but God is also essentially perfect. Indeed those other attributes flow from that (a lack ofor any one of them being an imperfection). But anyway, omnipotence would seem to be incompatible with having been created.

I don't know what you mean. The concept of God is the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent creator of everything. If you are not necessarily referring to that kind of a being you should use a lower case g.

Eh? More hot air. Just address the argument I made.

Where's the supposedly stupid argument for dualism?
Plus, what's the point in highlighting a stupid argument for a position? Here's a stupid argument for dualism: If it is sunny, dualism is true. It is sunny. Dualism is true.

That's absurd, of course, for its first premise has nothing to be said for it. But as a result it tells us nothing. It doesn't discredit dualism, for one can make a stupid argument for anything.

It's support in the sense that it may make the argument interpersonally effective, but other than that this is an ad populum argument, so far

No, it isn't. All cases for anything appeal to rational appearances - to rational intuitions. Not beliefs, note. it is fallacious to think that you can make something true by getting enough people to believe it. But my claim is that the reason - a faculty - of most people represents it to be true. Which is stunningly good evidence - the best you're ever going to have for anything, for all appeals to evidence are appeals to reason - for anything.

But God is perfect and it would be an imperfection to have not existed for some time. So any god that comes into being won't qualify as God.
And God is all powerful, yet an all powerful being cannot depend on anything or anyone else for her existence as that would manifest a lack of power. So once more, a god who comes into being won't qualify as God.
Plus, God is by definition the creator and sustainer of everything, yet if he is created he won't be and thus he can't be created.

made several points in that last post in no particular order, to which one specifically are you referring? I would be glad to explain my position more clearly — Pathogen

Your last point - you said that you were interested in being shown how free will is an objective possibility. If we have free will, then it is an objective possibility.

I would argue that randomness is not necessarily incompatible with free will but determinism always is. — Pathogen

What's the argument though? If we already have free will then yes, I grant that randomness does not preclude our continuing to possess it, likewise with antecedent causation. For instance, if I am wondering what to decide to do but, due to indeterminacy, it is indeterministic whether I will fall down dead or not - and I don't and I make the decision - then my decision was free, even though it was indeterministic whether I would make it or be dead.

But if my decisions are wholly determined by prior external causes - and you accept that this is incompatible with having free will - how would introducing some indeterminacy into the whole process give me free will? It's not as if my resulting decisions would be any more controlled than under the wholesale determinism scenario - I mean, if anything they'd be less controlled.

I don't understand this statement, would you mind clarifying it for me? — Pathogen

Something that exists contingently has come into being. Thus it has either been caused to come into being by something external to it, or it has popped into being out of nowhere (not, I think, a coherent possibility) in which case its existence is a result of pure chance. Either way, everything it subsequently does is going to be a product of antecedent determination and/or pure chance.

A necessarily existent thing, by contrast, has not come into being. It exists by its very nature. As a necessarily existing thing has not been caused to be by anything external and prior, and as its existence is the opposite of chancy (for necessarily existing things 'have' to exist - there is no possibility of them not doing so), then not everything a necessarily existing thing does will be wholly the product of prior external determination or pure chance. Thus, such a thing - and only such a thing - can have free will.

As I do have free will, I conclude that I am such a being.

Wittgenstein was wrong, I think. Imagine buying a book about Wittgenstein's life and finding that it said nothing whatsoever about his death. You'd be perplexed, surely?

Plus it is clear to the reason of virtually everyone that we have reason - powerful reason - to avoid dying under most circumstances.

That it implies it is harmful. After all, that's why we consider it one of the harshest punishments it is possible to give someone. It would not be a punishment unless it harmed the person it was inflicted on.

So death is a harm, or at least it is a harm under most circumstances.

But it is hard to see how it could be a harm if it is not an event in our lives. For surely to be harmed by an event it must have some impact on my life. But it could not impact my life if it occurs after it. So it must occur in it, then.

The thought "I exist" will always be true, whenever and wherever it occurs. So that thought, at least, can't be mistaken.

I am not entirely clear about what you are claiming. You say that you are not trying to prove that knowledge is impossible or that we can "reliably know that we cannot know anything". Your point, rather, is that we could be mistaken about anything.

But isn't that precisely what Descartes found he could deny when he found that he could not be mistaken about his own existence?

I mean, if we actually test the thesis that we could be mistaken about anything, it does seem to fail - for surely I could not be mistaken in thinking I exist?

I am not an atheist, though I used to be. But I would say that it is just as well that you stopped reading those people, for only one of those four is a trained philosopher. Why read people who are talking outside of their areas of expertise? You aren't going to get good arguments, just rhetoric.

As for not being able to deal with the arguments theists throw at you, why not take seriously that this is because they're good arguments?

How does assuming everything is conscious help explain how a lump of meat can be? It's no explanation at all.

Plus, the 'problem' is not explaining how meat can be conscious. The problem is that we have rational intuitions that represent all material things to be lacking in mental properties. And it's not a problem, unless you've started out assuming that we're material things.

Perhaps it is not 'your' theory in that you do not endorse it, but all that means is that you're rejecting one of my premises because it is inconsistent with 'a theory'. So what? That's not evidence the premise is false.

My premise is inconsistent with a billion theories. A trillion. That's not evidence it is false until or unless there's better evidence that the theory in question is true than there is that my premise is true.

I don't follow. Which premise are you disputing?

This overlaps with what i've said in another thread - but an event will not be wholly the product of prior causes and/or chance if the event is caused to occur by a necessarily existing object.

First, not all events can be caused by prior events, for that would land us with an infinity of prior events. So we know by rational reflection that some events must be caused by objects.

Of course, we'd have the same problem if every object had to be caused to exist. So we know that some objects are not caused to exist. And as nothing can come from nothing, we know that some objects exist of necessity. That is, it is in the nature of some objects to exist.

An object of that kind - an object that exists by its nature - has not been caused to exist by anything external or prior. And because it exists of necessity, its existence cannot be said to be chancy either. Thus, if we are objects of that kind, we would be capable of exercising free will.

I conclude that this is exactly what we are.

No, you are rejecting a premise because it conflicts with your theory.

Like I say, you need to provide an independent argument for the thesis that my mind is not a soul, and that argument needs to have premises that are more self-evidently true than mine. Then you would have a rational basis for rejecting one of my premises, but ortherwise all you're doing is saying one of my premises is false because it is inconsistent with your theory.

I didn't say that other people's intuitions count for more. They count the same, other things being equal. That is, if my reason represents X to be the case, and your reason represents not-X to be the case, and those are the only rational intuitions we've got to go on, then a reasonable person (so both of us if we are reasonable) should conclude that it is an open question whether X is the case or not.
I think someone who insists that their rational intuitions count and nobody else's do is wholly unreasonable and prejudiced. They really must think that they, and they alone, are hooked up to rational reality, and they can - by their own lights - have no better reason to think this than that they think it.
I am interested in what's true - so I am interested in what my mind actually is - not in persuading prejudiced people who have no interest in objectively weighing the evidence of something. The fact an argument fails to persuade a person like that is never going to be to the discredit of the argument.

Re what you say about the credibility of rational intuitions and the other things being equal clause - well, first we know in advance that we can't discredit all rational intuitions because all attempts to discredit rational intuitions must appeal to some. So, we know that some rational intuitions are accurate, and we know that the principle I am appealing to - that if something appears, rationally, to be the case, that is default evidence that it is the case - is true and thus that the rational intuitions that represent it to be are accurate. Thus we know in turn that such intuitions cannot be wholly a product of environmental programming.

Some are, though. A good case exists for thinking that rational intuitions that represent procreation to be ethical are wholly a product of environmental programming. I don't think a similar case exists for thinking that any of the intuitions I am appealing to above are wholly a product of environmental programming. But anyway, while the burden of proof would be on me to discredit the widespread rational intuitions that procreation is ethical (a burden I think can be discharged), if you want to argue that the any of the rational intuitions I am appealing to here lack credibility due to being a product of environment programming, then the burden of proof is squarely on you. And you don't discharge it by saying "I can say that they are the product of environmental programming' - for, yes, of course you can 'say' it, but you need to 'show' it. Brute possibilities are not evidence.

To stop this post getting too long, I will respond to the rest of what you said in another one.

Yes, I mean my mind by 'I'. I think the argument probably does establish that your mind needs to be a necessarily existing thing (and thus establishes that our minds are not material objects) rather than establishing that some part of us needs to exist of necessity. For if I am some complex whole rather than a simple thing, then even if that complex whole has a component part that exists of necessity, my coming into being would still have been a product of external causes and/or chance. So I - the mind - need to exist of necessity. Perhaps I could be a complex whole who is composed entirely of simple things that exist of necessity - I admit that this argument does not rule that out - but it nevertheless seems beside the point, for a complex whole that is made wholly of necessarily existing things is not a material object.

re what you say about premise 1 - yes, but that's not real moral responsibility. Incarcerating someone solely to protect others (and/or the criminal) is quarantine, not punishment. Being truly responsible for one's behaviour means being retributively responsible - that is, being such that if one does wrong, one can in principle be deserving of punishment. That kind of moral responsibility certainly requires free will and it is that kind that premise 1 invokes.

Re what you say about premise 2 - it has considerable support. Like I say, the reason of virtually everyone represents it to be true. If that isn't support I don't know what is.

That does not mean that premise 2 is true beyond all doubt, but the burden of proof is squarely on those who would deny it to provide countervailing evidence.

I am not clear on your last point - if we have overwhelming evidence that we have free will (our reason, which is our ultimate guide to what's what, represents us to have it), then it is an objective possibility (for anything actual is possible).

If our decision-making processes are indeterministic to some degree, then I agree that this would seem to pose as much of a problem as antecedent determination by external causes. Both seem incompatible with free will. That is, our reason does not just represent us to have free will, it also tells us something about what it involves, albeit negative things. It tells us that having free will involves one's decision-making process not being wholly determined by external antecedent causes, and it tells us that it also involves an absence of indeterminacy. That our reason makes such representations cannot seriously be in doubt, for both compatibilists and incompatibilists in the traditional debate make appeal to these intuitions.

It is possible to satisfy those conditions if one exists of necessity rather than contingently.

No, you really don't have a clue.

And no, that's not what evidence is. Anyway, I'm tired of this now as this is going nowhere and I'm clearly dealing with an asserter not an arguer.

Four independent arguments that appear to prove that X is the case.

Four independent witnesses come forward and say "James did it".

You can't raise a reasonable doubt about any of the arguments, and you can't raise a reasonable doubt about the probative force of those witnesses' statements - yet you persist in thinking that it is as likely someone else did it as James did it. That makes you an appalling detective. And it makes you a bad philosopher.

er, yes it is. Explain how it isn't.

I have now presented four arguments - each one valid, each one with premises that no-one has raised the least doubt about - that all imply the same thing, namely that our minds are immaterial souls.
Someone who, unable to raise an objection to those arguments beyond simply noting that they have conclusions they do not believe in, still persists in believing that the mind is the brain - or that we do not know what the mind is - is a dogmatist, plain and simple.
Following reason means something - it means drawing the conclusions she bids you draw.

It is not rational to remain agnostic once someone has presented you with powerful evidence that P is the case.

If there is a lot of good evidence that James did the crime, and none that he didn't, then you're not reasonably if you continue to assume that it is just as likely that someone else did it as he did.

You're dogmatically committed, it would seem, to the view that we do not know what the mind is. So committed that no matter how much evidence someone provides you that the mind is an immaterial thing, you're going to reject it because it conflicts with your thesis - a thesis for which you can provide no evidence whatever -that we don't know the mind is.

Question begging. You're just assuming the mind is the brain again (I think - not sure quite what you mean, though)

That doesn't address my point. Did you boil your pork in vodka or something?
The point is that you can't make someone morally responsible by holding them morally responsible. We hold people morally responsible because they appear to us to be morally responsible. That's why we try hard not to punish innocent people.

if you think you can make someone blameworthy by blaming them, you're nuts.

No, we hold people morally responsible because our reason represents them to be.

And you always will exist too. They have that implication too. And I suppose some may find that somewhat frightening. We all exist and always will and there's no escape.

Although having said that, no, a spirit of life did not evolve. I am not entirely sure what you mean by a spirit of life, but I assume you mean our immaterial souls.

And no, if the argument I have just presented is sound (and it is) then we did not evolve, but always existed. Likewise if the argument from divisibility is sound (and it is).

I am not sure what the wider implications are. But there's no 'should' about it - the arguments I am presenting are all deductively valid, have premises that are far more plausible than their negations, and entail the same conclusion: our minds are immaterial souls.

No, 2 + 3 = 5 is self-evidently true. Virtually everyone's reason represents it to be true - which is very good evidence that it is.
By contrast, 2 + 3 = 6 is not self-evidently true. virtually no-one gets that rational intuition (and those that do are technically referred to as 'stupid' - meaning, they're not very well hooked-up to reason).

Stop thinking you can make stuff up and thereby make it true. You can't. Be honest: it is self-evident to you that 2 + 3 = 5. It is not self-evident to you that 2 + 3 = 6.

It is self-evident to virtually everyone that premise 1 of my argument is true. It is self-evident to virtually everyone that premise 2 is true. It is self-evident to virtually everyone who has the power of reason and reflection that this argument is valid:

1. If P, then Q
2. not Q
3. Therefore not P

My argument had that form. join the dots.

And note, you can't say "my evidence is that our minds are material objects and so everything that they are and that goes on in them is determined by prior causes" for that is question begging.

You clearly do not understand how arguments work. Premise 1 and premise 2 entail 3. That is, 3 is necessarily true if 1 and 2 are.

You have acknowledged that 1 is true. So you need to deny 2 if you're going to block the conclusion.
Now on what basis do you deny 2?

Don't say '1'. Premise 1 does not entail that 2 is false. You need to add another premise to 1 in order to get the negation of premise 2. You need to add this:

Premise 2* Everything I think, desire and do is the product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.

What evidence do you have that premise 2* is true?

No, your approach is wrong. What deprives one of free will in one context may enhance it in another.

Its akin to asking when a meal is delicious. Sometimes a meal will be delicious becusae of the presence of garlic in it. Sometimes it will be disgusting because of the presence of garlic in it. Nevertheless, although I can give you no formula for deliciousness, I know it when I encounter it.

I don't know what you're on about. I don't have a definition of free will. But I know I have it.

Here's a fourth piece of evidence that my mind is an immaterial soul.

1. If everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance, then I am not morally responsible for anything I think, desire and do.
2. I am morally responsible for some of what I think, desire and do.
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), not everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.
4. If I am a material object, then everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance
5. Therefore (from 3 and 4), I am not a material object

If I am not a material object, then I must be an immaterial one, for that's the only alternative.