• The Adelson Checker Shadow Illusion and implications
    ↪@wonderer1
    Can you give any evidence that in what you said there is anything, even just a tiny bit, free from any conditioning of your mind?     — Angelo Cannata

    Is the argument here that one cannot think without using one's mind, therefore one cannot think?
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    If so, why not say so? — Ciceronianus

    Yes, the trouble with
    ↪Joshs
    's posts is that he hasn't said what his point is. It is set as a reply to my 'So because our calling it a "flower" is a social construct, we never see the flower?', but how?

    Joshs adopts the atomistic view that we "build" the objects around us from sense impressions or some such, form the "random (sic.) pixels of shape and color happen to impinge on our retinas... construing more complex forms of relational pattern tying one element of a visual scene with all the other elements." More recent work shows that the process is one of prediction rather than construction.

    And the "pixels" are not "random". We see the flower with four petals because there is a flower with four petals.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    This isn't responsive though to your attempt to negate the distinction between the object and the perception. Our conversation initially revolved around what you seemed to suggest was the superfluousness of referring to phenomenal states and your equation of the perception of the thing to the actual thing. — Hanover

    I'm doing no such thing.

    Odd, that you repeatedly misattribute stuff to me.

    He's not discussing metaphysics at all, but instead is just trying to hammer out how we use the term "direct" and "indirect"... It says nothing about reality. It just talks about how we talk. — Hanover
    Risible.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    You say it's too complicated? — Hanover
    Hence the quote in the next post.

    You say there are two sorts of perceptions: direct and indirect. — Hanover
    Not I. I'm supporting Austin's rejection of that distinction. But we do sometimes see things directly, sometimes indirectly - I woudln't call these "sorts of perceptions". I've already given several examples - seeing the sub directly as opposed to via sonar; seeing the flower directly as opposed to seeing a picture of it; seeing something directly as opposed to seeing it through a telescope, or in a mirror, or seeing it's shadow.

    What do I bring in my house to have that song? As we've determined, realism demands the song thing be able to exist independent of the perceiver. — Hanover
    You have an odd notion of what a song is. Download it on Tidal. Better quality.

    Then we have to determine somehow which perceptions are most closely correlated to the noumenal flower in order to rank the perceptions from most direct to least direct? — Hanover
    I don't have to do anything of the sort. You made that mess for yourself.



    Philosophers, it is said, 'are not, for the most part, prepared to admit that such objects as pens or cigarettes are ever directly perceived'. Now of course what brings us up short here is the word 'directly'-a great favourite among philosophers, but actually one of the less conspicuous snakes in the linguistic grass. We have here, in fact, a typical case of a word, which already has a very special use, being gradually stretched, without caution or definition or any limit, until it becomes, first perhaps obscurely metaphorical, but ultimately meaningless. One can't abuse ordinary language without paying for it.

    I. First of all, it is essential to realize that here the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the trousers- 'directly' takes whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite: while 'indirectly' itself (a) has a use only in special cases, and also (b) has different uses in different cases-though that doesn't mean, of course, that there is not a good reason why we should use the same word. We might, for example, contrast the man who saw the procession directly with the man who saw it through a periscope; or we might contrast the place from which you can watch the door directly with the place from which you can see it only in the mirror. Perhaps we might contrast seeing you directly with seeing, say, your shadow on the blind; and perhaps we might contrast hearing the music directly with hearing it relayed outside the concert hall. However, these last two cases suggest two further points.

    2. The 'first of these points is that the notion of not perceiving 'directly' seems most at home where, as with the periscope and the mirror, it retains its link with the notion of a kink in direction. It seems that we must not be looking straight at the object in question. For this reason seeing your shadow on the blind is a doubtful case; and seeing you, for instance, through binoculars or spectacles is certainly not a case of seeing you indirectly at all. For such cases as these last we have quite distinct contrasts and different expressions-'with the naked eye' as op- posed to 'with a telescope', 'with unaided vision' as opposed to 'with glasses on'. (These expressions, in fact, are much more firmly established in ordinary use than 'directly' is.)

    3· And the other point is that, partly no doubt for the above reason, the notion of indirect perception is not naturally at home with senses other than sight. With the other senses there is nothing quite analogous with the 'line of vision'. The most natural sense of 'hearing indirectly', of course, is that of being told something by an intermediary-a quite different matter. But do I hear a shout indirectly, when I hear the echo? If I touch you with a barge-pole, do I touch you indirectly? Or if you offer me a pig in a poke, might I feel the pig indirectly- through the poke? And what smelling indirectly might be I have simply no idea. For this reason alone there seems to be something badly wrong with the question, 'Do we perceive things directly or not?', where perceiving is evidently intended to cover the employment of any of the
    senses.

    4· But it is, of course, for other reasons too extremely doubtful how far the notion of perceiving indirectly could or should be extended. Does it, or should it, cover the telephone, for instance? Or television? Or radar? Have we moved too far in these cases from the original metaphor? They at any rate satisfy what seems to be a necessary condition-namely, concurrent existence and concomitant variation as between what is perceived in the straightforward way (the sounds in the receiver, the picture and the blips on the screen) and the candidate for what we might be prepared to describe as being perceived indirectly. And this condition fairly clearly rules out as cases of indirect perception seeing photographs (which statically record scenes from the past) and seeing films (which, though not static, are not seen contemporaneously with the events thus recorded). Certainly, there is a line to be drawn somewhere. It is certain, for instance, that we should not be prepared to speak of indirect perception in every case in which we see some- thing from which the existence (or occurrence) of some- thing else can be inferred; we should not say we see the guns indirectly, if we see in the distance only the flashes of guns.

    5· Rather differently, if we are to be seriously inclined to speak of something as being perceived indirectly, it seems that it has to be the kind of thing which we (sometimes at least) just perceive, or could perceive, or which- like the backs of our own heads-others could perceive. For otherwise we don't want to say that we perceive the thing at all, even indirectly. No doubt there are complications here (raised, perhaps, by the electron microscope, for example, about which I know little or nothing). But it seems clear that, in general, we should want to distinguish between seeing indirectly, e.g. in a mirror, what we might have just seen, and seeing signs (or effects), e.g. in a Wilson cloud-chamber, of something not itself perceptible at all. It would at least not come naturally to speak of the latter as a case of perceiving something indirectly.

    6. And one final point. For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.'I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?' (Compare 'I can see an unreal duck.'-'What on earth do you mean?' 'It's a decoy duck'-'Ah, I see. Why didn't you say so at once?') That is, there is seldom if ever any particular point in actually saying 'indirectly' (or 'unreal'); the expression can cover too many rather different cases to be just what is wanted in any particular case.

    Thus, it is quite plain that the philosophers' use of 'directly perceive', whatever it may be, is not the ordinary, or any familiar, use; for in that use it is not only false but simply absurd to say that such objects as pens or cigarettes are never perceived directly. But we are given no explanation or definition of this new use - on the contrary, it is glibly trotted out as if we were all quite familiar with it already. It is clear, too, that the philosophers' use, whatever it may be, offends against several of the canons just mentioned above-no restrictions whatever seem to be envisaged to any special circumstances or to any of the senses in particular, and moreover it seems that what we are to be said to perceive indirectly is never - is not the kind of thing which ever could be - perceived directly.     — Sense and Sensibilia, pp14-19
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    ↪Hanover


    The hard part... is going to be addressing the arguments Austin actually presents, and not re-dressing them so that they fit a preconfigured critique. (Austin) is not defending realism against antirealism, but rejecting the very distinction between these two.

    This applies also to direct/indirect realism. The danger for this thread is that the discussion becomes just another rendition of that tedious "he said/she said".     — Banno

    The quoted text continues...
    My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. — Ludwig V
    The point Austin makes quite early seems to me to cover this:
    I. First of all, it is essential to realize that here the notion of perceiving indirectly wears the trousers- 'directly' takes whatever sense it has from the contrast with its opposite — p.15
    You didn't see it directly, you saw it through a telescope, or a mirror, or only its shadow; how we are to understand "direct" perception depends entirely on what it is contrasted with; so of course it is difficult to imagine what "direct perception" is, per se. It's a nonsense, an invention of the defenders of the sort of argument Ayer is presenting. You can find examples in every thread on perception*.
    Austin is specifically tearing down philosophy's framing of the issue as both direct or indirect. — Antony Nickles
    Yes!
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    A list. Bless. It's not that simple.

    Is the song not the sound waves? — Hanover

    Well, yes, its not. It's a Beetles song, heard many times before, that I can play bits of and that many will be able to sing along with and which quite a few folk have made their own.

    A realist makes no epistemological claim. — Hanover
    That's not right, as you agree when you say "He will say that the flower exists however it does independently of the observer". The realist commits to the view that "the flower has four petals" is either true, or it is false, and that this is so regardless of who is looking at it or how. Those are epistemological claims. That is as opposed to antirealism, which claims that the number of petals is indeterminate, usually until observed; and thereby commits to a non-bivalent logic.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    You say there are certain objects we see directly. — Hanover
    No.

    And that repeated mischaracterisation of those who reject indirect realism is at the heart of why these threads are interminable. Sometimes you see stuff directly, sometimes you see the same stuff indirectly.

    What I hear is an interpretation of sound waves. It's for that reason that when you sing behind a wall, I don't hear the song. What do you suppose I hear when I hear the song? — Hanover
    I'm not at all sure what you are claiming here. So you think that you only ever hear "interpreted sound waves", and hence you never hear songs? I propose that when you hear a song, it is the song that you hear.

    What I can say of my perception of the flower is that it has four petals. I don't think I'm inconsistent in my position. — Hanover
    A realist will say that it is true that the flower has four petals, and that this is true regardless of what you percieve. As opposed to @Joshs, who apparently thinks that since the language we use for the flower is communal, the number of petals is, too.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    The empirical object is something that no one actually sees, because it is a social construction derived from myriad subjective perspectives. — Joshs

    So because our calling it a "flower" is a social construct, we never see the flower?
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    Give me a concrete case then of an object that is unimpacted by the perceiver so that you can say object A is described as having the qualities of a, b, and c in all instances. — Hanover

    What is it that you think this shows? So:
    We determined Banno's flower is not one such object and it seems your fish is not either. What then is that object you refer to? — Hanover
    The flower is one object; the fish, one object.

    There's a view that we only see things indirectly, and that view presents itself as opposed to the view that we only ever see things directly, building for itself the straw man of "direct realism". But if one gives a bit of thought to the issue, instead of just reacting, it is clear that the alternate to our seeing things only indirectly is that we sometimes see them directly, sometimes indirectly.

    "Sir. there is a submarine off the port bow!"
    "How do you know, Sonar Operator?" commands Captain Hanover
    "I can see it on the screen!"
    "Oh, that's not a Submarine! It's just a blip on the screen! And anyway, sonar uses sound, so you can't see with Sonar! Let me know when you see the submarine directly!"
    Lost with all hands...

    How about Banno's flower? It has four petals, a definite height and flowers at a particular time of year.
    — Ludwig V
    That's just a restatement of naive realism.     — Hanover
    It's also true. Indeed, by the end of this thread, you are agreeing that it is true.

    Any inconsistency between the flower and the perception is defined as distortion. If the radio transmits a song filled with static, we don't say the static was part of the song. We say the song was distorted by the static. If you ask if I'm hearing the song, my answer is I'm hearing parts of the song and parts of other things as well, but, to the extent the song is X, I'm not hearing X. I'm hearing all sorts of other things. — Hanover
    So we come across Hanover singing along to "Let it be" on his little transistor radio, the song barely discernible through the hiss and the hum. If we ask him what song he is listening to, his reply, despite the singing, is "I'm not listening to a song, but only to parts of a song, so I'm not hearing "let it be" I'm hearing all sorts of other things". (notice that this is a paraphrasing of his own words).

    We have to determine which part of Object X I am sensing against those perceptions I am having of things imparted upon Object X if we want to distill what Object X is. What is the undistorted X? — Hanover
    Thanks for this. It makes your mistake much clearer. The "undistorted X" is the song, in the second example, and the submarine, in the first. You have the thing and the perception of the thing confused. You think that you never see a flower because you only ever see it with your eyes, and never hear a song because you only ever hear it with your ears. Stove's Jew box, rather than his gem. Hence your conclusion: "What is the undistorted X? My position is that it is unknowable because the perception necessarily is filled with all sorts of distortions from within me and from the environment." You hold that you never see the sub or hear "let it be". That's enough of a reductio to reject your view.

    But you add "Either the flower is red or the flower is white. Either the flower has certain structural features or it does not. What is different about colour in that it can vary from perceiver to perceiver but not change the fact that it's the same flower". My bolding. You agree that the flower has four petals, and that this is the case for you, for me, and for the bee. You are agreeing that there are things about the flower that are true regardless of one's perceptions. Where previously you had insisted that "My position is that it is unknowable" you now agree the flower has four petals. You don't believe your own theory.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    ↪Janus
    I've been struck by the lack of clarity in several recent discussions revolving around subjectivity, objectivity, truth and belief. Hence this thread, which I doubt will contain anything new, but only stuff that seems in need of repeating.

    Before commencing the main argument, it may be worth pointing out that belief and truth are not the same. One can believe stuff that is not true, as well as disbelieve stuff that is true. Believing something does not imply that it is true, and being true does not imply being believed. I mention this because it is a simple, but ubiquitous error, and may well underpin other problems.

    And so to the argument. The words subjective and objective are such that we are prone to allow them to lead us up and down various garden paths. It is especially important, therefore, to keep an eye on their use in mundane contexts.

    Certain statements are labeled subjective because they set out an individuals taste or feelings. In contrast, other statements are called objective, as they do not set out an individual's taste, feelings or opinions.

    Supose that "I prefer vanilla to chocolate ice-cream" is a subjective fact - or if you prefer, it is a subjective truth. It's truth is dependent on my own taste.

    That this text is written in English is not dependent on my own taste or feelings. Hence it is an objective truth.

    That's an end to it; don't allow the notions of subjectivity and objectivity to take on any more significance.

    in particular, don't pretend that there are either only subjective facts, or that there are only objective facts.     — Banno
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    …just because people seem to assign truth values doesn't mean that that is necessarily what they mean; I — Apustimelogist

    Fucksake. Yea, people may not mean what they say nor say what they mean, so we might as well just give away the whole thing hey?
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪AmadeusD
    Are we now playing posts-last-wins?
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    Far be it from me — AmadeusD
    So it seems. :wink:
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪AmadeusD
    :wink:
    I simply repeated what you had already said, adding an observation about forum etiquette.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    If moral statements aren't about facts in the first place then they may not be amenable to the T-sentence thing. — Apustimelogist

    That just takes us back to the first few pages, about whether facts are just true statements or if the term is to be restricted to only physical states.

    It remains that we can and do commonly assign truth values to normative statements. We also use these truth values to perform deductions. The oddity here is the denial of all this because of philosophical ideology. — Banno
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪AmadeusD
    It is clear you have not followed the argument. You are under no obligation to participate.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪Apustimelogist
    I don't understand any of that. What's a "stance-independent act"?
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    I would say the question is objective. — Ludwig V

    I agree. But I baulk whenever someone says "It's subjective". It's a distinction I don't think is of as much use as some folk supose.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    If saying that it is true means that they are saying it is a stance-independent fact... — Apustimelogist

    "stance-independent fact"?

    There are "non-stance-independent facts"? And these are not true?

    I don't see any meat in your posts. I'm not at all sure of your point.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief.
    — Banno

    It is a statement of belief.     — AmadeusD

    T-sentences are about true, not belief.

    You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. — AmadeusD
    Was that your argument?

    If the tree is a Eucalypt, then it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"

    If you believe that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you believe that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
    If you doubt that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you doubt that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
    If you understand that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you understand that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
    If you suspect that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you suspect that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
    If you are 98% certain that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you are 98% certain that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
    If you act as if the tree is a Eucalypt, then you act as if it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"



    If one ought not keep slaves, then it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"

    If you believe that one ought not keep slaves, then you believe that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
    If you doubt that one ought not keep slaves, then you doubt that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
    If you understand that one ought not keep slaves, then you understand that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
    If you suspect that one ought not keep slaves, then you suspect that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
    If you are 98% certain that one ought not keep slaves, then you are 98% certain that it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
    If you act as if one ought not keep slaves, then you act as if it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
    Your point is pointless.
  • "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme"
    ↪Joshs
    I think you said that we need agreement in order to proceed.

    Well, that's what I said.

    And I'm happy to add respect, where appropriate.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    what is really there — Hanover

    But what is real depends on what is not real. On context.

    I was speaking in terms of the photograph being an accurate representation of the flower. — Hanover
    The photo is an accurate representation of the flower as seen with UV light. your asking if it validly represents the flower is confused. We can ask, quite validly, if the filter cut out sufficient red light, or if the emulsion might have emphasised some frequency a bit too much. Such considerations do not stop the photo being of the flower in UV light.
    You do not see the UV light. — Hanover
    Nor do you see red light. You see red.

    ...which is then represented to you in your consciousness. — Hanover
    The homunculus. No.
    which one is the flower, A or B — Hanover
    Neither. They are photos. And both. The flower has structural features that cannot be seen in visible light, but can in UV. We now understand bee behaviour better, because they seek out these structures due to their sensitivity to UV. Context.

    I do have a phenomenal state in my consciousness and it goes away when I close my eyes, but the flower remains. — Hanover
    That's an affectatious way of saying that you don't see the flower when your eyes are closed.
  • "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme"
    ↪Moliere
    Thank you for expressing so much more adroitly the view I had attempted to set out previously.

    I've re-read Feyerabend - Against Method and Science in a Free Society - with a view to tying down his notion of commensurable and incommensurable, and decided that his view changed over time. I think he started with something like Wittgenstein's language games in mind - he had gone to England with the intent of studying with Wittgenstein, but the latter's illness and death led him to Popper. I think he carried something of "language games", or perhaps a "forms of life", into his dealings with Lakatos. In Against Method Feyerabend emphasises incommensurability, but plays it down in later writings, even I racal, denying that incommensurability meant that there could be no comparison.

    The part that I'd still be uncertain about, at least, is whether or not they inhabit a different world or not. — Moliere
    Seems to me that, that we understand dolphins to be social and communicative shows us that they inhabit the same world we do. If their songs are showing rather then saying, then they are not subject to Davidson's considerations of sentential language.

    Contrary to
    ↪Joshs
    , if we commence by assuming that there is no possibility of communication on important issues, then we are throwing out the possibility of "ameliorating" the "violent breakdown in communication".

    Again, we can come to understand that the rabbit is a duck-rabbit, and hence to see the point of view of those who only see the duck. Only where there is some potential for agreement is there also potential to avoid violence.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    The forgery example makes clear the significance of subjectivity. — Hanover
    "Subjectivity"? Whenever you see that word, ask what it is doing. No, it's about intentionality; the genuine note is made with the intent of building a system of exchange, which the counterfeit can then undermine. Subjectivity is unhelpful.

    Which one is the accurate depiction? — Hanover
    Accurate for what purpose?
    ...retain its validity. — Hanover
    Valid in what argument?

    Context. Your claim was that we can't see UV light. I showed a picture of a flower in UV light. We can see the picture. It's an accurate depiction of the reflection of UV on the flower, and a valid observation of the structure of a flower as shown in UV... and so on.
    ...arbitrary changes... — Hanover
    The image is not arbitrary, but is determined by the reflection of UV and the subsequent filters and film used.

    You are way off.
    The question then becomes: once I have the phenomenal state of the flower in my consciousness, which one of those still represents the flower? — Hanover
    It is a loaded question, but because it supposes the nonsense of "phenomenal state of the flower in my consciousness". Poor philosophical theories produce poor results.

    That is, this is indirect realism... — Hanover
    No, it's a flower, seen in UV. I know you can't drop all that nonsense about things in themselves and phenomenal states of consciousness, and although it provides a basis for some wonderful pretence, in the end it confuses you.
  • When Does Philosophy Become Affectation?
    ↪Ludwig V
    I saw what you did there.

    :up:
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    ↪Bob Ross
    Cheers.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪frank
    At an AAP event last week, I was stuck by how much of the work, and especially the best work, was being done in collaborations, across multiple fields. It seems to be quickly becoming the most fecund habitat for professional philosophers.

    I supose if the philosophers are being paid, their efforts are seen as worthwhile.
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    It's true that I keep seeing traces or reminders of OLP — Ludwig V
    I was thinking of examples, an then
    This is a "philosophical" account of morality whose connection to lived reality is dubious at best. For a more reasonable approach see here — hypericin
    The article uses Austin's approach, even talking of misfires.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    ↪hypericin
    Good article. You should consider starting a thread specifically on it. It might be fun.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪frank
    Yep. It wasn't something I considered studying, and perhaps I should have. it's such clever stuff.

    It's pleasing that folk take an interest in philosophy. Engineering is not necessarily good preparation for such conceptual work.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    Interesting how much angst this simply issue causes folk. It shows how deeply logical empiricism has seeped into the thinking of our engineers.

    Perhaps philosophy is not as simple as folk might suppose.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    Ok, so here is my point:
    One ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves". — Banno
    Now we have been through this discussion, set out where this goes astray.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    No, I don't. And i have explicitly covered why not multiple times, so i'm refrain from repeating my very much coherent answer to this charge again. — AmadeusD

    Maybe your answer is not as clear as you think.

    But keep working on it.

    edit:
    It sits on it's own, while completely failing to rise to the status of truth. — AmadeusD
    The T-sentence is exactly about truth. It does not address belief.

    Again, keep thinking.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    I mean, there are lots of moral anti-realists across the world who would disagree with this sentiment. This rhetoric is not really more than question begging moral facts. — Apustimelogist

    Rhetoric?

    It's not a sentiment; it's an observation about English. "The sky is blue" is true if and only if the sky is blue. Acceleration due to gravity is 9.8m/s/s if and only if "Acceleration due to gravity is 9.8m/s/" is true.

    But for some reason, folk refuse to apply this to statements counting "ought". Special pleading.

    Those who deny this usually claim either that moral statements are not truth-apt; or that they are, but are all false. Which path will you choose?
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    You can act without believing your act to comport with truth. — AmadeusD

    Now you are confusing truth with certainty. Sure, you can act without being certain. So you are not certain that folk ought not keep slaves - perhaps a lack of moral fortitude leads you here - but you act on the basis that folk ought not keep slaves. That is, you act on the basis that "Folk ought not keep slaves" is true.

    it doesn't matter which propositional attitude you frame it with; the T-sentence sits on its own.

    So your reply doesn't help you avoid ascribing truth values to moral statements.

    Same reply to
    ↪AmadeusD
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    I would need to be confident in my own ideas to such a degree (one i can't fathom) that my beliefs entail teh truth of them. I just don't make that move. — AmadeusD

    So you are not confident in your conviction that folk ought not keep slaves. Ok.

    You are not being asked to be certain beyond any doubt. You are being asked if you think folk ought be allowed to keep slaves. And if you think folk ought not be allowed to keep slaves, then can you explain how it does not follow that you think "folk ought not be allowed to keep slaves" is true?
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    That it doesn't establish it's truth. — AmadeusD

    Sure - you can believe it or not. The example is chosen because it is so commonly believed. Like the puppies or eating babies.

    So do you think it is true? Should folk keep slaves? Kick puppies for fun?

    But moreover, if you think folk ought not keep slaves, how could you not be committed to concluding that "One ought not keep slaves" is true?

    I note a very subtle, but incredibly important difference between "..therefore X is true" and "..Therefore S believes X is true". — AmadeusD
    My suspicion, from what you have written, is that you are only now becoming aware of the implications of this.

    You're welcome.
  • Convince Me of Moral Realism
    "One cannot transmute lead into gold using chemistry." — hypericin

    ...and now do you not see that the context is important?
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    And yet, one ought not keep slaves. It is therefore true that "One ought not keep slaves".
    — Banno

    I reject your position.     — AmadeusD
    So, where does my deduction, given above, go astray?

    Set it out.

    It seems to me to be no more than a T-sentence. If one accepts that one ought not keep slaves, then one accepts that "One ought not keep slaves" is true. Where does this go wrong?
  • Austin: Sense and Sensibilia
    prosopography — Ludwig V

    Interesting, Yes, something like that, tracing the influence Austin had on his students by examining what they did and said.

    And in the face of our fundamental fear and desire, to merely offer as alternative the vast complex flawed variety of the world, is rather like saying eat your veg and exercise to someone who just wants a pill. — Antony Nickles
    :grin:
    This is evident in the present series of threads on moral antirealism, started by @Bob Ross. The attempts at conceptual clarification are rejected because they do not directly solve the Grand Problem Of What To Do.

    Austin and Wittgenstein both make what they are doing look obvious, so people take the point as simple, or trivial. — Antony Nickles
    Especially in a forum such as this, where dilettante abound. The sight seems to disproportionately attract retired or unemployed lab assistants and engineers. Some pay attention to the details. Others come already supplied with the answers to all our philosophical quandaries, ready to explain where we have gone wrong. This might be amusing: A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

    Anyway, I wanted to thank you both for making this thread far more interesting, informative and certainly longer than I expected.
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