Well, I'm only too pleased to provide you with the raw material.

But if you want to do something interesting in mathematics, or the philosophy of mathematics, this is not the way to go about it. — unenlightened

But yet again, here you are…. :wink:

I don't think so. — Leontiskos

I re-read MMP this morning and was again in awe of the complexity of her thinking. Better not to assume, so I went with "may". She almost certainly would have had much more to say on the issue, and I don't think she had a soft spot for Austin.

So the thread itself is badly set up as a game that doesn't have much interest or significance — unenlightened

And yet it lives, five years on.

If the King is in check then the other player can swipe away the peices, but this is rude — Moliere

Some rules ruin the game, others make it more interesting.

One way to fix the game might be to oblige players to list the rules they are making use of, and hence have them construct a tree.

Hence,

Players take turns to add rules. — Banno

The sum of any two integers is zero. — jgill

The product of any two integers is omega. (Where omega is the first number bigger than any integers). — Pfhorrest

Then integers takes on a use that is peculiar to this game. — Banno

Conclusion:

0=Ω — Banno

Let's call them Gill integers. — Banno

Let's call them Fhorrest Integers. — Banno

Question: prove that Fhorrest integers are the same as Gill integers

Theorem 1: Any two integers are the opposite of each other
a=-b — Lionino

(from JGill's rule)
Conclusion:

There is only one integer, 0. — Lionino

An adding: If there is only one integer, then Fhorrest integers are the same as Gill integers.

New rule: There is an integer that is neither a Fhorrest integers nor a Gill integer.

Your turn...

One of the failings of 'mercan English is its inability to distinguish it's ass from its arse.

Yeah, good point. I did that too quickly.

Which still needs to be explained. Why won't you ever explain this? — Michael

I think I have explained the situation at some length, but perhaps more can be said.

Thanks for this topic, one more interesting than most. I think you make an ostensible point, and I suspect Anscombe may have agreed with you, but I think there is more going on here that needs attention.

In Modern Moral Philosophy Anscombe talks of a sort of "ought" that has a "...special so-called 'moral' sense... a sense in which they imply some absolute moral verdict". From about p.11 she lists and dismisses various "standards" which might permit one to infer an ought. The list includes the following:

There is another possibility here: "obligation" may be contractual. Just as we look at the law to find out what a man subject to it is required by it to do, so we look at a contract to find out what the man who has made it is required by it to do. Thinkers, admittedly remote from us, might have the idea of a foedus rerum, of the universe not as a legislator but as the embodiment of a contract. Then if you could find out what the contract was, you would learn your obligations under it. Now, you cannot be under a law unless it has been promulgated to you; and the thinkers who believed in "natural divine law" held that it was promulgated to every grown man in his knowledge of good and evil. Similarly you cannot be in a contract without having contracted, i.e. given signs of entering upon the contract. Just possibly, it might be argued that the use of language which one makes in the ordinary conduct of life amounts in some sense to giving the signs of entering into various contracts. If anyone had this theory, we should want to see it worked out. I suspect that it would be largely formal; it might be possible to construct a system embodying the law (whose status might be compared to that of "laws"of logic): "what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander," but hardly one descending to such particularities as the prohibition on murder or sodomy. Also, while it is clear that you can be subject to a law that you do not acknowledge and have not thought of as law, it does not seem reasonable to say that you can enter upon a contract without knowing that you are doing so; such ignorance is usually held to be destructive of the nature of a contract. — Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, p.12

I've bolded the part that caught my eye. I think Austin and Searle are embarked on just the enterprise described. But they are not interested so much in prohibiting murder and sodomy - so far as I know - so much in providing a description of the social role played by our utterances, of how we do things with words.

Your girlfriend may well have intended to marry you, and this may have been so were it expressed or not. But she went further, making a promise, and thereby she also committed to marrying you, undertook doing so, binding herself to marrying you and placed herself under an obligation.

And all of that is a result of her having made the promise. It was an act done by her in making the utterance. One amongst many, many other acts we perform in making utterances - naming ships, asking questions, issuing demands or orders - and undertaking obligations.

We enter into these "contracts" by our participation in, and understanding of, these social facts.

Now I don't think this will convince you. You have a leaning towards notions of individualism that lead you to deny such social facts. But for me that's neither here nor there.

There is something of Moore's paradox here, the insincerity that English speakers see in "it is raining but I do not believe that it is raining". What would we make of your girlfriend saying "I promise to marry you, but I do not undertake an obligation to marry you"? Perhaps only that she has not understood what it is to promise.

I'm not sure what you mean: I was considering the two statements separately and it still seems to me, that regardless of the soundness or relevance of their content, that, taken informally as statements, they contradict one another. — Janus

Note 's testimony.

I would say that one’s duty to what is good comes first... — Bob Ross

Looks a lot like deontology to me. You are suggesting that we ought be virtuous because it is our duty.

That's not how I understand virtue ethics. It's claim is more like that we ought be charitable, we ought be courageous, we ought be forgiving, and that's an end to it; there is no further step to duty, no "because".

She intended to marry me. That’s all there is to it. — Michael

Well, no. She also committed to marrying you. She did not just intend to do so, she undertook doing so. She said she would. She bound herself to you. She placed herself under an obligation.

But we are now in the usual tediously circular posture of so many of our chats. No blame, just no progress.

Cheers. I don't see anything here that has not already been addressed.

Have a read of PI §201 and consider if a single principle ever implies a certain action, or whether a given action can be explained by any principle, given suitable ad hoc hypothesises.

Or look at the discussion between Lakatos and Feyerabend about what constitutes a rational methodology, and apply it to choosing what to do.

Or consider how the Duhem–Quine thesis might apply to explaining an action in terms of a principle.

my girlfriend promises to marry me, but several weeks later changes her mind.

Is my girlfriend obligated to marry me? — Michael

Yes. She undertook to marry you. Either she reneged on that obligation or you allowed her to leave it.

Just because obligations cease to be doesn't mean they never were, right? — Moliere

yep.

Yes. I've been very clear on that. This is true even using Searle's definition of a promise. Your claim that if S promises to do A then S has undertaken an obligation to do A is as of yet unsupported. — Michael

Well, what is a promise, if not the undertaking of an obligation?

Presumably, nothing, and there are no such things as promises.

Yet there are promises.

Which forms a neat reductio to show that you are mistaken.

There's sunshine, for the first time an a few weeks, so later.

I am saying that Searle's conditions – even with conditions (7) and (8) – do not entail that when one promises to do something one is agreeing to undertake an obligation. — Michael

So what do you think - if someone undertakes an obligation, are they thereby obligated?

If so, then you seem to be claiming that making a promise is not undertaking an obligation. And that does not appear right.

Even with (8) it doesn't count as undertaking an obligation. — Michael

If you do not agree that someone who undertakes an obligation is not thereby obligated, then I have no more to offer you.

Failure to commit.

Searle's conditions 1-6 that you linked me to. — Michael

Without (8), the promise does not count as undertaking an obligation. And that, apparently to all except your good self, is the very point of making a promise.

I don't even know what an obligation is, if something more than a command. — Michael

Perhaps an obligation is a binding of an individual to the performance of an act. It can be brought about by, amongst other things, promising and commanding.

If you do not consider yourself to be bound to enact those things that you promise, then it seems to me that you have simply misunderstood the nature of making a promise.

Searle’s conditions 1-6 seem sufficient. But again, even 7 and 8 don’t entail the existence of an obligation. — Michael

Sorry - can you give an account of what making a promise is, that does not involve placing oneself under an obligation? Is it your contention that one ought not keep one's promises?

The problem with this claim is that I cannot make sense of the difference between “do this” and “you ought do this”. At best it just claims that “do this” entails “do this”. — Michael

Then perhaps you ought not get a job waiting on tables? It is beginning to look as if you are describing a peculiarity of your own psychology rather than something of general interest.

It appears we disagree as to the nature of "obligation".

I’m asking you to justify this claim. — Michael

Well, that's what promising is. I'm at a loss to explain it any further.

Can you offer an alternative meaning for "promise"

Here are two sentences:

1. You ought do this
2. Do this

The first appears to be a truth-apt proposition, whereas the second isn’t. But beyond this appearance I cannot make sense of a meaningful difference beyond them. The use of the term “ought” seems to do nothing more than make a command seem like a truth-apt proposition. — Michael

Oh, very nice. I like that.

As a first response, if you are given a command, by someone with the authority to command you, then "do this" does imply "you ought do this".

If your boss tells you to take the tray to table five, you ought take the tray to table five.

It does seem that you are ignoring an important social aspect of language: that we do things with words, including placing ourselves and others under certain obligations.

No, I don't. — Leontiskos

Then what is it you are suggesting?

Again, what is the problem?

Ok.

...directly from Latin obligationem (nominative obligatio) "an engaging or pledging," literally "a binding" (but rarely used in this sense), noun of action from past-participle stem of obligare "to bind, bind up, bandage," figuratively "put under obligation" (see oblige). The notion is of binding with promises or by law or duty. — Etymology online

Is this not correct?

My access to the OED is not functioning at present. I don't see what it is you are saying is problematic.

In your concision you conflated 'algorithmic' with 'principled'... — Leontiskos

They are not unrelated. One performs an algorithm by following set rules - principles.

You equate rational thought with following a principle. Yet there are rational choices that do not rely on principles, we do not always make use of principles when we solve problems, it is often the case that we must act despite not knowing which principles to apply, and counter-instances can be provided for any given principles. After Philosophical Investigations §201, any action can be made to conform to any principle by the ad hoc addition of suitable assumptions.

I offer coherence over obedience as a guide to rationality.


You are welcome.

Wiki might suffice to show you the difference between material implication and strict implication. That might be what you have in mind.

Tones is correct.

You seem to have missed the point. The utterance of T counts as placing S under an obligation to do A.

That is, promising counts as placing oneself under an obligation.

That is what making a promise consists in.

If you just happen to change your mind thereafter, that does not remove the obligation.

Your mention of Anscombe was interesting. Do you care to fill it out? I wouldn't have taken you as an advocate of divine command theory - are you going to claim we can only promise before god?

Anscombe talks of obligation as if it functions only under a law, citing medieval etymology. From what I understand the word derives from obligationem, "a binding". It's the "counts as" that is peculiar, binding and worthy of consideration.

Again, someone who places themselves under an obligation is, thereby, under an obligation.

Yep. A workable solution, but a bit convolute for my taste.

Again, a tool not unlike the tree proof generator, that produced a png or other image that could be inserted into a post, would be most helpful.

'tis a think of beauty, but cannot be used to show truth tables within posts in TPF.

Other methods are clumsy.

So a few conclusions.

(A implies B) and (A implies notB) do not contradict one another.

It would be useful to have a page that generates an image of a given truth table.

Around a third of folk hereabouts who have an interest in logical issues cannot do basic logic.

might note that 's testimony is reliable.

Oh, and , (A→B)∧(A→¬B)↔¬A.

- very clear.

OK. What do you mean by "materialist" or "materialism"? — Gnomon

Well, you might be disappointed. It's the view that the world is made only of particles, of bits of matter, bashing against each other. That's a view that went out of fashion with Newton's action at a distance. Matter is not "the sole fundamental substance".

There is a pop view that, speaking roughly, what science says there is, is all that there is. I think this view problematic. The implication is that there is one best way to talk about any issue, and that is from the point of view of science. The alternative, perhaps articulated most clearly by Mary Midgley, is that we can, do and indeed ought, make use of multiple ways of talking about issues.

Here's two descriptions:

Painted using a matte house paint with the least possible gloss, on stretched canvas, 3.5 meters tall and 7.8 meters wide, in the Museo Reina Sofia in Madrid.

An anti-war statement displaying the terror and suffering of people and animals.

Both are of Picasso's Guernica. Somehow matte house paint on canvas is the very same thing as a powerful anti-war statement. Two quite different ways of talking about the very same thing.

If we try to shoehorn everything into one type of discussion, we are going to miss many very important distinctions.

Seems as my original point is being distorted here. That was that making decisions is not always algorithmic. The APS magazine provides a neat summation of the mechanics of making choices. This will not be new to you. It shows the sort of thing I have in mind, that decisions are often biased, or heuristic, or made under pressure, and not the result of optimal rational deliberation.

Much of your post simply twists this into something you can attack. I'm not interested in responding.

I find it hard to envision how a person could deliberately cultivate a character such that they are kind, if it were not for the fact that they knew that they generally or absolutely should be kind — Bob Ross

Well, the distinction between the various accounts is not so hard-and-fast. Deontologists will still act to produce the best consequences, other things being equal, while consequentialists will choose to do unto others if that produces the best outcome.

I supose the issue here is one of which is to be king. Deontology is about what we ought to do, while virtue ethics is about who we choose to be. I take it that we can maintain a distinction between being kind because it is the right thing to do, and being kind because one would be a kind person.

The difference is in background, in whether one is choosing one's actions because of a duty or because those actions make one a better person.

What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them. — SEP

@Michael, how odd.

So for you, someone who places themselves under an obligation is not, thereby, under an obligation.

Ok.

So does the sense of injustice include, or perhaps derive from, a desire to make things better? Then it makes not difference if the source of the injustice is a human or a cancer, the response is a desire to make things fair?

I think it a boxed beetle.

...it sounds like a reference to church dogma about such non-entities as The Trinity. You can't see it, or even understand it, you just have to believe it. Ironically, a three-flavored Quark is a sort of Trinity. — Gnomon

That's a bit of a misapprehension. Institutional facts are not mythical, transcendent or metaphorical. They are common everyday things like money, property, keeping promises and playing football.

This piece of paper counts as five dollars; this land counts as your property; this expression counts as undertaking an obligation; putting the ball in the goal counts as scoring a goal.

The physical thing has uses attached to it in accord with our shared intent.

There's a bunch of things in your post with which I disagree. So

Is that an indirect way of saying that you identify as a Materialist? — Gnomon

No, but it depends what you mean by "materialist".

ding an sich — Gnomon

I don't think this notion can be made coherent

...god's view of "how things are"... — Gnomon

I don't think science looks for the gods-eye view from nowhere, but the general view from anywhere - Einstein's Principle of Relativity.
But maybe in other threads?

Yep. In a perhaps counterintuitive sense, determinism and free will are irrelevant to ethics, if ethics is considered as the study of what we ought do.

Leontiskos is using a very Aristotelian concept of choice; whereas Banno is using it in the modern sense. — Bob Ross

Yep.

In recent work it is called Structural Rationality.

To some extent it underpins my preference for virtue ethics over deontology. Deontology concerns being rational by following rules, while there is virtue in attempting to achieve consistence in one's thoughts and acts. So there is more here than just semantics.

Again, I find your work most impressive.

So what will you do about it? What will you do next?

It remains that you must choose.