• Mary's Room
    Mary knew everything that could be known in the third person about color vision.

    She did not know what it was like to experience color vision in the first person.

    This does illustrate that first-person experience is not knowable from the third person.

    It does not show that first-person experience is a non-physical phenomenon.

    It’s entirely possible that there is a first-person experience to any physical phenomenon. In fact, it gets trickier if you try to assert that somehow humans have it but other things don’t, because then you have to posit something metaphysically different between humans and other physical things. Far more elegant to just grant that humans are like anything else — and that since we each know we have a first-person experience, we should assume by default that everything else does too.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Let's talk about the kinds of things that experience pain.

    Start with its function: it alerts us to damage, induces us to seek remediation, and to avoid the behavior that caused it. So only objects that can function in this way can have it: complex, living organisms. Maybe they don't all experience pain (do grapevines experience pain?), but this at least narrows it a good bit.

    This doesn't get us any closer to understanding how to reproduce the experience in a robot.
    Relativist

    On my account, reproducing the function will necessarily reproduce the experience, because the experience of anything correlates completely with its function.

    That's not the same as saying that describing the behavioral output of that function in the 3rd person is all there is to say about it. There's also the 1st person experience of being a thing with that function yourself.

    But if you make something with that function, it will both exhibit that behavior, and undergo that experience.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    This boulder has the capacity for experience, but it differs in two important ways from us: 1) it lacks self-reflection on those experiences; 2) it does not experience qualia.Relativist

    Agreed on point 1, but completely disagreed on point 2. The capacity for experience is exactly the capacity to experience qualia. Qualia just are are occasions of experience. (And on my ontology, if you read that web of reality thread too, absolutely everything is made out of such occasions of experience, which I hold are identical to physical interactions: to be is to do, to be is to be perceived*, so to do is to be perceived*, and conversely to perceive* is to be done-unto).

    *(I'd say "experience" rather than "perceive", but Berkeley's adage uses "perceive").

    I can write a hundred sentences describing the pain, but nothing I say will be equivalent to the raw experience.Relativist

    Agreed. But that says nothing at all about what kinds of things can have such experiences.

    Not all matter is wet, even in the slightest degree, but liquids usually are.bongo fury

    Sure, but wetness is an aggregate product of particles interacting in the normal ways all particles interact, so there's nothing new about wetness above and beyond the stuff all matter could already do; being wet is just one of the kinds of things matter was already capable of doing.

    Phenomenal consciousness is defined in opposition to that kind of process. Nothing that the ordinary mechanical properties of matter can build up to, including the full complex and nuanced behavior of a human being, can constitute phenomenal consciousness by itself, as it is defined by the people who came up with the idea.

    So if we want to say that everything that does instantiate that fully complex and nuanced behavior of a human being must have phenomenal consciousness like a human being (i.e. that philosophical zombies are not possible), then we either have to say that something wholly new pops into existence from nothing like magic, or say that there was something already there for it to be built up out of, something besides behavior -- a first-person experience.

    rocks don't have experiences. What is it like to be an electron? is a nonsensical questionRogueAI

    You're just arguing by assertion here. It sounds absurd to you to think that this could be the case, so you insist that it is not... but then if you follow through on that back through the chain of implications it ends up requiring even more absurd things. Basically: Rocks have some kind of experience, or else humans don't, or else magic happens. Saying humans don't have experiences or that magic happens are far more absurd than saying there is some trivial prototypical first-person perspective of a rock that's not even worth speaking of.

    What is is like to be an electron? Well, let's start with a human and go from there. What's it like to be a human brain disconnected from a body? What's it like to be such a brain that's asleep, or heavily sedated on drugs? Basically, take what it's like to be a normal able-bodied awake adult human being and start stripping aspects of that away. Well before you get down to the level of an inert hunk of matter that used to be part of a brain, you've gotten something so distant from ordinary human experience that we don't have the words to describe it.

    It's something we're already experiencing right now, underneath everything else we're experiencing right now, but it's such a trivial part of our experience that we never need speak of it. It's a little like the sound of your own heartbeat, or the sight of your own nose: it's technically always there in your experience but you never need take note of it because it's always there. Except, in this case, far more so than that.

    Likewise, I think that what it's like to be a rock, or an electron, is such a trivial experience that there's no need to ever say what it's like. But for reasons I've already gone over many times here, we have to affirm that there is something to it, something trivial and non-noteworthy and leave it at that, or else we end up having to affirm even crazier things.

    If the claim is that things like rocks have experiences, you're so close to idealism, just go whole hog and ditch the physical.RogueAI

    If you followed the previous thread that this is a successor to, you'll see that my ontology is a kind of phenomenalism, as well as a kind of physicalism. Physical stuff is empirical stuff, and empirical stuff is phenomenal stuff. Phenomenal stuff is "mental" stuff, except it doesn't require that there actually be minds (in the normal, substantive, functional sense) to experience it, only that it be the kind of stuff that minds could experience, e.g. empirical. Any minds that do exist are physical things themselves, and therefore empirical things, and therefore phenomenal things, and therefore "mental" things in the floofy sense just described.

    Minds are programs, matter is data, all programs are just made of data, data is all that feeds into and comes out of a program, and all data can be run as a program, but most of it just does nothing interesting when you do.
  • Midgley vs Dawkins, Nietzsche, Hobbes, Mackie, Rand, Singer...
    My point entirely. Bringing genes in the equation does not help much.Olivier5

    :up:
  • Midgley vs Dawkins, Nietzsche, Hobbes, Mackie, Rand, Singer...
    From a Darwinian standpoint rape advantages the rapist, but evidently not his victimOlivier5

    From a genetic standpoint, the rapist benefits iff there are viable offspring iff the victim benefits too.

    IOW if rape passes on the rapists’ genes it necessarily also passes on the victim’s genes.

    This genetic fact has no bearing on the moral status of rape, because genes are not moral patients, people are.
  • The Road to 2020 - American Elections
    in essence the demand is a Conservative one: equality before the lawBenkei

    Whether or not something is conservative depends on when and where you're talking about.

    Equality before the law has only been a conservative value in times and places that it was juxtaposed with e.g. affirmative action: new forms of inequality meant to benefit previously disadvantaged people.

    Pre-existing inequality before the law that benefited the people already in power has always been something conservatives have supported.

    By definition, they're in favor of the status quo and those whom it benefits; changes away from the status quo to benefit others is definitionally progressive.

    The same is true of e.g. states' rights, where when that's a state's right to keep things the same and entrench existing power structures, conservatives are in favor of that, but as soon as it's states' rights to do new things that disrupt those power structures, conservatives are all in favor of federal intervention to stop it.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    I have recently, in another conversation, realized there is some similarity between an epiphenomenal view and my own view, in that on an epiphenomenal view something doing a mental function both produces epiphenomenal experiences and the behavior we would expect of someone having those experiences (though as this other person was asking me, it does seem like a weird coincidence that a certain biological view should just happen to produce experiential states, and also produce behavior that we would expect of someone having those experiential states, even though the experiential states don't actually cause the behavior); while on my view, a mental function, like any function (all objects in the universe being defined entirely by their function), is a function from experience to behavior, so as that function changes both experience and behavior change with it, in an entirely not-coincidental way.


    Earlier parts of this conversation with you tangentially got me to thinking of a concise, mock-dialogue way of summarizing my view on this topic and my reasons for it. Let M = me and N = some other interlocutor.

    M: "...and that's why I don't believe in anything supernatural or otherwise non-physical."

    N: "So you don't believe in minds then? Minds are non-physical things."

    M: "No, I believe in minds, I just believe that they're functions of our physical brains."

    N: "But functionality isn't everything! Qualia are separate from physical behavior! Consider Mary's Room."

    M: "That just shows that there is a first-person, experiential perspective to account for, as well as the third-person, behavioral perspective."

    N: "So you admit that there's something non-physical! This first-person experience."

    M: "No, I think there's a first-person account that can be given for anything. That's an ordinary aspect of all ordinary physical things, and so not anything non-physical."

    N: "That's absurd! Rocks don't have minds! Only things that are functionally like humans can have that first-person, mental experience. Other things obviously don't have it. It must emerge somewhere in the development from rocks to humans."

    M: "Only things that are like humans can have a first-person experience that is genuinely mental in the way we normally mean of humans, sure. But other more elementary things must have some kind of experience out of which that human-like experience can emerge. Otherwise it could only spring into being from nothing, like magic... which is supernatural, and not physical."

    N: "So your solution to preserving minds in a physicalist account is to grant everything some magical non-physical capacity for experience."

    M: "Capacity for experience is not necessarily magical or non-physical. And granting it to everything is the only reasonable way of preserving the existence of minds in a physicalist account, since the only logical alternatives are that either nothing, not even humans, have any first-person experience (and so minds in the normal sense don't really exist); or else some things, like humans, magically get it from nothing (and so something non-physical happens)."
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Instantiating the function isn't enough - a zombie could record the frequency of reflected light and proceed to function appropriately.Relativist

    That’s the part where my panpsychism comes in. Whatever it is besides mere function that human consciousness involves, I hold that EVERYTHING already has that in some form or another, and the specific form of it becomes more sophisticated along with the functionality, because it is the other half of functionality besides the behavioral output.

    The input into any function of any thing is some kind of phenomenal experience, on my
    account, and the specific qualities of that experience will vary with the function, such that something that functions like a human can’t help but have a human-like experience — and things that function differently also have different experiences. There can be no philosophical zombies, because there cannot be anything that does not have any qualitative, phenomenal experience.

    It’s just that most things, like rocks, whose function exhibits no noteworthy behavior to speak of, also undergo no noteworthy experiences to speak of, for the exact same reason. But inasmuch as they technically do do something, they also technically do experience something.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    I don't see that you've accounted for qualia. Consider Mary, who is the world's foremost expert on color, but has never experienced redness. She learns to associate her intellectual knowledge with the experience only after she actually has the experience.Relativist

    I mentioned that in the OP:

    Against Eliminativism

    I am against eliminativism for the simple reason that I am directly aware of my own conscious experience, and whatever the nature of that may be, it seems that any philosophical argument that concludes that I am not actually having any conscious experience must have made some misstep somewhere and at best proven that something else mistakenly called "conscious experience" doesn't exist. But beyond my own personal experience, I find arguments put forth by other philosophers, such as Frank Jackson's "Mary's room" thought experiment, to convincingly defeat eliminativism, though not to defeat physicalism itself as they are intended to do.

    In the "Mary's room" thought experiment, we imagine a woman named Mary who has been raised her entire life in a black-and-white room experiencing the world only through a black-and-white TV screen, but who has extensively studied and become an expert on the topic of color. She knows everything there is to know about the frequencies of electromagnetic radiation produced by various physical processes, how those interact with nerves in the eye and create signals that are processed by the brain, even the cultural significances of various colors, but she has never herself actually experienced color. We then imagine Mary leaving her room and seeing the color red for the first time, and in doing so, learning something new, despite supposedly knowing everything there was to know about color already: what the color red looks like.

    This thought experiment was originally put forth to argue that there is something non-physical involved in the experience of color that Mary could not have learned about by studying the physical science of color, and I don't think it succeeds at all in establishing that, but I do think that it conclusively establishes that there is a difference between knowing, in a third-person fashion, how physical systems behave in various circumstances, and knowing, in the first person, what it's like to be such a physical system in such circumstances. In essence, I think it succeeds merely in showing that we are not philosophical zombies.

    A more visceral analogous thought experiment I like to think of is that no amount of studying the physics, biology, psychology, or sociology of sex will ever suffice to answer the question "what's it like to have sex?" Actually doing it yourself is the only way to have that first-person experience; at best, that third-person knowledge of the way things behave can be instrumentally useful to recreating a first-person experience. But even then, you have to actually subject yourself to the experience to experience it, and that experience that can only be known in the first person is all that's meant by phenomenal consciousness.
    Pfhorrest

    One way I look it physicalism, is that if true, it should be possible, in principle, to construct a machine that operates identically to human consciousness.Relativist

    I agree, and thing it is possible.

    How would a machine experience qualia, in a non-zombie way?Relativist

    The same way a human does: by instantiating the same function as a human, and so having its phenomenal experience (which correlates with function, in all things) be like that of all things that instantiate such a function, like humans.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    I remember Bush, and that he was an idiot, but even though I hated his policies he seemed like a kind of charming innocent doofus, aesthetically speaking. Trump, even ignoring his actual policies, just comes off as a mean asshole internet troll.
  • Super heroes
    It is more of a tactic to publicize the political bias of producers and the people involved.Gus Lamarch

    So were gods.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    So Qanon isn't far from the truth except that it's Trump and his buddies who are the paedophiles.Benkei

    Basically everything the alt-right accuses the left of is usually a projection of something they themselves are guilty of, so even without the details you give to support this claim, it's prima facie probable.
  • Super heroes
    Yup. The movie “Unbreakable” made this point too.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    Source on alleged Hunter Biden email chain verifies message about Chinese investment firmNOS4A2

    Russian-fabricated documents mention actual (unspecified) person who will swear that they are true. Film at 11.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    It’s not the discreteness of any change at all that distinguishes strong emergence from weak emergence, but the sudden appearance of something irreducible to anything that was going on with the constituent parts.

    All kinds of physical behavior are, so far as we know, reducible to combinations of the behaviors of their parts. But phenomenal consciousness is stipulated to be something independent of behavior, such that it could not be reduced to the behaviors of its constituent parts. Which leaves it either not existing at all, springing into existence from nothing (strong emergence), or existing in some form everywhere (from which more sophisticated forms can weakly emerge).
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    From that moment it can react to inputs and produce outputs (lights, for example), whereas previously it was as dormant as a rock.Malcolm Lett

    True, because its configuration now enables all of those inanimate objects to interact in a certain way. But the kind of actions they do to each other are still actions that their constituent parts were capable of all along. Every copper atom is already capable of exchanging electrons with neighboring atoms; a closed circuit just gives a bunch of them motive and opportunity to pass electrons around with each other in a circle.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Thanks for pointing that out! I haven't done much web dev in nearly a decade and am just now in the process of polishing up my site for job-search purposes, so adding an SSL certificate should have been on my to-do list anyway. It should be done now (or within about 15 mins after installation finishes). Thanks again!
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    The whole point is that many 'weak emergences' add up to a 'strong emergence'.Olivier5

    Except they don’t. All you’ve described here is weak emergence. Strong emergence is something beyond that. Something that doesn’t happen, but we have to acknowledge that it’s a thing people talk about to even deny that it happens.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    So the dictionary weakly emerges from the behavior of the scrabble tiles, which as I said is fine by me.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Where did the dictionary come from? That’s where the magic happens. It’s not just building up from things inherent in the tiles, bottom-up: something other than the behavior of the tiles is exteriorly imposed on them from the top down.

    You don’t get a dictionary by randomly combining scrabble tiles; if you did, that would be weak emergence. But if the act if randomly combining scrabble tiles somehow invokes a premade dictionary out of nowhere which then acts upon the tiles, you no longer have something just emerging (weakly) from the behavior of the tiles, but something wholly new popping into being in response to the tiles... like magic.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Strong emergence definitionally differs from weak emergence. Things that meet the criteria for strong emergence are “like magic”; things that only meet the criteria for weak emergence are not. So things that are not “like magic” — not of the same character as the things compared to magic — are not meeting the criteria for strong emergence.

    @Kenosha Kid, please back me up here.

    This whole subtopic is a huge waste of time anyway. All the examples of emergence you give are what I would count as weakly emergent and do not object to. Access consciousness, which is the thing that I think people normally mean by consciousness, is weakly emergent like all those other things, on my account. So we have substantive agreement everywhere it matters.

    Where we disagree is that I acknowledge that other philosophers mean something different by “consciousness” than we do, something distinguished from the thing we mean as “phenomenal consciousness”. They define that in a way that it could not possibly weakly emerge from non-mental properties. So either it strongly emerges, in a way completely unlikely any of the examples you’ve given, a magic-like anti-physical way; or else nothing, including us, has anything like what they’re talking about; or else everything has something like what they’re talking about, from which our form of it can weakly emerge.

    In counter to that, you just deny that anyone is talking about anything besides the weak emergence of access consciously. It’s fine if that’s all you want to talk about, because that’s the important part, but if we’re going to dismiss these other people who think human consciousness is magical, we have to address the other stuff they’re talking about: phenomenal consciousness, and strong emergence, which like it or not are different topics than access consciousness and weak emergence.

    Why would you be surprised at the sudden emergence of something metaphysically interesting?Isaac

    It’s not the interesting part, it’s the novel part.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    My take is that the distinction between weak and strong emergence is confusing a quantitative difference for a qualitative one.Olivier5

    Did you even read the rest of that wikilink? There is a definitional difference between strong and weak emergentism that you’re ignoring. See the part about simulability and analyzabulity especially. It’s nothing to do with self-organization. That is not mysterious.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Someone PM'd me a question about this thread, I don't know why they didn't just post here, but I thought my response to them might be illustrative for others too. They asked me:

    If I kick a rock..Will it experience anything? Will it think to itself "I have been kicked!" ?

    And I replied:

    I don't think a rock ever thinks anything, and it doesn't even feel anything in the way that a human does. It's more like... if you think of it in terms of diminishing degrees of conscious, that's probably the clearest thing.

    A human gets kicked and has a whole complicated process of brain activity that they experience, feelings they have, decisions they make about those feelings, and then behavior that they do on account of those decisions.

    Other times, even with a human, something can trigger a pure reflex response, and with a lot of lower animals they are entirely reflex response; but we know as humans that we still experience the reflex response, even though it's bypassing our higher thought processes, and it's reasonable to expect that e.g. a sea anemone experiences something like that when its tentacles are touched and it retracts them all by reflex, even though it doesn't have any higher thought processes.

    Even a sunflower has a means of detecting light and moving to point toward it, though it has no nervous system at all, and it seems reasonable to think that it has some sort of even more primitive experience of that light, even though it's not even capable of feeling the way an anemone is.

    All the way down to rocks, where when you kick it, it still reacts -- it moves, in accordance with the force you applied to it -- but its experience is so diminished that there's practically nothing to speak of at that point.

    Still, for the reasons described in the thread you've probably been reading, there's reason to think that something prototypical of human experience still happens to a rock. The major difference between a human experiencing being kicked and a rock experiencing being kicked is that humans have lots of complex reflective (bent-back-upon-ourselves) processes, so we don't just experience the force of being kicked, we experience our nerves firing in response to that force, and all the complicated neurological processes that the activation of those nerves kick off.

    I like to think of it as like a modified version of the Cartesian theater. We are mentally seated in the enormous theater that is our brain. Instead of a screen on which we see the outside world, there are only a bunch of tiny pinholes around the theater that let in light from what's happening outside. The theater itself reacts to the light coming through the pinholes, and does a bunch of spectacular things, and that's the show that we're watching.

    Most of our experience is experience of ourselves reacting to things. Less complicated subjects, who don't have that complicated mind-theater, only get a pinhole's worth of experience, if that. (And this whole metaphor is on the same shaky ground as the original Cartesian theater anyway, so don't take it too literally; it's just to illustrate the difference between human experience and e.g. a rock's experience).
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities? Such causal powers would be quite unlike anything within our scientific ken. This not only indicates how they will discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their mysteriousness will only heighten the traditional worry that emergence entails illegitimately getting something from nothing.Mark A. Bedau via Wikipedia
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    I never said it was magic, but it's an emerging phenomenon in the sense that it cannot happen outside of life. It has no meaning at the atomic level. No precursor, nothing that compares. It only means something at the cellular level. Below that level, it makes no sense at all.Olivier5

    You're not talking about strong emergence. Strong emergence is definitionally "like magic". If you can take constituent parts, and the things they do, and get them to do something like that together, then that's only weak emergence.

    I can't use a single atom as a lever, but I can use a bunch of atoms stuck together as a lever. Leverage "is an emergent phenomenon" in that sense, single atoms have no leverage, but leverage is still just an aggregate of things atoms can do. You don't need something besides just a bunch of atoms stuck together the right way to get a lever: it's not like you need to stick a bunch of atoms together, and add some "essence of lever" to them to make them have leverage. A bunch of atoms just doing what atoms do, in the right configuration, end up doing the work of a lever, with nothing extra required.

    That's the defining difference between weak and strong emergence.
  • Could there be a negative utility monster?
    Simple, just suppose there was some super-sensitive “monster” who needs inordinate amounts of care and gentle handling or else it easily suffers immense pain.
  • Dualism And Acting One's Age
    Minds definitely age. They scar and otherwise accrue damage over time, and deteriorate in function as the brain deteriorates with the rest of the body. I’m not quite 40 and my mind is very different from how it was at 20. My girlfriend’s 70 year old dad was a brilliant teacher when I met him about a decade ago, and now he can’t even troubleshoot his own computer.

    Minds age.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Atoms don't reproduce, and molecules don't reproduce. They don't have any 'elementary reproduction'Olivier5

    No, but sexual reproduction is not anything more than a complicated process of atoms interacting in the way that atoms do. Nowhere in that process is it required to suddenly invoke some elan vital or such to make the reproduced organism alive like its parents.

    I don't see any reason to assume they have any 'elementary consciousness' as a way to explain our consciousness... Both are just behaviors that emerged through life.Olivier5

    Access consciousness sure is, and that is what I take consciousness in the ordinary way we use the word to be.

    But other philosophers ask about “consciousness” in a different sense, something wholly unrelated to behaviors like that, such that something could conceivably, so they say, behave in an access-consciousness way, so far as we can tell in the third person, but not actually experience anything at all in the first person. That having of a first person experience at all, not being any kind of behavior but rather some essential metaphysical difference, either:

    - doesn’t happen at all (except we each know first hand that it does happen, at least for ourselves),

    - only happens for some things (and since it’s definitionally not anything behavioral, it can’t be built out of the behaviors of the parts it’s made out of, but just suddenly gets added like magic, like some elan vital),

    - or happens for everything (but to a degree and in a manner that can vary with the behavior of the thing too, such that only something that behaves like a human has a human-like first-person experience, but a rock with its much simpler behavior still has some first-person experience, just a much simpler one).

    Try and understand what I am saying about the Heraclitus river. What is a river? It is not actually defined by the specific molecules of water flowing through it. Otherwise you wouldn't see the same river twice. Likewise your body is not defined by the atoms flowing through it.Olivier5

    Right, I get that, and I’m saying that is true of everything that experiences time (i.e. everything with mass, that moves slower than light); everything is constantly changing, swapping out its constituents, and the only persisting thing is the pattern of information. For anything, even a single electron; even the quarks that make up a proton are constantly changing, blinking out of existence only to be immediately replaced by similar but different particles. Atoms themselves are like rivers.

    But that is all an aside, because my underlying point with regard to emergence is that a river can’t do anything that a bunch of water molecules can’t do, because there is nothing to a river but a bunch of water molecules, even though the particular molecules are always changing. For a river to do anything, the water molecules it’s made up of at that moment must do that thing.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    Have you ever heard of sexual reproduction? It is a universal property of living systems, and you can't find it anywhere in non living stuff. Stones and stars don't copulate. QED here is a strongly emerging phenomenon.Olivier5

    Do you think sexual reproduction involves any processes that are not built up out of the processes of the cells that are built up out of molecules that are built up out of atoms that are built up out of quarks etc? Is there some magic that happens somewhere in there? If not, then that's not strong emergence.

    Stones and stars are built out of the same stuff as humans, but they are different things built out of that same stuff. That you can arrange that stuff into a way that will sexually reproduce doesn't mean that everything made of that stuff has to sexually reproduce.

    I think you don't understand the difference between strong and weak emergence. Sexual reproduction is a textbook case of weak emergence.

    human beings are not produced by chemical synthesis. They are made by sexual reproductionOlivier5

    ...which involves a lot of chemical synthesis.

    You and I are made of information, essentially.Olivier5

    If you had read the web of reality thread, you'd see I already agree that everything is made of information. Atoms are made of information. Humans are nothing special in that regard.

    No single electron, nor any massive particle at all -- nothing that experiences time, in other words -- goes unchanged. They are all like Heraclitus' river: they are constantly being destroyed and re-created by the Higgs field.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    By describing it as panpsychism (everything is conscious), you are doing that. Yes, you are demoting consciousness in this context to any physical response function, but that itself is a result of poor choice of terminology.Kenosha Kid

    That's the terminology that the philosophers discussing the issue are using though, so if I want to communicate with them I need to talk about the same terms they are. They coined "phenomenal consciousness" as whatever the difference is between a real human and a philosophical zombie, two things that are by definition functionally equivalent.

    To deny that there can be any such thing as a philosophical zombie that's different from a real human (as you and I do), we either have to say that real humans just are what they claim philosophical zombies would be like (we have no first-person, subjective, phenomenal experience at all), or else that anything that is functionally identical to a human (like a philosophical zombie is supposed to be) must have the same metaphysical nature as a real human.

    The latter can either be because metaphysically boring material stuff, arranged the right way, magically gives rise to something metaphysically novel (strong emergence); or else that whatever it is that a real human is supposed to have that a philosophical zombie wouldn't -- which is not anything functional, because a zombie is functionally identical to a human -- is just something that everything has.

    So either:
    - we're zombies ourselves,
    - magic happens, or
    - everything "has a mind" in the sense that these people are talking about.

    The last seems the least absurd option to me.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    You sound like a panpsychist idealist. That's a contradictionRogueAI

    You should really read that previous thread on the web of reality. I'm not an idealist, but I am a phenomenalist. Things exist independent of minds, but they're all made of the kind of stuff that can exist in minds: information, observabilia, whatever you want to call it. There is no contradiction there, but yeah, it is a little bit like "everything is in the mind" and "everything is a mind".

    The analogy I like to clear that up is: all programs are data, and all data is executable (though most of it does nothing of interest when executed). "Material" stuff is "data"; "minds" are "programs". "Minds" are made of "matter", and all "matter" is metaphysically "mind-like" (though most of it has no interesting "mental activity"). It's only particular data structures (material objects) that do interesting things when executed (that have interesting conscious experience). But everything is still data, that is executable in principle.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    You're back to the Hard Problem: how does "active consciousness" emerge from "non-active consciousness" stuff?RogueAI

    I think you're misreading "access" as "active" here.

    In any case, access consciousness is the topic of the easy problem. There is no mystery there. Access consciousness is just a kind of functionality. How does the function of my computer emerge from the function of the atoms it's built out of? Very carefully, but not philosophically mysteriously. Likewise, the function of brains emerges from the function of atoms in a similar fashion.

    Whatever there is besides that function, whatever metaphysically special thing there also needs to be, that is phenomenal consciousness, which is the subject of the hard problem, and my solution to that is that everything has it, so nothing (phenomenally-)conscious emerges from anything non-(phenomenally-)conscious, because there is nothing non-(phenomenally-)conscious.
  • A hybrid philosophy of mind
    What's your objection to strong emergence?Olivier5

    it must draw some arbitrary line somewhere, the line between things that are held to be entirely without anything at all like phenomenal consciousness and things that suddenly have it in full, and thus violates my previously established position against fideism.Pfhorrest

    Basically, it's magic. Weakly emergent phenomena build up out of more fundamental phenomena. The kinds of emergent phenomena that Kenosha lists are things that build up out of the phenomena exhibited by basic physical particles: if you model their motion, mass, charge, etc, and model an appropriate aggregate of them just in terms of their motion, mass, charge, etc, you get the emergent phenomena in the model for free. Nothing wholly new suddenly springs into being in the real phenomena that you have to add into the model; the "new" things are all reducible to "old" (more fundamental) things. Strong emergence, on the other hand, would have something wholly new just pop into being suddenly at some point, for no apparent reason (because any reason would tell you what it was about the more fundamental properties that when combined in such a way give rise to this new property, and so would make the "new" phenomenon reducible to the old, and thus only weakly emergent).

    It just seems like a category error to call physics 'psychology'.Kenosha Kid

    Agreed, and that's why I wouldn't do that. But saying "everything is phenomenally conscious" isn't doing that, any more than saying "anything can be a quantum mechanical observer" is; "phenomenally conscious" and "quantum mechanical observer" are terms of art divorced from actual psychology, despite having psychological-sounding words in them.

    What is a 'purely functional' thing, then?Kenosha Kid

    I meant that in the sense that access conscious has only to do with the particulars of the function of a thing, and is not any kind of metaphysical difference the way that phenomenal consciousness is held to be by non-panpsychists. My overall position is saying that whatever metaphysics is going on with human beings that may be required for our having of a subjective experience, that metaphysics is going on with everything and is not special to humans; the important difference between humans and e.g. rocks, that makes us conscious in the ordinary sense (access conscious), is only the difference in the function of a human vs a rock, not anything metaphysically different.

    (Of course, on my account, the only differences there ever are between things are functional differences, but I'm distinguishing my account from views that say otherwise, e.g. views that say there is something metaphysically different about humans, not just functionally different).

    I guess my salient point is: are you assuming some non-conscious stuff exists? If so, do you believe consciousness comes from this stuff?RogueAI

    That depends on which sense of "consciousness" you mean. If you mean phenomenal consciousness, then I think everything has that, and that doesn't go against physicalism, because "phenomenal consciousness" on my account is just an ordinary facet of every physical thing, and is not what we actually normally mean by "consciousness". If you mean access consciousness, then I think there are lots and lots of things (most things) that are not access conscious, and our access consciousness, "consciousness" in the sense that we ordinarily mean it, is built up out of that stuff.
  • Amy Coney Barrett's nomination
    I still think it would be a good idea to aim for exactly one new justice per presidential term, regardless of vacancies, so that the court always reflects the recent history of the populace’ political leanings.
  • Amy Coney Barrett's nomination
    legistlate that no more than 1 new justice can be appointed per 4-year presidential term regardless of how many vacancies occur during that term180 Proof

    I would make that exactly 1, no more no less, regardless of vacancies. Otherwise the Senate could just block appointment like they did to Obama.
  • Philosophical Vexillology
    I thought this thread was going to be about flags representing various philosophies.

    If I were to design a flag for my country — as in the land, not the people or the government — it would be a tricolor with sky blue at the top, a medium green in the middle, and dark orange-brown earth at the bottom, perhaps with a leaf of valley oak as a central charge.
  • Donald Trump (All General Trump Conversations Here)
    So one has to admit that D. Trump played so well his given role (better than his precedents and the greatest actors at Hollywood did) to the point almost all people (right, left.. etc..), if not all, were fully convinced that he is a real top decision-maker and not just another official speaker (just a great talented actor behind whom there are... sorry I don't like talking politics).KerimF

    I think Trump did even that job poorly. I’ve never seen a president so obviously go off script and then get “handled” back on track by the people with real power. If I didn’t already know that was going on, Trump’s dismal performance would have tipped me off.

    I guess it’s still duped the masses though, who seem to think that Trump is personally behind all the awful shit that’s happening, and not just some manipulable idiot merely enabling other people to get their evil shit done in exchange for a time to bask in the spotlight.