But it is rational to feel grief when someone with whom one enjoyed a close relationship dies, yes?

Someone who didn't - someone who managed to persuade themselves that death is nothing to the one who dies and so felt nothing upon learning of their death - is not a model of rationality.

So this is a case where the Stoic says something that flies in the face of Reason. A good Stoic, who feels no grief when his/her partner or friend or parent dies, is not a rational person.

We often have reason to be unhappy - reason to feel unpleasant things. That is, a rational person is not someone who has managed to find a way of being happy no matter what the world throws at them. No, it matters what's thrown at you. If some things are thrown at you, you ought - ought - to be unhappy and you are not fully rational if you are happy despite them.

If the Stoic is simply trying to teach us how to be happy whatever the world throws at us, then they are a therapist, not a philosopher and often what they teach will be profoundly immoral.

I think I did that above - Stoics think grief is irrational.

But it appears often to be rational. If my partner dies, then I have reason to grieve her death. If there was a pill that would make me forget all about her, then I ought not to take it. And so on.

So, we often appear to have reason to feel grief. Other things being equal, that is evidence that we really do have reason to feel grief, despite the fact we would be happier not feeling it. And thus, it is evidence that Stoicism - or this particular Stoic belief - is false.

If a Stoic replies that I have misrepresented the view and that in fact the view is that grief is rational when it is rational and not when it is not, then the view is banal.

If the Stoic replies that we will be better off not feeling grief, then they have ceased doing philosophy and have become a therapist.

I agree, there "seems" so and it's commonly held as the case, but when analyzing the terms the common opinion seems to break down for me. — Dranu

But that is evidence that your analysis is going wrong. We don't need definitions. Prior to having any definition of goodness or happiness, it seems to us - that is, it is manifest to the reason of most of us - that happiness and goodness are not one and the same quality.

If, upon trying to define happiness and goodness respectively, you find that your definitions collapse them into one, then you have not discovered that they are one - that would be to give your own attempts at definition control over reality - but that your definitions are faulty.

You know what happiness is without having to have a definition of it. For example, if I said "happiness is a piece of cheese", you know that my attempted definition is mistaken even though you have none of your own to offer.

As it is manifest to reason that happiness and goodness are not the same - for someone can be good and not happy, and not good and happy - then we know in advance that any definition that collapses them is a faulty definition.

That is a point about approach - that we must respect Reason, not defer to our definitions in defiance of what Reason says.

But what kind of definition might be endorsed by Reason? Well, what about this: happiness is that which it is in your interests to acquire. By contrast, goodness is that which Reason wants you to acquire.

I do not follow your objection. Let's assume that it is not possible to create free will without thereby creating the possibility that it may be used to do evil. Let's also assume that free will is a great good.
Both of those assumptions - though questionable - are highly plausible. And given those assumptions, it seems plausible that a good being might create free will despite the fact that in doing so he would be creating the possibility of it being used to do evil.

I don't endorse Plantinga's view, but I am not seeing how you're challenging it - that's all. You seem to be assuming that a morally perfect being would do nothing to create any evil, yet that's precisely what Plantinga is attempting to show is false. He's showing it is false by showing that there are some goods -such as free will - that cannot be created without also creating the possibility of evil.

There are others, too. Take forgiveness. It is good to be forgiving and sometimes to forgive wrongs that have been done to you. But the good of forgiveness cannot exist if no-one does any wrong.

It is at least plausible that instantiating the good of forgiveness may sometimes be a good so great it sufficiently outweighs the badness of the wrongs being forgiven as to justify creating circumstances in which such wrongs would occur so as to create the possibility of the good of forgiveness.

They are surely obviously distinct, as there seems no contradiction involved in the idea of a bad person being happy, or a good person being unhappy.

Those who are good are deserving of happiness - that is, it is good if they are happy (and bad if they are not). But being deserving of happiness and being happy are not the same.

This is not to suggest that happiness is individually subjective. Happiness is no more individually subjective than goodness is. It is just that they are not the same quality.

Are you reverting back to your original argument that it's the lack of consent that's the problem? Or are you changing your argument to the extreme consequential argument that living entails lot's of suffering? — boethius

What do you mean 'reverting'? I have said repeatedly that my case for antinatalism is 'cumulative'. That means I think there are numerous arguments - no one by itself decisive - that imply procreation is wrong.

Sometimes consequences matter. Although it is prima facie wrong to do something to someone else without their prior consent, it is not always wrong. And sometimes it will be right - often in cases where failure to perform the act in question would have dire consequences.

That's what explains why it is often morally permissible - sometimes morally obligatory - to perform life-changing surgery on unconscious patients, or to force children to go to school, and so on. In those cases - and many more we can conceive of - failure to perform the act would have dire consequences.

Dire consequences do not always make those acts that prevent them right. But they sometimes do.

However, in procreation cases there is typically no dire consequences that performing the act averts. Thus, what explains why many other act that affect others without their prior consent are morally permissible (sometimes morally obligatory) does not apply to most cases of procreation.

I somehow did not see this reply so am replying now, rather late in the day. — Bartricks
I'm not convinced of this statement, but that of course does not make it untrue. — boethius

What was the point in saying that? It is true. I'm in an epistemically special position to know its truth, by dint of being me and thereby knowing far more about why I do things than you do.

You don't seem to have bothered to have read the argument. — boethius

I did, it is just not very good.

Your reply is also not very good. You are just blithely assuming an individual subjectivist position on harm - which is an absurd position in its own right and is also clearly not a view assumed by anything I have argued.

It is prima facie wrong to do something to someone else that significantly affects them without their consent.

My opinion that that is the case is not what makes it the case. It is self-evident to the reason of most people that it is prima facie wrong to do something to someone else if that act significant affects them without their consent.

IF someone has the opinion that what I have just said is false, their opinion is almost certainly mistaken. Why? Not because I say so. But because there is plentiful evidence their opinion is false. Namely, the widely corroborated rational intuitions of virtually all people.

In syaing that it is 'prima facie' wrong I am not saying that it is always and everywhere wrong. There will be lots - lots, note - of exceptions.

Pointing out these exceptions - which is all you've done so far - is, then, to ignore my argument.

It is as if I have said "2 + 2 = 4" and your reply is "no, for 2+ 3 = 5". I have said that to significantly affect another without their prior consent is prima facie wrong. You have replied by pointing out that there are many cases in which it is morally permissible, even morally obligatory, to do something that significantly affects another without their prior consent.

Er, yes. I know. That's consistent with it being prima facie wrong.

The point is that in the exceptional cases, we can 'explain' why this kind of act is overall right by pointing to the fact that, say, had the act not been performed the affected partly would have been even worse off, or some such.

Yet that is not the case in procreative acts.

Thus your examples provide no evidence against my conclusion. Deal with it.

I should add that it strikes me as human hubris to put limits on what an omnipotent being can do.

And as for God creating himself - well, it is more impressive to have created oneself than not done so. Thus God has created himself. And if God existed of necessity - as you are claiming - then God would not be omnipotent for he would lack the power not to exist. God is omnipotent and thus has the power not to exist which in turn entails that he exists contingently.

You have attributed to me claims I never made.

My argument was that a being who is not constrained by the laws of logic is more powerful than one who is. As there can be no one morepowerful than an omnipotent being, an omnipotent being is not going to be constrained by the laws of logic. Thus, an omnipotent being can do absolutely anything and not just the logically possible.

Again, a being who can do the impossible and the possible is more powerful than one who can do only the latter. The latter is constrained, the former is not.

You then say I said that logic is a social construction. No, that is absolutely not my view and you won't find it expressed in anything I have said.

Logic is robustly external in that there is nothing we can do to alter it.

Logic must be determined by an omnipotent being for that is the only way a being would not be constrained by it. Logic, then, is internal to them.

So far from being a social construction, logic is a divine construction. What is or is not possible is determined not by me or you or some group of us, but by a person, Reason, who by dint of this is omnipotent.

.

As I understand things, libertarians will typically mainain that substance causation is an essential ingredient of free will. Not all do - some think indeterministic event causation is what's needed. But anyway, what I have trouble with in what you say is your suggestion that substance causation is somehow incompatible with free will.

What often motivates a commitment to libertarianism about free will is the idea that, to be free, we need to be the ultimate explanation of why we made one decision rather than another. If my decisions are caused by events, then because I am not an event I will therefore not be the originator of my decision. Thus, to be the originator I - I, a thing rather than an event- need to be the cause of my decision. Substance causation - whose existence can be independently motivated - allows for this to be true and is this is why so many think free will requires it.

So I do not yet see a problem for the substance causal libertarian.

You have focussed on moral evils and not natural ones, though it is the latter that pose the more acute problem.

But even putting that to one side, you claim that the production of some moral goods requires the existence of evils.

I don't think the examples you give illustrate this convincingly.

But I concede that it does seem true that some moral goods require moral evils. For instance, it is morally good when an wrongdoer comes to harm. This kind of just-desert good clearly requires moral evils in order to exist.

But would a good god create a world full of wrongdoers and ensure that all come to harm so that the good of justice can come into being? No, that's not the act of a good person.

So even if there are moral goods whose existence requires moral evils, that does not demonstrate that a world containing them is plausibly the creation of God.

You also say that it would be selfish to create a world and not also create some innocent sentient creatures to live in it. But that is question begging and false. It is question begging because the idea of selfishness incorporates a moral judgement. That is, it assumes the wrongness of the act in question. So creating a world devoid of innocent sentient life can only be judged selfish - as opposed to just self-interested - if you assume one ought to create innocent sentient creatures. But that's precisely what's at issue.
It is also just plain wrong because there is clearly no positive obligation to create innocent sentient life.

is entails a goal of preventing, if only by argument, and convincing others, all future human life, or perhaps any life that can experience suffering. These prevented lives are prevented without the consent of the potential life forms. — Coben

Imagine the last women alive do not want to have sex. Is it ok to rape them to continue the species? No. Why? Because it is important to respect their autonomy. It is more important to respect autonomy, than it is to continue the species - hence what our intuitions tell us about this kind of case.

Now, in arguing that it is wrong to rape the last women I am not thereby committing myself to the view that life is not worth living, nor am I committing myself to the view that all procreation is wrong. There may be exceptions.

though actually I don't believe in objective morals, I prefer a universe with life, even life that can suffer,and I would guess that most life can suffer. IOW I do not accept consent violation as the value that overrides all other values. — Coben

So, by your lights nothing is actually right or wrong - we can just do as we like?

Third, I think life carries with it its own consent. Life forms want to live, it is inherent in their nature. A person may change their inherent drive to live and thrive once they have been faced with experiences X and Y. — Coben

This is incoherent. The fact that someone might subsequently consent to what you've done to them does not mean you didn't disrespect them in doing it. Take rape. It is wrong to rape someone even if that person subsequently doesn't mind.

Fourth, we are constantly doing things that potentially violate the consent of others. — Coben

Yes, and it nearly always needs justifying (and often can be). The point is that it is default wrong, not that it is always and everywhere wrong.

For instance, take unavoidability itself - that often justifies what would otherwise have been wrong. But that doesn't work in the procreation case does it, because procreation is avoidable.

ntinatalism is asking us to override the desires involved. Heterosexual penetrative sex is pretty much ruled out, since pregnancy can result in a foetus. — Coben

That's a wild exaggeration. The demand to remain childless is hardly overly burdensome (indeed, having children is burdensome as virtually all parents seem to confirm). And one can take reasonable precautions and, having done so, one is not then responsible should a pregnancy occur. And plus pregnancies can be terminated.

An analogy: it is wrong to knowingly infect another person with a venereal disease. Does that mean that one is obliged never to have sex 'just in case' one has one? No, that's absurd - there is just a responsibility to take precautions. Likewise in this case.

er, the problem of evil is addressed to those who believe in the omni god.

yes, but he's wrong.

because saying something doesn't make it so and this is a philosophy forum so it is reasonable to expect people to provide reasons in support of their views, rather than just express them.

So, once more, try actualy arguing for something.

I don't have any angst! What are you on about? This is philosophy forum, not a therapy forum.

I am not rewording the OP so that it addresses you! It is about the problem of evil and its implications for human procreation. Either address the arguments it raises or don't.

Eh? Once more, actually argue something - address the argument of the OP - rather than telling me about religious texts. It's irrelevant.

Also, don't say something is a non-sequitur without explanation.

Just focus on the argument I made in the OP.

Yes you do if you're using words in their conventional way. If I believe in a doughnut - a doughnut I call 'God' and 'Jesus' interchangeably yet that at the same time I believe to be a ring of sugary bread and nothing more - then I can call myself a Christian, but I am not one.

But that is by the by. Let's not start discussing labels rather than philosophical problems, despite the fact most prefer to do the former.

The problem of evil arises for a believer in God, understood - as is conventional - as a being who is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. And this thread is about the problem of evil and its implications for the ethics of human procreation. It is not about Christianity. It is not about labels.

The concept of God just is the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being.

If you want to define God as a potato, that's fine - then it is beyond dispute that God exists and there is no problem of evil. But then you believe in a potato and it would be grossly misleading to describe yourself as a believer in God, or a Christian, given that these words have well established uses that you are flagrantly playing fast and loose with.

It is not 'meaningless'. Rather, what you believe seems to be meaningless. You're calling yourself a Christian. But that clearly doesn't mean anything substantial in your mouth.

As for being more sophisticated - how am I not being sophisticated? You are the one who does not seem to understand what the term 'God' refers to, or to understand what it means for a being to be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, or to understand that the problem of evil arises for the view that God - understood as a being with the omni properties - exists and created everything.

Show me you are sophisticated and actually start explaining things.

As I have already said, the problem of evil addresses the thesis that this world and we in it are the creation of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. It predates the bible. And anyway, you can't solve these problems by biblical stipulation. How on earth does the fact the bible somewhere says "be fruitful and multiply" (which may, incidentally, be an injunction to do some maths) do anything at all to overcome the problem of evil??

It is not a non-sequitur. You've just said my conclusion does not follow. Explain.

I merely pointed out she isn’t an Antinatalist which makes your argument that there is a kantian Antinatalist argument extremely implausible. — Mark Dennis

I don't believe anyone with an MA in philosophy would reason this badly. You seriously think all Kantians agree on substantial normative matters? Blimey.

Show me what's wrong with my argument. You know, do some actual philosophy like wot you did in your MA.

The PoE, however, doesn't imply that procreators do not exist, so I don't see how it's relevant. — 180 Proof

The problem of evil implies that God does not exist because omnipotence, omniscience and moral goodness are essential attributes of God. Thus one cannot, for instance, conclude that God is actually a bit immoral. For a being who is not morally perfect is not God.

We are not essentially omnipotent, omniscient, or morally good. Hence the problem of evil applied to human procreative decisions does not imply the non-existence of human procreators. Rather it implies their immorality (if and when those who procreate knew what they were doing and were free to do it).

And so that's the conclusion I draw - I don't conclude that human procreators do not exist, I conclude that they are immoral.

And I wanted to briefly share my response to that statement you made above. Quite simply, I don't dichotomize and throw the baby out with the bathwater. Does that make sense? — 3017amen

Not to me, because you can't really believe in God if there's no content to your belief. It can be out of focus to some degree, but it can't not be there at all.

Zeroing in on exactly what omnipotence, omniscience and moral goodness involves may be tricky, but we know enough about each to know that this world's existence and our presence in it seems inconsistent with the existence of such a being. (Which is not to say that it is, in fact, inconsistent, just that it appears to be).

But you seem to be assuming I'm a pessimist. I'm not, I think. And you're assuming that I think life is not worth living. But I don't. I think most human lives probably are worth living.

My point is just that despite our lives being worth living it remains the case that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent god would not have created a world like this one and made innocent sentient creatures live in it, other things being equal. And that in turn, this implies that it is wrong for us to force innocent sentient creatures to live in it by creating more of them.

For example, imagine a universe in which everyone is extremely happy bar one person, on whose utter misery everyone else's happiness depends. Well, I think God would not create a world like that one. But in thinking that I am not thereby expressing a pessimistic attitude or supposing that the lives of most people in that world are not worth living. Rather, I am simply expressing the view that creating such a world would be incompatible with being morally good, omnipotent, and omniscient. Even if, for some reason, the world I have just described was the best possible world among all of those the god was capable of creating, it would be wrong for the god to create it. A good, omnipotent, omniscient being would simply desist from creating it. But again, that is not a pessimistic judgement nor does it express a belief that most lives in that world are not worth living.

I think that is relevantly analogous to the sort of situation we find ourselves in.

So perhaps we should consider whether if there were a diety, that it is characterized by insecurity, jealousy, ambition. greed, and all the other vices. And created humans in its own image. — uncanni

Yes, although there are far more ways of dealing with the problem of evil as it pertains to God than there are to the problem of evil as it pertains to human procreators. One way is to revise the attributes - though in a way this does not deal with the problem so much as concede that God does not exist. But there are other ways, consistent with God being God. For instance, perhaps the only way to have a truly ecstatic afterlife is first to have spent some time here (perhaps that is some kind of necessary truth that even God is powerless to alter). That is one possible way of squaring the evils of life here with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being (not saying it works, just that it has legs). Yet we cannot say similar things about human procreators.

So I think that the problem of evil for God highlights a problem of evil for human procreators that is, in some ways anyway, more acute than the problem of evil for God.

I am arguing. You, by contrast, are attributing to me ludicrous views that I do not hold and that are in no way implied by anything I have argued. Stop it. Do some actual philosophy - that is, argue something - rather than just venting your anger at me.

I don't believe you do have a masters in applied ethics - not from a reputable university anyway - as you demonstrably do not understand moral debate.

Prove me wrong by providing the argument that shows how my antinatalist view implies that I think it is right to kill children.

Btw this is why in real philosophy we cite our sources — Mark Dennis

Are you a representative of 'real philosophy'? I really don't think so.

I did not claim that Onora O'Neill is an antinatalist, I simply pointed out - for your convenience so that you can in future do a better job of pretending to know things you don't know - that she is the one made the now widely adopted distinction between Kant's ethics and 'Kantian' ethics.

I do not know why you have pointed out to me that she is a baroness rather than an antinatalist. The opposite of an antinatalist is not a baroness!

Why would I admit I am wrong when I'm right? You're wrong and your advice is rubbish.

I too am a bit confused by the question. For the question is about what reason is, but what you've talked about is the penetrative power of our faculty of reason.

How much our faculty of reason alone can tell us about the nature of the world we live in is an interesting question, but it is not the question of what reason itself is.

As to that question - the question of what reason itself is - the answer, I think, is that reason is a person. For reason prescribes and values and only a person can do those kinds of thing.

Yeah, project all you like. — Mark Dennis

No, you're the one projecting.

You're attributing to me views I do not hold and that are in no way implied by anything I have argued. You are, I think, hopeless at reasoning about ethical matters. I mean, just laughably bad. How on earth - how on earth - does it follow from being anti-procreation that one is pro killing children? Present the argument - show me how that conclusion follows.

You are the epitome of evil and an Antinatalist evangelical who really should just be removed from the site. — Mark Dennis

Arr, does Mark want a safe space where he doesn't get exposed to views he can't properly understand but feels very angry at? Must accommodate Mark. Grow up.

As a Christian Existentialist, I don't know what an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent Being means, so I can't comment on that. — 3017amen

Hm, I am not sure I understand that. I mean, surely you have to have some idea about what you believe in, otherwise you don't really qualify as believing it?
But anyway, it does seem reasonable to suppose that a morally good being will not necessarily bring about the best of all possible worlds.

For, as in my previous example, if a good god has the power to actualise one world and one world alone, and the world in question is one populated by wicked people coming to suffering deserved harms and indignities, then though that world contains more good than bad, the god would not actualise it. Creating such a world - even though it is a world of great justice - seems like something a good person would not do.

What if the good god had the power to actualise a world in which sometimes the wicked get their just deserts and sometimes the good get their just deserts, but equally often the wicked prosper and the good suffer? Would a good god actualise such a world if that was the only world they had the power to actualize? I do not think so. if that was the god's only option, then I think he'd desist from creating it.

Yet that seems to describe the world we are living in. And so I think a good person, though they do not have the power to change the world, will at least have the decency not to create a new innocent life and subject it to existence here.

Of course, in a way by doing such a thing the person makes themselves deserving of living here - for now they are being done as they have done to another. But this just underscores that there are some goods that a good person does not try to bring about.

With procreation comes responsibility. — 3017amen

I am saying that it is wrong to procreate and that one way to recognise its wrongness is to reflect on the problem of evil and, upon recognising that it is not reasonable to suppose that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient being would create a world like this one and subject innocent sentient life to living in it, that it is therefore most likely wrong for us to in effect do the same by procreating.

n the OT Ecclesiastes we have that existential angst you describe — 3017amen

I have to be honest and say that I am not sure what 'existential angst' is. As I see it I am simply describing the moral implications of a well-known problem for our procreative decisions.

No, he wants to kill all the children in the world and he’s trying to build his court case for why he’s not evil and that he’s just an angel of death helping us all find peace in true serial killer fashion. Bartrick you’re genuinely scary. I hope you don’t work with kids ever in your life. — Mark Dennis

Er, no - that's not implied by anything I've argued. It's your reasoning skills that are truly scary - there's really no telling where your reasoning will take you or persuade you to do.

But there are ways in which the world may well be one in which the good outweighs the bad and yet still it would not plausibly be a place an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being would have created.
For example, imagine that in fact most people freely conduct themselves in ways that make them deserving of all the suffering and indignities that befall them. Well, now the universe contains more good than bad, for suffering and indignity is not bad when it is deserved. Yet would an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being create such a place? Surely not.

thank you for that insight into your mucky younger days. But I don't think Reason approves of rampant fornication, so despite your success at not breeding I suspect God is still displeased with you.

yes, but that's why I said it is 'default' wrong. There will of course be cases where an act that affects another without their consent seems right. But in such cases there will be some other consideration that counts for more morally (or does in the case at hand). So, forcing children to go to school is justified because failure to do so will cause them great harm down the road.
These sorts of consideration do not apply to forcing someone into existence however. Failing to force someone to exist does not result in them coming to great harm, for they don't exist to be harmed.
So it is still unclear to me how you are challenging my case.

One more thing; Will the antinatalist movement ever convince 100% of the population to A not have children B always use a 100% fool proof contraception (doesn’t exist) and get an abortion if one slips through the net? This includes teenagers with raging hormones, sex addicts, prostitutes and basically every women who used to be a little girl that dreamed of being a mother and every man who dreams of being a father... or just dreams of having sex and being lousy with protection.

Oh and you can’t sterilise the entire population either because you run right back into consent. Of which, you will not get 100% as I said before. — Mark Dennis

What point are you making? The antintalist view I hold is normative. That is, it is about how we 'ought' to behave.

Murders happen. They probably always will. That isn't evidence that murder is morally okay, is it? Likewise, even if most people will continue to procreate in the light of arguments that imply it is wrong, ,that isn't evidence that it is right. It is evidence - if any were needed - that most people are a bit rubbish.

And as for sterilising the whole population - well, I haven't argued for that, have I? But if it is seriously wrong to procreate then it could be justified to sterilise the whole population. Why do you think it wouldn't be?

I am not making a consequentialist argument. Once more you demonstrate confident ignorance.

What I take exception to is people confidently pronouncing on matters they demonstrably lack knowledge about. You tell me confidently - as if you're my teacher or something - that what I have described as Kantian is not in fact Kantian. You just assume you know more than me. You demonstrably know less.

It is Kantian. You are clearly - clearly - unaware of a distinction commonly drawn between Kant's ethics and Kantian ethics. A distinction drawn by Onora O'Neill and that is now widely appealed to. This thread is not about Kant's ethics. It is not about Kant. It is about a consideration that is Kantian and about how it implies procreation is default wrong.

Note too, when a lot of equally ignorant people insist that someone who knows more than them is wrong, that's not good evidence that the person who knows more is wrong.

Anyway, this thread is not about labels - but don't keep insisting I am misusing them when you don't actually know what you're talking about or how to use them. Address the argument, not the label.

Then you say this:

So mr Antinatalist, why are you so angry with your parents? — Mark Dennis

Er, I'm not. Not remotely. You don't seem to understand the point I am making at all.

The Hypothetical consent scenario; You have a time phone. It rings, it’s your parents. They want to know if they should use contraception. What is your answer? — Mark Dennis

Imagine I'm the product of rape. the rapist phones me and asks me if they should rape my mother. Would my answer - whether positive or negative - tell you anything about the ethics of rape?

No.

Likewise with your example.

Ehhhh not Kantian. Others have already out argued you on that point. — Mark Dennis

Yes. It. Is. Name the philosopher who drew the distinction between 'Kant's moral philosophy' and 'Kantian' moral philosophy.

If you can't, you're ignorant of what you're confidently pronouncing on.

I am not entirely sure I follow you, since the Kantian claim I am making - namely, that it is default wrong to do something that impacts another in some significant way without their prior consent - is normative. That is, it is not a claim about how we actually behave, but a claim about how we ought to behave. And although you are right and it may well not persuade many people, that's neither here nor there since what's true is not equivalent to what persuades people.