The same sort of thing could be said of external objects. An idealist could turn your argument on it's head and claim that material objects are undecidable for the physicalist. — Marchesk

I don't follow sorry.

So you don't use logic to know if you have experiences or not? — m-theory

No, do you? How does that work? You form an argument and then experiences pop out with the conclusion? I'm curious, do you experience forming this argument?

So there is no logical method for deciding if you do or do not have mental phenomena? — m-theory

There's a logical argument for what constitutes mental phenomena, but that I experience seeing red, etc is not an argument.

Or it is possible that there is some logical method for determining your experiences, but it is simply not within your subjective awareness, and thus seems to be brute when in fact it would be an effective logical method. — m-theory

There is a logical argument for determining the nature and cause of my experiences, which could be physical. A physical correlation has been established, to the extent one accepts physicalism on ontological grounds (which I'm fine with btw).

But there is no logical argument for the raw fact that you have experiences. You just have them, and then at some point, encounter different arguments for why and what they are. And then maybe make your own version of them.

Experience is a priori to any argument.

I don't follow sorry. — m-theory

An idealist could ask whether material existence is determinable by logical argument, or just something the physicalist begins with as a premise.

No, do you? How does that work? You form an argument and then experiences pop out with the conclusion? — Marchesk

Then you cannot actually claim you are logically certain you are having them.
If you are sure then you must appeal to some other method, and the burden of proof is not on the physicalist.

There's a logical argument for what constitutes mental phenomena, but that I experience seeing red, etc is not an argument. — Marchesk

Again that you are seeing red is either decidable or it is not.
If it is decidable, then the physicality appeals to an effective procedure as the account for red.
If it is undecidable then you are not sure you are seeing red.
Or there is the appeal to other method for deciding the existence of red, which again is not the physicist's burden of proof.

My entire point here is that physicalist do have an account for mental phenomena, and that the skeptics can disagree with that account to be sure, but what they would be in error if they said that mental phenomena is inexpiable for the physicalist and the physicalist has no account for them.

Physicalism claims that the account for mental phenomena is an effective procedure because mental phenomena is decidable.

Seems like a topic for another thread maybe.

"Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon. By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation.

Do you think we are passive conduits of experience to our self, that the act of presentation is something that we only can experience as an observer. Or do you think that our experiences are representative and that we are in some sense responsible for what we experience as that which we represent to our self.

Then you cannot actually claim you are logically certain you are having them. — m-theory

Wouldn't the same principle apply to my existence? Am I supposed to provide a logical argument for existing? Isn't it just the fact that I exist?

My existence is a starting point or arguing. Maybe I try to argue that I exist because God, or evolution, or aliens. But that I exist is brute in that I can't argue for or against it.

But there is no logical argument for the raw fact that you have experiences. You just have them, and then at some point, encounter different arguments for why and what they are. And then maybe make your own version of them. — Marchesk

Yes that does not address the issue of your knowledge of mental phenomena that simply are.
How to you know they simply are?
If you can't not know they simply are, for the physicalist, this is equal to saying there exists some effective procedure which decides mental phenomena.
That you are subjectively aware of that effective procedure is how to account for the perception that mental phenomena just are.

My entire point here is that physicalist do have an account for mental phenomena, and that the skeptics can disagree with that account to be sure, but what they would be in error if they said that mental phenomena is inexpiable for the physicalist and the physicalist has no account for them. — m-theory

That certain neural activity is the cause of consciousness? The problem here is:

1. Distinguishing this from correlation

2. Showing how certain neural patterns implement consciousness (and why others don't), and whether that can be reproduced in other media, and to what extent other things or animals are conscious.

3. Determining the exact nature of consciousness.

So with water we understand the properties to be due to the chemical nature of H20 when those molecules combine together. We don't have that sort of thing for consciousness. We don't even know what it is. An electrical pattern? Information? A network? Algorithms implemented by the brain? Does it extend out into the body? Is it interaction with the environment?

Otherwise, we're just noting that certain regions of the brain light up under fRMI, or if you're brain damaged in a certain way, you lose consciousness, or whatever.

So you need a chemistry or some science of consciousness that answers the various questions. What is bat experience, if it has experiences? Can a machine be conscious? How did it evolve, etc.

Yes that does not address the issue of your knowledge of mental phenomena that simply are.
How to you know they simply are? — m-theory

Because I have them, just the same way I know that I exist, because I exist. Granted, I have to the kind of animal that is self-aware to do that. You might ask me to logically argue for being self-aware. But that would be silly.

Yes having no full and complete account is very different from having no account.

I agree physicalism does not have a full and complete account of mental phenomena.

But like I said there is no reason to assume that there can be no full or complete account, or rather it is not logically necessary to assume this.

Again how do you know you are having them?
How can you be sure?

Descartes has already demonstrated that there is a logical method for being sure you exist.
That you are not subjectively aware of a method is not equal to therefor it just is.

You might ask me to logically argue for being self-aware. But that would be silly. — Marchesk

I guess philosophy is just silly that way!
8-)

Again how do you know you are having them?
How can you be sure? — m-theory

How do I know I exist? How can I be sure?

Descartes has already demonstrated that there is a logical method for being sure you exist. — m-theory

How do I know that I think? What makes thinking any different than experience with existential questions?

I experience therefore I am. That's just as good.

I guess philosophy is just silly that way! — m-theory

These sort of questions are silly. You don't need to argue that you exist. Descartes only got to that point because he was trapped in doubting everything else and needed an out.

How do I know I exist? How can I be sure? — Marchesk

If I am certain that you exist, it is because there is an effective procedure such that it is not logically possible to doubt that you exist.

How do I know that I think? What makes thinking any different than experience with existential questions?

I experience therefore I am. That's just as good. — Marchesk

If there is no room for logical doubt this will entail that there is an effective procedure for deciding.

But like I said there is no reason to assume that there can be no full or complete account, or rather it is not logically necessary to assume this. — m-theory

The arguments against physicalism qua qualia is that no physical theory has the structure needed to explain consciousness.

David Chalmers, Colin McGinn and Ned Block have argued along those lines. Chalmers argument is that structure and function do not account for experience. Ned Block's argument is that the view from nowhere, or objectivity, cannot account for a view from somewhere or subjectivity.

The Lockean way of thinking about it is that we abstract from subjective qualities to arrive at the objective ones, and then we try to justify just the ontology of the objective ones by explaining the subjective ones in objective terms. But this is impossible.

It would be like coming up with a mathematical equation for the experience of red. Math isn't something that captures experience. It's an entirely abstract language.

If I am certain that you exist, it is because there is an effective procedure such that it is not logically possible to doubt that you exist. — m-theory

I am not certain that you exist, I'm just confident beyond reasonable doubt. I am certain of my own existence, whatever that entails (brain in vat, Neo, demonic dream character).

That is the point.
When we claim there is no logical grounds for doubt this entails an effective procedure.
Descartes showed that to doubt existence would be a logical contradiction.
Where there is no existence there is no doubt.
If there is doubt then there is existence.
To doubt entails that something must that doubts.

All these arguments are undermined by any claim that there is certainty beyond logical doubt that mental phenomena exist.
If there is such a certainty there is an effective procedure for deciding.

To doubt entails that something must that doubts. — m-theory

Alrighty then, to ask whether subjective experience exists entails that something which experiences subjectivity exists.

It's not quite as straightforward, because you need to also show that objectivity is abstracted from subjective experience, such that arguing objectively for subjectivity is to assume subjectivity in the first place.

IOW, doubting subjectivity undermines the objective. This is something that Dennett, etc seem to not realize, but probably they would not accept the premise that subjectivity is necessarily the starting point.

So maybe more argument is needed here. For me, it's enough to note that you don't have my experiences, and I don't have yours, and the only way we know about the objective world is via our own experiences.

Yes being logically certain entails and effective procedure.
If there is no logical room for doubt there is method such that you can decide without error.

Actually you have it backwards.
Subjectivity is abstracted from a necessary objectively existent dichotomy.

There is the self, and the not self.

Were it not so that these are necessarily distinct things it is not logically possible to arrive at either subjective or objective.

As sure as you are that there is self, you are necessarily just as sure that there is a not self.

As sure as you are that there is self, you are necessarily just as sure that there is a not self. — m-theory

I'm not, because solipsism retains it's logical irrefutability under the right formulation, even if I don't find it compelling.

Subjectivity is abstracted from a necessary objectively existent dichotomy. — m-theory

You're saying because of the other who has their own experiences, I know that mine are subjective, so it's the objective existence of other experiences which justifies my own subjective experience.

I don't think idealists would agree with that, but not a bad attempt.

If you are not then you have no well formed logical method to define self.
You would not be able to distinguish self from not self.

If you are not then you have no well formed logical method to define self. — m-theory

My world is my self? Yeah, I identify my own self as this body amongst other bodies and objects, but it's not the only way to think about the self. I could identify self with the summation of my experiences.

Isn't mysticism and Eastern religions about overcoming the illusion of self and seeing that all is one, and all that jazz?

No I am saying it is not possible to abstract anything from elusive subjective access.
This would lead to an infinite regress from ill definition.
If it were necessarily the case that this were true it would lead to self recursion.

If self recursion is not the case then we can be logically certain that it is not the case that there is only exclusively subjective access.

That doesn't mean that we have something like a blueprint of how exactly intentional content works yet. But of course, stances that posit intentional content as something nonphysical don't have anything like a blueprint of how exactly it works yet, either. So if not having a blueprint were a sufficient reason for you to reject a stance, you certainly couldn't embrace dualism.

That is very valid and something I hadn't thought of when trying to think of how physicalists would overcome it. Thank you for the rest of your answer as well :)

And thanks to everyone who has replied, sorry I didn't reply to a lot of you after the first few posts, but you've all managed to help explain how physicalists would respond to intentional content which is what I needed to know.

Someone on reddit also linked me to a short paper which aims to dispell the, what the author calls, 'psychological, ontological and logical' myths of intentionality as well. I mean I'm sure most of you will probably not learn a lot from it as you all seem pretty intelligent people already, but here it is if you want to read: http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/FILES/3M.pdf