You have been knocked out so many times you are punchy and stuck in repeat BS mode. — universeness

Yeah, right. You really hurt me when you smashed your face onto my knee and then repeatedly hit my foot with your crotch. Good technique!

That's what you got from what I said? You think I don't understand Berkeley?
So, just to be clear, you think what I said was wrong, do you? So, when he said "Their esse is percipi" - so, their being is to be perceived - you think he was talking about all things and not just sensations?

It's just that he's really clear on this - clear on pretty much everything, in fact, as you'd know if you'd read him - and so it's a bit odd that you think I'm misunderstanding him. Only someone who knew nothing about Berkeley and had just read a wiki page written by a confident ignoramus would think he was talking about being in general as opposed to the being of sensations. That's how it seems to me - someone who has read Berkeley. Odd. Yet you think I don't understand him.

As you no doubt know, the quote ' "their esse is percipi" occurs in paragraph 3 of the principles, so perhaps correct my misunderstanding by explaining how the words surrounding it do not mean precisely what I said, and not at all what you said.

Do you see as well how he didn't actually say "to be is to be perceived"? He said "Their esse is percipi". That means "their being is to be perceived". And the 'their' refers to what....? Sensations. As you'd know if understood him. Which you don't. Demonstrably.

No, I just know what I am talking about. You don't. You are just talking hippy nonsense. I imagine that if I asked you for a cup of tea you would make me some ghastly undrinkable sludgy gritty substance made from stewed bracken and a ton of bonkers spices. That's what your definitions are like.

So witty. Like I say, you haven't read him.

They may be right (although they really aren't - we can't change much), but changing them would be costly to us - it would require we make sacrifices. And we have no obligation to make those sacrifices. We do no wrong continuing as we are. That's what makes us moral monsters. We are doing no wrong in leading these lifestyles. Parents are - they ought not lead them. But we - we who have not created the problem for which the sacrifices would be needed - are not obliged to make the sacrifices.

Yes.

Perhaps, although that quote - and I am not sure if it accurately reflects his actual views - implies that all he is saying is that we cannot help but live harmful lives.
But that's not yet a moral monster. What makes someone a moral monster is that they are morally entitled to live an injustice wreaking life.

Of course, there are limits and we are obliged to do 'something' to ameliorate injustices (and parents are obliged to do a great deal - they ought to sacrifice their comforts). But not much. For the most part, we do no wrong in living comfortable lives of great destruction. Which is terrible.

The point is that killing the hermit does the hermit great harm.

So death is a great harm to the one who dies. A huge harm. It's one of the biggest.

So, if you kill yourself, then you are doing yourself a great harm.

That's a stupid thing to do, unless doing it prevented you from coming to an even greater harm.

Imagine you are upset one day and you decide to saw one of your ears off, a la van gogh. That's not sensible. You've made your situation worse, not better. Now you are upset and you only have one ear.

That's what death does. It makes our situation worse, not better. The only exception would be if your life is terrible with no prospect of it being otherwise.

I am still not seeing a third option. My argument concludes that procreation is wrong, other things being equal. To challenge it one needs an argument that implies the opposite or one needs to deny a premise.

That's the second option. The first option is to deny that we are created innocent. The second is to argue that despite the injustice that creating us causes, there is something even more morally significant at stake that justifies us in doing so.
You have not described a third option, but simply ventured a version of the second option.

And it fails. If we all stopped procreating that would not make nihilism true.

So if you hang an unloved hermit you have done him no harm?

We are talking at cross purposes. I am not denying that a person is entitled to kill themselves if they so wish.
My point is that death is extremely harmful to the one who dies. And thus to kill oneself is to do oneself a great harm. It is going to be irrational under most circumstances. It would be a case of jumping out of the frying pan into an even hotter fire.

So killing someone does that person no harm?! Killing an unloved hermit is a harmless thing to do?
This doesn't sound right at all. Death is a colossal harm to the one who dies. That's why it's used as a punishment. That's why killing others is so wrong. And it's why killing oneself to avoid a boring meeting would be stupid (whereas killing oneself to avoid endless agony would not be).

That's not a third option. It's an attempt at option 2. You are implying that we have a moral obligation to prevent moral nihilism from obtaining.

But killing someone harms them, yes? It may sometimes be the lesser of two evils, but it's still a harm, isn't it?

A preacher doesn't make arguments. I make arguments. You just say stuff. It's tedious. Up your game.

I don't know what you are saying anymore.
Do you agree that it is contrary to one's interest to kill oneself, extreme unending agony aside?

Oh. My. God. How many times?
I am arguing that reasons exist.
Are you a goldfish?

Reductionism is any view that 'reduces' one thing to something else. It is the view that x is made of y.

Its opposite is non-reductionism.

Holism is a view about the behaviour of features. Namely, it is the view that how a feature behaves depends on context.

Its opposite is atomism.

You haven't read him, have you?

Tell me, did Berkeley say it? What was he referring to?

You don't know. I know you don't know, because no one who has read him would leave out the context.

So, what is he talking about?

I will tell you. He is talking about sensations. It is the essence of a sensation that it be sensed. That is, sensations exist as mental activity.

He was not saying that it is the essence of anything's being that it be sensed. That would not make sense at all.

But sometimes it can be stupid. And most of the time it is not going to be in the best interests of the person who is contemplating doing it. Given this, it may be morally justifiable to condemn it as immoral. Not because it is, but in the hope that the person who is misunderstanding what's in their best interests might nevertheless respond to moral reasons.
Of course, sometimes it won't be contrary to the person's interests. But most of the time it will. And trying to persuade someone not to do something that it is contrary to their interests seems like a respectful thing to do.

The whole consent issue was not mentioned in the OP sadly. — I like sushi

That's because the consent argument is quite different.

This the problem with most of you - you seem incapable of focusing. There's more than one argument for antinatalism. And I just made a new one. So it's not the same as the others. See? Look up 'new'.

It's a 'new' argument for antinatalism. So, obviously - obviously - I will not be mentioning already existing arguments that are well known, such as the consent argument.

So, again, the argument is that procreative acts bring into being a person who deserves much more than they are going to get and positively does not deserve a lot of what they are going to get.

A person is created innocent and thus is created deserving no harm whatsoever. Yet they will receive harm. That harm is unjust. Thus procreative acts create an injustice.

To dispute this claim you need to argue either that people are born deserving to come to harm, or you need to argue that despite creating this great injustice there is something else of overwhelming moral importance that justifies a person in creating it.

Where?

Holism is not the opposite of reductionism!

You do realize Gnomon doesn't know what he's talking about?

Gnomon seems to be confusing holism with 'whole-ism'.

A belief has been debunked when the explanation of how we have acquired it gives us no reason whatever to think it true.
That doesn't mean it is false.

If I believe there is a lion in my kitchen and that belief is wholly due to my having taken a hallucinogen earlier, then I have no reason to think that belief is true. That doesn't mean there isn't a lion in my kitchen. There might, by pure coincidence, be one in there.

The evolutionary explanation of our belief in reasons is analogous: the explanation of our belief makes no mention of any actual reasons (just as the explanation of why I believe there's a lion in my kitchen makes no mention of any lion in my kitchen).

Thus, there is no reason whatsoever to think the beliefs are true. And given we do not have to posit any reasons to believe things, we shouldn't. There could still be some and they could even be arranged in the way we believe them to be. But that would be a pure coincidence and not a reasonable belief. Furthermore, just as my hallucinogen induced belief that there is a lion in my kitchen would not qualify as knowledge even if there is a lion in my kitchen, so too we would not know there were any reasons to do or believe things if our belief in them has been induced by evolutionary forces, even if there are reasons to do and believe things arranged exactly as we believe them to be

Yes, that definitely made sense.

Any region of space can be infinitely divided. And an extended object occupies some space. So it can be infinitely divided.

Explain why an extended object could not be divided. It would have a top and a bottom and sides, yes? And there would be some space in between, otherwise it is not occupying any space and is not a material object. Now why couldn't that object be divided?

Yes, like many common sayings, it is wrong.

He was not British. And he was not an empiricist.

Empiricism is a stupid view that, by its own lights, has no support.

He was not an empiricist.

It's a label that he would not have known and that was applied to him later by people who hadn't bothered to read or understand him.

Berkeley is most decidedly not an empiricist. Berkeley appeals to self-evident truths of reason. He takes it to be self-evident - as did Descartes, of course - that thinking requires a thinker. And on this basis he thinks minds exist.

Note, minds are not empirically detectable. Yet Berkeley believes in them. If he was an empiricist, he wouldn't.

Again: he takes it to be manifest to reason that thoughts require thinkers (and that sensations require sensors).

That's at the heart of his case. It's not an empirical truth - one cannot see, touch, hear, smell or taste that thoughts require minds. It is a manifest truth of reason.

And he takes it to be manifest to reason that our sensations must resemble what they're providing us with some awareness of.

And he takes ti to be manifest to reason that sensations can only resemble other sensations. Just as a texture can't be like a sight, or a sound like a texture, so too no sensation can be like something that is not a sensation.

From this it follows that the sensible world our sensations tell us about must itself be composed of the sensations of a mind.

That's his positive case for idealism.
He also has a destructive case: materialism doesn't make any sense. There is no need to posit any material objects. Plus a material object is extended in space by its very nature. But any object that is extended in space will be infinitely divisible. Yet nothing can be infinitely divisible, for that would involve it having infinite parts - which is to posit an actual infinity. There are no actual infinities in reality, thus there are no extended things.

Now the fallacy that Berkeley is often accused of having committed is the fallacy of confusing a vehicle of awareness with an object of awareness. It's a fallacy that many here commit. The fallacy involves going from "I think that p" to "p is therefore a thought". Lots of you commit it when you try and think about morality. You go from "I feel some acts are wrong and feel some acts are right" to "rightness and wrongness are feelings of mine". That's the fallacy.

Berkeley is said to have committed it, for he is thought to have argued that as we know the sensible world by sensation, then the sensible world is a sensation.

Yet clearly that is not something he argued. He drew that conclusion, but not in that way. He did not think the world our sensations give us an awareness of is made of those sensations - the sensations that give us an awareness of it. Our sensations are 'of' the world, but do not compose it (thus at no point does he confuse a vehicle of awareness with its object - our sensations are the vehicles of awareness, and the sensations constitutive of the world are their object). HIs point is that in order for them to be 'of' the world, they would need to resemble it. And it is from that, combined with the claim that sensations can only resemble other sensations, that we get to the conclusion that the world is made of sensations (and thus the sensations of a mind).

Perhaps the argument is unsound, but it's not fallacious.

Oh, and he was Irish, not British. The part of Ireland he was from was not part of Britain.

Berkeley's major problem is that he's a strict empiricist, — Wayfarer

No he isn't.

He's known as one of the great British empiricists.

He wasn't British or an empiricist.

What on earth are you on about?

It is dangerous to desire knowledge too strongly. — Gregory

Ok, oh wise one. Is there some knowledge you would like us not to seek after, such as how on earth you afforded that helicopter?

To say the reality consists merely in our thinking is fantastic poetry because it is so fantastical. — Gregory

What? That's not what an idealist thinks, at least not a sensible one. And that's not poetry either, but a thesis. Poems are poems. This is a poem: Gregory, Gregory, Gregory, how does your thinking go? With a fallacy here and a non-sequitur there, and several confident misunderstandings all in a row.

To doubt or deny the existence of an external world is to be stuck continually reminding oneself of this. — Gregory

That is not what an idealist thinks.

It creates one of those annoying subjective itches — Gregory

All itches are subjective. What's an objective itch?

Would you agree that reasons to do things are founded upon knowledge about the outcome of an action. — Daniel

No, for knowledge itself involves reasons. That is, to 'know' something is to have reason to believe it (among other things).

There is that which gives rise to us having a reason to do something or believe it. That, I would say, is the basis or ground of the reason. And then there is the reason itself.

It is important not to conflate the ground of a reason with the reason itself.

For example, let's say a person would not like the way they would look if they lost their teeth. Such person knows flossing and brushing their teeth would prevent their fall; so, such person flosses and brushes their teeth to prevent them from falling, — Daniel

You are describing the ground or basis upon which a person may have a reason to do something. But although everyday speech allows us to refer to the grounds of reasons as 'reasons', a reason is distinct from that which gives rise to it.

You have said that this topic is complex. I assume, then, that you can appreciate this complexity and will not make the mistake of conflating the ground of a reason with the reason itself?

My hunger gives me a reason to get myself a sandwich. That does not mean my hunger and the reason are the same. The hunger is the basis of the reason - the explanation of why I have the reason - but the reason itself is not the hunger.

Now, a wholly evolutionary story about our development will mention these grounds. And they will mention our belief that such grounds give us reasons to do things and believe things. But what such an evolutionary story will not have to posit is any actual reasons themselves.

It seems to me that it is you who is not appreciating this point. There are two mistakes people commonly make here. The first is to confuse the belief that p with p itself. So, believing that we have reason to do x is not the same as there actually being reason to do x. The second is doing what you're doing - which is to confuse the basis or ground of a reason with a reason itself.

There is no problem providing an evolutionary explanation of the grounds of the reasons that there appear to be, or providing an explanation of the appearances and beliefs in reasons to do and believe things. The problem is that these are not themselves reasons.

Yes. They acuse him, falsely, of committing a fallacy.

Then you learn a trade

Er, no. Christ. Reason is not strong with this one! You start with self evident truths of reason. You don't start with any worldview at all.

So? I didn't say it, did I?
I said that a dogmatist is someone who starts with a worldview and then rejects premises that conflict with it. Which is what you did.

Now, if you want to do philosophy, try and reject one of Berkeley's premises without assuming that materialism is true.

Where did I say that if you reject b's premises you are a dogmatist?

Where did I say that if you reject b's premises you are a dogmatist?

Oh do pay attention. That is NOT what I said, is it?

All you've done there is assert materialism! You haven't challenged the premise.

This is philosophy. In philosophy one uses reason to try and figure out what's true. That means something. It means that worldviews shouldn't turn up in premises, but conclusions. YOu need to 'conclude' that materialism is true without simply assuming it is. Otherwise you're not doing philosophy.

Now, Berkeley concluded that the sensible world is made of another mind's mental states. He didn't just assert it. He arrived at the conclusion from apparent self-evident truths of reason alone.

But what you're doing is assuming the truth of a worldview and then rejecting premises that imply its falsity. That's dogmatism. It's no different from a detective deciding ahead of investigation that Tony did the crime and then rejecting any apparent evidence that implies otherwise.

Materialism needs to be in a conclusion, not a premise.