But just saying something doesn't make it so. Well, sometimes it does. But not in the main. I know most of you think that if you say something it does make it so, but that's because you seem to have the philosophical mentality of 6 year old brats.
Argue. It appears self-evident to the reason of most that moral truths are necessary, not contingent. How else do you explain why the Euthyphro is considered by virtually all contemporary moral philosophers to be such a damning criticism of subjectivist views???

Yes, I know.

The argument in the OP says "a subject". The Euthyphro criticism applies to all subjectivist views. All of them.
It is you who has decided that because everything you've read on the internet says 'God' that the OP must say God too. It doesn't. The argument is addressed to any and all attempts to identify moral values and prescriptions with those of a subject, an agent of some kind.

Now, my point, for the umpteenth time, is that the argument actually applies to everyone. Which implies it is faulty. It is faulty.

Anyway, why do most contemporary moral philosophers think it refutes the 'God' version of subjectivism? Because if you just stipulate that the subject in question cannot, of necessity, change, then you haven't explained why. And, on the face of it, the stipulation seems false. If God is an agent, why can't he change his mind? No good just saying "oh, well I've defined him as unchanging". Again, get over the childish megalomania and realize that saying things doesn't make them so (well, there are exceptions, but meh).

It isn't consistent with omnipotence. I do things in accordance with my nature. So do you. For whatever I do, it was my nature to do it - my nature being partly constituted by the things I do.

But I'm not omnipotent. Nor are you. So, 'doing things in accordance with your nature' is not sufficient for omnipotence.

An omnipotent being can do anything he god damned wants. Including prescribing today what he proscribed yesterday. I mean, even I can do that - you saying being all powerful involves being able to do 'less' than I can do? Wow, good definition of omnipotence!!

So, you just have to insist - apropos nothing - that God's values and prescriptions are necessary and not contingent - which anyone can do about anything.

It is intuitively obvious that no mind values anything or prescribes anything of necessity. If you think otherwise, explain. Don't just give me a definition, give me a representation of reason that implies what you say. Note, a representation of reason, not a representation by a priest.

There wouldn't be a dent there if the ball wasn't on it. The ball is the cause of the indent - at every point in time the ball is the cause of the indent, a sustaining cause - despite the fact the ball has always been there and so never came to cause the indent.
I mean, that's the point of the example. It shows that something can be causing something else - and whatever you say, regular people would say that the ball was the cause of the indent and would not ask first "has it always been on the cushion?" - without being a prior cause.

In what way will you justify your claim about Helen's attitude? — alcontali

I won't. Not until you justify something - say something that addresses my argument. And don't just blankly state things as if you're saying them makes them true. Appeal to some supposed self-evident truths of reason and try and raise a doubt about a premise of my argument.

Do you mean "Ciao!"? I have literally no idea what 'Ciao' means. 'Ciao!' yes. But Ciao? Nope. I can't see how we're going to communicate effectively when you say 'Ciao' and yet I am used to 'ciao!'

Hahaha, coward. You mean I reason and you stipulate?

Bartricks said "causer" rather than "cause". So I have literally no idea - no idea - at all what he is talking about. And then he did some nasty arguing thing where he demonstrated that things I don't want to be true are true. And that was mean and so now I am going to climb mount righteousness and go and find someone else to stipulate at. Goodbyer.

'Causer' no more implies an agency than 'cause' does. I mean, it is just cause with an 'r' on the end.

As for the rest - you are just stipulating.

Not every event can have an event that causes it, for then we'll have an actual infinity of events and you can't have an actual infinity of anything. That's self-evident to the reason of most.

So, some events must be caused by things other than events, namely objects.

Your insistence that the uncaused causer cannot be a 'thing' is false. Certainly you've said nothing to support it.

Manifestly, then, some events have objects that cause them.

What kind of an object?

Well, not any kind of material object - for all material objects, being complex, must have been caused to exist.

We can't have an infinity of material objects any more than we can have an infinity of causes.

So, therefore the kind of object or objects that initiate causal chains must be immaterial.

The first cause or causes must therefore be immaterial objects.

That's still not an agent, but it is getting closer, for it also seems that agents - minds - are immaterial objects.

I honestly thought that we were addressing the question, "What caused the cushion to be indented in the first place?" I am not seeing how this other question is relevant to the OP. — aletheist

You haven't answered my question. The cushion is being indented. If we were to take the ball off the cushion, and someone asked us the cause of the indent on it, we would say "there was a ball on it" - yes?

So, the cushion is being indented by the ball. Yet the indent -which his being caused by the ball - was not caused by some prior event of the ball coming to be on the cushion, for it was always on the cushion.

Thus, our reason permits there to be cases of causation - such as the ball's on-going causing of the indent - in which there is no prior event that led to the effect. The ball is having an effect on the cushion, but there was no time when it wasn't.

Thus, the claim that something cannot be the cause of itself because that would require itself to exist prior to itself, is false. That does not seem to be required as the ball case shows.

That does not mean that self-creation is possible. It just means we have not been provided with compelling evidence that it is not.

I ask you to read charitably. That was clearly a mistake on the OP's part. But even if you refuse to be generous in your reading, it does not - not - imply that all causation is event causation. Rather, it implies that some causes have no causes at all. Not events, not substances, not anything.

Causer, cause. Whatever. Means the same and doesn't "entail a psyche".

I think that is simply false. What, right now, is causing the cushion to be indented? Are you seriously saying that the answer to that question is "nothing"?
I mean, you can't deny it is being indented, surely. It is being indented. And it is being indented by the ball. It was being indented by it a minute ago. And it is being indented by it now. And it has always been being indented by it.
And if we took the ball off the cushion, it would become less indented. And if someone said of the partial indent on the now ball-less cushion, "what was the cause of that indent?" we would say "oh, there was a ball on it". yes?

Ah, that was a mistake on my part, it should have said 'uncaused cause' as the OP's did. But you were addressing the OP, not me. So it is what they said, not what I did, that is relevant. And they said that there must be some events that have an uncaused causer. And they're right. And that's what the argument they presented established.

My worldview has nothing to do with it. If the indentation has always been present, then nothing caused it. — aletheist

This is just incompetent. It is intuitively obvious that the ball is causing the indentation. if I showed you the ball on the cushion and asked you the cause of the indentation, you - and everyone else possessed of reason and not in the grips of a theory - would agree that the cause was the ball. And you'd all agree to that without having to know whether the ball had always been there or not.

Anyway, it 'is' a counterexample to the claim that to be caused by something is for the causation to have preceded its effect. And thus we do not yet have good evidence that something cannot be he cause of itself.

What are you talking about? The OP's argument doesn't at any point state that there are uncaused events. Where?

Lots of true propositions, especially in philosophy, are counterintuitive. — aletheist

Yes, and that's prima face evidence that they are false.

It is clear to the reason of most that if A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, then A must be bigger than C.

It is counterintuitive to claim that if A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, then A can be smaller than C.

And precisely because it is so counterintuitive - that is, contradicts some of the clearest and most widely corroborated deliverances of our reason - we have reason to believe it is false.

Premise 2 of the argument is highly intuitively. And that is good default evidence it is true.

Rejecting it becusae it doesn't fit with one's favourite worldview is incompetent. It is like a detective just ignoring some evidence because it doesn't fit with her favourite theory about who did it.

Right, the result of a cause is just what an event is. An "uncaused event" is a self-contradiction. — aletheist

Er, no. The whole point of the argument is to establish that some events - so, some happenings, occurences, whatever - must be caused by things that are not events. That is, some events are caused by substances. Objects rather than occurrences.

You just don't follow the argument. It is used to demonstrate that in addition to event causation - which is causation by something undergoing a change - there must also be 'substance causation' - which is where an object causes something to happen without itself undergoing any change.

That's just what an event is. Stop digging.

No, you did not. If the indentation has always existed, then nothing caused it--not the ball, not the cushion, and certainly not the indentation itself. — aletheist

That's counter-intuitive. If we saw the ball on the cushion we would say that the ball was causing the indentation. Finding out that the ball has always been on the cushion does not call that into question. It's irrelevant.

So you didn't read the OP, just trotted out the standard stuff.

So, by 'God' you mean a mind who, if he is valuing X, is incapable of valuing Y? A mind whose attitudes are fixed - whose attitudes the mind itself is incapable of changing?

As well as appearing to be inconsistent with possessing omnipotence, the whole point of the objection is to draw attention to the fact that you cannot 'explain' why this would be the case. If we're talking about a subject - a mind - then clearly any mind can value something other than what he/she is actually valuing.

Just stipulating that this one can't doesn't address the problem.

That's why most contemporary moral philosophers think the argument refutes 'God' command theory, for in place of an explanation we simply find a stipulation.

no, you were incorrect. The OP is correct in what they say. There must be an event - so, an occurrence, a happening - that is uncaused.

That does not - not - imply that every event is caused by another event. That's just something you said, it is not something stated by any premise in the OP's argument or in the conclusion. Indeed, the conclusion is the exact opposite.

Okay, but it still does not demonstrate that something can cause itself. Besides, if the ball and cushion "have always existed in that arrangement," then nothing caused the indentation, since the cushion was never in any other shape. — aletheist

I said that I didn't see why something could not cause itself. I showed that the assumption that all causation requires a cause that is prior to its effect is false. Hence why I do not see why something cannot be the cause of itself. Again: Aquinas, it would seem, attempted an explanation. I pointed out that the explanation appears not to work. Thus, I do not see why something cannot cause itself.

Believe what you want. It is not something I usually bring up on the forum since I would rather be judged by what I say rather than by my credentials. — Fooloso4

What makes you think I'm not judging you based on what you say? I am. That's precisely what I am doing.

Where - where - did you say anything at all that addressed the argument I outlined (the Euthyphro)?

So, say something clever - start by addressing the actual argument rather than telling me what you've read about on Wikipedia. You know, like an actual teacher would.

So, not addressing the problem in the OP. A problem that doesn't mention God (note too, the original didn't either).

Once more then, here is the problem:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject

I think it is a bad argument. One of the reasons it is bad - just one - is that you can replace 'a subject' with something objective, and the argument works just as well.

Anyway, as you seemed obsessed with God - because no doubt 'God' is the one mentioned in all the versions you're reading online - make that subject God and tell me which premise you're denying.

I outlined the argument - the argument this thread is about - and here it is:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, Reason, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject, Reason — Bartricks

Now, which premise are you denying?

I don't believe you. Teaching intro to philosophy - hahahahaha. Yeah, to your bathroom mirror.

The dialogue is not called 'the Euthyphro'. It is called 'Euthyphro'. And the problem that I am addressing is the one I outlined in the OP. That one.

This thread is about the problem outlined in the OP. It is not - not, not, not - about Plato's dialogue. Start one up about that dialogue if you want (tip: read it first though). But this thread - this one, started by me - is about the Euthyphro problem or criticism or argument. The one I outlined in the OP. The one you've got nothing whatsoever to say about.

Tell me, when you go to an art gallery do you just spend your time looking at the frames?

No, you said this:

this would imply that every event is caused by another event, which is not what the first premiss asserts — aletheist

Which is just wrong. It is not what the argument implies. the argument implies the exact opposite. You learn to read - learn to read yourself!

This is not a counterexample, because the indentation is not causing itself. — aletheist

Er, it is a counterexample. The claim that nothing can cause itself is a conclusion. One derived from the premise that one cause needs to precede another. The example shows that one thing can cause another without preceding it. So, the example challenges the premise from which the conclusion was derived. It was not, then, an example of something causing itself, but an example of causation that is not prior causation.

“Nothing can be its own first cause, since then it would have to exist prior to itself and this is impossible.” — ModernPAS

I do not think that's true. I think this example is Kant's, but I am not sure. But imagine there is a cushion with a lead ball on it. The lead ball is causing an indentation in the cushion. But now imagine that they have both always existed in that arrangement. Well, it is still true that the ball is causing the indentation, even though there was no time prior to the indentation when it was caused.

What I do not understand is why something cannot be the cause of itself.

No, it really isn't. Anyway, it doesn't matter. This thread is not about Plato's dialogue, despite the name. It is about a famous objection to divine command theories - an objection that has its roots in that dialogue, but is what it is. And what it is, is the objection I outlined.

Do you know what 'paraphrase' means? And have you read the actual dialogue? (No and no).

The dialogue and what came to be known as the Euthyphro problem are two different things. — Fooloso4

Er, yes. And it is the Euthyphro problem that I am interested in here. Like I said!! Can you read?

if there can be no infinite regress of causes, then there must be an event that is uncaused. — ModernPASNo, this would imply that every event is caused by another event, which is not what the first premiss asserts. The conclusion is that there must be a first cause that is uncaused, not a first event that is uncaused. The overall claim, of course, is that God caused the first event. — aletheist

No, the exact opposite of what you say!

The whole point of the argument is to establish that not all causation can be by events.

If all causation was event-causation, then you get an infinity of past causes (which is an impossibility). Thus some events must be caused by things rather than events.

The first cause or causes must therefore be 'substance-causes' rather than 'event causes'.

I think the argument is correct, except that the conclusion is narrower than it should be. What we can conclude is that every event has a first uncaused cause or causes.

As for how to respond to Hume - well, premise 2 is self-evidently true. So his claim that it is unsupported - it claim it he did - is false. The reason of most people represents it to be true. Which is excellent evidence that it is true.

Well, that's just false. But do you have anything to say that actually addresses the argument of the thread? For either you agree with my argument's conclusion or you do not. If you do not then you must either think at least one premise is false or you must not realize that it is deductively valid. If the former, then say which one and present an argument - not a pronouncement - 'justifying' your doubt. If the latter, well, good luck in the world.

I do not think that's quite right. We can make sense of the idea of fixed values and prescriptions - fixed values and prescriptions that are as practical as you like. The point, though, is that whatever you identify their source as being, that source could issue and have different prescriptions and values. So my point is that the idea that it is only if you identify the source as a subject that you face the euthyphro is a myth. Objective or subjective, nothing is going to explain the supposeday immutable nature of moral norms and values.
So everyone must admit either that they cannot explain why moral norms and values are fixed, or else admit that contrary to rational appearances they are not fixed. Everyone.

As ever, I do not know what you are talking about. I think you run everything you say through a filter of prejudices about the nature of reality and this turns it into goblydigook.

So the idea that if morality is objective, then somehow the Euthyphro does not apply to you, is a total and utter myth.

Regardless of whether moral properties are conceived of subjectively or objectively, they are going to be contingent, not necessary.

Upon realizing this the moral objectivists should, of course, shit their pants.

Note, I am not saying that sometimes it might be right to give money to a beggar, sometimes not (for obviously that is true). I am saying that, for all moral objectivism entails, one could have two otherwise identical acts of giving money to a beggar, and one be right and the other wrong. Just as, by analogy, one can have to otherwise identical objective objects, and one could be one shape and the other another.

I do not follow your point. I am a subjectivist about moral values - a divine command theorist about them - and so I am clearly my view is targeted by the Euthyphro.

But I think all views are subject to it. So, let's assume - crazily - that moral values are objective. Well, how would holding that view give one any grounds for denying a premise of the argument I presented?

So, here's the Euthyphro again, adjusted for moral objectivism.

1. If moral values are objective, then moral values with be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. therefore, moral values are not objective

For instance, take an objective property like shape. The vodka and lemonade in front of me has a certain shape. It is the shape of the glass it is in. But it doesn't have that shape of necessity, but contingently. I just tilted the glass, and the shape of the vodka and lemonade changed.

Now, shape is objective, yet no object has its shape of necessity. So if moral value is objective one cannot, on those grounds alone, conclude that therefore moral values are necessary.

Thus, the argument applies to moral objectivism as much as it does to moral subjectivism.

No, not an it - a subject of experiences. Like me. Like you. We're not 'its'. We are persons. I just plumped for 'her' because I think historically Reason has been talked about as if she were a 'her'. But it really isn't important and it is not the matter under debate here.

I mean, if you ask me who I am, all I can really say is 'me'. I'm me. The one who wrote this and thought the things it expresses. Likewise, she is the one whose values are moral values, etc.

Not really sure I understand the question. She's Reason, the one whose values are moral values and among whose prescriptions are to be found moral prescriptions.

Hm, no, when I say that something is wrong with the objection, I mean this objection:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, Reason, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject, Reason

And I meant by wrong that the argument is unsound, because an argument that would refute all theories - including nihilism - must be unsound, for not all theories about moral value can be false.

So, those who wield the Euthyphro objection against my kind of view, should first note that it works against theirs too.

That, I am hoping, will wipe the smile off their smug faces.

I haven't mentioned Apollo.