I've already acknowledged that not all causes, for example merely physical causes, are normative reasons. — Janus

Yes, but in about 2 minutes time you'll say something that implies you think all causes are normative reasons.

I'm saying that causes of human and some "higher" social animals' behavior are, in the sense that behavior is constrained by what is acceptable to the group, normative. — Janus

Well anyone can say stuff. Argue.

None. People are able to do immoral things. Like I say, you don't seem to be appreciating that this is a normative issue. You can't refute antinatalism by having a baby.

I do not see that. That's a possible explanation of why we have reason not to kill ourselves unless we are in unending agony. But the point is that if we only have instrumental reason to kill ourselves if we are in unending agony, then death must be extremely harmful to the one who dies. Not quite as harmful as suffering a life here of extreme agony - hence why we would have instrumental reason to kill ourselves under those circs - but very harmful.

And that's why religions typically condemn it. It is, I think, primarily out of a concern to prevent someone harming themselves

We are all one in the East. If you fly there you will gradually merge with other passengers into a big ball. That's why lots of planes crash there. Although who's to say? How does anything know anyone?

As I have to go away for a few hours, I will continue.

I take it to be a conceptual truth that if event d occurs at time t1 then it is present at t1. If you think an event d can occur at t1, yet not be present until later, then I just think that's a contradiction. When an event occurs is when it is present and when it is present is when it occurs. "It's occuring now, but is it present?" makes no sense.

So, the event d occurs - and so is present at - time t1. That is, d is 'now' at t1. Not after, not before. But at t1. It has presentness at t1. These are just different ways of saying the same thing.

If my sensation of d's presentness does not occur until time t2, then d appears present when it is not. That is, my sensation of d's presentness is false. If materialism is true, then all my impressions of presentness are false. Nothing that I sense to be present is actually present. The event of my sensation of d's presentness will occur after d is present, not simultaneous with it. And that's true of all of my sensations of presentness if materialism is true. So they're all false if materialism is true. Which is why it isn't.

If I understand you correctly - and I am not at all sure I do - then all you are saying is that my sensation of the presentness of d will be present when it, the sensation, is present. Which is true, but beside the point. For the sensation of d's presentness is of d's presentness, not the sensation of d's presentness. And d is not present, it is past.

That's not what I said. I said that if I want something not to be produced by a robot but by a person, then something other than a robot - a person - needs to perform the job of producing it for me.

There's as much evidence that all of this is real, as there is that it is an illusion. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Yes, and what about eastern ideas? They're good.

It's all subjective :starstruck: Who's to say? :cool: Wikiwikiwikiwiki SEP SEP SEP wikiwikiwiki. :chin:

Now, go away and let the serious discussion continue.

:vomit: :eyes: :rage: :rofl: How anything know us do?

Who's to say?

it's a concept.

What about eastern ideas?

But :scream: how :chin: do :rage: any :groan: of :shade: us :vomit: know :cry: anything? :worry: :lol: :nerd: :death: :party:

Have you read my posts?

There isn't a problem of interaction.

Objects can cause events. Events are different in kind to objects. Thus clearly different kinds of existence - events and objects - can causally interact.

That example doesn't beg the question against anyone.

Regardless of your materialist or immaterialist commitments, you have to accept that objects cause events.

Thus we have independent evidence - proof, no less - that different kinds of existence can causally interact.

Thus there is no reason to suppose that minds would be unable causally to interact with material if they turn out to be radically different kinds of existence.

The Origin of The Species by, if memory serves, Karl Dorwin

If I want a pot that has not been made by a robot, then the job of making me that pot cannot be automated

What about the property of existence? Surely two different kinds of thing can both have the property of existing? To deny this is to start out by asserting monism, not establish it.

If I have the property of having caused event p, and event p has the property of having been caused by me, do we share a property?

So, event d occurs at time t1. It is present at t1 then. It, the event, is present at t1. Yes?

What do you mean?

What point are you making?

What? Read the OP

So, to be clear, you think that if an event occurs at time t1, it can be present later? Again: that makes no sense. You seriously think an event can be present later than when it occurs?
You are welcome to materialism if that's something you think is coherent. It's not - it's mental.
When did it occur? T1
But when was it present? T2
Mental.

That doesn't answer why t1 must be the present moment. Why must the present time be equated with the occurrence of event p instead of when I am aware of it or sense it? — Luke

Well it does, because if the present is that which can render the impression of the present accurate, and the impression of the present occurs at t1, then that which can render that impression must occur at t1 as well.

Note, I have never ever identified the present moment with our sensation of it. Our sensations represent something to be the case - in this case the presentness of p is what they are representing to be the case.

What could render that impression accurate? A past event? No. For it is an impression of presentness, not pastness.

So only a present event can render an impression of presentness accurate.

Hence why p needs to occur when the sensation of p's presentness occurs if the sensation of p's presentness is to be accurate.

Can you explain to me how your view - that an event can occur at t1 yet be present later than it occurs - makes any sense at all?

Does it make sense to wonder "hmm, well, I accept that p occurred at 3 o clock - but when was it present?'

1. If materialism is true, the present moment is not where our sensations say it is.
— Bartricks

Why not? — Luke

Because my sensation that event p is present will occur at t2, yet event p occurred at t1.

If event p occurred at t1, then it was present at t1, not t2.
— Bartricks

Why? — Luke

Because if an event occurs at time t1, then it is present at t1, not t2.

If the present moment is "when our sensations tell us it is", then p is present when our sensations tell us it is, not whenever p actually occurred. — Luke

But I also said that I am not a materialist. I think materialism is false partly because I think the present moment is where our sensations represent it to be. WHich is not where it would be if materialism were true. So:

1. If materialism is true, the present moment is not where our sensations say it is.
2. The present moment is where our sensations say it is
3. Therefore materialism is true

So you need to argue that if materialism is true, the present moment is where our sensations say it is.

But it isn't.

SO far as I can tell, what you're doing is insisting that the materialist can say that event p is present if our sensations say it is, even if it occurred earlier. That doesn't make any sense, does it?

If event p occurred at t1, then it was present at t1, not t2.

That's what I'm saying, too. — Luke

Good, so we agree that in order for my sensation that p is present to be accurate, p needs actually to have presentness.

I assume we have been using t1 and t2 as follows:

t1 = the time that an event occurs
t2 = the time that we become aware of, sense, or respond to that event. — Luke

Yes.

You've just said in the first quote above that the present moment is the time that we are aware of, which means the present moment is at t2. — Luke

No, I said that in order for an impression of presentness to be accurate, the event it represents to be present would have actually to be present.

So, if at t2 I get the impression that event p - an event that occurred at t1 - is present, then that impression will be inaccurate.

I'm not a materialist. I'm trying to refute it. So we both agree that my sensation that p is present is accurate. I think that's incompatible with materialism though. Or at least, incompatible with our best materialist explanation of how the world interacts with our brains. FOr if an event occurs at t1 then it is present at t1.
An event can't occur earlier than it is present, can it?

My view is that the present moment is when our sensations tell us it is.

So, if I sense that p is present, that is default evidence that p is present.

But if won't be present if materialism is true. It'll be past.

You, if I have understood you correctly, want to say that this is not true for the materialist can simply insist that an event can be present at a time later than that at which it occurs. Which I think is incoherent.

I am not denying that an event occurs at t1 and that we are aware of it at a later time t2. I am only denying that we must situate the present at t1 instead of t2. — Luke

What I mean is, if the event of p occurs at t1, would you admit that it is present at t1? It seems to me that you want to say that despite p occuring at time 1, it is present at a later time.....that, to my mind, makes no sense.

I am not denying that an event occurs at t1 and that we are aware of it at a later time t2. I am only denying that we must situate the present at t1 instead of t2. — Luke

So you think that present determines the past?

Yes, but even a pro-lifer is opposed to those.

So, if abortions are available, why would one build artificial wombs?

If we have a sensation of presentness, then actual presentness will be that which is capable of rendering it accurate. But only something that is actually present - that has actual presentness - can render accurate an impression of presentness.

If event p occurs at t1, then it is present at t1, not t2. Otherwise it would not be correct to say it occurs at t1.

If I have a sensation that represents even p to be present, then in order for that sensation to be accurate p would need to be present.

But if event p occurred at t1 and my sensation of its presentness occurs at t2, then my sensation is inaccurate. For at the time of the occurrence of my sensation the event it represents to be present does not have presentness but pastness.

So, we do not decide in advance when the present moment is. We look to our appearances to tell us, for that is how we're aware of it. But if materialism is true, then they tell us it is where it isn't.

If it's not a person then yes, it doesn't matter - but then why be in favour of artificial wombs? Should there be artificial mouths built for teeth we have removed?
But if they are persons, then what seems to matter is not whether there's an artificial womb available, but how the person got to be inside the woman.

My point was that if my sensation represents the event p to have presentness, then for that sensation to be accurate the event - not my sensation of it - would need to have presentness. But it wouldn't have if it was actually present at t1, not t2.
If you say that presentness is when the sensation of presentness occurs, then it is not 'of' presentness but is the presentness.

I don't see a lack of artificial wombs to be the problem. I see deciding to procreate to be the problem.

Let's say a person freely decides to get themselves pregnant. And let's assume the fetus is a person. Well, isn't it wrong for that person to abort?

If the decision to get pregnant was not free, then that's different. The woman does not owe the person the use of her womb or the inconveniences and pains of birth. And though it is still unjust that the baby dies, this is not an injustice the woman has any obligation to prevent.

But if she freely got pregnant, why doesn't she owe it to the person she summoned into existence the continued use of her womb?

Well that impression of presentness is had of the events that our sensations are giving us an awareness of, rather than of the sensations themselves (though it can be of them too when we introspect). That is, at time t2 I have a sensation. The sensation is of event p. And it has presentness - that is, it represents the event to be now. But if that event actually occurred at t1, then the presentness that I sensed it to have, it would not have. My sensation was present, but what it represented to be present was not.

Would you agree that we have an impression of presentness? That is, some sensible events appear to be happening now, whereas there are others that appear to have pastness (and then we say that we seem to be remembering them).

ok, but why are you in favour of artificial wombs then?

I specifically asked you if it would be wrong for a woman to abort rather than transfer the baby to an artificial womb if one was available (see the content of my second response above). To which you responded 'yes'. Do you know what 'yes' means? Did you actually mean 'no'?

Why do you think it would be wrong for a woman to abort if there was an artificial womb available then?

Why not? Presumably you think it would be immoral to abort if there was an artificial womb available because abortion kills an innocent person who does not deserve to die?
Well, if there is no artificial womb available then surely it's entitled to the continued use of the natural one it is currently inhabiting?

And if there was no artificial womb available she would not be doing something immoral?