"What seemed“brute emergence”was assimilated into science ordinary emergence—not, to be sure,of the liquidity variety,relying on conceivability. I see no strong reason why matters should necessarily be different in the case of experiential and nonexperiential reality, particularly given ou ignorance of the latter, stressed from Newton and Locke to Priestley , developed by Russell,and arising again in recent discussion."

I think this says it all. Chomsky does in fact understand the difference between weak and strong emergence. He doesn't believe in strong emergence and what he calls radical or brute emergence is just a matter of our ignorance, not a real fact. In other words, he believes consciousness arises from non-consciousness via weak emergence.

Now it's hard for me not to speculate that he knows what he's doing there.
Firstly, he makes a straw man out of the hard problem saying that there's no such thing because the question ''How it is like to see a sunset?" does not make sense. Of course, the hard problem does not reside in this question.
The second step he takes: he moves the problem to another area. "Look guys, the reason why we don't make sense of consciousness arising from non-conscious matter is that we didn't define matter."
Of course, that's a trick. The problem remains no matter what: how can we get from non-conscious to conscious?
In order to solve this one too, he proceeds to the third step - emergence. Again, here he adopts another tactic due to a lack of options. He knows weak emergence is problematic and no new properties would help, and he also knows strong emergence is bonkers. So what does he do? He dances around concepts without being clear, as he did in the RLK interview.

He quotes Locke many times, when Locke says:

"We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking,
than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator."

(Chomsky's emphasis)

We would substitute "God" for "nature" and get the "hard problem". He says we don't know how consciousness arises from matter, even if we are sure that it does.

But he further adds that we don't understand how motion works, something that seems to be quite a deal simpler than consciousness.

In other words, he believes consciousness arises from non-consciousness via weak emergence. — Eugen

Yeah, he does, I even provided the Priestely quote which shows that.

He doesn't believe in strong emergence and what he calls radical or brute emergence is just a matter of our ignorance, not a real fact. — Eugen

There is something about the underlying properties which must give rise to the "higher order" phenomenon, but we don't know what it is. As I've said several times, we have theories in the case of liquids, we understand the theories, not the phenomenon. Unless you say that theories are the phenomenon, that's a different conversation.

No, strong emergence is not bonkers, it happens all the time, with almost everything.

But, I think we've exhausted what can fruitfully be said on this topic - at least I have. Maybe someone else can engage with you on the topic.

Thanks for the conversation though, it was interesting.

Manuel, you're falling into his trap. Let me explain.

There are two dimensions here: empirical and philosophical/logical. Chomsky thinks empirical evidence dictates us consciousness isn't fundamental, so every philosophical debate should exclude that possibility.

THE TRAP:

He says we don't know how consciousness arises from matter, even if we are sure that it does.

But he further adds that we don't understand how motion works, something that seems to be quite a deal simpler than consciousness. — Manuel

Do you see what he's doing there? He conflates two totally different problems. The problem of movement doesn't claim to have any logical issue, it's just a mystery, while the hard problem is a totally different animal. The hard problem claims to be a logical problem, not a mystery.

By raising empirical evidence over logic, Chomsky faces problems with the latter. So his only way is to strawman things, conflate terms, and remain in a grey area. This is exactly what he's doing.

If he were intellectually honest, he would say: yes, there might be logical issues with consciousness arising from non-consciousness, but we should still do what empirical evidence is telling us. Instead of that, he either denies them or conflate them.

Do you see what he's doing there? He conflates two totally different problems. The problem of movement doesn't claim to have any logical issue, it's just a mystery, while the hard problem is a totally different animal. The hard problem claims to be a logical problem, not a mystery.

By raising empirical evidence over logic, Chomsky faces problems with the latter. So his only way is to strawman things, conflate terms, and remain in a grey area. This is exactly what he's doing.

If he were intellectually honest, he would say: yes, there might be logical issues with consciousness arising from non-consciousness, but we should still do what empirical evidence is telling us. Instead of that, he either denies them or conflate them. — Eugen

Yep, I am well aware that motion and consciousness are quite different, in terms of phenomena and emergence. But this issue here is of intelligibility.

I don't agree on consciousness being a logical problem, we don't know, how matter could give rise to consciousness, that is to say, within current science, we have no way of capturing experience and submitting it to experimental procedures, such as are used in biology or any other field.

That's not logical, that's conceptual.

And it's not only Chomsky, but also Raymond Tallis, Colin McGinn, Steven Pinker, but more importantly Descartes and Locke (and others) argue in a quite similar vein, each emphasizing different aspects of the "hard problem". It's a mystery too.

And it's fine if you think he is conflating something, but it is a whole different thing to imply that he is being intellectually dishonest.

I don't agree on consciousness being a logical problem, we don't know, — Manuel

The hard problem states it's illogical to get consciousness from non-consciousness, and there is absolutely no answer to that to this moment. So it remains a logical one, unlike motion, which is just a mystery.

I don't agree on consciousness being a logical problem, we don't know, how matter could give rise to consciousness, that is to say, within current science, we have no way of capturing experience and submitting it to experimental procedures, such as are used in biology or any other field. — Manuel

No, the problem is different. We don't know if consciousness arises or is fundamental, and logic tells us we face some very serious issues if we postulate consciousness from non-consciousness.
Trying to solve those problems invoking empirical evidence is silly. What constitutes evidence for consciousness? Behaviour? If it doesn't behave like me, it must not be conscious. This is the answer? It's silly.

And it's not only Chomsky, but also Raymond Tallis, Colin McGinn, — Manuel

... Collin McGinn in a nutshell: "We fail explaining consciousness, so instead of changing our view, we'll say our view (materialism) is correct, and we'll call all those insurmountable problems mysteries. Problem solved." BLEAHHH :vomit:
The only difference between Chomsky and McGinn is that Chomsky says matter isn't defined. "Wow, I'm so smart!"

Descarted believed consciousness was fundamental.

The hard problem states it's illogical to get consciousness from non-consciousness, and there is absolutely no answer to that to this moment. — Eugen

Sure there is an answer. The hard problem, as you state it, commits a fallacy of composition. (Or fallacy of division, depending on the details.)

Really? How come? I want details, please!

And it's irrelevant anyway. Chomsky doesn't address the hard problem saying it has a ''composition fallacy". Chomsky redefines the hard problem in a way it has been never formulated.

Really? How come? I want details, please! — Eugen

Lay out your argument and I will point the fallacy out for you.

Dude, I was sarcastic... of course I won't start the classic silly debate ''Hey, we can get to flying from parts that don't fly."

But I will say this: if Chomsky said ''There is no hard problem" because ''The hard problem suffers from the composition fallacy.", I wouldn't call him dishonest. But no, the guy says ''<<How is it like to see a sunset?>> is a non-question, therefore there is no hard problem".
That's just him serving us his puke on a plate. No, thanks!

Dude, I was sarcastic... of course I won't start the classic silly debate ''Hey, we can get to flying from parts that don't fly." — Eugen

Cool. So we can consider it a bare assertion when you say:

The hard problem states it's illogical to get consciousness from non-consciousness, and there is absolutely no answer to that to this moment.

Yes, exactly, the hard problem is a logical problem, not a question "How is it like to see a sunset?". And yes, there is no serious counterargument so far. But the second assertion is my personal opinion, consider it something extra rather than central to my problem with Chomsky.
I am not criticizing him for believing that the hard problem suffers from the composition fallacy, I am criticizing him for being mumbo jumbo.

1. "Newton exorcised the body and left the ghost intact" :vomit:
2. "There is no hard problem because <<How is it like to see a sunset?>> is a non-question" :vomit:
3. "Radical emergence happens all the time" + "What seemed brute emergence was assimilated into science ordinary emergence" :vomit:

There is no hard problem because <<How is it like to see a sunset?>> is a non-question" :vomit: — Eugen

What Chomsky is doing with that statement is attempting to foster a recognition in his listeners. It didn't work in your case, but that's just the way it goes.

Matthew 13:1-8

What Chomsky is doing with that statement is attempting to foster a recognition in his listeners. It didn't work in your case, but that's just the way it goes.

Matthew 13:1-8 — wonderer1

It seems to me you're suggesting there's something interesting there that I'm too ignorant/dumb to see it. Could you please shed some light onto it for me, please?

It seems to me you're suggesting there's something interesting there that I'm too ignorant/dumb to see it. — Eugen

I used to think that it made sense to see people as being somewhere along a one dimensional line from smart to dumb, but that was 36 years ago. Now I recognize that all of us have different constellations of cognitive strengths and weaknesses that determine what ways of learning we are better or worse at.

Could you please shed some light onto it for me, please? — Eugen

I think it is largely a matter of intuitively grokking what Chomsky meant, and I'd suggest that the best way for you to do that might be to think about the problems you would run into if you tried to provide a full explanation of what it is like for you to see a sunset.

Taking the example of a stone held motionless in a gravitational field and then released, at the initial state it will have a mass in a gravitational field and at a later state it will have a mass in a gravitational field and a velocity. Between the initial and final state the properties will have changed.

Theory and intuition
From observation, we can establish the theory that v = gt, but there is no intuition that we can discover from either the stone or the gravitational field that the stone will of necessity move when in a gravitational field. We know from observation that g = 9.81m/s2, but we have no intuition why 9.81 and not 3.43 for example.

IE, for Chomsky, we may have a theory how something happens but no intuition why it happens, which is Mysterianism.

Panpsychism
There cannot be consciousness without the matter of the brain. As there cannot be motion without the stone, yet motion is not in the stone, we can draw the analogy and say that consciousness is not in the matter of the brain.

IE, Chomsky does not believe that consciousness is fundamental within matter, as in panpsychism, but as Priestley writes, is the product of the whole rather than its parts.

Emergence
We may have a theory that v = gt, a theory why liquid emerges from molecules or a theory how consciousness emerges from the matter of the brain, but we have no intuition why any of these should be the case. In fact, I would suggest that there is no theory for which we have an intuition, in that all theories are based on mysterious intuitions. We may have theories explaining emergence, but if all intuitions for emergence are mysterious, then there is no distinction between weak and strong emergence as there is just the mystery of emergence.

IE, for Chomsky, there is no distinction between weak and strong emergence. It also follows that term radical emergence is redundant.

Properties
As the property of motion is different to the property of the stone that happens to be in motion, the property of consciousness is different to the property of the matter of the brain. Property dualism is the position that the property of consciousness is different in kind to the property of the matter of the brain, whereas Monism is that although the property of consciousness is different to the property of matter of the brain it is of the same kind. As the statement "it is true that x" does not add anything to the statement "x", then what does the statement "x and y are different in kind" add to the statement "x and y are different" ?

IE, within a deflationary approach, properties may be accepted to be different without needing to introduce the concepts of dualism or monism.

I think it is largely a matter of intuitively grokking what Chomsky meant, and I'd suggest that the best way for you to do that might be to think about the problems you would run into if you tried to provide a full explanation of what it is like for you to see a sunset. — wonderer1

My point is this is not related to the hard problem! Geeeez

This is a very good summary.

Thanks for sharing.

Monism is that although the property of consciousness is different to the property of matter of the brain it is of the same kind. — RussellA

What do you mean the same kind? What makes them the same kind? What is the difference between same kind and different kind?

If motion is so mysterious, how can we affirm it is of the same kind as atoms?

What is the difference between same kind and different kind? — Eugen

Dualism and Monism
Summing up: Dualism includes Substance Dualism and Property Dualism and Monism includes Physicalism, Idealism and Neutral Monism.

Substance Dualism is the idea that mental substances and physical substances are of different kinds. Property Dualism is the idea that there is only one physical substance, but mental properties and physical properties are of different kinds. Physicalism is the idea that there is only one physical substance and mental properties and physical properties are of the same kind. Idealism is the idea that there is only one mental substance and mental properties and physical properties are of the same kind. Neutral Monism is the idea that there is only one substance and mental properties and physical properties are of the same kind.

Pleonasm
In practice, trying to decide whether two things are of the same kind or of a different kind is almost impossible. Is a Monet painting of a water lily the same kind of thing or a different kind of thing to a Damien Hurst dot painting. They are the same in some respects but different in others. The question is so complex that the terms "same kind" and "different kind" become almost redundant. The Deflationary approach would be just to accept that the Monet is different to the Damien Hurst, ignoring altogether the term "kind".

Neutral Monism
My belief is in Neutral Monism, in that reality consists of elementary particles, elementary forces, space and time. Therefore, expressions such as motion, consciousness, matter, emotions, governments,mountains, existence, France, Socrates, etc are no more than certain mysterious combinations of elementary particles, elementary forces, space and time.

As Chomsky said in Mysterianism, Language, and Human Understanding about Mysterianism:
16min - "Well, returning to the impact of Newton's discoveries, his greatest achievement, David Hume wrote, was to draw the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, while also restoring nature's ultimate secrets to that obscurity in which they ever did, and ever will remain. We may add, for humans at least, other in forms of intelligence might view the world quite differently. All of this is dedicated Mysterionism for very substantial reasons".

Idealism is the idea that there is only one mental substance and mental properties and physical properties are of the same kind. — RussellA

- No, there are no physical properties in Idealism, there are only mind properties.

In practice, trying to decide whether two things are of the same kind or of a different kind is almost impossible. — RussellA

Mr. Chomsky created/uses Mysterianism to conflate two things that shouldn't be conflated, namely weak and strong emergence, i.e. full reduction or not. If you use this trick, yes, it's impossible. If you're honest with yourself and stop inventing sophisticated false stories, you will have a clear image. Moreover, Mr. Chomsky doesn't seem to find any problems in deciding if there are many kinds of properties or not. He clearly says no, there aren't. And he says that in spite of admitting we don't really understand things.

I read your previous comment and it was really helpful. It confirmed my intuitions. Chomsky is simply brilliant, I find him being in a total different league in comparison with all other materialists. Nevertheless, his brilliant arguments are fake as fuck. I think I will open another OP specially dedicated to that.