The fact that the computer has a drastically more complex design does not make it anything more than a tool. — Cavacava

I agree, and that was Jaron Lanier's point to the functionalists who think that the mind can be computed, which is why he came up with a bizarre scenario of using a meteor shower instead of a billion Chinese to implement a digital simulation of a person. For functionalists, the substrate is immaterial, as long as it provides the functionality.

How is the algorithm realised? i.e. turned into physical form? It requires an intepreter - otherwise it is just marks on paper — Wayfarer

What is an algorithm computed by a processor? It's just shuffling around 1s and 0s, right? Or to be more precise, it's just moving electricity around.

If we wanted, we could have a billion robot arms righting the writing to paper. Naturally, these would be of Chinese manufacture.

Is there an objective account of life? Can a "pencil and paper" be alive? — tom

Is a sufficiently sophisticated simulation of a living organism alive? At that point it might be a matter of how we wish to use words, although it could have ethical and legal ramifications at some point, if it's simulated human life.

If you watch or read any science fiction, you're probably come across advanced virtual worlds where characters in those worlds experience their digital reality like we do the physical world. In the book, "Permutation City", set in the 2050s when brain scans are detailed enough, digital human copies live in virtual worlds.

We can ask a Chalmers type question about all such scenarios. Are our digital copies p-zombies, or does it make sense to suppose they see color, hear sounds, etc? I don't think saying it's just a matter of how we wish to use words helps here.

Consider that you were given the option of uploading your mind to a virtual world where you don't have the same physical limitations, such as growing old. But the process is destructive to your physical self. Do you do it in anticipation of experiencing the joys of digital life? Or do you suspect that your digital self is just a bunch of 1s and 0s that won't experience anything at all?

If you think that your digital self can have experiences, then why not a pencil and paper version? What difference does the substrate matter? By the 2050s, it could be a quantum computer server farm instead of silicon and electricity.

Do physicalists think consciousness is "explainable" in physical terms? Life isn't even explained in physical terms, but rather in terms of abstractions that supervene on the physical. — tom

They think consciousness is explainable in term of abstractions that supervene on the physical, such as neuroscience. So if neuroscience can fully explain color experience (at some point in the future), then it's physical.

More broadly, it's about whether an objective account can be given for subjectivity. Tying this back to the OP, if there is such an objective account, then it might be computable, and if so, then there should be some algorithm for computing an experience of seeing blue. And if that's the case, then why wouldn't a pencil and paper computation of the algorithm result in that experience?

That is, unless one intends to posit some positive metaphysics specific to consciousness - you know, the soul or some such. — SophistiCat

I'm under the impression that modern philosophers don't appeal to the soul when defending versions of consciousness which aren't explainable in physical terms. Rather, they come to the conclusion that physicalism is false.

Of course, what constitutes "true" understanding, as well as "true" conscious experience, is anyone's guess. I don't think there is a metaphysical truth of the matter here, because we are ultimately just stipulating how we are going to use words such as "understanding" and "conscious experience". — SophistiCat

We don't have to use those words. The sky looks blue to me on a clear, sunny day. But if I could see the rest of the EM spectrum in some range of color, it would look quite different. But what color is the sky when nobody's looking?

That might sound like a silly question, but consider that asking about other properties of light or the atmosphere when nobody is looking is answerable by physics. So then, where does the experience of color come from, if it's not in the sky or photons of visible light?

A tempting answer is to say that the visual cortex of the brain generates color. But when the brain is examined, there is no color to be found there, of course. So where is that color experience taking place?

Maybe it's in the interaction between the visual system and the environment. But that's just moving the problem from the brain to the entire visual system. There is still no color to be found. It's only there when someone is experiencing it.

So we end up with an objective/subjective divide. The objective account of vision leaves out the color experience.

That's why when we want to know what a bat experiences, if anything, when using echolocation, we have no way of answering that question, since we lack bat experiences, unless we can correlate bat neurophysiology for echolocation with our physiology for some experience we have.

It's the same problem a person born blind from birth will have in trying to imagine what a rainbow experience is like. No amount of third person explanation can relay color experiences.

-lots of folks have had gastrointestinal problems where they've ended up with parts of their gastrointestinal system damaged or removed and there's no evidence that that's affected anything mental in those individuals. — Terrapin Station

Anecdotally, I heard otherwise on an episode of RadioLab, where a guy had to be fed from a device because of a hole in his intestines which the doctors couldn't surgically repair. He developed the most intense cravings for food that nearly drove him crazy. At one point, he ended up in some stranger's backyard, taking over their grill, just because of the smell of the food.

http://www.radiolab.org/story/197243-gutless/

Also, there's evidence that the bacteria in your gut influence your mood.

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/magazine/can-the-bacteria-in-your-gut-explain-your-mood.html?_r=0

I'd also go further and add that not only does the object look a particular colour in a particular light, but that that object IS that particular colour in that particular light (from a particular perspective, of course). The object's properties are being directly affected by the properties of the light source, which is affecting the properties of our perception of the object. So the object is "blue" in one kind of light, and "green" in another kind of light, and so on. — numberjohnny5

I don't think this works, because the physics will not agree with that (it's the same wavelength in all cases, and nothing has changed on the object's surface), and you have optical illusions where we see color that isn't there at all.

It's clear that we're seeing the object as different colors in different lighting conditions, because that's how our color vision works, not because the object has different colorings.

If anyone wants to reject the above on idealistic grounds, you still have to account for optics and illusions. In idealist terminology, our experiences are in disagreement with one another as to whether the object's color changes.

What is it about computation, or translations from some sets of symbols to other sets of symbols, that could produce a state of conscious awareness? — jkop

I don't know, but quite a few people think the mind is computable, and don't like the idea of some important mental aspect being unique to human physiology.

Think about it though, if you had control over what one persons actions effected other peoples realities like that you could have quite a lot of control over the entire population while at the same time being completely non-existent to every human being alive. — intrapersona

I like to blame some of my poorer choices on aliens, at any rate.

I never saw a good answer to that, only that idealism is not solipsism, and so has other minds built into it somehow.

If each 'phenomenal world' is entirely dependent on its 'experiencer' then this kind of causal interaction is impossible. — csalisbury

Seemed to me that some of the idealists back on the old board did defend this, and that the Cyrenaics defended that position in ancient Greece.

An experience is a biological phenomena: the identification of something, not an expression of it (eg with pen and paper). — jkop

If we consider some of the claims by transhumanists or AI enthusiasts, then the right sort of computation will result in experience.

Consider the idea of mind uploading. If you could emulate your brain in software, would it have experiences? If so, then would the paper equivalent?

When physics predicts results that have not been empirically verified it is because these predictions exist as a result of the formal logic.
This was what lead to the acceptance of GR in particular, the formal logic predicted things that were eventually empirically verified.
It more like a two way street.
We make formal logic models, and then verify them from observation and vice versa. — m-theory

Right, but observation can also disconfirm. If GR had been contradicted, then the math wouldn't have mattered. So unless there is some deep reason for math and observation to always be in agreement, provided the physicists do the right math, then it's not formal.

will be honest, I have no interest in why you believe that what you said is valid. — m-theory

Physics isn't formal in that physics is derived from (or driven by) experimental results. The wave equation exists because of the double slit and other such experiments. So does GR and every other scientific equation.

You think the brain has some non-physical aspect to it? — tom

I don't know whether non-reductionism is the case or not. Some physicalists ascribe to emergentism at different levels. I'm also not sure whether physicalism is the case. Maybe someone will figure out how to give a physical explanation for consciousness, but maybe not.

In addition to that, I'm skeptical that functionalism is entirely substrate independent. I kind of think that the sort of bodies we have determines the kind of minds we have.

If red is undecidable then Chalmers should not know if he is or is not experiencing it. — m-theory

You're arguing that our self-awareness is necessarily decidable, otherwise, we wouldn't be able to know. So knowledge is decidable.

Denial of known physics is always an option, particularly when there are no consequences that matter. — tom

I'm not aware that physics requires universal computation to be the case, only that some have asserted that all physical processes can be computed. Sounds like an ontological claim to me, but maybe there is a mathematical proof for this?

Even if so, the big challenge would be to show that everything about the living brain is reducible to physics.

I must admit I do not follow you here.
I don't understand why how this is the case? — m-theory

I assumed you were making a Dennettian style argument, which is why you were asking how I knew for certain that I had experiences. Dennett has stated that we don't have any sort of subjective experience. We are the equivalent of p-zombies.

But you might be arguing that subjectivity is reducible to objective, physical processes, which is different from eliminativism about qualia. Chalmers has argued that you can't make such reductions, because experience is not reducible to structure or function, which is similar to saying that the experience of red is not captured by number or shape.

Except that physicalism explains reality with formal logic. — m-theory

By that, you mean it appeals to physics, which is empirically driven?

And why would anyone decide that some of our experiences are not actually being experienced? Because it doesn't fit well with their ontology. So Dennett has to say that we are all p-zombies. There are only objective experiences.

What about when we dream of seeing red? Well, we don't actually dream, we just seem to remember to have dreamed. Those are the contortions one has to make to consistently deny subjective experience.

But the advantage is that it makes the hard problem go away for Dennett, and he gets to be on the side of science, while Chalmers, etc are mysterians and woo mongerers. And by Dennett, I mean anyone who argues along these lines.

No I am saying it is not possible to abstract anything from elusive subjective access. — m-theory

Interestingly enough, the idealists, at least some of them, might agree with this. Didn't Berkley argue against abstacta?

But I don't agree, so I might agree that some of our experience is objective. So let's say that Locke was basically right and shape, number, extension, etc are objective features of physical objects.

So that's great, we can do science and believe that it truly attempts to describe the world as it is. But what about when we want to explain the rest of our experiences?

Do we draw a line in the sand and deny that color, sounds, smells, etc are really being experienced?

If we can do that, then why stop there? What makes the objective world that we experience any more real? Why not deny that we experience shape, number, etc?

It potentially undermines itself, or at the very least, is inconsistent. What is being done is deciding that certain experiences are real, and the rest are not even experienced.

If you are not then you have no well formed logical method to define self. — m-theory

My world is my self? Yeah, I identify my own self as this body amongst other bodies and objects, but it's not the only way to think about the self. I could identify self with the summation of my experiences.

Isn't mysticism and Eastern religions about overcoming the illusion of self and seeing that all is one, and all that jazz?

Subjectivity is abstracted from a necessary objectively existent dichotomy. — m-theory

You're saying because of the other who has their own experiences, I know that mine are subjective, so it's the objective existence of other experiences which justifies my own subjective experience.

I don't think idealists would agree with that, but not a bad attempt.

As sure as you are that there is self, you are necessarily just as sure that there is a not self. — m-theory

I'm not, because solipsism retains it's logical irrefutability under the right formulation, even if I don't find it compelling.

To doubt entails that something must that doubts. — m-theory

Alrighty then, to ask whether subjective experience exists entails that something which experiences subjectivity exists.

It's not quite as straightforward, because you need to also show that objectivity is abstracted from subjective experience, such that arguing objectively for subjectivity is to assume subjectivity in the first place.

IOW, doubting subjectivity undermines the objective. This is something that Dennett, etc seem to not realize, but probably they would not accept the premise that subjectivity is necessarily the starting point.

So maybe more argument is needed here. For me, it's enough to note that you don't have my experiences, and I don't have yours, and the only way we know about the objective world is via our own experiences.

If I am certain that you exist, it is because there is an effective procedure such that it is not logically possible to doubt that you exist. — m-theory

I am not certain that you exist, I'm just confident beyond reasonable doubt. I am certain of my own existence, whatever that entails (brain in vat, Neo, demonic dream character).

But like I said there is no reason to assume that there can be no full or complete account, or rather it is not logically necessary to assume this. — m-theory

The arguments against physicalism qua qualia is that no physical theory has the structure needed to explain consciousness.

David Chalmers, Colin McGinn and Ned Block have argued along those lines. Chalmers argument is that structure and function do not account for experience. Ned Block's argument is that the view from nowhere, or objectivity, cannot account for a view from somewhere or subjectivity.

The Lockean way of thinking about it is that we abstract from subjective qualities to arrive at the objective ones, and then we try to justify just the ontology of the objective ones by explaining the subjective ones in objective terms. But this is impossible.

It would be like coming up with a mathematical equation for the experience of red. Math isn't something that captures experience. It's an entirely abstract language.

I guess philosophy is just silly that way! — m-theory

These sort of questions are silly. You don't need to argue that you exist. Descartes only got to that point because he was trapped in doubting everything else and needed an out.

Again how do you know you are having them?
How can you be sure? — m-theory

How do I know I exist? How can I be sure?

Descartes has already demonstrated that there is a logical method for being sure you exist. — m-theory

How do I know that I think? What makes thinking any different than experience with existential questions?

I experience therefore I am. That's just as good.

Yes that does not address the issue of your knowledge of mental phenomena that simply are.
How to you know they simply are? — m-theory

Because I have them, just the same way I know that I exist, because I exist. Granted, I have to the kind of animal that is self-aware to do that. You might ask me to logically argue for being self-aware. But that would be silly.

My entire point here is that physicalist do have an account for mental phenomena, and that the skeptics can disagree with that account to be sure, but what they would be in error if they said that mental phenomena is inexpiable for the physicalist and the physicalist has no account for them. — m-theory

That certain neural activity is the cause of consciousness? The problem here is:

1. Distinguishing this from correlation

2. Showing how certain neural patterns implement consciousness (and why others don't), and whether that can be reproduced in other media, and to what extent other things or animals are conscious.

3. Determining the exact nature of consciousness.

So with water we understand the properties to be due to the chemical nature of H20 when those molecules combine together. We don't have that sort of thing for consciousness. We don't even know what it is. An electrical pattern? Information? A network? Algorithms implemented by the brain? Does it extend out into the body? Is it interaction with the environment?

Otherwise, we're just noting that certain regions of the brain light up under fRMI, or if you're brain damaged in a certain way, you lose consciousness, or whatever.

So you need a chemistry or some science of consciousness that answers the various questions. What is bat experience, if it has experiences? Can a machine be conscious? How did it evolve, etc.

Then you cannot actually claim you are logically certain you are having them. — m-theory

Wouldn't the same principle apply to my existence? Am I supposed to provide a logical argument for existing? Isn't it just the fact that I exist?

My existence is a starting point or arguing. Maybe I try to argue that I exist because God, or evolution, or aliens. But that I exist is brute in that I can't argue for or against it.

Pencil and paper can't get you a cup of "Earl Grey Tea, Hot!" or play Chopin, or win against you in a Chess match, et cetera. Pencil and paper can't even read itself. — Nils Loc

Ture, but then neither can software. You have to have peripheral devices hooked up to your computer to do all that.

hat makes experiences of color etc. obtain is that those are properties of matter/structure/process complexes. You need the right sort of matter, in the right structures, undergoing the right processes, or you don't have the properties in question. — Terrapin Station

So you subscribe to an identity theory of mind. The physical substrate is necessary for conscious experience. Has to be squishy meat.

1.216 billion. See, they could do it too. — mcdoodle

I was imprecise. Most experts agree that 1.378 billion humans is needed to implement a universal Turing machine.

A lot less Datas would be needed, though. Only about 575 Datas could emulate their dreams on paper.

I don't follow sorry. — m-theory

An idealist could ask whether material existence is determinable by logical argument, or just something the physicalist begins with as a premise.

Or it is possible that there is some logical method for determining your experiences, but it is simply not within your subjective awareness, and thus seems to be brute when in fact it would be an effective logical method. — m-theory

There is a logical argument for determining the nature and cause of my experiences, which could be physical. A physical correlation has been established, to the extent one accepts physicalism on ontological grounds (which I'm fine with btw).

But there is no logical argument for the raw fact that you have experiences. You just have them, and then at some point, encounter different arguments for why and what they are. And then maybe make your own version of them.

Experience is a priori to any argument.

So you don't use logic to know if you have experiences or not? — m-theory

No, do you? How does that work? You form an argument and then experiences pop out with the conclusion? I'm curious, do you experience forming this argument?

So there is no logical method for deciding if you do or do not have mental phenomena? — m-theory

There's a logical argument for what constitutes mental phenomena, but that I experience seeing red, etc is not an argument.

Irrelevant cultural side note: Why do we assign these mind numbing tasks to a billion Chinese? Do we suppose they have nothing better to do with their time. Why not a billion Africans? A billion Europeans and North Americans? Isn't it enough that they have to make all this junk we buy, without having to do all this calculation on top of everything else? — Bitter Crank

Because racism. Only a Chinese substrate will realize a true Turing machine. God is Chinese, and Searles messed up by having the room output Chinese, otherwise he had a solid argument. Silly Searle.

But really, probably because China is known for having more than a billion people. India would have worked. Africa is just too general. I don't even know how many people live on the continent, and I'm pretty sure there aren't 1 billion Europeans.

Why 1 billion? Because it's nice big number, but not too big for there to be that many people. So now you know!