Nothing to do with Dennett's "Quining Qualia" Having finished rereading Q
uining Qualia, I'll answer the question one post at a time.
(1) What do you think Dennett's position is in Quining Qualia? — fdrake
That conscious experience is the dispositional, relational and functional properties of the biological systems responsible for conscious experience,
and nothing additional. This part is key:
Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special. — Qunining Qualia
And this part right after:
The standard reaction to this claim is the complacent acknowledgment that while some people may indeed have succumbed to one confusion or fanaticism or another, one's own appeal to a modest, innocent notion of properties of subjective experience is surely safe. It is just that presumption of innocence I want to overthrow. — Qunining Qualia
Which includes my attempt to avoid any sort of strong statement about qualia properties which might be subject to quining, although I did defend privacy.
So what is being left out in my view after accounting for dispositional, relational and functional properties, that science can discover? The sensation itself of colors, sounds, feels, etc.