To expand a little on my last point - note that my theory (that my mind is an immaterial soul) is described in the conclusion of my arguments, not any of the premises. So my theory is supported by reason. But you're rejecting one of my premises on the grounds that it conflicts with your theory. That's not rational.
You need first to show that your theory is described by the conclusion of an argument that has stronger - that is, more self-evidently true - premises than the ones that entail my theory. Once you've done that, then I think you'd have some grounds for citing my premise's incompatibility with your theory as some kind of evidence that the premise is false. But not otherwise.

I don't offer a definition - you haven't understood my point at all.

Free will is free will and not another thing. Sometimes free will involves being free from things, sometimes it involves having things. Is there some pattern to it? Maybe, maybe not.

The point, though, is that we can be sure we have it, even if we don't know exactly what it involves.

Re the rational intuitions that represent procreation to be ethical - well, those, I think, have been induced not by drugs, but by environmental programming. That is, most humans are going to get the intuition that procreation is ethical regardless of whether it actually is or not. Thus that intuition doesn't count for anything, I think.

Re thinking that only your own rational intuitions have any probative force - no, here we simply disagree. I think it is arbitrary to think that your rational intuitions count for something and those of other people do not.
I am not denying that sometimes one may be perfectly justified in believing something on the basis of one's own intuitions, even when they are contradicted by others. And I don't deny that we're often justified in giving our own intuitions some default clout that we don't have to give to others (but in all these cases I would support my case by pointing out that this is what other people's intuitions say too). But to think that, systematically, one's own count for more just in virtue of being one's own is, I think, prejudiced. I can see no reason to think it would be true - you'd have to think that you alone are hooked up to rational reality, that you have some special insight that others lack or something. And those just seem like prejudices. I don't deny they exist - far from it, we have abundant evidence of their existence here on these threads.

I don't think that I would be giving other people's intuitions clout on an arbitrary basis, for it would be the same basis upon which I give my own clout. How's that arbitrary?

Yes, but a claim is not evidence. Our reason represents minds to be indivisible. That's why it makes no sense to attribute half a mind to someone. That's why I can't reduce my debts by lopping bits off myself. And so on. So, my premise has support from our rational representations. By contrast, when you deny it all you offer as 'evidence' is that certain theories would permit it. Well yes, but that's not evidence. Far from it - it means you're rejecting my premise not on the basis of reason, but because it conflicts with your favourite theory. Your theory is now unfalsifiable.

no, not necessarily. For example, if I am free of information is my will freer as a result?

And you should read Descartes. Then you'd understand him better and wouldn't think he thought your neurology has nothing to do with your decision to go and have a meal.

So, for instance, let's say we uncover overwhelming evidence that everything we do has been determined by prior causes. Well, it is more reasonable to conclude that we have therefore discovered that free will and antecedent determination are compatible, rather than conclude that we therefore do not have free will. Why? Because it is more intuitively clear that we have freee will than that free will is incompatible with antecedent determination.

Any case for the anything - including the Heisenberg uncertainty principle - will have to appeal to some rational intuitions and thus will presuppose the truth of the principle expressed in premise 1. Thus the Heisenberg uncertainty principle cannot be used to challenge the credibility of premise 1 - that'd be like using the fact you're on a second floor as evidence that there is no first floor.

It is also important to distinguish two distinct questions - do we have free will? And 'what does free will involve?'
The answer to the first question is "yes", for the evidence that we have free will is overwhelming - the rational intuitions of literally billions of people represent them to have free will. That is excellent evidence that we have free will.

But it does not tell us what free will involves. That question is trickly. But the trickiness and debatable nature of mooted answers does not call into question that we have it.

No, you gave an example of an epileptic which did not do anything to challenge the credibility of premise 2, and you talked about qualia - which no premise of my argument made any mention of.

I assume that in your latest reply you're trying to raise the problem of interaction. But again, I don't yet see which premise you're challenging with it, or what the problem is.

Eh? No, you should have written it in English. Try again.

Gibberish. Maybe translate it into Latin and it'll sound better. But in Engilsh it's gibberish.

You're not helping - I don't need any help, Descartes has got my back. So you don't worry your little cotton socks off about me, just go in for the attack.

Maybe read him in English next time, that way you might understand him a little better.

Now which premise in his oh so dated argument are you disputing?

What help does my (Descartes') argument need, do you think? Seems to be doing just fine as it is, so far as I can tell. I mean, you've been unable to raise a reasonable doubt about either premise.

You sooo haven't read him.

I'll phone up my bank, shall I, and tell them I just removed 10% of my brain, so now I owe them 10% less and we'll see how plausible they find my second premise. My guess - very plausible indeed.

What's his memory got to do with it?

The post surgery person either owes you $1000 or nothing, yes? Because either it is Ralph, or it is a totally new person. It isn't 'half-Ralph'. We may not know for sure whether it is Ralph or not-Ralph, but we know that it isn't 'half-Ralph'. We know that it is absurd to think he owes you $500. We know that it is absurd to reduce your debts by having bits lopped off your brain.

Why do those things sound absurd? Because our reason represents our minds to be indivisible, that's why.

You've never read him, have you?

Does he owe me $500? You seem to have trouble focussing.

Note, if your answer to my question is 'b' then that is also the answer to what you are.

Maybe stop assuming I don't know stuff and just address the argument.

I know. Which premise are you disputing?

Say what you like, it's showing it that's difficult.

Tell me, do you think Descartes was a) one of the greatest thinkers of all time, or b) a twit?

Yes, I know that. Now, which premise of MY argument are you challenging and how?

Again, question begging - you're assuming that the mind is the brain AGAIN.

Let's imagine that Ralph has severe epilepsy. I've lent Ralph $1000. But now Ralph needs his brain to be cut in half. So they cut it in half and, because they're hungry, they take one half out and eat it, leaving him with a functioning half.
Ok, so what - does this half-Ralph now owe me $500? No, obviously not. He owes me $1000. Because Ralph hasn't been divided, only his brain has.
Or perhaps the division extinguished Ralph altogether, in which case the resulting person owes me nothing.
Those are obviously the options though, aren't they - the post-surgery person either owes me nothing, or $1000. They don't owe me $500, because they're not - and can't possibly be - a 'half-Ralph'.

Which premise of my argument mentioned qualia?
You need to challenge a premise of my argument. I'm talking about THE MIND

Question begging.

This is a reply to your 3. You're now talking about the CONCLUSION of my argument (well, I say 'my' argument - it is actually Descartes'). The conclusion is entailed by the premises, so until you've provided grounds for a reasonable doubt about the premises it does demonstrate that the mind is immaterial.

This is a reply to your 2. I don't understand what you mean. Why are you talking about qualia? I said the MIND is indivisible. This is something our reason represents to be the case.

For instance, have you ever attributed half a mind to a person? What would that even mean?

Premise 2 is supported by our rational intuitions and so you need countervailing evidence that it is false. What you must not do is just assume that the mind is the brain and then tell me all about how divisible the brain is. You need an argument that has "the mind is a material object" as a conclusion and premises that are more plausible than mine. Then you'll have provided rational inquirers with a reason to think there's a reasonable doubt to be had about the intuitions in support of premise 2. Unless you do that you're just assuming the mind is the brain - or some other extended thing - not showing it to be.

this is a reply to your first point.

You're confusing the smallest things scientists need to posit with 'indivisible' things. A common mistake. Take the smallest thing that is extended in space. Now divide it. It has nothing to do with size. It has to do with the fact that extended things occupy some space and any - any - region of space is divisible.

So, you haven't challenged premise 1. What you've done is this: 'sciency, sciency, sciency, science - therefore premise 1 is false". This is metaphysics, not science.

try making an argument.

You've looked some words up. Well done. Now make an argument. it's hard - hard to make a good one. Try.

Make an argument.

The case for antinatalism is going to be cumulative - that is, it is not going to consist of one knock-down argument, but numerous arguments that all imply the same conclusion.

In my view most procreative acts are seriously immoral, both because of the nature of the act itself - it is an act that imposes something significant on someone else without their consent - and because of what it typically says about the character of those who perform it (namely, that they are self-centred, narcissist megalomaniacs).

So here's one argument:

1. If an act will impose something significant on another person without their consent, then it is default wrong to perform that act
2. Procreating imposes something significant - life here - on another person without their consent
3. Therefore, procreative acts are default wrong

The argument is deductively valid (so its conclusion is necessarily true if its premises are). It is undeniable that the first premise has considerable support from our rational intuitions and premise 2 is obviously true.

No it isn't. You're begging the question because you're just assuming that the mind is a material thing - a brain. Yet what the mind is is the issue under investigation. So you need to present an argument that has 'therefore, the mind is material' as a conclusion but not a premise.

If you can do that, and if the premises of the argument are sufficiently self-evident (or themselves derived from sufficiently self-evident truths) then you will have provided rational inquirers with some reason to believe that minds are divisible, and thus some reason to doubt whether the rational intuitions that represent our minds to be indivisible are accurate. But until or unless you do that, you're just begging the question by dogmatically assuming that you already know what the mind is, regardless of the evidence.

Hard, isn't it? Hard to actually argue, much easier to dispense condescending advice and attack personalities.

Present an argument. Your advice is terrible and I don't want it. Now, present an argument for something. Don't express your feelings, don't give me advice about the world and other people. Just present an argument.

Argument - present an argument.

And Rovelli's point is indefensible. But you wouldn't and couldn't know that.

what you find difficult is addressing proper arguments, but feel free to dress it up in a self-serving way.

No it isn't. You don't know what a straw man is. Stop using terms you don't understand.