You weren't paying attention. — T Clark

You are right, but not for the reason you think. There was a mistake in my initial post.

I don't really understand him. On one hand, he says particles can't form consciousness because they have 0 consciousness, but on the other hand, he thinks that particles with 0 consciousness + form with 0 consciousness can.
I also don't understand his view on emergence. He says holomorphic emergence implies irreducibility, but it seems to me consciousness is reducible to matter + form at the end of the day.

But that's not the point of my issue with Jaworsky

I'm not sure about Laszlo's view on emergence, but Jaworsky seems odd to me. He admits consciousness is irreducible to matter, but he says those properties are not ''generated" by lower-level systems. But the word emergent itself denotes something generated.

No, you didn't. Your answer isn't connected to my question.

Thanks! Solved, although for some reason I cannot provide the link for the dissertation, but you can google it with the name I provided.

Which of his books did you read? — Pantagruel

I didn't read his books, I saw a presentation of his and I also read some blogs of his and a dissertation of a guy about his work.

https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/hylomorphic-structure-emergence-and-supervenience

https://philosophyofbrains.com/2016/05/11/hylomorphism-and-emergence.aspx

HYLOMORPHISM AND THE MIND-BODY RELATION Kevan Norris

You didn't pay attention, that wasn't my question.

Idealism is the idea that there is only one mental substance and mental properties and physical properties are of the same kind. — RussellA

- No, there are no physical properties in Idealism, there are only mind properties.

In practice, trying to decide whether two things are of the same kind or of a different kind is almost impossible. — RussellA

Mr. Chomsky created/uses Mysterianism to conflate two things that shouldn't be conflated, namely weak and strong emergence, i.e. full reduction or not. If you use this trick, yes, it's impossible. If you're honest with yourself and stop inventing sophisticated false stories, you will have a clear image. Moreover, Mr. Chomsky doesn't seem to find any problems in deciding if there are many kinds of properties or not. He clearly says no, there aren't. And he says that in spite of admitting we don't really understand things.

I read your previous comment and it was really helpful. It confirmed my intuitions. Chomsky is simply brilliant, I find him being in a total different league in comparison with all other materialists. Nevertheless, his brilliant arguments are fake as fuck. I think I will open another OP specially dedicated to that.

Monism is that although the property of consciousness is different to the property of matter of the brain it is of the same kind. — RussellA

What do you mean the same kind? What makes them the same kind? What is the difference between same kind and different kind?

If motion is so mysterious, how can we affirm it is of the same kind as atoms?

I think it is largely a matter of intuitively grokking what Chomsky meant, and I'd suggest that the best way for you to do that might be to think about the problems you would run into if you tried to provide a full explanation of what it is like for you to see a sunset. — wonderer1

My point is this is not related to the hard problem! Geeeez

What Chomsky is doing with that statement is attempting to foster a recognition in his listeners. It didn't work in your case, but that's just the way it goes.

Matthew 13:1-8 — wonderer1

It seems to me you're suggesting there's something interesting there that I'm too ignorant/dumb to see it. Could you please shed some light onto it for me, please?

Yes, exactly, the hard problem is a logical problem, not a question "How is it like to see a sunset?". And yes, there is no serious counterargument so far. But the second assertion is my personal opinion, consider it something extra rather than central to my problem with Chomsky.
I am not criticizing him for believing that the hard problem suffers from the composition fallacy, I am criticizing him for being mumbo jumbo.

1. "Newton exorcised the body and left the ghost intact" :vomit:
2. "There is no hard problem because <<How is it like to see a sunset?>> is a non-question" :vomit:
3. "Radical emergence happens all the time" + "What seemed brute emergence was assimilated into science ordinary emergence" :vomit:

Dude, I was sarcastic... of course I won't start the classic silly debate ''Hey, we can get to flying from parts that don't fly."

But I will say this: if Chomsky said ''There is no hard problem" because ''The hard problem suffers from the composition fallacy.", I wouldn't call him dishonest. But no, the guy says ''<<How is it like to see a sunset?>> is a non-question, therefore there is no hard problem".
That's just him serving us his puke on a plate. No, thanks!

And it's irrelevant anyway. Chomsky doesn't address the hard problem saying it has a ''composition fallacy". Chomsky redefines the hard problem in a way it has been never formulated.

Really? How come? I want details, please!

I don't agree on consciousness being a logical problem, we don't know, — Manuel

The hard problem states it's illogical to get consciousness from non-consciousness, and there is absolutely no answer to that to this moment. So it remains a logical one, unlike motion, which is just a mystery.

I don't agree on consciousness being a logical problem, we don't know, how matter could give rise to consciousness, that is to say, within current science, we have no way of capturing experience and submitting it to experimental procedures, such as are used in biology or any other field. — Manuel

No, the problem is different. We don't know if consciousness arises or is fundamental, and logic tells us we face some very serious issues if we postulate consciousness from non-consciousness.
Trying to solve those problems invoking empirical evidence is silly. What constitutes evidence for consciousness? Behaviour? If it doesn't behave like me, it must not be conscious. This is the answer? It's silly.

And it's not only Chomsky, but also Raymond Tallis, Colin McGinn, — Manuel

... Collin McGinn in a nutshell: "We fail explaining consciousness, so instead of changing our view, we'll say our view (materialism) is correct, and we'll call all those insurmountable problems mysteries. Problem solved." BLEAHHH :vomit:
The only difference between Chomsky and McGinn is that Chomsky says matter isn't defined. "Wow, I'm so smart!"

Descarted believed consciousness was fundamental.

Manuel, you're falling into his trap. Let me explain.

There are two dimensions here: empirical and philosophical/logical. Chomsky thinks empirical evidence dictates us consciousness isn't fundamental, so every philosophical debate should exclude that possibility.

THE TRAP:

He says we don't know how consciousness arises from matter, even if we are sure that it does.

But he further adds that we don't understand how motion works, something that seems to be quite a deal simpler than consciousness. — Manuel

Do you see what he's doing there? He conflates two totally different problems. The problem of movement doesn't claim to have any logical issue, it's just a mystery, while the hard problem is a totally different animal. The hard problem claims to be a logical problem, not a mystery.

By raising empirical evidence over logic, Chomsky faces problems with the latter. So his only way is to strawman things, conflate terms, and remain in a grey area. This is exactly what he's doing.

If he were intellectually honest, he would say: yes, there might be logical issues with consciousness arising from non-consciousness, but we should still do what empirical evidence is telling us. Instead of that, he either denies them or conflate them.

"What seemed“brute emergence”was assimilated into science ordinary emergence—not, to be sure,of the liquidity variety,relying on conceivability. I see no strong reason why matters should necessarily be different in the case of experiential and nonexperiential reality, particularly given ou ignorance of the latter, stressed from Newton and Locke to Priestley , developed by Russell,and arising again in recent discussion."

I think this says it all. Chomsky does in fact understand the difference between weak and strong emergence. He doesn't believe in strong emergence and what he calls radical or brute emergence is just a matter of our ignorance, not a real fact. In other words, he believes consciousness arises from non-consciousness via weak emergence.

Now it's hard for me not to speculate that he knows what he's doing there.
Firstly, he makes a straw man out of the hard problem saying that there's no such thing because the question ''How it is like to see a sunset?" does not make sense. Of course, the hard problem does not reside in this question.
The second step he takes: he moves the problem to another area. "Look guys, the reason why we don't make sense of consciousness arising from non-conscious matter is that we didn't define matter."
Of course, that's a trick. The problem remains no matter what: how can we get from non-conscious to conscious?
In order to solve this one too, he proceeds to the third step - emergence. Again, here he adopts another tactic due to a lack of options. He knows weak emergence is problematic and no new properties would help, and he also knows strong emergence is bonkers. So what does he do? He dances around concepts without being clear, as he did in the RLK interview.

He'd say the case of liquids is the same as consciousness, you disagree and call it weakly emergent. OK, then you disagree with him. — Manuel

I have no interest to make this a me vs Chomsky thing. Forget about my personal opinion.
My issue is that we're stuck in a grey zone when we could easily work this out.

Ok, liquidity is strongly emergent. What is weakly emergent then? Give me some examples please.

But being over and above makes it radically different. That's the point.

So what exact part/s of Property Dualism would Chomsky reject in order to say he wouldn't accept Property Dualism?

"yes" on consciousness being over and above its constituents, — Manuel

But that is Property Dualism.

Ok, I think I'll have my last shot.
My strong emergence implies Property Dualism (not Substance Dualism!) and consciousness would be over and above its constituents. So, in your opinion, does Chomsky believe in this?

Thanks!

I will. Thank you again for your answers!

Thank you!
But heavy is not fundamental, bricks are not heavy. Heavy must be > 10kg, and each brick has 1 kg.

Yes, I asked several times, but I want an answer under my definition of strong emergence. Heavyness is ONLY weakly emergent under my definition, even if bricks aren't heavy. Why? Because heavyness represent nothing more than the sum of its constituents.

Consciousness of the wall would be different from heavyness under my example because consciousness and mass are two different properties even if consciousness arises from mass. This and only this is the kind of strong emergence I want to know if Chomaky believes in or not.

What's his address?

Heavyness strongly emergent - I doubt Chomsky would believe that. Heavy is just an arbitrary quantity for mass. What the f is strongly emergent about that?
What is weak emergence?

Manuel look, I appreciate your effort but it seems to me you intentionally avoid some of my clear direct questions.

So Chomsky would say liquidity is irreducible?

I don't understand reduction then. If you are arguing that liquidity is "reducible" to molecules, you mean to say that liquid arises from molecules? And this is weakly emergent because our theories describe the phenomenon? — Manuel

- You're missing my point. No, it is not weakly emergent because our theories describe it, it is weakly emergent because there is no property of liquid that it is not reducible to more fundamental properties.

I've got an idea. Let's say the brick is fundamental and its only fundamental property is mass. No brick is a wall, but 100 bricks form one. The wall has the property of being heavy. No brick is heavy, but the wall is. Surprising, but not really. The wall is nothing more than bricks, and ''heavy" is nothing more than mass. Liquidity is the same, only that it is more complex. But the most important thing is that they're both 100% weakly emergent.
Now let's say that the wall, besides being heavy, it is also conscious. And even its consciousness arises because of mass, it is not reducible to mass, it is a totally new property.

So let's assume mass is all there is to know about bricks. So we've defined bricks. Now we would conclude that mass is the secret ingredient to consciousness, but consciousness is not mass, it's something totally different.

Now let's take this one step further.
2049 - physicists find a new property called X, where X is NOT subjective experience. Now, they're able to make a complete theory of quantum and relativity, and everything works in physics. Everything except... consciousness. There are still obnoxious philosophers who state that X and the other properties of what we call matter don't explain consciousness.
Now, what would Chomsky say?
A. Consciousness is 100% reducible to X, mass, electrical charge, etc., therefore weakly emergent
B. Obviously, consciousness is strongly emergent in the way Eugen understands strong emergence, i.e. irreducible property

Forgive me for butting in, or if it's been covered, but if one knows all the properties of certain particles, can't one predict which phenomena will emerge? For example, if we knew enough about H and O, would H2O's liquid properties be surprising? — RogueAI

That's exactly my point. Moreover, I don't even care if one is surprised or not. There is a clear difference between weak and strong emergence and it has nothing to do with intuitions, human capacities, or Chomsky being puzzled by liquidity, which is rather silly in my opinion because there's nothing puzzling about liquids.

Radical emergence is the idea that a new property arises which was not evident in its constituent parts. — Manuel

This is one way to look at things, but for me, it is not interesting. Again, it is not about properties being or not evident, it is about being new and irreducible or not, regardless of anything else. That's the strong emergence I'm interested in. So... does Chomsky believe in this type of radical emergence?

I'm not clear on what you have in mind here. — Manuel

- It seems to me Chomsky denies the possibility of consciousness being fundamental on the basis of empirical evidence. So he doesn't care if for instance panpsychism makes perfect sense from a logical point of view, he will still dismiss it because there is no empirical evidence for atoms being conscious.

As for this question, I don't think he distinguishes much between these views. Radical emergence has become a problem recently in philosophy, these new properties, of liquidity or heat just arose from the phenomena, they're emergent. But if you call it strong or weak is mostly terminological. — Manuel

Coming back to the same old problem. This is why this conversation keeps missing a key point - we simply have to differentiate these two notions, i.e. weak and strong emergence. If you want to help me, you have to forget what Chomsky or anyone else believes about weak and strong emergence, and try to give an answer based on what I call weak and strong emergence.

Weak emergence: new properties appear, but they are 100% reducible to more fundamental properties.
Strong emergence: new properties appear, and they are new in the real sense, they are irreducible to any other properties.

So forgive me for repeating the same question over and over again. Does Chomsky believe in what I call strong emergence?

Thank you!

Thank you and sorry for the late answer! I'm very confused when it comes to Chomsky, so it takes time for me to come up with something.

I.

According to him, consciousness is emergent — Manuel

I know the video very well, he didn't say consciousness was emergent, he just said radical emergence was real. I was very intrigued by this part because it seemed to me that after RLK argued that water wasn't radical emergence, Chomsky didn't defend his view but rather he ran away abruptly using the movement analogy. I think it's a soft spot for Chomsky, it seemed that way for me.

II.

According to him, consciousness is emergent — Manuel

, then you say

But saying consciousness is reducible to brains doesn't make any sense, how is that a reduction? I don't see how a brain is a "lower level" phenomena of mind, it seems to me to be a higher one, in terms of, we discover brains through consciousness, otherwise, we couldn't even postulate them. — Manuel

.

So mind is strongly emergent, but it is lower than the brain, the reason being that we discover brains through consciousness. Am I right?


III. Let's clarify the weak-strong emergence issue. Let's forget about what is or isn't intuitive for us, or about our capacities. Strong emergence is when new irreducible properties come into play, regardless of human capacities to understand that or not. Liquid may be difficult for our intuition, but it is not strongly emergent.
So does Chomsky believe or not in REAL strong emergence?

IV. Here's what I believe drives Chomsky into mysterianism:

1. He doesn't care much about the logical arguments in the debate between those who claim consciousness is fundamental and those who don't because he believes science (and not logic) should answer this question. When science tells us what are the properties of what we call matter, then we will have the answer.

2. He has the intuition that there is nothing in the current way of doing science that would ever give us a fully satisfactory answer.
Therefore, it seems we're stuck with a mystery.

Am I wrong?

V. You didn't answer my initial question, or I simply missed your answer. So...
Does Chomsky believe consciousness is one of the three (fundamental, weakly, strongly emergent), or he believes there are many other options that our logic cannot comprehend?

Thank you!

Thank you for your contribuition! I will come back with answers, but for now, I am reading Chomsky's Mysteries Nature Hidden. I have read a bit and I'm like ''Ok, he's a materialist", next minute I am ''Ooops... he's going for fundamental consciousness." :lol:

Thank you! ''I)" is pretty clear.

But for ''II)" I have some things to say. Logic is enough to accept that consciousness is either a. 100% reducible, b. not 100% reducible, or c. fundamental.

Q1. So by saying consciousness isn't reducible to matter, does Chomsky leave the room open for options b and c, or he is saying that there are other options that our mind cannot comprehend?
Q2. If the latter, why would he believe that?

If we had no natural limit to understanding, we would have no scope, thus we couldn't develop anything. — Manuel

- No, not at all. We would have a scope, of course. That scope would be to understand everything.

Q3. What serious arguments does Chomsky have for imposing this limit on the matter of consciousness?

Agree. It can be helpful at times, but not a trustworthy source.

What exactly is the advantage of information over matter when it comes to explaining consciousness?

I'm not debating that. I said ''IF the hard-problem is real..."

I'm trying to relate your comment with the OP. I can't.

:up: