As a Christian, the question of whether or not hell exists is one I ponder often. — robbiefrost

I take it you are interested in whether it is a reality, as opposed to an essential element of a Christian worldview?

I also take it that the idea of hell is the idea of some 'other' place that bodily death potentially takes you to. And I take it as well that essential to the idea of hell is that it is some place that is substantially worse to live in than here.

Given that understanding of the concept, I would say that we have good - though by no means decisive - reason to think that such a place exists.

My case for hell appeals to this argument:

1. If an event is harmful to a person, that person must exist at the time of the event.
2. Death is an event that is harmful to the one who dies.
3. Therefore, the person who dies exists at the time of the event of their death

That argument is valid and premise 1 seems self-evidently true to the reason of many. Existence is a prerequisite for harm. And likewise for premise 2. The argument therefore appears to be sound. Certainly the burden of proof is on anyone who wants to claim otherwise.

The argument establishes two things. First that we survive our deaths, and second that upon death our situation becomes considerably worse than it was before it. After all, if - upon death - we go to somewhere substantially better than here, then death would not be a harm, but a benefit.

The apparent harmfulness of death, combined with the fact that harm requires existence, implies that what awaits us after death is life in a place worse than here - hell, in other words.

As for why such a place exists if God exists - well first, we can have good evidence that something is the case, without knowing why it is the case. If, for example, I come home one day and discover an elephant in my living room, then I have excellent evidence that there is an elephant in my living room even though I haven't the faintest idea how it got there. Even if it seems utterly inexplicable how it could have got there - all the doors to my living room are smaller than the elephant - I can still have excellent evidence that there is an elephant in my living room.

So, we might have excellent evidence that hell exists, and excellent evidence that God exists, consistent with being completely at a loss to explain 'why' God created hell.

Second, it is quite easy to come up with possible explanations. For example, a morally good being might harm others if those others deserve to come to harm. Wrongdoers, if they have done wrong of their own free will, typically deserve to come to harm. So, hell may be just punishment for wrongdoers - and in that way its existence could be consistent with the existence of a good God.

Your arguments all sound so circular. rational, reasonable, true, simple, theory, proposition. A lot of words just strung together in incoherent ramblings. No real insight, no vision, no clarity. Most of the time I have no idea what you are talking about. — ovdtogt

Yes, well my cat can't distinguish between a Rembrandt and a child's scrawl and seems to think its own bottom is the most beautiful thing in the world.

? Explain. Saying something doesn't make it so (not normally). So, explain. Or are explanations beneath you?

And a clarification [can] serve the same purpose as a justification.
You can clarify what you believe in and what you disbelieve. You can use clarification as a justification for your beliefs.
I have no idea why I am getting a line through my text. — ovdtogt

I think the line going through your text was the best thing about it.

Clarifying a belief is not the same as justifying it. Deal with it.

Note, I justified my analysis of truth. I didn't start with the analysis and then look for a justification. I started by trying to figure out what truth itself is.

So, what is it for the umpteenth time? Well, if all rational deliberators would agree that theory X - whatever it may be - is the true theory of truth if Reason represents it to be, then on grounds of simplicity it is reasonable to assume that 'that' is what the property of truth consists of. A proposition is true when Reason asserts its contents, and not otherwise.

That's not a problem for well grounded true belief. Invalid inference is not well grounded. You seem to be a bit confused. — creativesoul

Er, I think you're the confused one. You don't seem to understand how Gettier cases work, or have any stable notion of what a 'well grounded' belief is.

Gettier style cases can be constructed for any mechanism of belief acquisition that does not guarantee the truth of the belief.

Here's why. A belief can be justified, or well-grounded, or warranted, or whatever, yet false.

So, just imagine such a scenario. That is, imagine that the procedure has been followed perfectly, yet the belief it has resulted in is false.

Now imagine the case again, only imagine that this time the resulting belief is, by fluke, true.

That's a Gettier case.

And in such cases it seems clear to the reason of most that the believer falls short of having knowledge. They're arrived at their belief impeccably, and it is true, but it isn't knowledge.

Thus, it seems that no combination of true belief and belief-formation procedure is sufficient for knowledge.

As such knowledge itself cannot be reduced to some combination of true belief and belief-formation procedure.

I've already adequately argued for that by showing that both of Gettier's cases are cases of malpractice, and I've pointed out the obviousness that believing a broken clock is working does not count as good ground. — creativesoul

Christ, this is tedious. No. You. Haven't.

Saying 'malpractice' a lot doesn't do anything. I don't have a clue what you mean by it - and nor do you, you just read it on a page on the internet somewhere and thought if you use it you'll sound like you're steeped in the literature.

As for being well-grounded - well, I refuted that view. That view is refuted by cases in which someone's belief is based on another true belief, but fails to qualify as knowledge.

here's my characterisation of this debate.

Bartricks: here's an eye-wateringly brilliant thesis.

Creativesoul: promising start, but let me teach you. Malpractice. Malpractice. Mally, pracky, tice.

Bartricks: er, what?

Creativesoul: grounded. Well grounded. True beliefs that have lots of ground around them are knowledge. There is no problem. I have spoken.

Bartricks: not sure what you mean by 'well grounded'

Creativesoul: I mean this. Or that. Or something.

Bartricks: well, if you mean this, then this case refutes you.

Creativesoul: answer this question

Bartricks. Answered

Creativesoul: Now this one....and this one....aand this one.

Bartricks. Answered

Creativesoul: Well, those answers aren't quite right. Now this one, and this one, and this one

Bartricks: answered - why are you asking me these questions?

Creativesoul: your view is silly. Ridiculous. Here's an argument against it that has premises that have nothing whatsoever to be said for them.

Bartricks; Your argument appears to be rubbish.

Creativesoul: your view is absurd. It isn't on the internet and I can't associate it with a big name. So it is rubbish.

Bartricks: your argument is rubbish - its premise have nothing to be said for them and appear false on their face - my argument is good, as its premises are self-evidently true or conceptual truths.

Creativesoul: there's no problem. As I showed you earlier. Yes, you took me to the cleaners, but I can't realise that becsaue I have blinkers on.

Bartricks: here's my parody of our discussion

Creativesoul: this is pointless. You can't receive my instruction. You don't listen to me or any of the other intellectual peons on here. You need therapy. You are a terrible person. How dare you use reasoned argument to show things. You are in need of help. Goodbye!!

Bartricks: bye squidy.

This is just ridiculous. I cannot take it seriously. — creativesoul

That's the problem the closed minded have always had with new solutions to old problems

That's true, if one holds that truth and usefulness count as properties then the terms "truth" and "usefulness" are used as a means to denote different properties. — creativesoul

No, it is just true. You can 'hold' whatever you want, that isn't going to make usefulness and truth denote the same property.

Not all powers of reason lead to that... — creativesoul

Yes, some people can't reason very well. They can reason well enough to locate sandwiches and push them into their face every so often, but not well enough to gain insight into trickier questions, such as "what is truth". There's a technical word for them that rhymes with poo squid.

What makes that claim true? What makes the other claim false? — creativesoul

Again: see the thread on truth. This thread is on 'knowledge'.

And a clarification serves the same purpose as a justification. — ovdtogt

No it doesn't. Clarifying what Buddhists believe, for instance, does not serve to justify those beliefs. There is no inconsistency in understanding that Tim believes P and at the same time believing that there is no reason to believe P.

Anyway, you are confident about matters before you've thought about them. I mean, this whole style of yours - pronouncing first and then trying to think of something to say about the pronouncement later - betokens that.

I described a case above. Here's another: there are four mugs in my sink. That's true, but it is too trivial for me to have any reason to believe it. Yet I do believe it, and it is true, and I seem to know it given that I formed it on the basis of the evidence (there appear to be four mugs in my sink).

Yes I just make pronouncements. And if people disagree I engage with them and try to clarify my position to the best of my ability. — ovdtogt

Yes, well stop that. That's not philosophy. Positions are ten a penny. And clarifying a position is not the same as justifying it.

Er, no. I think it is true and I provided an example of a case in which I might have knowledge yet lack a justification for my true belief. Read my reply to Andrew M above in which I describe it. Then say some crap about it.

Just because you believe they are not justified to hold a certain belief does not mean they hold unjustified beliefs. What a solipsistic creature you are. — ovdtogt

I didn't say that if I believe they hold unjustified beliefs, their beliefs are unjustified. This just underlines my point: you can believe your belief is justified without it being so.

But even if I did hold the absurd view that if I believe someone is unjustified, necessarily they are unjustified, this would not imply I was a solipsist. Far from it: it would be a belief about the status of someone else's belief, and thus would imply I was not a solipsist.

I think you'll be getting a bonus from Total Crap Plc this month.

I have given it in a nutshell. — ovdtogt

Which explains why it was nuts. Again, you haven't engaged with the argument of the OP, or argued anything at all. Just pronouncements.

No-one holds a belief they would not justify to you, if you asked them to. They might not (yet) have formulated their justification but they do believe they have a justification for that belief. — ovdtogt

Another pronouncement. And it's false. Are you being sponsored by "Total Crap PLC" or something?

Even if it is true that everyone would justify their beliefs to me if asked - and that's obviously not true - that is not the same as their beliefs being justified, for one might try and justify a belief that there was no normative reason to believe.

Dyslexia is a problem many people suffer from. Nothing to be ashamed of. — ovdtogt

Yes, and arrogance and ignorance are also problems many people suffer from too. But they are something to be ashamed of so, you know, be ashamed.

Now back to the topic of this thread: what is truth? I have provided an analysis and all you've done is pronounce. Stop pronouncing and try arguing something

No, I just don't like those who confidently pronounce on matters they know nothing about.

You said this:

That means you do have to have a justification for your knowledge. Knowledge without justification does not exist. If you believe something, you will have a justification for it. — ovdtogt

Another pronouncement. And all the claims are false. Knowledge without justification does appear to exist - I described a case.

And it does not at all follow that if one believes something, one has a justification for believing it. Unjustified beliefs exist (most of yours are of this kind, for instance).

Whatever. It doesn't matter - the important point is that everything you've said is false. You've just pronounced, rather than argued. And your pronouncements are all false.

You've said that beliefs that are false cannot be known to be false.

Yes they can.

You've said that if a belief is useful, it is true.

No, for false beliefs can be useful.

And so on.

We've established already that everything you say is false or nonsense.

Yes there is. It's not "but can not been known to be false", but "but can not have been known to be false".

Doesn't matter, of course. But it does underline that you possess the standard toxic combo of confidence and ignorance.

You - you - should learn to write. They don't have a different meaning.

You said "A belief may be false, but can not been known to be false". The grammar is bad and the statement is false. A belief that may be false can be known to be false.

I never stated a belief can not known to be false. — ovdtogt

yes you have:

A belief may be false, but can not been known to be false — ovdtogt

You clearly don't have a stable view.

sometimes we can have knowledge without a justification — Bartricks
What is an example of that, on your view? — Andrew M

I use 'justified' to mean 'has a normative reason to believe' (which is uncontroversial). So in saying that sometimes a person can 'know' something without having any justification for the belief, I mean that sometimes a person can know something even though there is no normative reason for them to believe it.

Let's say a total stranger has been accused of a crime and some evidence is provided that they did it and I form the belief that they did it based on the evidence (and they did actually do it). Well, I think I qualify as 'knowing' that they did it. But in this case I clearly have normative reason to believe they did it: the evidence provides me with normative reason to believe they did it.

But now imagine that a good friend of mine has been accused of an equivalent crime and some evidence is provided that they did it. Do I have reason to believe they are guilty?

Well, I think it is plausible that I do not. The evidence is relevantly similar to the evidence in the previous case. But the important difference is that this time it is my close friend who stands accused. And I think it is plausible that I have a moral obligation to my friends not immediately to think the worst of them. And I think it is plausible that the moral obligation to be a good friend means that the evidence in this case does not provide me - me - with any normative reason to believe in my friend's guilt. Others, yes. But me, no.

Now imagine that I nevertheless do believe that he is guilty on the basis of the evidence. I shouldn't, but I do. And now imagine that he is, in fact, guilty. Well, it seems to me that I 'knew' he was guilty. I knew the first guy was guilty, and it seems no less true to say that I knew my friend was guilty too, for I formed both beliefs in exactly the same manner (I formed them based on the existence of the evidence). But in the first case the accusation provided me with normative reason to believe in the person's guilty, whereas in the second it did not. Thus in the latter case my true belief qualifies as knowledge despite the lack of any normative reason for me to believe it.

No, I should assume neither until I have good evidence to do so. — Janus

You do have good evidence - the fact that people clever enough to be paid to think about such things find the cases prima facie puzzling.

If your doctor tells you to get the mole checked out, whereas your mindless friends all tell you that the mole is fine, you're a fool if you think you've got no good reason to think you need to get it checked out.

Yes, but you obviously did not have good evidence on the basis of the red hair alone. It is the DNA testing of the red hear that constitutes good evidence. — Janus

No, upon doing the DNA testing we realize that the hair is good evidence. It was good evidence all along. Even if no testing is carried out on it, it is good evidence that Terry did it.

So you need to adjust your analysis from 'good evidence' to 'justifiably believed to be good evidence'. But then the original clock case refutes that view.

Survival is necessary to reason. — ovdtogt

And trees upend numbers in the dark.

Holes can't be true
Digging can't be true
Sorry you'll have to explain that to me. — ovdtogt

Yes, that doesn't surprise me.

Propositions can be true (or false). That's because they have 'representative contents' - that is, they represent something to be the case. Hence they can be true if what they represent to be the case is the case, and false otherwise.

Why can't a hole be true? Because it is a hole, not a proposition. "There is a hole to your left" can be true. But holes themselves can't be.

Likewise for digging. Digging is an activity. Activities can be done or not done. They can't be 'true' or 'false'. It can be true that you are digging something - but in that case what's true is the proposition "A very confused person is digging" rather than digging itself.

A belief may be false, but can not been known to be false. Only a belief not known to be false can be useful. A belief has to be considered true to be useful. So truth and usefulness do not denote different properties. — ovdtogt

Every single thing you've just said is false. That's quite impressive.

A false belief can certainly be known to be false. A lot of people believe things that we can know to be false.

"Only a belief not known to be false can be useful." No, false again. It is common for people to believe they are far more popular than they really are. That belief is false in many cases. But it is useful as it makes those who have it happier than they would otherwise be (which is generally useful).

Are you thinking at all before you write these things?

So truth and usefulness do not denote different properties. — ovdtogt

No they do denote different properties - clearly they do - and furthermore that claim does not follow from anything you said before. Fail.

I don't see anything to be puzzled over here. — Janus

That's because you don't understand the original cases. (I mean, philosophers are and have been puzzled by these cases, so the fact you're not should give you pause - you shouldn't assume the philosophical community is not up to where you are, you should assume you're not up to where they are).

A true belief that is based on evidence is not equivalent to knowledge, for we can easily imagine cases in which someone acquires a true belief based on evidence yet it is manifest to the reason of most that they lack knowledge.

For instance, imagine there is a murder scene and upon seeing a red hair on a chair I form the belief that Terry did it. I have no special reason to think that the red hair came from Terry's head - for there are loads of red haired people. Nevertheless, the sight of it causes me to form the belief that Terry did the crime.

Now, in fact Terry did do the crime and the hair is, in fact, good evidence that he did it (as DNA testing on it confirms it is from Terry's head).

So, I formed my true belief on the basis of good evidence. Yet clearly I did not 'know' it was Terry. Why? Because although the hair was good evidence that he did it, I was not justified in believing that it was.

As for the clock cases - even if the person does qualify as knowing in the second case, it then shows that one can know even when it was by pure fluke that one's true belief was true.

No, I just applied your reasoning to it. It refutes you. Holes can't be true. But they can be useful. Digging can't be true. But it can be useful. And on and on.

Nothing is 'the truth'. Everything is contains a degree of truth. — ovdtogt

Oooo, someone's been on the Krishnamurti again. Truth is one but many. Love is truth. Truth is a tapeworm peeking out the bum of the cat of reality.

The philosopher J.L.Austin thought that the desire to be profound is the enemy of philosophy. I think he may have had a point.

This is so inconsistent, it can't be philosophy. — Harry Hindu

It isn't inconsistent at all. It is philosophy. And also, inconsistency is not inconsistent with philosophy - philosophers are inconsistent all the time and spend a lot of their time trying to find inconsistencies in each other's positions. Owned.

If knowledge is "an attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs", then people have knowledge when they have an "attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs". — Harry Hindu

Er, no. Now 'that' is inconsistent. I'm not inconsistent, you are. If knowledge is an attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs, then people have knowledge when they have a 'true belief' that Reason is adopting that attitude towards. Not when 'they' have the attitude, but when 'Reason' does. Owned.

The second question is not distinct because you can tell when someone has knowledge because you have defined it. — Harry Hindu

The two questions are distinct. Knowing 'that' someone has something is not the same as knowing 'what' it is that they have. I can know that you own a keg of beer without knowing what beer is made of. O.W.N.E.D

So people have it when they fit the definition that you have proposed, which is a dumb way of explaining it, IMO. — Harry Hindu

It isn't dumb, but it will appear that way to the dumb. If it was dumb, why am I finding it so easy to own you?

Truth is a property that we shouldn't be attributing to knowledge. Truth and knowledge are distinct, not what knowledge is and how to know whether someone has it or not. — Harry Hindu

Now that's dumb. Conceptually confused. It's like denying bachelors lack wives - it does no more than show you've failed to grasp the concept under analysis. Knowledge essentially involves having a true belief. Nobody, but nobody, denies that. What else it requires is debated, and what it actually 'is' is distinct again. I so own you.

If you want to look for some esoteric 'mumbo jumbo' definition of truth, that is your prerogative. I think that is just about as useful as digging a hole and filling it in again. If you want to cleverly rearranging words, why not do a crossword puzzle? — ovdtogt

I'm not defining truth, as I've already said. And you're begging the question.

Sometimes it is useful to dig a hole and fill it in again (for instance, let's say a crazy rich person pays people to do it - well, now there's some use in me doing it). Presumably by your lights that makes the hole, er, true?

Our belief in an anthropomorphic God may be false but that belief may still be useful. — ovdtogt

Er, what? So you now agree that a belief can be useful yet false? Yes, I know.

So, this thread is about what truth is. It's not about whatever pseudo profound utterance occurs to you. It is about 'truth'.

Now, if a belief can be useful yet not true, then we know - or those of us who have powers of reason can know - that truth and usefulness denote different properties. Which is something we already knew, because it is directly self-evident. Deal.

Beliefs that are believed to be false have no usefulness. False beliefs that are believed to be true can be useful. — ovdtogt

You're just thoroughly confused. First, you have suggested that if a belief is 'useful' then it is true.

Now, that's obviously false, as false as saying "if something is a biscuit, it is true".

And it's incoherent, because to truly be useful it has to be 'true' that believing the proposition is useful. Which is now going to set you off on a regress.

But anyway, it's false on its face.

But you've decided to double-down. That's a mistake. First, grossly implausible views require considerable ingenuity to defend well. You're not qualified.

Second, you keep stating things that are obviously false in the hope that confidence about them will somehow make them true. For instance. "beliefs that are believed to be false" - what do you mean? If you believe a proposition, then you believe its contents obtain. That's just what it is to believe something. I can't believe it is raining and at the same time believe that my belief that it is raining is false. If I believe it is raining, I believe that raining is the case.

This claim:

Reason asserts, requires, demands, bids, favours, values

is 'true'. — Bartricks
What makes it so? — creativesoul

See the thread on Truth! And our evidence that such claims are true is that our reason represents them to be.

For example, if you think the walls are talking to you, then you're nuts, right? Why? Because walls can't express desires and beliefs as they have none, because they're mindless. Now, that's self-evident. You can't investigate it empirically. But our reason assures us that those objects that lack minds, cannot do things such as assert, require, favour, demand, value.
That's the best possible evidence that mindless things cannot do those things.

Now, if you just insist they can, then although that's your prerogative, you're just ignoring the evidence and asserting rather than arguing.

Here's how you make a case for something. If the thing you're making a case for isn't already self-evident to reason, then you need to show how its truthis implied by propositions that are self-evident to reason.

Propositions that are self-evident to reason are the stopping points of justifications. There are exceptions - such as when we have reason to believe that our faculty of reason is malfunctioning.

Now, to make a case against me I claim that you are going to have to construct arguments that will have premises that are not - not - self-evident to reason.

Perhaps I am wrong about that, but so far you have provided no evidence that I am.

Insisting, apropos nothing whatsoever, that Reason does not represent, direct, assert, require, demand, is not to raise a reasonable doubt about anything I have argued. Like I say, just pick up a book about Reason - a book about ethics, a text book in philosophy - and see how far you get before some mention is made of directives of reason, or demands of reason, or requirements of reason, and so on. It won't be far.

'Reason' is just the name for the source of those directives, demands and so on.

If you think 'directives' of reason do not exist, then argue for that - and argue for it without appealing to any directives of reason (an impossible task).

Perhaps you think that directives do not need a source. Well, they do. A directive can't exist by itself anymore than the age of an object can exist absent the object.

Perhaps you think that directives can be issued by things that are not minds. Okay, like what? Give a clear example.

If you can't do those things, all you're doing is saying "no!" Anyone can do that. Einstein: E=mc2. Creativesoul: No!

What's unclear about my reasoning?

Is there a universal consensus among those who use their reason to figure out what truth is (philosophers) about what truth is?

No. There are just several theses, theses that most of those who are trying to figure out what truth is agree are not very plausible.

Given that there is, at present, no consensus on what truth is, it is worth asking "what would it take for there to be?"

That is, when would philosophers agree that they have found the true theory of truth?

That answer is unquestionably this: they would all agree that theory X is the true theory of truth when the reason of all of them represents theory X to be the true theory of X. For what more could anyone want than this?

Well, then it makes sense to suppose that 'that' is what truth is. That is, that truth itself is none other than the property of being a proposition that Reason is representing to be the case.

That's my reasoning.

So what does truth depend on?

Reason.

It depends on Reason asserting something. Why? Because if and only if she asserts something will anything be true. Why? Because that's what truth is.

I don't know about you, but I am so tired nothing is making sense to me, however, I think our argument is right on target. Do you remember Robin Willaims "Reality... what a concept." Have you ever tried LSD? I have heard it can be an experience that changes a person's reason. Good night — Athena

No, I have never tried LSD. Why would I want to try something that might change my reason? That would be like rubbing salt in my eyes in order to see better.

Reality isn't a concept. It is something we have a concept 'of'.

The idea of a person is not a person.

A person is that which answers to the idea of a person.

The idea of free will is not free will.

Free will is something we have an idea of. And free will itself is that which answers to the idea.

So you're confusing ideas with what they're ideas of. That's like confusing a book about Napoleon with Napoleon.

Ideas are 'about' things - they have 'content', the content being that which they're about. You, for instance, have some kind of an idea about me. But I am not an idea. When you go to sleep your idea of me disappears, but I do not. So, though you can have an idea about me, and I about you, we are not thereby rendered ideas. The same applies to reality, truth, time, free will, etc, etc.

I worded myself poorly. You didn't say time couldn't be known. I am saying time can not be known because we can not experience it. — Athena

This doesn't seem to be on topic - which is knowledge, not time - but even if time is not experienced, it would not follow that it can't be known. I don't experience 'my self' for instance - my self is an experiencer, that-which-has-experiences, but it is not itself experienced. Nevertheless, I can surely know that I exist. And I can know that this argument:

1. P
2. Q
3. therefore P and Q

is valid, even though I cannot experience validity.

Plus it also seems false to say that we do not experience time. I seem to be experiencing the present, for example, and when I remember something it - its content - seems past - and when I anticipate something, what I am anticipating seems future.

So, it makes no sense at all to say that normative reasons are not conventional. — creativesoul

Oh, okay then. What a good point!! You're not arguing, you're just making false statements. You just don't know what a normative reason is. They're not 'conventions' or 'what is conventional'. I can have reason to do something even if there are no conventions, and often we have reason to defy convention. You're just showcasing your ignorance.