Really I don't want to spend my time refuting solipsism.
You can conjectured that is the case if you want.
But of course you cannot logically found that solipsism is a necessary truth.

To say you are definitively aware of experiencing your thoughts, to physicalist, is no different from saying there is an effective method for being certain about the existence of your thoughts.
That is to say that thoughts are decidable.
If they are not decidable that poses problems for physicalism sure, it would mean that we cannot
logically determine if we experience intentional states. — m-theory

Physicalism isn't a thesis about or that depends on formal logic in any procedural way.

No I am saying it is not possible to abstract anything from elusive subjective access. — m-theory

Interestingly enough, the idealists, at least some of them, might agree with this. Didn't Berkley argue against abstacta?

But I don't agree, so I might agree that some of our experience is objective. So let's say that Locke was basically right and shape, number, extension, etc are objective features of physical objects.

So that's great, we can do science and believe that it truly attempts to describe the world as it is. But what about when we want to explain the rest of our experiences?

Do we draw a line in the sand and deny that color, sounds, smells, etc are really being experienced?

If we can do that, then why stop there? What makes the objective world that we experience any more real? Why not deny that we experience shape, number, etc?

It potentially undermines itself, or at the very least, is inconsistent. What is being done is deciding that certain experiences are real, and the rest are not even experienced.

Except that physicalism explains reality with formal logic.

And why would anyone decide that some of our experiences are not actually being experienced? Because it doesn't fit well with their ontology. So Dennett has to say that we are all p-zombies. There are only objective experiences.

What about when we dream of seeing red? Well, we don't actually dream, we just seem to remember to have dreamed. Those are the contortions one has to make to consistently deny subjective experience.

But the advantage is that it makes the hard problem go away for Dennett, and he gets to be on the side of science, while Chalmers, etc are mysterians and woo mongerers. And by Dennett, I mean anyone who argues along these lines.

Do we draw a line in the sand and deny that color, sounds, smells, etc are really being experienced? — Marchesk

We have to draw a line somewhere.
If these things are decidable then there is a method for describing them mechanically.
So decidability is a great line to draw in the context of physicalism.
The trick is learning how nature accomplishes this in physical systems.
It is not an easy problem but there is no reason to assume it is the hard problem such that there is no avail.

If we can do that, then why stop there? What makes the objective world that we experience any more real? Why not deny that we experience shape, number, etc? — Marchesk

The objective world is just about accessible information.
For the physicalist subjective and objective are not mutually exclusive terms and physicalism does not approach explanations of phenomena under the assumption that these terms are mutually exclusive.

It potentially undermines itself, or at the very lest, is inconsistent. What is being done is deciding that certain experiences are real, and the rest are not even experienced. — Marchesk

I must admit I do not follow you here.
I don't understand why how this is the case?

Except that physicalism explains reality with formal logic. — m-theory

By that, you mean it appeals to physics, which is empirically driven?

Except that physicalism explains reality with formal logic. — m-theory

No it doesn't--not necessarily at least. But is there even one example of a physicalist whose physicalism amounts to "explaining reality with formal logic"? Who? Give a reference for that.

Not just physics.
Again I pointed out that there are good deductive reasons for rejecting solipsism.

Well this is just silly because...yes it does.

Yeah, bullshit. Again, give one example of a physicalist whose physicalism amounts to this.

I must admit I do not follow you here.
I don't understand why how this is the case? — m-theory

I assumed you were making a Dennettian style argument, which is why you were asking how I knew for certain that I had experiences. Dennett has stated that we don't have any sort of subjective experience. We are the equivalent of p-zombies.

But you might be arguing that subjectivity is reducible to objective, physical processes, which is different from eliminativism about qualia. Chalmers has argued that you can't make such reductions, because experience is not reducible to structure or function, which is similar to saying that the experience of red is not captured by number or shape.

Nonsense.

That's some example you buffoon.

Yes but if Chalmers is certain he has mental phenomena, then this can be reduced to an effective procedure for ac count on my view.

If red is undecidable then Chalmers should not know if he is or is not experiencing it.

Where he is sure that he does, logically entails an effective method.

If red is undecidable then Chalmers should not know if he is or is not experiencing it. — m-theory

You're arguing that our self-awareness is necessarily decidable, otherwise, we wouldn't be able to know. So knowledge is decidable.

Now now.
Be nice.
I don't give an example because it is not necessary to do so.
Physics is described with math (formal logics).
This is readily available fact for all.

Where it is not logically possible to doubt then there is an effective procedure to account.

I'll be how you deserve.

Physicalism is just physics?

You said physicalism has nothing to do with formal logic.
That is demonstrably false.
The physical world is described with maths.
Hence formal logic has a great deal to do with physicalism.

Saying it does not is silly and I have no obligation to engage such an obvious falsehood.

ou said physicalism has nothing to do with formal logic. — m-theory

No I didn't. You need to be able to read better than that if you want to not come across like a buffoon.

I said, "Physicalism isn't a thesis about or that depends on formal logic in any procedural way. "

I will be honest, I have no interest in why you believe that what you said is valid.
It is irrelevant to any point I have made on this thread.

will be honest, I have no interest in why you believe that what you said is valid. — m-theory

Physics isn't formal in that physics is derived from (or driven by) experimental results. The wave equation exists because of the double slit and other such experiments. So does GR and every other scientific equation.

When physics predicts results that have not been empirically verified it is because these predictions exist as a result of the formal logic.
This was what lead to the acceptance of GR in particular, the formal logic predicted things that were eventually empirically verified.
It more like a two way street.
We make formal logic models, and then verify them from observation and vice versa.

You're saying utter nonsense about physicalism being a thesis re whether there's a formal logical "effective decision procedure" about the ontological status of mentality.

You are silly if you think there is no formal logic that justifies the position of physicalism ontology.

I have laid out the deductive reason why physicalism asserts the claims that it does.

You are silly if you think there is no formal logic that justifies the position of physicalism ontology. — m-theory

What is the formal logic that justifies the "position of physicalism ontology"? (Is English your first language?)

I find it odd that you claim to be a physicalist yet insist there is no formal logic to support your position.

I don't find it odd that when I asked you what the formal logic was that justifies the "position of physicalism ontology," you didn't respond with the formal logic in question. Rather, I completely expected that.

Here.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#PriPosPhy

Now answer my question.
How is that you believe there is no formal method for justification of physicalism yet you claim to be a physicalist?