This is just nonsense. — creativesoul

Okaay.

Reason cannot assert, direct, or prescribe. — creativesoul

Yes she can and does.

It is self-evident enough to say that persons and only persons assert, direct, and prescribe, because people use language. Reason does not. Reason is not equivalent to persons. — creativesoul

Yes she is.

This claim:

Reason asserts, requires, demands, bids, favours, values

is 'true'.

This claim:

Reason does not assert, require, demand, bid, favour, or value

is 'false'.

This claim: only a person can assert, require, demand, bid, favour, value

is 'true'.

From them it follows that Reason is a person.

You disagree. You have no argument for your view, however, and you are committed to making claims that are manifestly false. I can't stop you making them, but thankfully no matter how many times you make them - or how passionately - that won't make them true.

I'm saying truth depends on Reason asserting things because that's what truth is. Truth, not water, is the topic of this thread, water-boy.

Well, congratulations on completely missing the point.

Anything that makes you feel you are better off today than yesterday is truth. — ovdtogt

That's obviously false. It's as obviously false as saying "truth is a table. Anything that is a table is true". It's just confused.

"Useful" and 'true' clearly denote different properties, otherwise the idea of a false but useful belief would make no sense (and it clearly does make sense).

The obvious question is, what is Reason? and why the capital letter? Just to reifying it? — Banno

Reason is a person. That's not reification. Reification involves making a mistake - the concept incorporates the idea of error. But Reason 'is' a person - there can be no reasonable doubt about it, for Reason asserts things and only persons - minds - can do that (as is itself manifest to the reason of all of those apart from the insane).

Why the capital letter? Because the word 'reason' is multiply ambiguous and historically a capital letter has been used to denote the source of reasons.

‘Survival is unnecessary’ - is this statement true or false according to Reason? — Bartricks

So what does Reason tell you about the truth of this statement? And what does its truth depend on (apart from an appeal to Reason, of course)? — Possibility

I don't even know what the question is - it's like asking "is it true that blue?"

"And what does its truth depend on (apart from an appeal to Reason, of course)?"

Truth is not an appeal to Reason. Appealing to Reason is how we find out about what's true. But truth itself is the property of "being (sincerely) asserted by Reason".

If you now ask "what does truth depend on (apart from the assertions of Reason)?" the answer is "nothing" - for that's like asking "what does water depend on, apart from hydrogen and oxygen?" It expresses a refusal either to understand or accept the analysis just provided. Which is your prerogative, of course, but the fact is that I've argued for it and the argument has yet to be challenged.

Thus we can say that what beliefs count as knowledge are the beliefs that Reason adopts a knowledge attitude towards. And the beliefs that Reason adopts a knowledge attitude towards are those that are justified, true and something else to be determined (such as the 'no fluke' condition).

So aren't we, in effect, back where we started? That is, we are inquiring about the conditions of knowledge, albeit mediated by Reason. — Andrew M

No, because now we can recognise that there are two distinct questions here - "what is knowledge?" and "when do we have knowledge?"

The answer to the first question is "an attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs". The answer to the second question, well, varies and we can only say rough-and-ready things about it. Such as that, for the most part, we have knowledge when we have a justified true belief, but not always - sometimes we can have knowledge without a justification, sometimes we can have a justified true belief and not have knowledge, and so on.

Hitherto most have thought that they were answering the first question - the "what is knowledge?" question - by answering the second. That's a big mistake. And in a way one is continuing to make it if one faults my view for not being able to answer the second, for that is to fail to recognise that the second is a quite distinct question.

So, my analysis does not answer the second question, but that's not a fault in it - far from it, for it answers the first question and it was the first qusteion, not the second, that we wanted answered.

Note too that though my analysis does not answer the second question - a question it was not seeking to answer - it nevertheless helps us see why it won't have a definitive answer. For once we understand that Reason is a person and knowledge an attitude she is adopting, we can understand that though there is likely to be a character to when and where she adopts that attitude, there need be no rigidity about it. We can understand that there is unlikely to be a signed-sealed-and-delivered set of conditions that will always and everywhere make a belief knowledge, just as we understand in our own case that, say, there is no ingredient whose presence in a foodstuff will always and everywhere lead to us finding that foodstuff delicious.

So Reason has no reasons, as it were. She is inscrutable. — Andrew M

I am not sure what you mean when you say that "Reason has no reasons", for the second word 'reason' is ambiguous. If it is an 'explanatory' reason - so, basically, a cause - then I see no reason to think that Reason's attitudes will lack causes. For instance, if I acquire a true belief in one way, she seems not to adopt the knowledge attitude towards it, whereas if I acquire it another way, she does.

Take Russell's case of the stopped clock. Well, in that case it seems as if the fact the true belief was acquired by fluke explains why Reason did not adopt the knowledge attitude towards it. Thus her 'reason' (in the 'explanatory' sense) for not adopting the knowledge attitude towards that true belief was that it was acquired by fluke.

However, perhaps you mean by 'reason' not 'explanation' but 'normative reason'. But I see no reason to think that she will lack those either. For normative reasons are also attitudes of Reason. And nothing stops her from adopting such attitudes towards other of her attitudes. Just as I can like an attitude of mine, so too can she (that is, she can approve of herself adopting certain attitudes towards things - approve of herself adopting the knowledge attitude towards whatever she adopts it towards).

So I see no reason - no justification, no normative reason - to think that Reason has no reasons.

It seems that you regard human reason as a kind of intuition or feeling that derives (however imperfectly) from Reason. Through a glass darkly, so to speak. — Andrew M

Yes, quite. Our reason is to Reason what the internet is to me - it is the means by which I am communicating with you.

By what authority do you claim time is not an abstract concept and therefore can not be known? — Athena

I didn't say that - I didn't say it couldn't be known (I know there is time, for instance). I said that it is not an abstract concept.

An abstract concept is an idea about something abstract. 'Concept' is fancy for 'idea'.

Time is something we have an idea 'of'. It is not itself an idea.

It's like saying 'free will is an abstract idea' or 'morality is an abstract idea'. Same mistake - confusing the idea with what the idea is of.

As for what time actually is - well, it's made of the same kind of stuff that knowledge is made of, namely attitudes of Reason. But to argue for that would take us beyond the scope of this thread. We're beyond it already.

If 'warrant' means 'has normative reason to believe' then yes, but then 'warrant' means nothing distinct from 'justification'.

Whatever warrant means, unless it just means 'known', we'll be able to come up with counterexamples to the idea that knowledge is true belief plus warrant.

By offering another kind of knowledge which is also unjustified? — creativesoul

No, by offering an example of a case in which a person has a 'well-grounded' belief yet fails to have knowledge.

If 'well-grounded' just means 'justified' then the original counterexamples will do.

If 'well-grounded' means 'a true belief that is based on another true belief' then my case described above refutes it.

Like I say, my thesis is that if you add anything to 'true belief' aside from "that Reason has a certain attitude towards you having" then the thesis can be refuted (unless what's added is the trivial 'that is known'.

Warrant?

What counts as sufficient/adequate reason to believe? — creativesoul

I am not sure what you're asking - I was giving a definition of a normative reason. It isn't in dispute that justifications must involve them - they're also called 'justifying reasons'.

But it doesn't matter. It's not justified. The problems for JTB, if there are any, need to be clear cut examples of justified(well-grounded) true belief. An unjustified true belief is not. — creativesoul

yes, but with that example I was refuting the theory that knowledge is well-grounded true belief.

Add anything (aside from my thesis, of course) to 'true belief' and I hold that it can be refuted as a theory about what is sufficient for knowledge.

On second thought, the term "normative" could be problematic. That would amount to agreement with conventional standards. All paradigm shift begins with rejecting convention somewhere along the line. So... I'm unsettled about the normative aspect. — creativesoul

No, a normative reason can also be called a 'justifying' reason. It has nothing to do with conventional standards - indeed, we judge the appropriateness or otherwise of conventional standards by considering to what extent there is normative reason to accept them.

There are different kinds of normative reason, but they are called 'normative' just to distinguish them from other uses of the term 'reason', such as 'explanatory' reason. An explanatory reason explains why something occurred. But a normative reason is a reason to do or believe something.

So, if the clock reads 3 o clock and I have no reason (normative reason) to believe the clock is stopped, then I have reason (normative reason) to believe it is 3 o clock.

So, on my usage - which is, I think, uncontroversial - justifications 'just are' made of normative reasons. Being justified would then involve either holding a belief that you have normative reason to hold, or having acquired a belief in a manner that you had normative reason to acquire it in. Something like that, anyway.

Typically a justified belief, to the best of my knowledge, is one that can be and/or has been argued for. Traditionally, the justification of one's beliefs involved offering the ground; the basis for belief. I mean, I'm fairly certain that the justification method was invoked as a means to further discriminate between conflicting knowledge claims. — creativesoul

I am using 'justified' far more broadly to mean just 'a belief that there is a normative reason for the person to believe'. So that it includes beliefs that have not been inferred. Some of those are, I think, correctly described as 'justified'. After all, inferences have to proceed from some beliefs and those beliefs cannot themselves have been inferred, yet we do not - presumably - want to say that all such beliefs are unjustified. So I would say that a belief is justified just if there is a normative reason for the person to believe it, a reason they may well be unaware of.

The person believes that a broken clock is correct. That belief is false. It also serves as ground for the subsequent belief regarding what time it is. So the belief about the time is not well-grounded. It is based upon false belief. — creativesoul

Okay, so a 'well grounded' belief is one that is in some sense 'based' on a true belief? Okay, but that's by-the-by because we can conceive of cases in which a person has a 'well grounded' true belief yet, intuitively, does not qualify as knowing.

For example, let's say I know full well that I am in a town in which all but one clock has stopped. I see a clock. I believe that the clock is working. That belief is clearly unjustified. But it happens to be true - by fluke the clock I am staring at is, in fact, the one clock in town that is working. From that true - but unjustified - belief I draw the conclusion that it is 3 o clock (because that's the time the clock says it is). That belief is true and well-grounded, but intuitively it does not count as knowledge.

I think that's going to be something we will be able to do for any proposal that adds something to 'true belief' in an attempt to spell out knowledge's ingredients.

In the original clock case, the subject has a justified true belief, but it is not knowledge.

In this variation of the original clock case, the subject has a well-grounded true belief, but it is not knowledge.

I don't see a difference - for they are all cases in which a person acquires a true belief in an epistemically responsible fashion, yet does not appear to qualify as knowing.

Is it well-grounded to believe that a broken clock is correct? — creativesoul

I am not sure what you mean by 'well-grounded'.

Justified... or "well-grounded"? Did Plato use the term "justified"? — creativesoul

I am not sure, but I am also not sure I see a distinction between the two. I take it that a belief is justified when there is a normative reason to believe it. Perhaps well-grounded means something different....

Same problems as the truth thread. Anthropomorphism... the personification of thinking about thought and belief(Reason). — creativesoul

But if Reason asserts, directs, prescribes, and so on, then Reason must be a person, for it is a self-evident truth that persons and persons alone do that kind of thing. So it is not a mistake.

Reasoning involves thinking, but not all thinking is reasoning. And reasoning can be done well or badly. It is not just 'done' in the way that thinking about thought is either done or not done. No, it is done well, or it is done badly, or indifferently.

How so? Because reasoning is attempting to listen to Reason. That is, reasoning is not Resaon - that's a category error (reasoning is an activity, but Reason is not an activity). And when one fails to hear clearly what Reason says to do or believe, then one is reasoning badly. That is to say, one is attempting to hear her in ways that she disapproves of.

So Reason is the source of the prescriptions and assertions that we are attempting to hear when we engage in reasoning. Hence how reasoning can be done badly or well.

And again, what - other than a person - can possibly be a source of a prescription? What - other than a person - can possibly assert anything to be the case?

So there is no mistake here, there's just an unothordox view about what Reason is, but that's no reason to reject it.

1 Knowledge should work all of the time, not some of the time.
2 Knowledge is useful.
3 Knowledge answers questions
4 Knowledge solves problems.
5 Knowledge is made of facts.
6 Facts are true
7 Facts are true because they are useful, answer questions, solve problems. — ovdtogt

That's just a string of false claims, not an analysis of knowledge.

I don't know what 'knowledge should work all of the time" means? It's confused. It's like saying 7 should work all the time.

2 Knowledge is useful. — ovdtogt

Not necessarily. "Useless knowledge" is not a contradiction in terms. And we can think of loads and loads of examples where knowing something was anything but useful. For instance, there are some things that, if you know them, can make your job harder. If you know that your friend is in the audience, it might be much harder to do a good performance or make a good speech, and so on .

3 Knowledge answers questions

No, that's a category error. Knowledge doesn't 'do' anything. It 'is' something - exactly what is the issue under debate - but it doesn't 'do' anything. We do things with it, but it does nothing.

5 Knowledge is made of facts.

No, for if there are no persons in existence then there is clearly no knowledge, yet there would still be facts (such as the fact no persons exist).

6 Facts are true

No, propositions are true, facts are part of what make propositions true.

7 Facts are true because they are useful, answer questions, solve problems

No, facts are not true - propositions are the bearers of truth. And 'true' and 'useful' are not synonymous properties of a proposition.

So you haven't answered my question or said anything true.

Just for the sake of argument, time is an abstract concept. Time is not a tangible reality. That is, it is not a thing that is perceptible by touch, therefore it can not be known. It can be believed by an individual or the whole state in that time zone can believe that it is three o'clock, as it can be believed the earth is flat, but if I understand the OP argument, believing something is not exactly knowing it. Experience is a vital part of knowing, and if it is not perceptible by touch, it can not be experienced. — Athena

I don't know what point you're making. Time is not an abstract concept, but what time is is not the topic of this thread. This thread is about what knowledge is. It is not about what can be known, but what knowledge itself is.

Coward.

Answer the question.

To answer one of your questions. This law is not about children breeding. It’s a law that applies to people over the age of consent. The law is not about the child but the adult. — Brett

that's not an answer to my question. You've just told me it is against the law. Er, yes, I know. It is against the law because it would be grossly irresponsible to allow it.

Now, again, is it morally justified to prevent children from breeding - is, in other words, the law against it 'just'? yes or no?

Why don't you answer the questions?

Are you a complete anarchist where procreation is concerned? Should it not be regulated in any way at all? Should children be allowed to breed, for instance? Or would that be irresponsible?

Are you an anarchist across the board? Are you opposed to the state regulating who can fly a plane or drive a car?

You express concerns about authority. Those are just general concerns.

Are you opposed to all interference? Should anyone and everyone be allowed to do anything to anyone? Or engage in any activity at all, no matter how great the dangers may be of doing it badly?

What principle are you appealing to?

The state mustn't interfere in anyone's life ever?

The state mustn't interfere in anyone's life unless the way they're living it poses a threat to the rights of others?

The former is not consistent with my proposal, but it is also far more controversial than it and requires robust defence - provide it.

The latter is not controversial, but is consistent with my proposal.

Why don’t you address the rest of my post, not just eugenics? Why not address the potential problems of licensing? — Brett

I just did. How about you address something I've argued.

I assume you now agree that eugenics is not always and everywhere wrong and that your 'that's eugenics' point was cheap?

The point is the problem of authority over people, how complicated it is and the unknown knock-on effects. Because in your posts there’s no room for the sudden unexpected spark of brilliant life that comes to us randomly and unexpectedly.
It’s the randomness that’s behind the brilliance, not the ticking of boxes. — Brett

Ah, the random unexpected spark - the last resort of someone who's totally lost the argument.

Should children be allowed to breed? I mean, it isn't currently allowed. You'd allow it - yes? You know, because of the unexpected spark. Or do you agree with me that that is just the most stupid argument in the world ever?

Authority - normally we don't have the moral authority to interfere with other people's private lives, and that applies a fortiori to the state. But that's because most people's private lives are the result of their own free choices.

There are exceptions. A pigeon ethicist wouldn't be able to see them. But everyone else can.

Children don't choose their parents. Their upbringing is not a result of their own free choices.

Now, are you opposed to licencing pilots? Answer please. Are you a total anarchist?

But it is good eugenics. — Brett

No. Did you read anything I wrote about it - anything? Are you a pigeon? Everything is black and white. Eugenics = bad. Gassing = bad. Crumbs = good. Waddling and cooing = good. Pooing randomly on things = good.

What's your point?

This is a form of eugenics. — Brett

I know. Your point?

Is your point that the Nazis practiced a form of eugenics and that therefore it must always and everywhere be wrong?

I am assuming so, otherwise I don't see what point you could possibly be making (describing a view does not amount to criticizing it).

I am having a fence built at the moment. But I am a bit worried that it is evil to have the fence built because I've just been told that the wood has to go into a - wait for it - gas chamber. That's how they treat it. If they don't do that to it, it'll rot. They put the wood in a gas chamber and gas it and then do other things to it. But the important point is that it goes in a gas chamber - a giant one. And Nazis used gas chambers, didn't they. So that's evil, right? It's evil to put things in gas chambers.

Only no, it isn't. It kinda matters what you're using the gas chamber for. Racist holocausts - evil. Treating wood. Utterly ethically innocuous.

Now, stop being silly and thinking that if something qualifies as a eugenics policy that makes it evil and Nazi and wicked. That's every bit as stupid as thinking that all uses to which one might put a gas chamber are evil just because the Nazis put them to an evil use. It's the opposite of sensible debate - it's cheap, silly, emotive debate.

Now, we already have a eugenics policy. Children are not permitted to breed. The very seriously mentally challenged are not permitted to breed.

Are you opposed to those eugenics policies? Should children be allowed to breed? No, of course not. Yet that's a licencing scheme in all but name. If you are below a certain age, you are not permitted to breed. I am just extending that idea in sensible and, I think, ethically justifiable - I would say mandatory - ways.

Now, do children have a right to a good home and a healthy upbringing?

yes.

What's a 'right'? What does it mean to say that someone has a 'right' to something?

It means force can be used if necessary to give them it.

That's why people protest about rights - that's why people always get a bit hot under the collar when people talk about rights. It is because they're talking about the legitimate use of force - of coercion.

So, children have a 'right' to a good home and a healthy upbringing.

That means we - we moral agents, or suitable agencies operating on our behalf - are entitled to use force and coercion to give it to them.

That means that stopping someone who is clearly not going to be able to give the child he/she has a stable, happy home and a healthy upbringing is something we're entitled to do.

That's eugenics. But it is good eugenics. It is not racist eugenics. The justification is to prevent rights violations.

Perhaps you think it won't prevent rights violations, but then argue that. Don't just label it 'eugenics' and think your job is done.

Why should I accept a statement which issues from a misunderstanding due to a reification of an ambiguous way of thinking about reason? — Janus

Question begging. I am not misunderstanding anything. I am just saying things you - you - disagree with. That is not equivalent to being mistaken.

Reason does all of the following, as a cursory read of any philosophical text on the matter will show: command, direct, require, bid, favour, prescribe, assert, value.

Now, don't just say "no she doesn't". That's just silly. She does. And she has to be a 'She' (or He - whatever) becaues only shes and hes do that kind of thing. Q.E.D.

Argue something and stop just farting out assertions, Hugh.

Of course it's your assertion I just don't agree with you that reason itself universally "asserts" anything. — Janus

Evidence? Again, you have no justification for these claims. I am justifying mine.

You have agreed that my example was an example of an assertion.

Now, it is also a 'true' assertion. But it is not true because 'I' assert it, is it?

So, why is it true, then?

Because Joe Bloggs asserts it?

No.

Becasue Reason asserts it?

yes.

There's no other plausible answer.

Now, don't just nay say. That's not arguing.

Again, you have agreed that this - "if an argument is valid and has true premises, then the conclusion is true" - is an assertion.

You should also agree that it is 'true'.

Is. It. True. Because. I. Assert. It?

No.

Why is that assertion true, then?

Don't explain why we 'think' it is true. Explain why it is actually true. In virtue of what is it true?

Knowledge should work all of the time, not some of the time. — ovdtogt

What do you mean? I am asking what knowledge is - literally what it is made of.

So, take someone who knows something. Don't question whether they have it or not - they clearly do have it. The question is what they have in having it. What does their having knowledge consist in?

It can't just be having a true belief, for that would mean that lucky guesses could count as knowledge. But if I believe - on the basis of no evidence whatsoever - that Jack killed someone, then I do not 'know' that Jack killed someone even if, as it happens, he did.

So, it is clear to our rational reflection that having knowledge does not just involve having a true belief.

It does involve having a true belief - for when we imagine someone with a false belief, it seems clear in every case that they lack knowledge. 'False knowledge' seems an incoherent idea.

So, knowledge does involve having a true belief, but having a true belief is not sufficient. Yet it would be sufficient if 'knowledge' was composed solely of possession of a true belief. Thus, it is not.

What about a justification, then? If we add a justification to a true belief, does that transform the true belief into an item of knowledge?

Sometimes - often - yes. But not always, as Russell and Gettier demonstrated. There are cases -clear cases - where a person clearly has a justified true belief, but equally clearly lacks knowledge.

Thus, knowledge cannot be composed solely of a justified true belief, for otherwise there would not be such cases (and there clearly are).

I think there are also cases (though I have not yet described one - and I also would admit that they are not as clear cut as Gettier cases) where a person has knowledge and yet is not justified in their belief.

So it seems to me that, upon reflection, justifications are not essential to knowledge. They sometimes transform a true belief into knowledge, but they do not invariably do so.

What's knowledge, then?

Well, because it seems that the only thing all clear items of knowledge have in common is that they involve a person possessing a true belief, and because having a true belief is clearly not sufficient to have knowledge, I conclude that knowledge is a relation that a true belief stands in to Reason. I don't say that's entailed. It is a proposal. But I do think that whatever else anyone proposes, it will either amount to saying "a person has knowledge when they have knowledge" - in which case it is true but vacuous - or it will be false, for we'll be able to conceive of cases involving the said combination yet that are clearly not cases in which the person possesses knowledge.

My proposal, then, is that when Reason feels a certain way about a true belief of yours (or anyone's), then that true belief qualifies as knowledge. Sometimes - very often, it would seem - the fact your true belief is justified is going to be what is responsible for making Reason adopt that attitude towards your belief. But not always. Just as, by analogy, covering something in chocolate will often make me like it, but not invariably.

The topic here is "what is knowledge?" There is already broad agreement that whatever else knowledge involves, it involves having a true belief and a justification for it. But there are cases where these elements are present yet the person does not possess knowledge.
— Bartricks

I don't see how you can define knowledge in such a way and then say that a person fits that definition yet doesn't possess knowledge. It's like saying, "It walks, talks and acts like a duck, but isn't a duck". — Harry Hindu

No, that's quite wrong. It's not a 'definition'. It is a thesis. It was Plato's thesis. And it seems true for the most part.

But then counterexamples were devised - cases where although a person possesses what the thesis says they need to possess, it seems manifest to reason that they nevertheless lack knowledge.

You're doing things the wrong way around - or you're imagining that philosophers do things the wrong way around.

A good philosopher does not just 'define' knowledge and then dismiss as 'not knowledge' anything that fails to match that definition. That's not philosophy.

A philosopher tries to figure out what knowledge is by a combination of looking at clear cases of knowledge possession and seeing if there is anything they all have in common apart from being cases of knowledge and conceptual analysis.

They may propose a thesis - as Plato did - but then others are going to set about trying to refute it. Which they do not by just 'defining' knowledge differently and then insisting that the word does not apply to what Plato described. But rather by rational reflection - a major part of which involves devising thought experiments to test the thesis.

Now it seems to me that there is nothing all clear cases of knowledge have in common apart, that is, from involving a true belief.

That doesn't mean that having a true belief is sufficient for knowledge - it is clearly not, for we can easily imagine cases in which someone has a true belief but does not have knowledge. Nevertheless, there seems nothing - apart from being cases of knowledge - that all cases of knowledge have in common apart from involving a true belief. Knowledge cannot be reduced to 'true belief', but there seems nothing else all cases of knowledge have in common.

And that's why I propose that knowledge itself is an attitude Reason is adopting towards true beliefs. Hence why there is nothing else they all have in common apart from being cases where an agent has a true belief.

How would we distinguish between those beliefs Reason approves of and those she does not?

Or to put it another way, why does Reason approve of the beliefs she does? — Andrew M

I do not think those are the same question. The latter has as no definitive answer - it would be like asking me why I find delicious what I find delicious (it varies) - but is also irrelevant to the question at issue. The question at issue is what knowledge is, not why it exists.

As for the former question - well, our reason is our source of insight into what Reason approves of.

Take the Gettier cases mentioned earlier. It used to be thought that possession of a justified true belief was sufficient for knowledge. But then Gettier cases are brought to our attention. And, for most of us, it is clear enough to our reason that the subject in a Gettier case lacks knowledge even though they possess a justified true belief. Now, that isn't arbitrary - people are not just randomly deciding, on the basis of nothing at all, that the subject in a Gettier case lacks knowledge. No, their reason tells them that the subject in that case lacks knowledge.

So, just as I think I know there's a fig tree in my study because there appears, visually, to be one there - a visual impression that has been confirmed by everyone who has come into my study thus far - I think we can know when a person has knowledge if it appears to our reason that the person in question has knowledge. That includes people who may be unaware they have knowledge, too. It can be apparent to our reason - even if it is not to theirs - that they know something, and that is excellent evidence that they know it.

Are you reifying, deifying or otherwise personifying reason? — Pantagruel

No, not 'reifying' because that term means 'mistakenly treating as a thing'. I am treating Reason as a thing, but there is no mistake. And I am personifying Reason, but again, that is not a mistake.

It is not essential to my case that Reason be personified - one could accept what I have said but insist that non-persons can adopt attitudes towards things and that Reason is such a non-person. Now, I think that's an insane position - for I think that a person who sincerely believes that non-persons can adopt attitudes towards things is mad. Hence why I personify Reason. But one could resist personifying Reason consistent with accepting everything else I have said about knowledge. I just wouldn't recommend it, as it is bonkers.

But personifying Reason also sheds light on the nature of knowledge. Why has knowledge defied analysis? Well, because philosophers have been trying to locate its ingredients. But 'knowledge' is not a thing - it is not a kind of cake or other kind of substance. It is a specific kind of attitudinal relation that a true belief stands in to Reason.

So then why is reason adopting an attitude towards that belief? (your words). — Pantagruel

Well, because it is true and has been acquired in a manner she approves of. But beyond that we do not need to know why she has adopted it, for my point is that a belief qualifies as knowledge when - and only when - Reason is adopting this attitude towards it.

For an analogy: a cake qualifies as being delicious-to-me when and only when it is causing certain taste sensations in me. That's true even if we do not know more specifically why it is causing those sensations in me.

I believe many things. Some of what I believe I feel I 'know'. Of course, my feeling that I know something does not entail that I know it. There may be some things I do not feel I know, but that I do know. And there may be some things I feel I know, but do not know. The point, however, is that there is a feeling associated with knowledge - I feel I know some things.

That feeling - a feeling we're all surely familiar with - does not constitute knowledge when we feel it towards a belief of ours (or anyone else's). After all, as just said, it is quite clear that if I feel I know something it does not follow of necessity that I know it.

But that feeling - the knowledge feeling - does make a belief into knowledge when Reason has it towards a belief. That's what I am proposing, anyway.

'Knowledge' is a word applied to a state of confidence, shared or individual, that an event, or sequence of events.. was/is/will be.. the case. Words like 'belief', 'truth' and 'justification' are merely negotiable aspects of that state of confidence. — fresco

No, that's clearly false. Merely being confident about a belief is not sufficient for knowledge (it may not even be necessary). If I am confident I will win the lottery this evening that does not mean I know that I will (even if I get lucky and win it).

Do you know what I mean by metacognitive? — Pantagruel

No.

An attitude towards a belief would be cognition about a belief. — Pantagruel

Why not just say that, then?

And, like I say, where is the inconsistency between these two claims?

Ok but this

Sometimes someone can know something - that is, can have a justified true belief - without knowing that their belief is justified. — Bartricks
and this

having a true belief that Reason is adopting a certain attitude towards (the knowledge attitude). — Bartricks
seem to be in disagreement? — Pantagruel

How are they 'in disagreement'??

I can have a justified true belief - that is, a belief that I have acquired in a manner that Reason approves of - without realising that Reason approves of it.

There is no inconsistency.

If your sole valuation of human life is based on IQ. — I like sushi

How on earth does that follow?

I think people should be prevented from breaking other people's arms. By your logic that means my sole valuation of human life is based on having usable arms.

For the record: I think people with low IQ have rights. Hell, I think my cat has rights.

Your facile reasoning is irresponsible so maybe you shouldn’t be allowed to have children? — I like sushi

Look, I know you've recently acquired this word 'facile' and you're understandably enjoying using it, but there's nothing facile about my reasoning.

Further still, given that you may already have children perhaps they should be ‘culled’? — I like sushi

Your reasoning, however, is another matter altogether.

How on earth does it follow that I'm in favour of culling existing children just if I am in favour of preventing some people from breeding?

I mean, you realize that means you - you - are in favour of culling the kids of psychopaths, yes?

I am in favour of preventing irresponsible breeding - that does not mean that I am in favour of killing those who have already been brought into existence. After all, in addition to having a right to a decent upbringing, kids also have a right not to be killed.

I only suggested such action for complete psychopathic, vicious and/or murderous types. I am certainly not talking about selective breeding based on the whims of what I or anyone else considers a ‘genetic’ advantage. — I like sushi

Just to be clear - you are in favour of eugenics, then. Yes? By your definition of eugenics, you. are. in. favour. of. it.

My proposal is not based on 'whims' anymore than yours is. It is based on the idea that a) people do not have the right to do things if the lack the skills to do them well and when doing them badly has very bad consequences for others.

That's not a whim - it is the same basis upon which it would be justified to stop psychopaths breeding.

Oh, are you disappointed in me. I am not playing games. Now, I've answered your questions, answer mine. If - if - a couple knew that any child they had would have a very low IQ, should they procreate? Is that a responsible thing to do? Don't ask 'how would they know?' - that doesn't engage with the point.