Conceptual analysis is usually done with formal logic. For example:
x is a occurrent belief iff x is a belief & x is activated.
x is a dispositional belief iff x is a belief & it is not the case that x is activated.

I finished reading Armstrong's Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics today. I am going to Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics.

The title of the discussion is so stupid.

Logical truths are known by studying logic. Logical truths' truths depend on purely logic. You should distinguish what makes statements true from how we know statements.

Of course not. Logical truths depend on logic.

What I claim is that presentism is wrong because it makes you delete memories or mental processes occurred in the past. Presentism is about ontology of time. If presentism were right, then memories about the past would be deleted with the events and the times of the past. So, presentism is in trouble.

"All blue dogs are dogs." This statement is true in virtue of logical forms. I think this is true a priori.

Analyticity is related to necessity and a priority. If analytic statements are necessarily true, they are automatically true come what may. If analytic statements are true a priori, they are known without experiential knowledge.

Your option is not a theory. It's just common sense.

You reject both presentism and eternalism. What is the third option that you accept?

So, what is your opinion?

Eternalism is the view that every time exists including past, present, future.

Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics - D. M. Armstrong
Analyticity - Cory Juhl & Eric Loomis

My answers are certainly answers. If you are unable to accept this fact, go to the grave.

That is not a question. Explanations are sufficient. I recommend you to go back to this thread to make up what you need to get.

Conceptual atomism model:
'Brown' and 'dog' compose 'brown dog'. It's easy and simple.
Opposing theories model:
'Brown' is composed by 'color', and 'brighter-than-black', and so on. 'Dog' is composed by 'animal', and 'quadrupedal', and mammal', and so on. ... 'Brighter-than-black' is composed 'lighter-than-black' and 'color' and so forth. ... 'animal' is composed by 'living thing' and 'biologically constructed' and so forth. ... ... ... ... and 'quark' is composed by 'physical' and 'small particle', and so on. Is there an end?

Compare two stories.

Infinite regress of dividing concepts into parts and parts and parts... — quine

This is how.

So, why isn't this an example of "dividing" the concept of 'dog' into other concepts? — Luke

It's because dividing concepts into lower levels causes to make compositionality of concepts fail. Infinite regress of dividing concepts into parts and parts and parts...

One thing is a criticism on opposing theories, another is a report of which opposing theories state. There's no trouble.

Conceptual atomism asserts (1) concepts can be composed, and (2) concepts can be composed only if concepts are atomic. (2) can be restated as: (3) concepts *cannot* be composed if concepts have lower level structures (i.e. they are not atomic).
More precisely:
(1) If concepts are not atomic, then concepts cannot be composed.
(2) Concepts can be composed.
Therefore, (3) concepts are atomic.
Modus Tollens.

Many theories of concepts say (1) concepts have lower level structures, and (2) concepts can be composed, "both at the same time".
The premise 2 above is different from 'many theories of concepts'. The premise 2 does not say (1) concepts have lower level structures, but says (2) concepts can be composed.

Do you see the difference???

According to informational semantics, concepts are mental particulars representing information about objects. For example, concept 'dog' is a mental particular representing information about real dogs.

It's about semantics of concepts. Informational semantics says that meanings of concepts are information.

'Snoopy' and 'dog' are independent atomic concept respectively.

I did, but you forgot.

Many theories of concepts say that concepts have lower level structures, and that concepts can be composed. Conceptual atomism says that concepts can be composed only when they are atomic.

My friend has a nickname called 'quantum mechanics general relativity'.

Your example is not valid one. Of course, 'tuna', 'salad', 'tom' do not compose 'tuna salad tom' conceptually.

You misunderstood. I claim that concepts are atomic.

Do you not see that 'brown' and 'dog' compose 'brown dog'? Compositionality of concepts is one of the important characteristics of concepts.
What I am defending is that conceptual atomism is necessary for compositionality of concepts.

What you didn't get is what philosophers of concepts usually talk about. Lexical concepts mean simple vocabulary concepts. 'dog', 'brown', 'cat', 'stupid' are lexical concepts. 'brown dog', 'stupid cat' are concepts composed. Most theories of concepts say that lexical concepts have lower levels of contents: for example, 'dog' is divided into 'animal', 'quadrupedal', 'mammal', and so on. Conceptual atomism rejects that concepts (i.e. lexical concepts) have internal structures.

Concepts mean lexical concepts. The units are atomic concepts. The structure of 'brown dog' is divided into 'brown' and 'dog'. However, 'brown' itself has no internal-sub-structure. 'dog' itself has no internal-sub-structure, too. Other theories accept the thought that 'brown' or 'dog' has some structures, so they reject the thought that concepts are atomic. For example, some theories of concepts might say that 'dog' is divided into 'animal', 'quadrupedal', 'mammal', and so on. They are positive to accept the structures of concepts, and they are not conceptual atomist positions. Get it?

There are various versions of 'the world is the totality of so-and-so'.

Wittgenstein: The world is the totality of facts.
Carnap: The world is the totality of physical objects and logical structures.
Quine: The world is the totality of physical objects and mathematical objects.
Lewis: The world is the totality of things in possible worlds.
Armstrong: The world is the totality of states of affairs.
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Check out SEP (http://plato.stanford.edu) entry on Quine.

Basically, Quine divides existent things into two sorts: physical objects and mathematical objects. Quine made an emphasis on theories of reference than on theories of meaning. It is important for Quine to see how quantifiers quantify over variables. Quine says, "To be is to be the value of a variable." Mathematical objects, especially sets, are accepted because of their usefulness. Sets can include various physical objects. For example, the set of chairs includes chairs as physical objects.
Any question?

The world is the totality of things.

We can distinguish logical possibility from metaphysical possibility. It is possible that Donald Trump is a staff at Kakao Corporation, but it is not possible that Donald Trump is a fried egg. P-zombies are logically possible, but they are metaphysically not possible.

How can beings physically identical to conscious beings without consciousness behave like having consciousness?

the definition of p-zombies literally means that they are indentical to a conscious being — Chany

If p-zombies are identical to conscious beings, how are they different from us?

Platonism is often understood as realist view of abstract objects in contemporary sense. Rudolf Carnap defends the realist view of abstract objects in his Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.

This wasn't a homework assignment. I have tried something as follows:
'The king of France looks red to Russell'
= (∃x)(Fx & (∀y)(Fy → x = y) & (∃z)(Gzx & Hza))
In set theory, I have tried:
(∃x)(x ∈ A & x ∈ B)
That's it.