Sissy

Those are not ''my terms".

As an aside, an "experience" as a concept is a type. — RussellA

Ok... elaborate a bit please, it looks like you're saying something there

Guys, I'm not your philosophy teacher. You either learn those concepts and debate or ignore this OP.

Ohh hey man, you changed your photo hehe

Did you just bother writing that?

I think there are plenty of them.

It seems to me that your reply has nothing to do with what I'm asking for.

Sounds philosophical to me.
Hegel wrote a book with that as a title.
Are you interested in some kind of summary of arguments?
Toward what end? — Valentinus

Yes, something like how would two guys argue on panpsychism for example, one for and the other against, presenting the arguments and counter-arguments. Same for materialism, idealism, and every other ontology.

Thank you a lot, guys! I'll start searching.

Thank you, man!

But I don't understand what the fundamental difference between materialism and neutral monism would be in order for the latter to be able to give rise to consciousness since they both lack consciosuness as fundamental. So why is matter incapable to give birth to consciousness, but another substance (whatever that would be) is?

I saw a book on a library and the translator is I. Katz.

I've search it. Yes, there is one :)

I think my journey with this topic has reached its end, unless some new information occurs and maybe change my view. Even if I'm not convinced by Spinozism (not yet at least), I had a great time with you guys!

Thanks again for all your explanations, I think you are well versed in this topic.

- Thank you for all the effort you've made. Super-comments, I need to re-read some of your explanations. You're a pro!

Thank you! You offered me one of the first and concise answers.

Thank you! Yes, I'm a real bot with IQ 3.000.000 and I hold the truth. I just wanted to play with your minds.

- You started a war against my person, but I have to admit you gave me some decent answers. So I guess thank you too... a$$#013!

Thanks for your effort, man!

"consciousness can arise from something with 0% consciousness"; again just a strawman on your part. — 180 Proof

No strawman. He doesn't state it, of course, but in his metaphysics the substance is not conscious. So consciousness truly arises from something that has 0% consciousness. 1 (0%) +1 (0%)+...+1(0%) = 100 (0%) in my opinion. There's no counter-argument in his work.

Spinoza is a philosopher, not a scientist. — 180 Proof

- I don't need scientific proof, I just need an explanation for why it is logical. Now I get it, there is none. There's no common ground and there could be none in the absence of counter-arguments.

If everything reduces to statements like ''You get consciousness from unconscious things exactly like you get purple from red and blue", I will never be convinced.

If you can put your own anti-physicalist/anti-materialist/pseudo-scientific biases, or dogma, aside while doing so, then you might come away with the recognition that you have been asking the wrong questions of the wrong source(s) all along, as you still are. — 180 Proof

Just because materialism doesn't convince me doesn't mean I'm dogmatic or unscientific. Also, it doesn't mean I'm not open to change my opinions if logical/scientific proof is made.

If you can put your own anti-physicalist/anti-materialist/pseudo-scientific biases, or dogma, aside while doing so, then you might come away with the recognition that you have been asking the wrong questions of the wrong source(s) all along, as you still are. — 180 Proof

I'm simply not convinced why my questions don't make sense, and the more you say it, the more I believe otherwise.
1. The hard problem, at a more fundamental abstract level is basically the problem I've raised throughout my time here, ie you cannot obtain consciousness from non-consciouss stuff, you cannot reduce consciousness to the things that supposedly compose it.
I may have asked the wrong questions at the beginning, but it was not me making no sense. I had a big hunch there's no strong account for consciousness in Spinoza, no more than assumptions, but no explanations for my questions. You told me that there was something when in fact there was nothing.
2. I think they are simple questions. One can say that Spinosism is not about my questions, and that his view on consciousness was already established by denying my assumptions with 0 arguments. Yes, I admit that I could make a parallel between my questions and asking a Christian where in the Bible is a logical proof for how matter and soul could interact. The answer could be ''there is no such thing'', but not ''your question makes no sense''.
3. I've asked clearly for several times ''Is there an explanation for this or that or just assumptions?" and the rest of the guys told me that there are no explanations and that he basically just assumed all those stuff related to consciousness. You were the only one telling me otherwise.
4. There are many other experts in Spinoza who raise this problem and their questions are pretty similar to mine, so I kind of doubt I make no sense. And I'm being totally honest with myself.

Good luck with all your 'panpsychist' titling at windmills. — 180 Proof

I'm not a panpsychist (blind assumptions again) and I'm not sure anymore if Spinoza was one. I admit you've made a strong case against that.

Eugen, so with this post I leave you to the tender mercies of those willing to be more patient and indulgent than I'm no longer willing to be. — 180 Proof

I think my journey here has reached its end.
.

Dude, try to understand that I'm just trying to find answers. If I don't agree doesn't mean I'm this or that. With enough arguments, maybe I will change my mind, maybe not. Don't take it personally.

Take 'my interpretation of Spinoza, my metaphors & analogies, my paraphrases and recommended books' (on this thread) with a pinch of salt and make of them what you can. — 180 Proof

You've done a great job. You couldn't convince me otherwise, but you've earned my respect.

Thank you for all the great job you've done!

Definitely not. My point was made very clearly.

1. It would explain exactly why I am wrong, that is, why the law by which things without consciousness form consciousness is logical. It seems illogical to me, but an explanation in this sense might convince me. Is there an explanation in Spinoza's work?
2. It would explain exactly how he knows that there is a law of nature in which complexity is consciousness. It seems logical to me as well that simplicity is consciousness. Why consciousness = complexity, but consciousness differs from simplicity. Is there an explanation for the form of this law?
3. He would explain how he came to the conclusion that these are the laws of conscience and not others. Is there such a thing in his work? — Eugen

I think that the unbridgeable gap between us consists in the radically different vision that we have, and that somehow starts from consciousness: I don't think that consciousness can be obtained from something without consciousness. I hope that in Spinozism I will find concrete explanations for the opposite opinion, but I have not found them yet.
You believe that consciousness can arise from something with 0% consciousness, thus Spinoza makes sense. But for me, a law of nature that says that elements possessing 0% consciousness can give birth to consciousness is not logical yet. However, things could change and I could be convinced of Spinoza's metaphysics if:
1. It would explain exactly why I am wrong, that is, why the law by which things without consciousness form consciousness is logical. It seems illogical to me, but an explanation in this sense might convince me. Is there an explanation in Spinoza's work?
2. It would explain exactly how he knows that there is a law of nature in which complexity is consciousness. It seems logical to me as well that simplicity is consciousness. Why consciousness = complexity, but consciousness differs from simplicity. Is there an explanation for the form of this law?
3. He would explain how he came to the conclusion that these are the laws of conscience and not others. Is there such a thing in his work?

So far I have drawn the following conclusions from Spinozism. Please let me know if they are correct.

1. Logic is fundamental, and everything that is logical to exist exists due to infinite nature, but everything that is illogical does not exist. From logic, we obtain an infinity of laws of nature - from laws we obtain concrete things from nature that are 100% subject to the laws of nature.

2. There are no things that break the laws of nature.

3. Regarding consciousness - there is a law that is logical and says that consciousness is the complexity of the mind. Basically, it is a law that allows emergence, but at the level of nature, it is nothing new, because the law precedes the emergence itself. It is like saying a chess player didn't invent a new move, because the move was already there when chess rules were made.

4. Simple minds have no consciousness, complex minds are consciousness. - No panpsychism, no combination problem

5. There is no causality - the mind is not dependent on matter, and vice versa. - No materialism, no hard problem

You're being very helpful, really.

Don't thank me yet. I suspect your questions, Eugen, aren't done with either of us ... — 180 Proof

I'm neither at war, nor fight. I'm just trying to obtain all the information I need before drawing the final conclusion.

I thought about things more and decided to come back with probably one of the last sets of questions:
1. Logic predominates in Spinozism - can we say that logic is the most fundamental in his vision?
Everything that is logical exists and everything that is illogical does not exist. Correct?

2. Do we have an infinity of laws of nature and things of nature?

3. As regards the free will, if there is no causal relationship between mind and extension:
A. would everything have happened the same even if the mind had not existed (for example I would have written this O.P.)?
B. would everything change and the world would look different if the mind did not exist?

Thank you!

Ok, but until then, even if in maths we can find a way to obtain 6 from 2+2, in reality we always obtain 4, right? So in Spinozism, that which 2+2=6 is inadequate.

Hmmm... hard for me to express myself on this one.

You said 2+2 can be 6 in maths. But in reality, if we take 2 objects and we add another 2, we always get 4, not 6. So even if we could in theory obtain 6, the only possible reality is 4. But if we somehow do obtain 6 in the real world by adding two more things next to other 2, do we jump to the conclusion that 2+2=6, or we conclude that there is something hidden in our experiment that we hadn't thought about before and 2+2 will always be 4 in the ''happening world''?

How can we deduce if 2+2 =4 is logical or not?

I think I've lost my inspiration. If my questions still make no sense, please give me a few days to formulate them the right way.
Thanks!

Hummm, then how do we establish if something is logic or not?

Interesting. In this case, am I wrong if I say that empiricism should be primordial in our understanding of the reality? E.g., if we do an experiment where our previous mathematical model indicated 4 but we obtain 6 instead of 4, should we conclude (of course after a few repetitions) that our mathematical model was wrong, not the experiment, right?
And if the answer is yes, should we adapt our maths as well? E.g. we put 2 apples in a box, then we put another 2 and we get 6 apples out of the box instead of what we expected from our mathematical model, ie 4. If that were the case, should we conclude 2+2=6?

Thank you! I think I understand.

logic is reality — 180 Proof

I've got one on this: let's assume 2+2=5. If that were the case, we would be considered logic and accepted as the only way under Spinozism and there could be no other reality where 2+2=4. But 2+2=4, and it is the one and only way, so there could be no other reality where 2+2=5. So my assumption that, in theory, there could be a reality where 2+2=5 is simply wrong and makes no sense, right?

So yes, maths is a tool, but by using it, can we deduce what's logic and what is not, ie what is real and what isn't real?

I've got 2 questions for you, 1 related to Spinozism, 1 not directly connected to the topic of this OP, it is related more to the concept of emergence, because I want to understand better how Spinozism is related to naturalism.

1. Under Spinozism, the laws of nature have to be logic? E.g. you cannot have 2+2=6, you MUST have 2+2=4. And from this logic derive the physical laws of nature, ie things attracting or repelling each other, etc. Am I right?

2. As far as I know, there are 2 types of emergence: weak and strong.

The whole is the sum of its parts, ie consciousness is matter and only matter. E.g. some compositions of matter are pain, thoughts, etc. So there's absolutely nothing new on the table, just combinations of matter, and we could also draw the conclusion that it is emergent only from our perspective, but at the level of reality, it is just laws manifesting.

Strong emergence - consciousness is created by matter, but it cannot be deduced only from its components, so the whole is more than the sum of its parts. But it would be also fair to state that even if it is not deductible from our perspective, we could still not call it emergent from the universe's perspective, because there are also laws playing their roles after all, exactly like in Spinozism.
E.g. if we were to rewind the universe a billion times, we would also obtain the strong emergence, because it is in its laws to do so.

Which one of two would be more appropriate for Spinozism?

Am I wrong about the emergence?

Thanks, man!

Nobody can suspect me of being friend, but I have to admit his last reply was probably the most helpful for me in order to understand what you guys are saying.
I have to say the analogies and simple language you gave there were super-helpful.

Now it makes sense to me what you're saying (or, at least I hope so :rofl: ). But before adding my opinions, I'd like you to confirm if I'm getting you right:

It will probably sound cheesy but I cannot find a better one.

So in the let's say ''abstract'' part of reality, there are infinite necessary essences. But even if we're talking about infinite here, it does not include for example magic, because magic is supernatural, and God is just natural under Spinoza.
So there is something like a necessary law which states something like 100 = complexity and complexity = consciousness. 1 means simplicity and simplicity is NOT consciousness, but 1+1+....+1 = 100, and 100 means complexity.
So back to the ''happening reality'', when we get 100, we get consciousness.

In a nutshell:

In the abstract it is necessary: 1+1+...+1 = 100 and 100 = complexity; complexity = consciousness.
This, in turn, translates into the ''happening world'' something like that:
a rock = 1+1+1 = 3, simplicity +simplicity + simplicity = unconscious +unconscious +unconsious, which is not complexity, so it is not consciousness
a human: 1+1+....+1 = 100, simplicity +....+ simplicity = unconscious + unconscious +...+ unconscious = complexity = consciousness
So 100 is composed of many ''1''s translates into complexity is composed of many ''simplicities'', which in the ''happening world'' it translates something like consciousness is composed of ''unconscious'' things.
And even if in the ''happening world'' we could call it emergent because certain interactions have to happen in order to obtain the complexity (please correct me if I'm wrong again), it is not fair to call it emergent from the point of view of the whole reality, because it was already there in an abstract form. All that happens in the ''happening world'' is just an expression of those necessities from the "abstract", and because the reality is infinite, then it will 100% happen when the right combinations occur.


I hope I'm getting it right, or at least to have made some progress.


In regards to the wrong question, I admit that the hard problem applies to materialism, and Spinozism is not materialism.

Spinoza is describing how it happens: if qualia is produced by non-qualia, then it is a mode of substance. We get the causality in the presence of that mode.

That's what makes the difference between it happening or not. If the mode is not present, we do not have qualia caused by non-qualia. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think (hope) I understand you perfectly. This is an exposure of how things might happen IF it is possible to get qualia from non-qualia or consciousness from non-conscious, but it is not an explanation for WHY it is possible to get qualia from non-qualia. In Spinozism, I am searching for the latter part.

not reporting why you cannot leave your bunker — Valentinus

I just wanted to find out if Spinoza offers an alternative response for emergence to the question ''How is it possible to obtain consciousness from non-conscious?". So far, I think he does say consciousness arises from non-conscious, but he does not have an explanation for how this would be possible in the first place.
So the answer would look something like this: It is possible to obtain consciousness from non-conscious, because this and that. The reason why a rock is not conscious and you are is because you are complex, and consciousness arises from complexity because this and that. So far, all I've received is: consciousness it just comes from non-conscious, and complex modes are conscious.That doesn't not mean that nothing will ever convince me otherwise. Maybe some explanation will occur eventually. If that explanation will convince me more than emergence, it remains to be seen, but so far I haven't heard one.

I think you're accusing me for not paying too much respect for Spinoza. It is not my interest to respect or disrespect him. I just want to understand the answer to my question, that's all. Don't take it personally.
I'd love to leave my bunker, but so far I haven't been convinced to do so. But I'll keep insisting until I'll have a final answer. I'm studying Spinoza, trust me :smile:

Whether it is caused by a conscious entity or a non-conscious entity, qualia is explained for Spinoza. — Valentinus

It seems to me it is just defined, not explained. That's exactly my issue.

He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed. — Valentinus

Ok, I admit! That was actually funny :lol:

Let's use the exmaple of qualia coming out from no qualia. For Spinoza, the absence of qualia is body and mind. The occurrence of qualia is body and mind. So when qualia is generated out of its absence, it an event of body and mind (no qualia) going to another event of body and mind (qualia). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes! So Spinoza does indeed explain (define) consciousness in this way, but he doesn't provide an answer for the question ''How can qualia be generated out of its absence?'', he just assumes it does. Right?

- cool name

Just a suggestion - Why not reach out to a philosophy department at a university and talk to a Spinoza scholar - if you can find one? A conversation in real time might cut to the chase. — Tom Storm

That'd be great, but it's basically impossible. I've got a life...

It seems to me some of your questions are constructed using modern understandings that don't quite fit and may be incompatible with Spinoza. — Tom Storm

Agree, but I'm getting better at this.

Are you feeling frustrated? — Tom Storm

- yes, but also happy. Frustrated because I can't find a way to make myself clear enough and because sometimes I don't exactly understand answers. Happy because I'm making progress, I really do, I think I'm much closer to my goal than I was at the beginning. I'm also happy because people actually put a lot of effort in order to help me, even if I am sometimes a pain in the ....

but maybe it will help to reflect on why you are frustrated. — Tom Storm

I know the sources of my frustration.

Ar — Tom Storm

ct on why you are frustrated. Would it help to slow do? What do you think is going on in this discussion between you and the others? Are people refusing to answer you? — Tom Storm

Even if most of the guys here are super-cool, I have to say I consider SOME OF them biased and rather prone to defend Spinoza than providing me with straight answers, and others are actually malicious and preoccupied with my person. But no, that doesn't frustrate me.

Or are you making it hard for them to answer? — Tom Storm

I'm struggling to make things simpler.

I don't really want to go down the rabbit hole for "qualia", which similarly to before is a concept anathema to Spinoza. This would be another debate where you're coming at Spinoza very obliquely and thus glance off his ideas rather than sticking in them. — fdrake

So to sum this first part up, Spinoza does not offer an explanation for how come a force with 0 consciousness, will, qualia, etc. can give rise to consciousness, am I right? Please try to answer me in the shortest simplest manner. A yes/no would be perfect, if possible, of course.

I already showed you that mind as composition thing earlier, and mind as idea of the body. — fdrake

Yes, but here's where I'm still failing to see the logic. In Spinozism, I see a human being as a ripple of an ocean with two characteristics (minimum): Extension (body) and thought. Even if we go with the parallelism and for the sake of the argument we leave the physical interaction of atoms apart in order to escape materialism emergence and the hard problem, the problem still remains. In Spinozism, it's all about cause and effect. Are consciousness, qualia, or will caused by something with no qualia and will? If yes, how does Spinoza explain this is possible? Or he just assumes it does?

Even if we go further and eliminate cause-effect at all, I still don't understand WHY do humans have consciousness, but a rock doesn't? It seems to me that the human mind is just defined as ''the idea of the body'' or as a ''composition thing''. but this is not an explanation for why it has qualia or will while other things don't.
For me, saying humans have will because we are more complex than rocks does not explain anything, it is just an assumption that consciousness arises from complexity.

So why exactly ''an idea of the body'' possesses qualia? Or it just does?
PS: I don't demand a scientific proof, but at least a logical explanation. Or at least tell me if there is an explanation at all.

So far, it seems to me Damasio gives primacy to the body, whilst Spinoza's parallelism doesn't.

He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed. — Valentinus

You guys are psychos :lol:

You have shown a lot of patience and I would like you to understand me.
I have always wondered how consciousness is possible. The explanation of the materialists, that is, the emergence, failed to convince me.

In Spinoza, as in materialism, qualia, will, and human thoughts have as a source something without qualia, consciousness, will, etc. But, as far as I understand from you, in Spinoza it is not about emergence as in materialism. But does he come up with an alternative explanation?

For me it is simple. In order to take Spinoza seriously, he has to offer: 1. a logical and coherent explanation for how it is possible that from a God without qualia and will to reach qualia and will; 2. a coherent explanation for how it is possible for something complex (man) to be conscious and something less complex not to possess consciousness, then I can take these metaphysics seriously.

If the answers for 1 and 2 are YES, then I would like to hear those explanations.

If Spinoza does not offer such explanations in his paper, but only starts from the premise that 1 and 2 are simply the case, and we simply have to accept, then this discussion is over from my point of view.

Any metaphysics that does not give me a serious and coherent explanation for consciousness, qualia or will, but that only starts from assumptions related to consciousness, or that contains fundamental problems, is a metaphysics that I cannot take seriously.

Spinoza doesn't think about it like that. — Wayfarer

Then how exactly does he think about it?

Please give me a short answer for these:

A. He claims that consciousness arose from a God/Nature who does not contain consciousness and does not see the issue here. I mean, he doesn't ask himself, "How is it possible to get consciousness out of something with 0% consciousness?", but he simply thinks that's the way it is. Right?

B. For Spinoza, consciousness is not explained, but starts from the premise that it is present in creatures and not in objects, ie it is the idea of ​​a human body, and Spinoza limits himself to associating human consciousness with the complexity of the idea of ​​human body.
He does not have a logical explanation why complex ideas are qualia, subjectivity, thoughts, etc., but only starts from the premise that it is in the nature of complex ideas to be so. Correct?