How do you make the physical sciences immune from this doubt? — frank

Good question. I would as soon doubt the existence of neuroscience as I would anger.

if you were Dennett, how would you counter this? — frank

I don't know, maybe the illusion is useful? It was adaptive for creatures to evolve that belief that they were phenomenologically conscious in some real manner. He has used the computer desktop metaphor before in talks about evolution and consciousness.

When are the elements of a pattern real and not merely apparent? Answering this question will help us resolve the misconceptions that have led to the proliferation of "ontological positions" about beliefs, the different grades or kinds of realism. I shall concentrate on five salient exemplars arrayed in the space of possibilities: Fodor's industrial-strength Realism (he writes it with a capital 'R'); Davidson's regular strength realism; my mild realism; Richard Rorty's milder than-mild irrealism, according to which the pattern is only in the eyes of the beholders, and Paul Churchland's eliminative materialism, which denies the reality of beliefs altogether. — Real Patterns

That is interesting. Could make for it's own thread on forms of realism. But we could apply Dennett's five flavors of realism to qualia as well, and wonder why he's on the Churchland side when it comes to conscious sensations, whereas he's a mild realist about beliefs.

ARE there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superseded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they do not. There is no such state as quasi existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist. — Real Patterns

I haven't read that paper before. Looks like Dennett will be defending quasi-realism about certian mental content like beliefs. I always wondered what a proper definition for quasi-realism is.

a computer possessed information about the state of it's body, and was programmed to engage in behaviors when that information appears in working memory, then how is that any different than what humans do? — Harry Hindu

Depends on whether the computer lacked a subjective experience of pain.

What is often used that way? It was a question. Read it again. — Harry Hindu

What you asked. I'm not terribly fond of using computers as a metaphor for brains and minds, as I think it's misleading. But there are some similarities like handling information.

S the brain a metaphor for the mind? — Harry Hindu

No. It's what's responsible for the mind when it's alive.

Is the computer a metaphor for how the brain works, or how the mind works? — Harry Hindu

It is often used that way.

What is the relationship between brain and mind? — Harry Hindu

One is three pounds of flesh, and the other has something to do with the resulting subjectivity, intelligence, intentionality and behavior of a person or animal.

The solution is to not divide the world into two separate parts - monism. — Harry Hindu

But then you're stuck with explaining everything from that monism. And some things don't fit quite so well. Take information before the evolution of life. What does it mean for a bunch of rocks to be information? Information to whom?

A nice colorful graphic of the eight emotions.

Similarly, in the 1980s, psychologist Robert Plutchik identified eight basic emotions which he grouped into pairs of opposites, including joy and sadness, anger and fear, trust and disgust, and surprise and anticipation. This classification is known as a wheel of emotions and can be compared to a color wheel in that certain emotions mixed together can create new complex emotions.

More recently, a new study from the Institute of Neuroscience and Psychology at the University of Glasgow in 2014 found that instead of six, there may only be four easily recognizable basic emotions. The study discovered that anger and disgust shared similar facial expressions, as did surprise and fear. This suggests that the differences between those emotions are sociologically-based and not biologically-based. Despite all the conflicting research and adaptations, most research acknowledge that there are a set of universal basic emotions with recognizable facial features.

https://online.uwa.edu/news/emotional-psychology/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20American%20Psychological,situations%20they%20find%20personally%20significant. — The Science Of Emotion: Exploring The Basics Of Emotional Psychology

So there is some evidence for that anger and disgust form a basic emotion which is developed separately by social factors.

Although anger and aggression can have wide-ranging consequences for social interactions, there is sparse knowledge as to which brain activations underlie the feelings of anger and the regulation of related punishment behaviors. To address these issues, we studied brain activity while participants played an economic interaction paradigm called Inequality Game (IG). The current study confirms that the IG elicits anger through the competitive behavior of an unfair (versus fair) other and promotes punishment behavior. Critically, when participants see the face of the unfair other, self-reported anger is parametrically related to activations in temporal areas and amygdala – regions typically associated with mentalizing and emotion processing, respectively. During anger provocation, activations in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area important for regulating emotions, predicted the inhibition of later punishment behavior. When participants subsequently engaged in behavioral decisions for the unfair versus fair other, increased activations were observed in regions involved in behavioral adjustment and social cognition, comprising posterior cingulate cortex, temporal cortex, and precuneus. These data point to a distinction of brain activations related to angry feelings and the control of subsequent behavioral choices. Furthermore, they show a contribution of prefrontal control mechanisms during anger provocation to the inhibition of later punishment.

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-28863-3 — Distinct Brain Areas involved in Anger versus Punishment during Social Interactions

That study by Olga M. Klimecki, David Sander & Patrik Vuilleumier takes anger to be a real emotion with neural correlates and behaviors.

There's no anger, but there's still these unexplained "feelings" that people continue to call 'anger'? And since neuroscience can find no neural correlate for 'anger' then the feelings must be wrong? Jesus. — Luke

Indeed. What the hell?

I'm left with the impression that you and I both hold that fear is the only innate emotion. — creativesoul

What about love and social bonding???

As I said to Khaled, if you're of the former persuasion, there's no point in us talking (there's no point in talking to anyone). If you're just going to assume that the way things seem to you to be is the way they actually are regardless of any evidence to the contrary, then there's no point in seeking other views is there? — Isaac

When it comes to denying emotions like anger, then yeah I'm going to have to strongly object. But thanks for answering my questions in detail.

No need to talk in terms of "qualia" or "quale". — creativesoul

I'm still worried about the coffee being bitter. One would think Banno could do better.

But then again, maybe Banno likes bitter tasting coffee. I like cauliflower. Dennett finds it repugnant.

I have a feeling that if we quined the relevant qualia, we could add cauliflower to the coffee, and nobody would object.

The content of the conscious experience is the content of the correlations... that includes both internal things and external things, however the correlation drawn between those things is neither for it consists of both. — creativesoul

That's not half bad.

I'd also add questions about non-perceptual experiences and how those avoid some sort of movie in the head. Dreams being the number one concern, but things like inner dialog sound like a stream of consciousness podcast is running in your skull. Or when a song gets "stuck in your mind".

've already answered the question of what all conscious experience consists of. Meaningful correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

But those meaningful correlations might include the coffee being bitter when you drink it and the cat being black on a white mat when you see it over in the corner.

I mean draw correlations between different things. — creativesoul

So our conscious experience consists of relations we notice in the world between things like coffee drinking and cats on mats. The tastes and colors are relational properties, then.

hey are meaningful correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

And by attribute meaning, do you mean we project these correlations onto the world? We're conscious of correlations we draw among cats and mats?

If there is no internal world, why don’t you see what other people think? They don’t really think? You’re a solipsist? — leo

Reminds me of the aliens in Liu Cixin's Three Body Problem trilogy. Their thoughts are always visible to one another as patterns of lights which was the result of their neural activity. They communicate directly in that sense. Which means they can only engage in primitive forms of deception when separated by enough distance. When they figure out how deceptive humans can be, they become afraid of us.

So, I take it that you've no idea what it takes to attribute meaning? — creativesoul

Kantian? I should know better than to argue consciousness or direct/indirect perception with a Kantian, if that's the case. That's a different enough position to make those irrelevant. It's the bloody physicalists and functionalists that need to shouted down.

Thought and belief are not mental states on my view, by the way. — creativesoul

I don't know what you mean here. What are they?

That sounds like a worthy project. So consciousness is an overloaded word with different meanings. That's probably why qualia was used to denote sensations. Dennett wants to quine some of the proported properties of those sensations, undermining any hard problem or explanatory gap. I have my doubts as to his success.

But this thread has broadened to other related matters so ...

Should this be its own thread? Or do you we just continue since we left Dennett's quning in the dust long ago?

What does that have to do with anything I've written here? — creativesoul

Attributing meaning sounds like something to do with "the quality of mental states (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes) that consists in their being directed toward some object or state of affairs.".

Now obviously you think this is a conscious activity. But it sounds like a different topic than the sensations that make up consciousness. If you agree there are any.

You do realize intentionality is separate debate in philosophy of mind?

Because there's no color or pain in neurons?

That works. — frank

Yes, but apparently we can just talk about something else and there's no problem.

Ah yes. A Dennett speciality. Change the definition and declare the problem dissolved.

I'm beginning to think some of you don't actually experience colors or pains. How else could you claim to be conscious and argue the way you do? Maybe Jaron Lanier was right. You can't argue with a zombie.

So functionalism? If not, why not? — frank

Because colors and pains don't make up functional explanations.

s that what counts as an acceptable reply nowadays? — creativesoul

Is it acceptable to use a different definition? Attributing meaning is a separate topic.

in·ten·tion·al·i·ty
the fact of being deliberate or purposive.
PHILOSOPHY
the quality of mental states (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes) that consists in their being directed toward some object or state of affairs.

Maybe that's not exhaustive enough, thus I mentioned cognition and intelligence.

You can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable. — Banno

Primitive is another way to put it. You can't break down red into anything else, unless there is someday a neurological explanation from neural function to red experience.

And you cannot show them to us, because they are private. — Banno

Certainly not if you've never seen red before. But if you have, I can remind you or point out a red thing.

The ability to attribute meaning. — creativesoul

So you have your own definition for consciousness.

Wouldn't that better fall under intentionality, cognition or intelligence?

Is it just a conflict about what qualia is? — frank

I prefer to just say qualia is the contents (or properties) of conscious experience, whatever that turns out to be. If qualia is too problematic, we can drop it in favor of colors, sounds, pains, etc. Or just sensations.

Or one can defend qualia against it's critics, maybe with some amendments to the concept. Your choice. The interesting thing is that conscious properties do tend to circle back to those four properties Dennett critiqued. Or three, since he didn't really do anything with privacy.

Color is a primitive property making up visual experience.

ou can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable. — Banno

I thought we were talking about red. I don't know whether the concept of qualia is worth salvaging, but trying to explain a sensation is impossible other than via analogy. Doesn't mean there is no sensation of color.

Problem is that sensations tend to lead back to qualia, so round and round we go.

p-zombies are hard to kill.

http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=47537

:lol: — Banno

adjective
incapable of being expressed or described in words; inexpressible:
ineffable joy sonary.

Should I circle back to Luke's comment on showing?

So you're quesitoning whether we can know that we don't know something? Or are you questioning whether it's meaningful to say there could be conscious experiences different from the kinds humans have?

Because the second one is awful anthropocentric. But maybe I don't follow your death knell blow.

For some reason, it's never broached in the Matrix Trilogy. Neo and the rest of the unplugged just accept that being outside the Matrix is the real world. Now for someone born naturally, that makes sense. But for someone unplugged, what makes them any more confident in the nightmare world they wake up to? If one world was a simulation, how do they know the next one isn't?

The Thirteenth Floor explores that a little bit better, but the movie eXistenZ ends on that note of doubt.



So does Inception, for that matter.

I agree that dolphins have conscious experiences. But I disagree in that we can say some of their experiences might be fundamentally different from our own, because they have a form of perception we don't. What that is, we cannot say.

It's just noting a hard limit to our understanding, at least as things stand now.

And??? — creativesoul

Only 32 more pages to 100.