Eh? No, the judgement is about something featuring as the object of one of Helen's attitudes - a valuing attitude.

Suit yourself. — creativesoul

Try "Put on your suit".

Your modal suit. The modal suit with the quantification in the buttonhole.

No. I won't try that. I'll stick to the original. Much thankings.

Er, yes I did. Was it a whole hemisphere you lost?

Nothing ironic there.

Close but no...

Not all Helen's valuing attitudes are valuing X. — creativesoul

er, I said the truth condition of the judgement that Helen values X, is a valuing attitude of Helen's. That's true. Obviously true.

The judgement that "my car is blue" has my blue car as its truthmaker. Pointing out that not all cars are blue is so confused I have to conclude you've recently suffered a head injury.

No, not a clue what you're talking about.

The truth-maker of a judgement such as "Helen values X" is a valuing attitude in Helen. The truth-maker of a judgement such as "Y is morally valuable" is a valuing attitude in Reason.

You're just asserting the truth of views that my argument refutes, or else views that are not incompatible with its conclusion.

For example, yes, I agree that morality is not empirically available. Moral values are the values of a subject, Reason. We learn about them via our faculty of reason, not via any sense.

To that extent, then, what you've said is consistent with what I've said. But then you just assert, without any argument at all, that moral judgements do not have truth conditions. Yes they do - the values of Reason. As my argument establishes.

Note too, 'evaluating' is not the same as 'valuing'. To evaluate is to make a judgement. That's not what I take valuing to involve. We regularly judge things to be morally valuable. My point is that the truth conditions of those judgements - so, that which would make the judgement true - is not our own valuing activity, but the valuing activity of Reason.

yes. Their valuing is not a moral valuing. Only reason can do those.

Why would I try and prove you wrong? I agree. If you value your car, it is not necessarily morally valuable.

I agree. That's my view. My view is our values do not constitute moral values. Moral values are the values of a subject. But it is manifestly not us.

I don't think you have followed my argument. None of your valuings - none of them - constitute moral values.

Think of it this way: Two blind chickens are pecking at the ground, picking up small pebbles, hoping that one of the pebbles will be an edible piece of grain. One will find grain pieces repeatedly, the other will never find the grain. (Say, within a time period of an hour.) Do the grain exist, and its nutritional value exist? Yes. Does the one chicken that finds it see it justified to believe that the grain and its nutritional value exist? Yes. Does the second one find that? No. Yet the grain exists. — god must be atheist

Your example not good. I improve. Imagine three legged goat at market. Others do not buy goat, for it has three legs not four. But you know that this goat is young and these are its milk legs. It will grow more and bigger legs. You buy goat. Then you discover that goats not have milk legs. So you cut off one of wife legs and strap it to goat. Goat now better than ever, though wife not so good. And this shows something I think, but just my opinions.

And you really think I'm going to lift a single finger to cite a source for you? You'd go off in a huff or just change the subject the moment I did. That's obvious. Now, go get an introductory book on ethics and read it. Don't go to a Wikipedia page that your spotty friend down the arcade wrote. A proper introductory book. Read what it says about the Euthyphro.

I mean, why do you think Plato/Socrates made that objection rather than your 'atheism' one? Because they are a) stupid or b) clever?

You think B is stronger??? Seriously?!? Right. Well, that's confirmed my thesis about what you are.

Go back over this thread and tell me you've not made a single quoting error, typo or exaggeration for rhetorical effect, then lecture me on the matter. — Isaac

I have not made a single quoting error or exaggeration for rhetorical effect. Typos, yes. But what you did wasn't a typo, was it!?

Baby steps Isaac. If. Morality. Requires a spaghetti monster. And it doesn't. It really doesn't. It doesn't. Okay. It doesn't. But 'if' it did - as premise 1 says - a premise that is false - but 'if' it did, then we'd have excellent, I mean, excellent evidence that there is a spaghetti monster.

That's why only an idiot would take issue with 2b. A wise person would take issue with premise 1. Because.....if premise 1 is true then the combination of 1 and 2a means that 2b is false.

Again, consider these arguments

A

1. If Isaac exists, then a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. Issac exists
3. Therefore a flying spaghetti monster exists

B

1. If Isaac exists, then a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. No flying spaghetti monster exists
3. Therefore Isaac doesn't exist

Now, which is stronger?

Why A, of course.

Because YOU do exist. Yes?

Now, 1 is false. But if 1 is true - and it isn't - but 'if' it was, then we'd have excellent evidence that a flying spaghetti monster exists. That evidence would be you.

Surely you can agree that you'd be a total idiot to think B is the stronger argument of the two?

What? Why would only an idiot reject the existence of a flying spaghetti monster on the grounds of the complete lack of any evidence for one. That's the exact grounds on which we justify most things we consider do not exist. And what prevents me from doing both? — Isaac

Because if premise 1 is true, there would be good evidence for one. As premise 2a is well supported.

You don't understand arguments, do you?

Why, oh why, are you talking about Elizabeth Anscombe? What introductory book on ethics by her are you talking about? She didn't write one. She wrote an article called "Modern Moral Philosophy". It's shit.

Pick up an introductory book on ethics written by a contemporary moral philosopher. Read what it says about divine command theories.

I repeat: you don't know what you're talking about. The basis upon which most contemporary moral philosophers reject divine command theories of ethics is the Euthyphro. Not atheism. The Euthyphro. For the reasons I said.

I repeat my accusation! I tattoo it on my forehead. I have scrawled it in my own excrement on the wall. I am shouting it loudly at the screen. You. Cannot. Cannot. Follow an argument!

The cheek of telling me I am misusing words. You said I claimed my argument was 'infallible'. Where? I would never say that. It doesn't make sense. Arguments aren't 'infallible'.

My argument is 'sound'. That is, it is 'valid' and its premises are 'true'. Not 'infallible'. Quote me saying my argument is infallible!

You, my sun, are the won who is Miss using words.

This premis is wrong, Bartricks

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued — Bartricks
In reality anyone can value anything withoiut making it morally valuable. This is the reason we keep telling your that your premise is false. — god must be atheist

Er, no. That premise is TRUE. You seem to have trouble understanding sentences. It does not say "for something to be morally valuable is for ME to be valuing it, does it?

Noooo. It doesn't say that. Indeed, I have argued that moral value is not composed of my valuings.

It doesn't say that for something to be morally valuable is for YOU to be valuing it either, does it?

noooo. it doesn't say that either. Indeed, I have argued that moral value is not composed of YOUR valuings.

It says "for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.

Now, learn to read. Then learn to understand arguments. Then read it again. Note what follows from what.

What. Follows. From. That. Premise. And. The. Other. Premises. Is. This. That moral value consists in something being valued by SOMEONE.

Not YOU.

Not ME

Someone.

Reason.

Once more - you cannot, absolutely 100% cannot, follow an argument.

This is utter nonsense. Replace with

Argument A.

1. If moral values and norms exist, a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. Moral values and norms exist
3. Therefore a flying spaghetti monster exists

Argument B

1. If moral values and norms exist, a flying spaghetti monster exists
2. No flying spaghetti monster exists
3. Therefore no moral values and norms exist

Are you suggesting that I cannot refute 1. simply by arguing that a flying spaghetti monster doesn't exist? — Isaac

Er, no. You don't seem to understand the English language. Which of those two arguments is stronger. Say now. They are both unsound. Which is stronger though?

I didn't say 'all'. Quote me. Come on. Find a quote where I say 'all'. Let's see if you understand language as well as you do arguments.

so why do you reject spaghetti monsterism about morality?

of those two hackeyed arguments argument a is stronger. But both are incredibly weak due to the gross implausibility of 1. So a total idiot would reject spaghetti monsterism on the grounds there is no spaghetti monster whereas someone who knew how to argue would instead reject the idea that morality requires a spaghetti monster.

You're just pronouncing. How about addressing the argument of this thread?

You are not a god - your words do not determine what's true.

The argument I have presented is about moral values. It establishes - whether you like it or not, and whatever theory you favour - that moral values are the values of a subject, a subject who is not me, or you, but Reason.

This it does. If you don't believe me, inspect it. Try and refute it. But don't just ignore it and make arbitrary pronouncements from on high.

Yes. You. Do. Which premise? Spell it out. But in my words, not yours. Paste the premise and then tell me how anything I've said contradicts it.

That makes no sense at all. No I haven't. Which premise are you talking about? Again, you really, really, really don't understand arguments.

Yes. Take any metaethical theory - so any theory about what morality is - and it can be applied to Reason.

And yes, you try and figure out which one is true by consulting your reason. I mean, if you want to find out about me, you'd ask me, wouldn't you? I'd be your first port of call. So if you want to find out about Reason, you consult - well, Reason! Who else? How would you go about it? Oh yes, you'd just think one is right and it would be.

Er, yes. It establishes that not all value is moral value. Do you actually understand arguments at all? I mean, you've thrown the word 'quantification' in so that we'll all think you do. But it seems to me that you most certainly don't.

They are both good examples of prominent thinkers who are both atheist (certainly in Nietzsche's case, and almost certainly in Hobbes's) and divine command theorists.

They were not supposed to be representative of the views of athiests, but good examples of atheist divine command theorists!

I do not understand your chicken/pebble analogy.

No, your rewording is wrong and far from improving on mine, it makes the premise into a tautology.
My argument is fine as it is, you just don't understand it.

Clue: the whole point of the argument - the whole point of it - is to establish that my valuing something (or your valuing something) is not sufficient for it to be morally valuable!!

I think you don't understand arguments.

Okaay. Whatever!

I'm not providing references - this is the internet!! Just look them up if you don't believe me. I mean, Nietzsche is probably the most famous atheist in the world - and he was writing his works precisely in order to prepare people for the realization that as 'God is dead' there are no moral values, just our own - and Hobbes, well, Hobbes was a thoroughgoing materialist who, though he could never say explicitly that he did not believe in any gods (that would literally have cost him his life), was known as the 'beast of Malmesbury' precisely because everyone nevertheless thought (no doubt correctly) that he was an atheist.

And, as ever, you just don't understand these positions. Divine command theory is not a theory about what exists. It is a theory about what would need to exist for morality to exist. Hence it is compatible with atheism (which is a theory about what exists).

Atheist divine command theorists are nihilists. Not the only way to arrive at nihilism, but one way.

As to how you might know what Reason prescribes and values - you consult your reason. The faculty designed to give you insight into what Reason prescribes and values. The faculty that, if you would but consult it, will tell you that my arguments are sound.

↪Janus Apparently we ask Bartricks. — Banno

That is sooo not my position! Just barmy.

Suppose Bartricks is right, and what is good is exactly what is demanded by reason.

Even then, each of us must decide whether to do what is demanded by reason.

So, even then, we must each decide whether to follow the divine command or no.

Hence Divine Command Theory is of no use in helping us decide what to do — Banno

What's that got to do with the price of tea in China? Whatever theory of Reason is correct, that remains true. That is, whatever Reason is you still have to decide whether to follow Reason's prescriptions. So your point is utterly irrelevant.
The issue is what moral values are. And moral values are - demonstrably are - the values of Reason, and Reason is demonstrably a subject, a subject who is utterly herself and not you or I.

Be indifferent to that conclusion all you want, that won't affect its truth. Reality doesn't work like that.

I am not making the claim, you are. It a sign of a poor argument that you make outlandish claims and then pass the burden of proof to anyone opposing them. — Isaac

It is not the one making a claim who has the burden of proof - that's only something those who get all their information from youtube videos think. No, it is the one who says things that are contrary to appearances who has the burden of proof. After all, if you claim that the one who has made a claim has the burden of proof then you have made a claim yourself and have a burden of proof. And you are not going to be able to discharge that burden without appealing to other claims, and so nothing turns out to be justified. Which is really stupid, because that means you're not justified in thinking nothing is justified.

Anyway, you don't know what you're talking about. That's the message here.

Go to a bookshop. Pick up an introductory book on ethics - one written by a professional philosopher and published by a reputable academic publishing house, not one written by a scientist or a psychologist - and read what it says about divine command theories and the primary reason they should be rejected.

It isn't 'atheism'. After all, if divine command theory is true, then guess what - atheism is a very unreasonable position. That's something most atheists realize, hence why they typically argue 'against' divine command theory.

And guess what else - atheism and divine command theory are....compatible! Atheism says no gods exist. Divine command theory says that for morality to exist, a god needs to exist. Those are compatible beliefs. Nietzsche and Hobbes held this combination of beliefs.

What's not compatible with divine command theory is - wait for it - the conclusion of the Euthyphro argument!! Hence why that - and not atheism - is the main reason why divine command theories are rejected.

Again, because you have such a poor grasp of the dialectic here, let's go through it (pointless, I know, so determined are you that you're right, despite having no arguments to offer for anything).

Here are two arguments. Argument A.

1. If moral values and norms exist, a god exists
2. Moral values and norms exist
3. Therefore a god exists

Argument B

1. If moral values and norms exist, a god exists
2. No god exists
3. Therefore no moral values and norms exist

Which is the stronger argument, other things being equal?

A.

Why?

Because both are valid and share the same first premise. But they contradict, so we know that at least one premise is false.

As they only differ in terms of their second premises, it is those we must compare to judge their relative strength.

2A is self-evident to reason. That is, it is supported - extremely well supported - by rational representations.

2B, by contrast, is not. It is just a belief.

Furthermore, argument B entails a conclusion that conflicts with rational appearances.

Thus only a fool would endorse argument B over argument A, other things being equal.

And that - that - is why it is the Euthyphro, and not atheism, that is the main reason why divine command theories are rejected. For atheism is more reasonably believed to be false, if premise 1 is true.

And thus for atheism to be credible, premise 1 needs to be challenged.

You can't challenge it by just insisting atheism is true.. I mean, you would and so would most others here, becsaue you think if you think something it is true. But a competent arguer would not do that.

You need to dispatch 1 on independent grounds.

Most philosophers currently - I stress, 'currently', not historically - think that there are good rational grounds for rejecting premise 1. The....EUTHYPHRO. Deal.

Are you Pontius Pilate now? Jesus didn't answer, but I will. It is whatever Reason sincerely asserts to be the case.
But I thought you a) didn't care as it has no practical import (according to you) and b) I make you sick.

yes, it is sound. So its conclusion is true.

As for it having no practical implications - well you are incredibly bad at discerning implications so you have no reliable basis for drawing that conclusion. And it's wrong.

But anyway this is philosophy and we're interested in what's true, yes? Not what's therapeutic. What's 'true'.

not sure I follow you. But I don't think there's any particular thing a subject must value. But even if there were, that would not make that value a moral value.

the first premise says 'if' my valuings are morally values (so not 'they are' but 'if') then if I value something necessarily it will be morally valuable.

Analogy - if water is made of gold then if I have some water necessarily I have some gold.

Then the next premise says that if I value something it won't necessarily be morally valuable.

Analogy - if I have some water I do not necessarily have some gold.

Both premises are consistent with each other, because the first does not assert that moral values 'are' my values. It says 'if'.

They are also both true. Like the water/gold ones.

Together they entail that moral values are not my values.