirically verifiable and so undermines itself. That is, it is demonstrably false. To avoid incoherence the wannabe empiricist must simply insist that it is a self-evident truth of reason that, aside from that one insight from reason, all other information about reality comes via our sensations. And that view, though not incoherent, seems ad hoc. But is, importantly a form of rationalism.

Those who reject rationalism are just announcing that they cannot defend their view (whatever it may be). They can merely state it, but if asked to provide reason to think it is true, they will refuse.

And remember that I answered it. Yes. A thing can cause a change in itself. We are things and we cause changes in ourselves. Note too that if every change in a thing has to be caused by some other change, then one would have to posit an actual infinity of changes. As there are no actual infinities in reality, we can conclude that some changes are caused not by some other change, but by a thing. It's called substance causation.

You seem to have missed the point. When the cube becomes a pyramid, has it been reduced by a sixth? Has some part of the clay been removed?

No, I still don't follow you.

There are minds and there are states of mind.

Minds are not made of their states. They 'have' states. They are not made of them.

So, by distinguishing between minds and their states one is not thereby dividing the mind.

Consider a lump of clay that is cuboid. It has six sides. But then it changes into a pyramidical shape. Now it has five sides. It has not been reduced by a sixth.

So apparently we are in fact … entities with parts … because there is some distinction between global selfhood and particular states of mind that it is is useful to mention … — apokrisis

I don't know what you're talking about.

Does half a mind make sense?

No.

Minds are indivisible. They are the example par excellence of an indivisible thing.

And they can change their states.

I am a mind, a simple thing. Now, being simple means having no parts. But it does not mean having no properties.

One of my properties is that I think. That, note, is a state of a thing. It is not the thing. It is a state it is in.

So, I - this simple thing, a mind - am currently in a state of thought. And indeed, I am in other states as well, and I am no less simple for that. I am not just thinking something, I am also desiring something.

But anyway, let's just stick with one state. I, a simple thing, am in a state of thinking about beer. Now I cause myself to think about wine instead. There. Note, I am still in one state, it is just that I have changed it from being a state of thought about beer to a state of thought about wine.

Yes. We ourselves are simples - entities with no parts - and we can change what mental state we are in.

No, you are just confusing being able to do something with actually doing it.

I am able to be in France. You think that means I am in France, don't you? You think I have just admitted being in France. Crazy. I don't know how to reason with someone who thinks that follows. I have not 'admitted contradictions' then.

You have said I have committed contradictions in what I have argued above. Locate one.

Yes, but I am not doing that. I believe there are no true contradictions. So the question is whether that is consistent with my being God. And it is.
All you're doing is pointing out something that I have been very clear about myself, namely that God can make true contradictions.

Yes, if I was God I could.

I do not believe I am omniscient. The question is whether that is consistent with me being omniscient. Can an omniscient being be ignorant of their omniscience? If the answer is yes, then the fact that I do not believe myself to be omniscient would not establish that I am not God.

God's own will constitutively determines what is and is not an item of knowledge. So, if God does not believe a thing, then that thing lacks a justification, even if it is true. And so if God does not believe he is omniscient, then what that would mean is that the true belief that he is omniscient is unjustified and thus not an item of knowledge. Until or unless God believes in his own omniscience, the true belief in it will not be an item of knowledge and thus God's ignorance of his omniscience will be compatible with his possession of it. And thus the fact that I myself do not believe in my own omniscience does not establish that I am not God.

I don't believe there are true contradictions. I know that as certainly as I know anything. So, if I am God then there are not any. Thus I take the establishment of a contradiction in the idea of me being God to establish that I am not God. Not because i think God is incapable of making contradictions true, but because i am myself confident they are not true.
But let's say that my own belief that contradictions are not true is somehow consistent with me being God and with contradictions being true - all that does is confirm what I am arguing, namely that it is possible I am God.
Like I say, I think that establishing a contradiction in the idea of me being God does serve to preclude the epistemic possibility of me being God, given what I actually believe. But if I am wrong about that, I am possibly God even under those circumstances.

So either you re god, or you are not god. — Banno

Yes.

If you are not god, we don't need to show a contradiction in order to show that you are not god. — Banno

To 'show' it you do. I am wondering if I can be shown not to be God by the idea of me being God being shown to be one that contains a contradiction. That's what I am wondering: does the idea of me being God contain a contradiction?

If you are indeed god, them since the validity of any argument depends on what you will, whether an argument shows you to be god or not depends only on what you will. — Banno

Yes, and I think that if a contradiction is involved in the idea of me being God, then I am not God. Forget God for a moment: I think contradictions are not true. I don't think they're true and not true. I think they're not true.

It is to show that there is an actual contradiction involved in the idea.

Remember: I don't think any contradictions are true.

Yes, you know full well that I do.

An omnipotent being can do anything and so an omnipotent being has the ability to make any argument valid. For an argument to be valid is no more or less than for God to instruct us to take its conclusion to be true if the premises are.

Really? — Banno

Yes, I am asking whether I can discount the possibility. In the OP I said very clearly that I do not believe I am God and that I take the idea to be a very unreasonable one.

You said that there were actual contradictions contained in what I said. I have asked you to show me them. You haven't. I think that's because there aren't any.

If you are god, as you supposed in your OP, and if god can will anything, including apparent contradictions, then whether there are any contradictions is entirely up to you. — Banno

I am not supposing I actually am God. I am just wondering if I can entirely discount the possibility. I do not think any contradictions are true. So, if I am God, then there will be no true contradictions.

That God can make contradictions true does not seem relevant, as I myself think there are no true contradictions.

I think what you mean is that there are no contradictions contained in anything I said.

No. They would demonstrate it to be false. So identify a contradiction in something I have said

Identify one contradiction, mortal

I'd like to refer you back to my initial questions of whether an omnipotent being has to always be omnipotent or if they can be omnipotent without actual doing actions that make them lose their omnipotence. — Jerry

I have given the answer several times now: an omnipotent being can do anything and thus has the power to cease to be omnipotent.

Again: an omnipotent person is able to be cease to be omnipotent.

Why?

Because they're omnipotent!

Once more: if you can't do something, you're not omnipotent. Yes? So the idea of an omnipotent being who is unable to stop being omnipotent is a contradiction. It is no less contradictory than the idea of a square circle.

So of course - i mean, it is blindingly obvious - an omnipotent being can stop being omnipotent. They can do anything!

We can now return to the question: can I rule out that I am omnipotent?

So then it seems an omnipotent being can cause themselves to lose their omnipotence, and that doesn't contradict their nature of being omnipotent? — Jerry

Yes. If they were unable to stop being omnipotent, then they would not be omnipotent.

Being able to do something does not mean one has done it.

This: " there is an omnipotent being and there is a rock he can't lift" is a contradiction

This "an omnipotent being is able to create a rock he cannot lift" is not.

This too is a contradiction "there is an omnipotent being and there is something he can't do".

Indeed, if you recognize that this is a contradiction - " there is an omnipotent being and there is a rock he can't lift" - then you should recognize that its contradictory nature lies the fact that the situation described is one in which an omnipotent being is unable to do something.

It's all very confusing, — Jerry

It isn't at all confusing. It's very easy to understand.

An omnipotent being is a person who is able to do anything.

So, to the question "is an omnipotent person able to....." the answer is 'yes' no matter what.

I think a useful definition would be a being that can make anything possible, actual. — Jerry

No, that is not omnipotence. Why? Because it is a contradiction to suppose that a person with fewer powers than another is the more powerful.

A person who is bound by what is currently possible, is a person who is less powerful than a person who is not bound by what is currently possible.

So, an omnipotent being will a person who can make anything possible. Not just 'can make anything that is possible, actual' but 'can make anything possible' .....and then actualize it if they so wish.

You can, if you want, just insist that you want to use the word omnipotent to label a person who is unable to do some things, but then you will simply be using the term different to how I do and will not be engaging with the OP.
In the OP I am wondering whether it is possible that I am able to do anything. I am not wondering whether I am able to do some things and not others.

I fail to see any in yours. I could not make head nor tail of what you said.

Yes. The true proposition 'I am omniscient' could be one that lacks justification. If that is the case, then it is not an item of knowledge and thus my not knowing it would be consistent with my being all knowing

The precise opposite is true. Positing two generates contradictions. Positing one does not.

If I have the power to create a boulder too heavy for me to lift, then that's a power I have. If someone else can create a stone to heavy for me to lift, then that's a restriction. For it is now not up to me whether there are any stones I can't lift. And if someone creates such a stone, then there is something I can't lift, which is incompatible with omnipotence. Whereas if I create the stone myself, then although I will have given up my omnipotence, I will have some so by exercising one of my powers.
So your claim is demonstrably false. I have already pointed this out. And all you have done is repeat your belief that there are problems with omnipotence for one person (there are not) and no reason to think these would not arise with two (whereas there are contradictions with two, and none with one).

I've told you what omniscience means and there is really nothing more to say on that.

As for the second part, no nothing I have said implies the child is omniscient.

As for boulders - of course an omnipotent being can make a boulder to heavy for him to lift - why not? The point is he'd be able to make one the other one can't lift.

I literally just told you.
If there are two omnipotent beings neither will be able to do all things as the other will place a limit on those abilities

One omnipotent person would have the power to stop the other one doing things, and vice versa

You are not taking my question deeper, but changing it for another one.

It also does not follow from my actually being God that I am God of necessity. God is not God of necessity, for then there would be something he could not do, namely cease to be God

I too am drinking a glass of wine, although it started out as a glass of water.

Why not instead ask the opposite? Is it possible I am not God? — Yohan

Because that one is philosophically uninteresting. It's obviously possible that I am not God. What's interesting is that it is genuinely metaphysically possible that I am God. Highly unlikely, of course. But nevertheless, entirely possible.

It's entailed by omnipotence!! The definition of God that I gave - and that you completely ignored - is that God is omnipotent (among other things). That entails that there is only one God. If X denotes someone who has 3 + 1 apples, then it denotes someone who has 4 apples. That you can't see that doesn't mean it wasn't there in the definition.

Uniqueness follows from omnipotence - you can't have more than one omnipotent person.

I do not think I am God. (By 'God' I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person). — Bartricks

That means that possession of those properties makes one God and failure to have any means one is not God. That is, it means that omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence are necessary and sufficient for qualification as God.

So either you did not read that opening line or you read it and did not understand its implications.

Now, engage with the substance of my case and stop telling me about how you misuse the word God.

Opening line of the OP. Read it