Are you in favour of creating artificial wombs? And if one is available, would a pregnant woman who wanted an abortion instead be doing something immoral if she had the abortion?

And I think you must show if our belief in normative reasons is actually evolving or not. — Daniel

Why? That makes no sense given I am arguing against such an account! Why would I need to defend the account I am attacking?

If our belief in normative reasons is not evolving, you must show that it is not evolving. — Daniel

Do pay attention - I am arguing that if a wholly evolutionary story about us is true, then there aren't any reasons to do or believe things. Yet there are reasons to do and believe things.....thus it is false.

This is the argument Daniel - read it:

Here it is:
1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.

And to that we add this premise:

2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things

From which it follows that:

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things.
— Bartricks — Bartricks

Which premise do you think is false and why?

Where is your argument? All you have done above is once more insist that all causes are normative reasons - which they are not. Look, you don't seem capable of grasping a point for longer than a minute.
Normative reasons can cause things. But not all causes are normative reasons. So, that an evolutionary story appeals to causes does not establish that normative reasons have to be posited. Stop hoping that big words like 'attenuated' will make up for a lack of point

I just found a wiki page that said universes lack intelligence. Shall I paste the entire page?

But how do you know that you agree? How does anyone know anything?

Scientists have discovered that your loved one is genetically a cat, even though they are in every other way indistinguishable from another human. Do you a) have her put down; b) insist she eat from a dish on the floor and stay off the furniture; c) rethink the visit to the bird sanctuary; d)continue as normal and watch a box set?

So you went with b.

That makes no sense. P zombies resemble us in every outward way, so there is no 'reply' that is typical of them but not us. And it wouldn't be a real reply if I were a p zombie - it'd be bot generated. So it would be an apparent reply, but not a real one.
But if this is a bot reply would you a) bake a cake; b) make another reply that makes no sense and reveals the sloppy nature of your own thinking; c) start another thread asking philosophically uninteresting questions about a curious scenario?

Presumably wisdom is not a synonym for omniscience?
It seems to me that wisdom incorporates moral claims. That is, a wise person is someone who knows what it is morally good to know.
As such a virtuous person will be wise and a wise person will be virtuous, or at least you can't be to some extent wise without being to some extent virtuous.
But it is fallacious to infer from this that wisdom 'is' virtue. If something occupies space then it will have a shape. But it does not follow that space 'is' shape. Likewise from the fact that being wise involves being virtuous to some degree, does not establish that the two are the same. Indeed, we can explain why the two are found together: to be wise is to know what it is morally good to know.

I don't see the philosophical relevance of your questions.

If you discovered that your house, which up to now you had thought was made of wood and plaster, was actually made of brandy snaps and icing sugar, would you a) start eating it; b) move out; c) sell up; d) start thinking you were living in a children's story; e) go and sit in your chocolate cake sofa and watch a box set?

First, Rawls does not reject desert but appeals to it. If you reject that a person deserves x, you are not rejecting that x exists. If I deny that my house is green I am not thereby disallowing the existence of green.
Second, wikipedia is written by enthusiastic amateurs. So it's a bit like citing a post from someone here. It's almost certainly going to be shot through with clumsy mistakes. As it is in this case: Rawls does not reject desert, indeed his whole case appeals to it. Maybe read him, not wikipedia pages on him (although don't actually do that as he's an overrated twit and a dull read).
Third, make an argument.

I think resemblance is a sensation. I sense x to resemble y. There is a resemblance sensation experienced when I sense or think about x and y. And by hypothesis, in order for that sensation of resemblance to be of actual resemblance, it would need to resemble it (otherwise I would not be perceiving it). And only a sensation can resemble a sensation (a truth of reason). Thus actual resemblance is a sensation.

Re Platonism. I am not sure what to say about that. I suppose that a version of Platonism according to which the Forms are archetypes in the mind of God is entirely compatible with Berkeley's view.

Insofar as I understand Plato, the realm of the Forms does not resemble the sensible world. Rather, the sensible world 'reminds' us of the Forms. That's a different relation entirely.

So, if we are talking about what it takes for our sensations to be perceptions of a world, then there needs to be a world that resembles those sensations in order for them to constitute perceptual awareness of it. And that world would have itself to be made of sensations.

But perhaps understanding the world requires possession of a fund of concepts acquired from elsewhere. I think that's compatible with Berkeley's view.

Imagine an air traffic controller looking at flashes of light on a circular screen and lots of numbers. Is the air traffic controller perceiving the planes he has so much information about and whose behaviour he can predict and direct? No. The air traffic controller is acquiring lots of true beliefs about some planes, but he is not perceiving them.
Or perhaps a better example might be a pilot. Pilots do not have to look out the window to fly the plane and navigate the landscape, as they have enough information from their instruments. But when the pilot is looking at the instruments they are not perceiving the landscape (unlike when they look through the window at it).

There is clearly a difference then between acquiring one's awareness via means that in no way resemble what one is becoming aware of and via means that do. And it is in the latter case that we can be said to be 'perceiving'. Or at least, that a necessary condition for perception has been met (resemblance isn't sufficient).

That's all Berkeley needs, for he is concluding that the world we perceive is made of sensations. There are, however, other features of reality that we do not perceive but are nevertheless aware of, such as minds.

Deserts contain life! — universeness

I don't know what that means.

I have been delivering what you deserve for a while now. — universeness

I think that's an attempt at wit. It's hard to tell.

If you stick to doing that when you respond to others then I will comply with your request.
I you continue to be the obnoxious p**** you can be towards others then you will keep getting what you deserve in return bar..tricks! Learn little bar..tricks be a big boy now. — universeness

Oh dear, D for effort. Again, try and engage with the topic.

Er, you're the one throwing stones and I'm the wave. You can see that by noting that I said some things about desert and you didn't, you just I was a pedestrian thinker.
Now, once again, address the OP. Say something about desert. Not about me. About desert. And if I disagree with you and explain to you why your view is wrong, respond to the criticism rather than say something about me. See? Learn to handle criticism.

There are different kinds of causes for actions and normative reasons are one of them. Desires are another, and instincts are another. So that all reasons are causes does not entail that all causes are reasons, since there are other kinds of natural causes that do not pertain to human action and are thus not reasons for human action ( although they might be).. — Janus

I asked you if you think that causes and normative reason are one and the same.

Your answer, so far as I can discern it in that muddle, is 'no'.

That's correct.

Normative reasons can be the causes of things. They're not always. For example, you have reason to think I know what I am talking about. You don't though. So that reason is not being causally effective.

But they 'can' be.

So, that something has been caused to occur does not mean that a normative reason is present.

Do you see how that follows?

If not all causes of things are normative reasons, then if something has been caused to occur you can't conclude that a noramtive reason exists.

Do you see?

Now, the word 'reason' can sometimes be used as a synonym for 'cause'

When it occurs in evolutionary explanations, that's what it means. It denotes a cause.

And that's not equivalent to it denoting a normative reason. Do you see?

And so though an evolutionary explanation of our development will cite causes, it will not cite normative reasons.

It will cite beliefs in them. It will not cite the objects of the beliefs. And I explained in the OP why, when that happens, we do not need to posit the object.

Now, if you think my argument is dumb - which you do - then you need to do the following. You need - without conflating normative reasons and causes - to show how an evolutionary explanation of our development needs to posit actual noramtive reasons. Not causes and not the belief in normative reasons. Actual normative reasons.

Do that.

Good one Oscar.

Look, you're derailing this thread. It's on moral desert. I said some things about moral desert - true things. Such as that it is always a person's, that we can't affect another person's desert of harm, and that an injustice is what we have if a person does not get what they deserve.

So far as I can tell you've not engaged with any of this.

Either do some philosophy or become a lot funnier. One or the other.

Well that wasn't philosophy. Try again.

Answer the question: do normative reasons cause us to do things or not? — Janus

Yes, they 'can' do (as I said and you didn't bother to read). Now answer my questions:

do you think that causes and normative reasons are one and the same or were you just putting big words together that you didn't really understanding and hoping I'd think you were clever and not a Hugh?

Now, stop asking me questions and actually engage with the argument in the OP. ("But how do we know anything? And everything is subjective. And how do we know anything? Is it true just because Bartfuck says so? How know everything do we? Subjective. Conceptual. Noumenal. Hegel." Yes?).

This is a philosophy forum. Do some.

It means that it is a distinction without a real difference. — Janus

So, you think normative reasons are causes and causes are normative reasons?
Or did you not know what you were saying (clue: it's that one).

And what reason would that be? — Janus

It would be an epistemic reason. There - that's a big word for you. You can misuse that one now. Have fun with it.

So answer the questions and address the argument if you want this discussion to progress any further. — Janus

No discussion with you goes anywhere. I'm using you.

I'll put it another way: normative reasons are effective only if we believe them. Adaptive advantage gives us good reason to believe in them; namely that following them is generally adaptively advantageous.. — Janus

Address the OP. You haven't done that. If there are normative reasons, then we have reason to believe in them. But if an evolutionary account of our development is true, then there aren't any. See? So you need to show how there will be some if an evolutionary account is true. It's called 'begging the question'. You do it. Always.

I've already acknowledged there is a conceptual distinction, and I've already explained why I don't think it is substantive. — Janus

I don't know what you mean by that (and nor do you). It's doobidoobidoo talk. Stop it. When I make a distinction, resist the temptation to articulate it in your own words. You don't know what most words mean, yes? So stop it. Stop trying to change the meaning of what I say into something stupid that you understand and then attributing it to me. NOw, why the F, when I said 'causes' did you start talking gibberish about 'conceptual distinctions'? Eh? Why? Do you think it makes you sound clever?

THe OP is about normative reasons. Normative reasons are reasons to do things.

The word 'reason' can be used as a synonym for cause. But that does not mean that a normative reason and a cause are synonymous.

There are causes of things. Some of them are normative reasons and some are not.

You claim that reason does not deceive us and that God is reason. — Janus

I conclude that God is Reason. I don't claim it. I conclude it.

It follows that you believe God does not deceive us. — Janus

Er, no it doesn't. You explain why you think it does. It doesn't.

If this is not on account of omni-benevolence then what is it on account of? — Janus

Reason - who is a person - will be omnibenevolent. That doesn't mean 'won't ever lie'. How many words do you actually know the correct meaning of? Is it 8 or 9?

Hugh: yeah, but you believes that God are Reason and that means you is thinking that is onionbenvolent, which means you think Reason likes onions.

I said that the word 'reason' is ambiguous. I don't think you understand what that means.

I'll just tell you - it means it has more than one distinct meaning.

I then said that the word 'reason' can be used to denote normative reasons (which are what the OP is about) and also to denote 'causes'.

So, once more - and do take the bloody trouble to read what I am saying you giant Hugh - 'the reason the car exploded is the bomb'. The word 'reason' there denotes a cause.

I have reason to blow up the car. The word 'reason' there denotes a normative reason. Not a cause. A normative reason.

Now, if we haven't already far exceeded your ability to understand, we're definitely going to now. Normative reasons can sometimes cause things to happen. Oooo. So normative reasons can also sometimes be causal reasons as well.

But - and hold to the sides of your Hugh - causes are not necessarily normative reasons.

For example, the bomb didn't have a reason to blow up the car. It did. It caused that to happen. But it didn't 'have a reason to' do so.

Now, an evolutionary explanation of us will mention causes. It won't mention any actual normative reasons

This now sounds like this to you - doobidoobidoobidoo - yes?

What have you done, Hugh? All you've done is insist that normative reasons and causes are one and the same. No argument for that. Just an insistence.

Argue something!!!! Engage with the bloody OP. Take the bloody time to understand it. Then argue against something it says. DOn't nay say. Argue.

Do you know what ambiguous means?

Shall we try again?

The word reason is ambiguous. What does that mean? (Pssst, it doesn't mean that it can write with either hand)

You don't seem to be able to read. The distinction was between normative reasons and causes.
And you have said above 'I understand the distinction between p and q, but doobidoobidoo I think ps are qs." So you don't understand it at all, do you?

No, those are causes, not normative reasons. You are confused because the word reason can also be used as a synonym for cause or explanation.

The reason the car exploded was the bomb.
I have reason to blow up the car.
The word reason means something quite different in the first sentence to the second. In the first it means cause. In the second it means normative reason.

The reason we believe in normative reasons (not causes,but normative reasons) if an evolutionary explanation is correct is that belief in them was adaptive. That does not mean we have to posit any. We posit causes, not normative reasons.

You said - using incorrect terms to do so - that premise 2 is false because doobidoobidoo. How can I address that? Make an argument.

No, you Hugh, 'sound' is what a valid argument is when its premises are true. And unsound is what it is when one is false. Ignorant Hughs tend to use valid, sound and true as synonyms. But that's because they are ignorant Hughs.
And what you said - after insisting my valid argument was invalid - is this. You said 'promise 2 is infalse becorn doobidoobidoo'. And that, around these parts, is good filosophymizing.

A: Your argumentation is invalidity because it is doobidoobidoo. Hegel. Everything is subjective and how do we know anything anyway?

B: I agree that his urgemont is unfactisound,but it isn't doobidoobidoo. It is wahdiwahdiwaa. Noumenal. Everything is subjective and God's a dick and how do we know anything anyway?"

C: Have you read unqualified Hack's work on why everything is subjective and how do we know anything anyway? It's really good as he explains the dumbdidumbdidumb of everything and makes a great point when he says 'and how anything know do we?'

You keep changing your claims.

Soundness is a property of arguments, not premises. You mean 'false', not unsound.

Now you're saying that 2 is false. But you offer no argument, you just say things. Read the OP and address the case I made or go away and be a Hugh elsewhere.

As I expected, you are unable to focus on the question.

My question was whether a professional thinker is likely to be a shallow thinker. And the answer is 'no'. They're likely to be a deep thinker.

So, a professional thinker is likely to be a deep thinker. And a shallow thinker is unlikely to be able to detect deep thinking when they encounter it. Hence this.

The fact-value distinction creates an apparently insuperable obstacle for philosophers, but not for ordinary people. Why? — Srap Tasmaner

What do you mean by the fact value distinction? I think most philosophers - now and throughout history - would not draw it.

Here's another distinction - the fact concrete distinction.

There are facts. And there is concrete.

Facts are facts, not concrete. And concrete is concrete and not a fact. However, some facts are about concrete.

Now, the same is true of facts and values. There are facts, and facts are facts and not other things. And there are values and values are values not other things. But some facts are about values. (There are facts about what I value, for instance, and there are facts about moral values too).

The same applies to the 'is/ought' distinction. The 'is' denotes a fact. It 'is' the case that I am sat in a chair. 'Oughts' are directives (normative oughts are, anyway). But there can be facts about those, just as there can be facts about concrete even though concrete is not a fact.

It is fact that you ought to x, for instance.

Well, would you agree that it is unlikely that a professional thinker is a shallow thinker?

You've fulfilled my every expectation Bortricks. — Janus

And you're very much a Hugh.

By the way I love the consistency of your God. He is reason so he, being omni-benevolent, would never deceive us. — Janus

Yeah, Hugh, you need to stop trying to think - it isn't working. It's not 'my' God, it's 'God'. And it does not follow from his being omnibenevolent that he would never deceive us. But you haven't the first idea what does or does not follow from another thing, do you? It's just whatever you think next.

1. If P, then Q
2. P
3. Therefore Q

Hugh: 3 doesn't follow from 1 and 2, so far as I can see, because you're Bartricks and you know nothing. If P, then squirrel. But squirrels like nuts. So therefore nuts. If P, nuts. Bartthick.

1. P
2. Q
3. Therefore P and Q

Hugh: no, so far as I can see, 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. How do we know anything? Do we just have to accept what you say, Bumtrick? I think that what follows from 1 and 2 is "I'm off to the shops".

1. If P, then Q
2. If Q, then R
3. Therefore if P, then R

Hugh, no, so far as I can see, 3 does not follow from 1 and 2. What follows from 1 is 34, or maybe yellow. Bumthick.

Tedious.

When you've managed to collect above 100 IQ points, get someone to read this to you:

1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p. (that has the form "If p, then q")
2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things (that asserts p)
3. Therefore, if a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things (therefore q).

So if I am a deep thinker and you a shallow one, you wouldn't notice, yes?

Do you think shallow thinkers are good at detecting deep thinkers?

I have no idea what you are talking about.

Useless. Hugh.