3. Having an experience = having physical property P

Next he asks, "How could phenomenal consciousness just be a certain physical property? Surely if something SEEMS phenomenally conscious, it IS phenomenally conscious. "

His answer: we are not aware OF phenomenal consciousness at all. What we are aware of are the qualities (like redness) of which phenomenally conscious states make us aware. — Relativist

Hmmm, so then it becomes a matter of explaining physical property P, which is a matter left up to neuroscience, I take it. I like it better than saying red experience is an illusion.

Consciousness is not the problem. Our account of it is. — creativesoul

Agreed, so what is the correct account?

All concepts are creature dependent. — creativesoul

Alright, yes, nature isn't conceptual. So I'll rephrase:

Some of our concepts are about the structure, function and properties of the world. Others reflect our experiences of the world. Since there's a big difference between the two, at least when we get to science, then there's a hard problem, since we are part of the world science seeks to explain.

Our experience of the world differs considerably from our explanation of the world.

I showed how qualia fit into a physicalist account (I did not originate this; I'm relating Michael Tye). I realize this isn't a complete account, but it's a piece of the puzzle. — Relativist

Okay, but the hard problem is showing how a brain state of seeing red is a red experience, or results in a red experience. Saying they're identical is one way to go that would fit with physicalism. But it doesn't explain why some brain states are experiential and others are not.

Does Type support an identity theory of mind?

The quale "green" is not ontologically identical to the scientific concept of green (e.g. the range of wavelengths), but the two are related to one another: objects that we perceive as matching the green quale of experience are also known (through science) to reflect light in a specific range of wavelengths. — Relativist

Right, but this presents an ontological problem. For physicalists, anyway. It's not a problem if you're down with dualism, or you're an idealist. It's also not a problem for anti-realists, because they will just deny there is an ontological distinction to be made between subjective and objective.

What do you mean by "reconciled"? — Relativist

The hard and harder problems exist if we take our ontology from science, because it leaves the phenomenal out. Reconciling would mean figuring out a way to include the phenomenal in the scientific, whether that's by reduction, identity, elimination, emergent or expanding the scientific ontology (panpsychism or dualism).

What do phenomenal concepts have in common such that that commonality makes them count as being phenomenal, whereas the non phenomenal concepts do not have/share this same common denominator or set thereof? — creativesoul

Phenomenal are creature dependent. We see red not because the world is colored in, but because our visual system evolved to discriminate photons that reflect off surfaces in combination of three primary values. But that still leaves out the experience of red, because a detector or robot can make that discrimination without supposing there is any experience.

Here it gets a bit murky because shape and extension is also part of our visual experience. It's just that we can use those aspects of our visual field to form scientific explanations of the world. The real question is why there is an experience of a visual field, instead of it being "all dark" like it would presumably be for a detector or a rock.

Vision is tricky. Pain and pleasure are easier to make clear. Why does my nervous system need to have an experience of a painfully touching a stove if we can describe the nervous system performing the function of jerking my hand back without any experience?

Consciousness is not the problem. Our account of it is. — creativesoul

Obviously it's not a problem for nature. It's a problem for humans because we can't figure out what the proper account of consciousness is. And depending on what the proper account is, our ontology or epistemology might need to change to reflect that.

What is the difference between those and that which does not count as being those? — creativesoul

Phenomenal: color, sound, smell, taste, pain, pleasure, hot, cold, thoughts, beliefs, desires, dreams, feelings.

Non: shape, space, time, composition, number, structure, function, computation, information, empirical.

That's not my experience (nor, I think, anyone else's). — Andrew M

It's been the human experience since at least philosophical inquiry began and the distinction between appearance and reality was a thing. Thus the word phenomenal and science attempting to explain what appears to us. The table appears solid, but it's not solid in the way it seems to be to us. Everyone is surprised when they learn a table is mostly empty space. Nor does it have as well a defined boundary as it appears, because its actual boundary is molecular.

Similarly, the table's color is just how our visual system perceives the light bouncing off the table, as opposed to the radio, gamma, X-Rays going through the table. Or the infrared or ultraviolet bouncing off. If we could perceive the entire EM spectrum of the sky, it wouldn't be blue. Thus the sky on a clear, sunny day is not actually blue, that's just our experience of it.

Furthermore, our color experience is correlated with whatever neural activity results in a color experience. This neural activity is not blue or painful. But it somehow results in blue or pain. And nobody can why or how that's the case, other than it's a correlation.

The "concept" of greenness is that mental image that we perceive. The word "green" refers to this quale. The range of wavelengths associated with greenness are those wavelengths that are associated with this quale. — Relativist

Right, and it is these concepts which cannot be reconciled with our scientific concepts.

The experience of greenness is nonverbal; words cannot convey the experience. — Relativist

Words can convey that we have those experiences. As a sighted person, when you say you saw something red, I can visualize or remember red.

Oliver Sacks has one story of a person with brain trauma who lost the ability to not only see but remember colors. Their world became shades of gray. Communicating red to them would be like a talking bat communicating sonar to us. We know it exists, but we wouldn't know what it's like, or in this person's case, be able to put yourself into that state.

What problems are you referring to? — Relativist

That consciousness isn't limited to perception. Let's say for sake of argument the naive realist view of colors, smells, tastes, sounds and feels was correct. Even in that case, it leaves a hard problem for memory, imagination, dreams and hallucination, because those experiences originate in the brain and not the outside world.

I think the most coherent version of solipsism is just experiences with no self owning anything. Self is just another experience of the single stream, which is all there is.

Some of the more important mental activity that is discussed in theory of mind is that which mediates between stimulus and response. — Relativist

Problem is that consciousness isn’t limited to perception. Memory, dreams, imagination, feelings, thoughts and hallucinations all can have colors, sounds, etc

I just don’t buy that language is the problem here. I have pain and color experiences, but those aren’t part of the scientific explanations of the world or our biology. And language doesn’t create pain or color experiences. Rather, they are simply part of our experience which language reflects. This leaves color and pain unexplained, with no way so far for us to reconcile with science.

Language is dualistic, because that’s our experience of the world. No amount of invoking ordinary language or Wittgenstein makes that go away.

f one morning you wake up feeling dumpy and stupid, just write an article in a philosophy forum and talk about how much you don't know about consciousness, you will feel better. The more you write about this thing that you don't know, the smarter you'll feel. — god must be atheist

That and professional philosophers write papers, publish books and give talks on consciousness. Consider these kinds of threads to be loose commentary.

Is this a real problem though? — Benkei

Yes, as much as any philosophical problem is real.

I'm from the "common sense" approach that what's conscious is what people decide it is and it's neither here nor there why. — Benkei

The debate has been rigorously laid out by Chalmers, Nagel, Dennett (in the negative), Block, etc.

Of course you can ignore all that in favor of ordinary language if you like. Just keep in mind that philosophy got started long ago in part because ordinary language contains many conceptual problems.

Second time I read the term "superhuman". The fact something is done at a superhuman level is now posited as an argument against something being conscious. — Benkei

It's only meant to say that Data is not a functional isomorph with humans. Data isn't perfectly simulating the functions of human brains, so we can't use that argument to say he has to be conscious.

I also don't think being able to reproduce the full range of human emotion should be a prerequisite to be considered conscious. — Benkei

Agreed, but the harder problem is about the epistemic justification for deciding whether a physical system different from our own is conscious. And the argument is that we have no way to really know, because our own consciousness does not tell us what it is about us that makes us conscious. It could be the brain stuff, it could be the functions performed by the brain, it could be both, or it could be that something else like panpsychism is the case. We just can't tell.

Yes, I saw that and agree. I'm not satisfied with anyone's solution to the hard or harder problems. You end up biting one or more bullets no matter which way you go.

Solipsism or not, if we suppose that you are talking-in-a-dream to other people in a language that is understood by your dream participants, then it is not a private language. — Luke

It is, because the dream participants are me. Or to be more accurate, the dream participants are experiences only, not other people. A solipsist engages in private language by definition, so solipsism would have to be ruled out for a private language to be impossible.

As for BIVs, do you know any? — Luke

This is a philosophical discussion, and if someone makes that claim that something is impossible, then it's right to point out scenarios where it's not. Impossibility is a very strong claim.

Wording is important here, I didnt say “equal”. — DingoJones

Equal means identical in logic and math ...?

I wouldn't have gone that far, but you did say that 2 in 1972 on a blackboard would not be equal to 2 in 2019 on a whiteboard, because they are numerically different in space and time. Same goes for X.

If that's the position nominalism ends up taking, then it does undermine identity. When I write X = X, well there are two Xs in different locations, written at slightly different times!

The third law of logic is the principle of identity. If identity is incoherent at the level of rigor logic requires, then we can't say that X=X is true, which likely has pretty bad ramifications.

All I'm saying is that if strict nominalism leads to abandoning a pillar of logic, then perhaps the nominalist restriction on identity should be loosened up a bit so as to not undermine logic?

In a certain sense I would say so ya. Obviously, when making references informally “identical” is perfectly coherent though. — DingoJones

Doesn't identity underpin logic? That's a pretty extreme position to take. Nominalism isn't worth jettisoning logic.

Im not sure what 2 identical to 2 would mean. In the strict, technical way we are talking about here nothing can truly identical to anything else. — DingoJones

So the concept identical is incoherent? This is a reductio ad absurdum.

It would be because you're not a nominalist, and you maybe buy real abstracts/abstract objects, you'd probably be a platonist re ontology of mathematics, and so on. — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure. I can see your argument against composite objects, but what about physics itself? There are universal laws and properties in physics. How can equations apply to all instances?

The context of the current dispute is whether functionality can be identical across multiple things, which is something that's kind of taken for granted in computer science.

Yes, it would have to be at the same time in order to be identical. If the time was different, that would not be identical. To be identical there can be no differences. — DingoJones

So when we say that 2 is identical to 2, it doesn't matter if one two was written on a blackboard in 1972 and another on a whiteboard in 2019.

Is that because 2 is not an object? Substitute the word red or #FF0000 for 2 if you like, or F=MA.

There's no connection between nominalism and whether objects can be composites. Under nominalism, it's just that the parts and the object are particulars (that aren't identical through time on a nominalistic rejection of genidentity as well). — Terrapin Station

I kind of think there is. Because if we say a chair can be a composite object, then we're saying a lot of different kinds of material arrangements can be a chair. If every chair is particular, then what is the meaning of "chair"? Why are these different objects chairs?

t's not that "you're not allowed to conceive of it." Your abstraction isn't literally the case objectively, and your abstraction/conception itself isn't identical through time. — Terrapin Station

So is it philosophically the case that composite objects don't exist, or only exist for one instance in time?

Actually for that matter, is it the case that fundamental particles don't persist in time, since they're always numerically different?

Not at the same time is numerical distinction, so it's not identical in that sense. — Terrapin Station

Which means you're not allowed to conceive of an object over time, since it's always different.

Yes, it would have to be at the same time in order to be identical. If the time was different, that would not be identical. To be identical there can be no differences. — DingoJones

So a specific shade of red cannot be the same shade over time? What about the mass of an electron? Is that property different over time, even though its numerically measured to be the same?

I'm convinced that any sufficiently in depth discussion of realism or consciousness will turn into one on QM.

It does make me wonder what Platonists do with the wavefunction and the possibility that properties don't have set values until they're observed. @Wayfarer?

Not sure this helps the nominalist either.

That seems really incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Why does it have to be the exact same time to be the same photons? Do the photons turn into other photons over time?

But anyway, are you really so sure this couldn't be done with a double-slit kind of setup?

The photon wouldn't be numerically distinct (including numerically distinct temporal instances) but we'd somehow be able to point the the photon bouncing off of numerically distinct tomatoes? — Terrapin Station

There might be a way to emit and capture the same photons in a very controlled setting, while bouncing them off two surfaces made to reflect the same wavelength.

I'm asking you about the light. You used that as a determiner. — Terrapin Station

You're asking me whether the same photons bounce off different surfaces? Not under normal circumstances, but there might be a way to do this experimentally.

So the same light reflects off of two numerically distinct tomatoes? — Terrapin Station

The tomatoes are numerically distinct, the property is not.

Are they numerically distinct instances of redness? — Terrapin Station

Not if they reflect exactly the same wavelength of light.

Things can have identical properties, such as color, under nominalism, just not the same instances of that color? — DingoJones

I don't see how that works. How can nominalism have the same instances of color if everything is particular?

Properties and functions present the same problem for nominalism as does object identity. You can even dispense with objects in favor of mereological nihilism, and properties/functions would still pose a problem.

A nominalist isn't going to take any numerically distinct things as identical to each other, a fortiori because we believe that the idea of this is incoherent . — Terrapin Station

But that's begging the question. How do we know two numerically distinct things can't be identical in some manner that would contradict nominalism? Note here that I'm exluding numerical identity and spatiotemporal location.

We have tomatoe 1 and tomato 2. If they both have exactly the same color, then isn't that an identical property that nominalism says can't exist?

So, what would make one a nominalist, at least in the more common sense of the term, is that one doesn't believe that any numerically distinct things can be identical. — Terrapin Station

So all it would take to disprove nominalism is to find a numerically distinct thing that was identical for some property or function?

Wouldn't any two computers count then, or do they have to be of different chip design?